

**JUKUN-TIV RELATIONS SINCE 1850: A CASE
STUDY OF INTER-GROUP RELATIONS IN WUKARI
LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA OF TARABA STATE**

BY

**ELIJAH ITYAVKASE AKOMBO
BA (ED) HISTORY, M. A. HISTORY
PGA/UJ/9767/97**

**A thesis in the Department of HISTORY, Faculty of Arts,
Submitted to the School of Postgraduate Studies, University
of Jos, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award
of the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY of the
UNIVERSITY OF JOS**

JUNE, 2005

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis is the product of my research and has been written by me. It has not been presented for a higher degree in any other university. All quotations have been acknowledged and distinguished by quotation marks in the text and endnotes at the end of each chapter.

Elijah Ityavkase Akombo

CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that the research work for this thesis and the subsequent preparation of this thesis by Elijah Ityavkase Akombo were carried out under my supervision.

L.D. Walu (Reader)

(HOD)

J.G. Nengel (Reader.)

(Supervisor)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I wish to extend my profound gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. J.G. Nengel. I lack words to express my appreciation for his kind gesture and constructive advice without which this output would not have been possible. May the Almighty God reward him richly.

I also wish to express my gratitude to my employer, College of Education, Jalingo, for giving me the opportunity to pursue a Ph.D programme. Similarly, I am very much appreciative to my numerous Tiv and Jukun informants whose names can not be contained in a small space like this. Their enormous contributions, indeed, made this research a reality.

I am also much indebted to Mr. Dan Nengel for taking the pains to produce Chapters One to Three on the Computer within a very tight schedule. The same appreciation goes to Chief Lukas Atuk (the Tafida Aduwan District) of the Computer Centre, University of Jos, Mrs Ann Enweremadu, of Zoology Department, of the same institution, and Stephen Chinwendu for working tirelessly on Chapters Four to Seven to ensure the perfect production of the entire thesis on the computer. My appreciation can not be complete without mentioning the very dutiful, patient and accurate role played by Janet A. Atang's, who reformated the entire work for final production. May God richly reward your collective sense of commitment, patience and accuracy.

I must not also forget to commend my numerous well wishers made up of relatives, in-laws and friends, whose curiosity to celebrate the completion of the programme was a great source of encouragement to me as my hands were on the plough. Many of these well wishers made unquantifiable moral, financial and material contributions in the course of the research. God alone can replenish what was expended as contributions towards this study.

I will, indeed, not be forgiven by the law of love and moral justice to fail to thank my dear wife, Rahaba, for standing by my side in the course of this work. I lack words to express her love, moral and financial support to this piece of work. Our two children, Bemgba and Sefa, are equally appreciated for tolerating my frequent absence from the house in the course of this research.

Above all, I am most grateful to the Almighty God for granting me the lifespan, resources, good health, wisdom and knowledge needed for a study of this nature. To him, alone, the glory belongs, for assembling together both Tiv and Jukun informants who willingly provided very valuable inputs for this study.

DEDICATION

This project is dedicated to the course for the search for lasting peace and unity between the Tiv and the Jukun in Wukari Local Government Area of Taraba State

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TITLE PAGE...	...i
CERTIFICATIONii
DECLARATIONiii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT...	...iv
DEDICATION...	...vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS...	...vii
ABSTRACTxv

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1: BACKGROUND1
1.2: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK2
1.3: OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY...	...5
1.4: SCOPE AND JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY...	...5
1.5: STATEMENT OF PROBLEM7
1.6: THE LOCATION OF THE AREA...	...8
1.7: THE PEOPLE OF THE AREA...	...13
1.8: ORIGIN OF THE JUKUN AND MIGRATION...	...13
1.8.1 The Jukun Factor...	...21
1.9: TIV TRADITIONS OF ORIGIN AND MIGRATION...	...25
1.9.1 The Tiv Factor...	...32
1.10 END NOTES...	...54

