SubRegional Security Co-Operation and Conflict Management in West Africa: The Economic Experience

Abstract

This thesis examined the experience of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group, ECOMOG, in conflict management in the intra-state conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone between 1990 and 2000, when ECOMOG’s operation lasted. The specific objective of the study was the evaluation of the experience of ECOMOG, as a mechanism of subregional security cooperation, and how it conducted peace operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone under Chapter VII of the UN charter. It appraised the conceptual and theoretical framework for conflict management, especially peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. The research relied on primary sources and secondary data sources. The case study method of analysis as well as tables to summarize some of the information found was used. The research provided an in-depth study of the ECOMOG peace enforcement strategy in Liberia and Sierra Leone as well as rendered an evaluation of the experiences of ECOMOG. It also provided lessons from the ECOMOG experience and rendered appropriate recommendations. It noted that ECOMOG’s peace operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone had raised complex issues about the legitimacy, competence, effectiveness and neutrality of subregional security mechanisms in conflict management. It argued that: i) regional and sub-regional organizations have a growing role in peace operations under Chapter vii and viii of the UN Charter; ii) the ECOMOG experience in peace operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone had raised serious questions about consent, competence, effectiveness and neutrality of subregional organizations in peace operations; and, iii) the experience of ECOMOG provide lessons for future peace operations by subregional organizations in intra-state conflicts. The ECOMOG experience illustrates the importance of getting the consent of adversaries before thecommencement of peace operations. This study confirms previous claims that intra-state conflicts do not lend themselves to interventions that are premised on ‘traditional peacekeeping.’ This means that intervention forces must be prepared to invoke robust mandates when necessary; if incapable of mustering the necessary resolve, they should not get involved in the first place. Despite the numerous setbacks that were experienced by ECOMOG, this intervention was seen as a possible first attempt by a subregional organization. There is the possibility of ECOMOG serving as a basis for a new regional security co-operation arrangement in Africa since Africans now take responsibility for Africa’s security.