**CHAPTER FOUR:
TRENDS IN COLONIAL POLICIES AFFECTING INTER-GROUP
RELATIONS 1900-1960**

4.1: AN OVERVIEW OF COLONIAL POLICIES	121
4.2: COLONIAL JUKUN-TIV RELATIONS 1900-1960.....	155
4.3: COLONIAL RING FENCE POLICY AND THE JUKUN-TIV RELATIONS... ..	131
4.4: THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE JUKUN AND TIV IN WUKARI NATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE EFFECTS ON INTER-GROUP RELATIONS	148
4.5: ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN WUKARI DISTRICT AND JUKUN-TIV RELATIONS 1935-1959...	159
4.6: JUKUN –TIV POLITICAL RELATIONS IN THE COLONIAL YEARS 1950-1960... ..	164
4.6.1: election of charles tangul gaza into the federal house of representatives in 1959 and its effect on jukun-tiv relationship...	168
4.7: SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROGRAMMES AND THEIR EFFECTS ON JUKUN-TIV RELATIONS IN THE COLONIAL ERA 1918-1960...	171
4.7.1: Road construction projects and Jukun-Tiv relationship..158... ..	174
4.7.2: The Colonial education policies and Jukun-Tiv relations...	178
4.8: END NOTES... ..	182

CHAPTER FIVE:

JUKUN-TIV RELATIONS 1960-1979

5.1: INTRODUCTION...191
5.2: THE <u>NANDE IOR</u> EPISODE 1960...191
5.3: THE <u>ATEM TYO</u> EPISODE 1964...196
5.4: THE <u>NANDE IOR</u> AND THE <u>ATEM TYO</u> EPISODES AND JUKUN-TIV RELATIONSHIP...199
5.5: THE 1964 GENERAL ELECTIONS AND JUKUN-TIV RELATIONS 1964-1966... 202
5.6: JUKUN-TIV RELATIONS 1967-1979...205
5.6.1: Relationship along Wukari-Tsokundi Axis...206
5.6.2: Relationship along Wukari-Akwana Axis...211
5.6.3: Relationship within Wukari Metropolis and Rafin Soja Axis...213
5.7: SOCIO-POLITICAL ISSUES IN THE 1970S AND JUKUN-TIV RELATIONSHIP...217
5.8: THE ROLE OF JUKUN LEADERSHIP AND JUKUN-TIV RELATIONSHIP IN THE 1960S AND 1970S.....	...222
5.9: CONCLUSION...226
5.10: END NOTES235

CHAPTER SIX:

THE ERA OF GROWING AGGRESSION

6.1: INTRODUCTION242
6.2: THE APPOINTMENT OF SIMON IORTER MUSA AS WUKARI LOCAL GOVERNMENT CHAIRMAN 1981-1983245
6.3: THE TIV-HAUSA POLITICAL ALLIANCE OF 1987258
6.4: THE ELECTION OF SAMUEL TSOVINI ADDA AS WUKARI LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCIL CHAIRMAN, DECEMBER 8, 1990272
6.5: LAND ISSUES AND WORSENING JUKUN-TIV RELATIONS BETWEEN 1980-1999276
6.6: JUKUN-TIV CLASH AT UBANG IN KATO BAGHA DISTRI284
6.7: THE 1991/92 JUKUN-TIV CONFLICT...262
6.7.1: Local Government Policy on the return of the displaced people292
6.7.2: Amicable Jukun-Tiv communities in the post crisis period305
6.7.3: Jukun-Tiv politics in the post crisis period307
6.8: CONCLUSION312
6.9: END NOTES 315

**CHAPTER SEVEN:
THE PROBLEM OF RECONCILIATION IN WUKARI
LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA 2001-2004**

7.1: BACKGROUND	322
7.2: THE FULANI AND THE IMMEDIATE CAUSE OF THE 2001/2002 CRISIS...	325
7.3: THE OUTBREAK OF THE 2001/2002 CRISIS AND THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE JUKUN... ..	331
7.4: THE COURSE OF THE 2001/2002 JUKUN-FULANI/TIV CONFLICT...	336
7.5: THE CRISIS AND JUKUN-TIV RELATIONSHIP 2002...	339
7.6: JUKUN-TIV RELATIONS AFTER 2003...	349
7.7: END NOTE S.....	363

CHAPTER EIGHT

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1: SUMMARY... ..	367
8.2: CONCLUSION...	370
8.3: RECOMMENDATIONS...	372
8.4: CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE.....	367
8.5: SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH	377

ABBREVIATIONS

UNRISD -	United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
SNP -	Secretariat, Northern Province
NAK -	National Archives Kaduna
MAKPROF -	Makurdi Province
BVPP -	Benue Valley Project Papers
NTA -	Nigerian Television Authority
JHSN -	Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria
NPC -	Northern Peoples' Congress
AG -	Action Group
UMBC -	United Middle Belt Congress
NEPU -	Northern Elements Progressive Union
NCNC -	National Congress of Nigeria and the Cameroon

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1:	Tiv and Bantu words compared27
Table 2:	Distribution of Jukun and Tiv Settlements in Wukari Local Government Area in 199035
Table 3:	Wukari Division Annual Tax census between 1933 and 1946 ...	132
Table 4:	Population of ethnic groups in Wukari District in 1937... ..	135
Table 5:	Population of Tiv clans in Wukari District in 1946... ..	137
Table 6:	Estimated revenue for Wukari Division in 1935/36 fiscal year...144	
Table 7:	Tiv contributions to Tax in the Four Administrative Units in Wukari Native administrative Authority in the 1935/36 fiscal year... ..	150
Table 8:	Description of Jukun -Tiv relationship in Wukari in the Ten Districts	228
Table 9:	Population of former Wukari Division per ethnic groups in 1946.	253
Table 10:	A conservative list of Tiv settlements displaced along Wukari-Gidan Idi road during the 1991/92 Jukun-Tiv conflict... ..	294
Table 11:	List of Tiv primary schools closed down during the 1991/92 crisis... ..	299
Table 12:	List of primary schools in Jukun settlements closed down during the 1991/92 crisis... ..	300
Table 13:	Tabular description of Jukun- Tiv relationship in Wukari after the 1991/92 crisis... ..	313
Table 14:	Tabular representation of some Jukun communities that resisted Federal Government Tiv Resettlement Scheme... ..	344
Table 15:	Jukun settlements that cordially welcome the Tiv after 2001/2002 crisis... ..	347
Table 16:	Tabular description of Jukun- Tiv relationship in the first half of 2002	361

LIST OF MAPS

Map 1 - Map of Nigeria showing former Benue Province and Wukari Division9
Map 2 - Map of former Wukari Division...10
Map 3 - Map of Nigeria showing Taraba State and Wukari Local Government Area.11
Map 4 – Map of Wukari Local Government Area showing some key settlements...12

ABSTRACT

Jukun-Tiv relation has increasingly gone through disturbing phases over the years, especially as from the inception of colonial rule in the area. Every turning point appears to alter the level of co-operation between the two communities in the present day Wukari Local Government Area of Taraba State. This unfolding trend gives the impression that the two communities never enjoyed peaceful intercourse. This assumption has been examined and proved to be erroneous. A very thorough appraisal of the available sources about the Jukun-Tiv contact and interaction indicates that the phenomenon has not always been dominated by conflicts in the pre-colonial period. There were strong social, economic and cultural ties that bond the two societies together. Much of the current inter-communal conflicts that have characterised the relationship between the two societies developed during the colonial period. The study has demonstrated that inspite of the hostilities, the two communities have seen the need, and are resolved ,to co-exist on a peaceful and amicable basis. This is the main focus of the study.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND

Societies generally across the world, especially in Africa, have had very disturbing phases in their history. Such phases are characterized by inter group rivalries. In some societies, the levels of conflicts have reached alarming stages that it seems hardly possible to imagine that such societies ever enjoyed any peaceful relationship.

The rising tide of instability and the issue of peace and national security are essential in the study of societies. The significance of the issue of peace and security has to do with a shift of emphasis from the study of societies in isolation, to the study of societies in the light of their relationships with one another. Recently, this scenario seems to dominate most research work in the social sciences. The purpose is to establish areas of agreement and disagreement between societies, and with greater focus on the causes of such conflicts and compromise.

With respect to the subject of this work, there has been increasing interest in the study of the Tiv and their neighbours, particularly the Jukuns. The attention has been focused on this subject because over the years, the Tiv-Jukun relation has steadily become bleaker. However, in spite of the attention on the problem of peace and national security, no comprehensive research has been undertaken on the problems of peace and instability among the Tiv, Jukun and their neighbours. This study is a contribution to the our understanding of the remote and immediate causes of the problem of unending conflicts between the Tiv and the Jukun.

Contacts between the Tiv and the Jukun in former Wukari Federation in the colonial years goes over many generations. A close look into the history unveils a very romantic past in the Tiv-Jukun relationship in Wukari. The pre-colonial era, in particular, was a period of mutual contacts, characterised by understanding and co-operation in virtually all spheres of life.

In the course of time, especially during the colonial period, many changes altered the good relationship that had existed between the Tiv and the Jukun. The colonial rule had profound impact on the relation between the two communities. This resulted essentially from the colonial policies, which sowed and watered seeds of discord between the two communities. The confusion and antidote created by the colonial arrangement in the area resulted in suspicion, confrontation and, later, open hostility between the Tiv and the Jukun, who constituted, and still constitute, a major factor in the entire Benue Valley.

Within this perspective, it is clear that since the colonial era, most of the factors that once bond the Tiv and the Jukun together have dissipated. This best explains why both the colonial and postcolonial Jukun-Tiv relationship, particularly in Wukari Local Government Area, has been a catalogue of civil unrest, resulting in wanton destruction of lives and properties. These crises aside it is clear that Jukun-Tiv relationship has not always been a tale of woes.

1.2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The conceptual framework has been premised on a number of works, which have provided the stimulus and insight for this study. Elsewhere, Preswerk and Parrot stated that: a problem can only be solved by reference to theoretical or operational

concepts... involves a certain carving up of reality and in particular an active structuration on the part of the investigator.¹

Preswerk and Parrot provide an important flash point for our conceptual perspective. This implies a survey of existing works in our attempt to establish the main operational concepts in our study. Apparently, we are constrained to sheave out the main operational features in the concept of inter-group relations. According to Okibe, inter-group relations imply “co-operation between different groups which takes the form of trade, diplomatic ties, wars, mutual borrowing of techniques, management of trade and boundaries.”²

Okibe's view provides the contours in the process of inter-group relations. In a nutshell, he sees the concept as a process that involves co-operation and conflict between groups involved, as the situation warrants. This neutralises Okpeh's view that: “...since individual interest in the society differ, human society and the relationship in it is marked by antagonism, disagreement and consequent conflict.”³

Okpeh's conception is premised not only on the difficulty in divorcing the phenomenon of conflict from the phenomenon of co-operation in the course of contact and interactions between groups, but also largely on the increasing phenomenon of conflict and violence ignited by inter-group contacts.

The foregoing analysis is very crucial in the definition of our conceptual perspective. Among other issues, it is deduced that man is always compelled by many factors to be in constant contact and interaction with his fellow beings. This process normally carries along with it consensus and conflict. This explains why Otite declared that, “...consensus and conflict though apparently contrasting and incompatible, are co-existing features of Nigerian society.”⁴ Similarly, Sheriff and

Sheriff declared that inter-group relations imply, "States of friendship or hospitality, co-operation or competition, dominance or enmity, peace or war between two or more groups and their respective members."⁵

These diverse views imply that the interplay of many crucial concepts gives us a better understanding of the general concept of inter-group relations. This involves looking at diverse phenomena in the interactive process as the Sheriffs' rightly observed. Our analysis of the Tiv-Jukun relations since 1850 suffers from the same fate. We have to look at the different phases of the Jukun-Tiv relationship over the years, and what major factors shaped and sustained each of the phases. This involves looking at the phenomena of co-operation, competition, enmity and wars as the dominant features involved in the process.

From the foregoing perspective, it implies that the study of inter-group relations is significantly a multifaceted enterprise. Invariably, the study can not be adequately pursued using only one school of thought. On this note, therefore, one decides to adopt a multidimensional or pluralistic approach. This entails the use of a variety of theories and concepts in our search for adequate inputs for meaningful conclusions.

OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

The main objectives of the study are:

1. To examine Jukun-Tiv relations from the mid-nineteenth century till the time of the British conquest.
2. To analyse the changes in Jukun-Tiv relations both during the colonial and post colonial era.
3. To assess the main remote and immediate causes for the negative development in the Jukun-Tiv relations.
4. To highlight the major facets of consensus and conflict in Jukun-Tiv relations over the years. To appraise the effects of the emerging crises between the two groups, particularly the 1990/92 and the 2001/2002 episodes.
5. To proffer some workable solutions for the purpose of rebuilding a healthy relationship between the two groups.
8. To contribute to our general understanding of the causes of conflicts among societies.

1.3 SCOPE AND JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY

The former Wukari Federation comprised of three districts, namely: Wukari, Takum and Donga. The dominant ethnic groups in the Federation were the Tiv, Kuteb, Jukun, Ichen, Hausa and Chamba.⁶ Today, these districts have been reorganized into Local Government Areas. While the present Donga Local Government Area represents the former Donga District, both Wukari and Takum Districts have each been split into two local government areas, namely Wukari, Ibi, Takum and Ussa, respectively.

Both the Tiv and the Jukun are found in each of the local government areas, though in greater proportions in Takum, Ibi, Donga and Wukari. Invariably, contact and interaction between these two communities in the local government areas have remained a common phenomenon long before the incident of colonisation in the area.

However, due to the cumbersome nature inherent in the study of inter-group relations, this work focuses mainly on the Jukun-Tiv relations in what is today Wukari Local Government Area. References to other polities in the other local government areas will be made as the need arises. This is due to the interwoven nature of relations in the areas.

This study spans across three main phases: the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods. While the take-off point is 1850, the terminal point is 2004. These phases are merely for the convenience of analysis. The early phases were marked by relatively peaceful co-existence. The later two phases were characterised by colonial conspiracy which witnessed the spirit of suspicion, growing hostility and aggression.

The choice of Wukari Local Government Area was informed by the fact that Tiv-Jukun relations had been subjected to perennial conflict. Right from the colonial period, conflict between the Tiv and the Jukun in former Wukari Federation always started from what is today Wukari Local Government Area. This therefore underscores the need for a proper examination and assessment of the remote and immediate causes of the conflicts for the purpose of building peaceful relationships.

1.4 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Crisis and conflicts do not dominate the whole period of human existence. However, inter communal conflicts have become widespread throughout Nigeria. This growing attitude results from the spirit of intolerance among societies.

Inter-group relations in Wukari Local Government Area, particularly between the Tiv and the Jukun have assumed the same disturbing dimension over the years. The central focus of the study is Jukun-Tiv relations in Wukari Local Government Area between 1850 to 2004. The study examines the nature and form of relationship between the two communities. This involves looking at the main trends in the development of the phenomenon covering the precolonial, colonial and postcolonial periods.

The major problem associated with this study is the dearth of source materials. While the precolonial period suffers from the acute dearth of recorded source materials, the colonial period is dominated mostly by colonial records which do not properly address the subject matter. Similarly, the postcolonial period is dominated by partisan source materials, which are full of sentiments and emotions devoid of objectivity.

In an attempt to address the problems associated with the inadequate source materials, one decided to adopt a multifaceted approach. This involved the use of many source materials for the purpose of corroborating information derived from each of the sources.

1.6 THE LOCATION

The present Wukari Local Government Area was one of the three districts of former Wukari Federation in the then Benue Province. It was created in 1976. At present, the sixteen former districts of the Local Government Area are merged into thirteen districts namely, Wukari, Puje, Tsokundi/Gidan Idi, Nwokyo, Bantaje, Matar Fada, Akwana, Assa, Kente, Rafinkada, Chonku, Chinkai and Jibu.

Located in a very large expanse of land, approximately between 9.8°E and 8.9°N of the equator, the Local Government is bounded to the North and East by Ibi and Donga Local Government Areas respectively. To the Northeast, it is shielded by Gassol and Bali Local Government Areas. To the South, it is enveloped by Logo and Ukum Local Government Areas of Benue State. Wukari Local Government Area is situated in an area with relatively hot climate of between 24°C to 27°C .⁷ The area has an annual rainfall of between 40-80 inches.⁸

Blessed with fertile land, agriculture remains the dominant occupation of the area, with fishing as a subsidiary economic activity. Both root and cereal crops are widely grown in the area. While the root crops are yam, cassava and sweet potatoes, the cereals are guinea corn, millet, maize, rice, beans, soya beans etc. Similarly, banana and other tree plantations like mango, cashew and orange give very impressive yield. Basically, the Local Government Area is an agrarian society.

1.7 THE PEOPLING OF THE AREA

Blessed with a very vast fertile agricultural land, Wukari Local Government Area comprised many agrarian communities. Among the ethnic groups found in the area are Jukun, Tiv, Hausa, Fulani and Etulo.⁹ Others are the Chamba in areas like Rafin Kada and Nyankwala, the Itchen, etc.

It is important to mention that human waves into what is today Wukari Local Government Area followed two main streams. While the Jukun¹⁰ and their satellite groups, including the Chamba,¹¹ migrated into the area through the upper Gongola Region, the Tiv¹² came from the east of the Benue valley, from the Bamenda highlands in the Cameroun. The Fulani, on the other hand, are believed to have come through the Mambilla highlands, which still harbour substantial chunks of Fulani communities.

It is equally important to stress that the thirteen districts in the Local Government Area are not arranged on ethnic basis. In the case of the Tiv and the Jukun, in particular, they are found in all the districts as our Table I in this chapter shows. The Fulani, particularly the cattle Fulani, are spread across the thirteen districts, and with some pockets of Hausa communities residing mostly in Wukari town for commercial activities.

1.8 ORIGIN OF THE JUKUN AND MIGRATION

According to Professor Sa'ad Abubakar,

It can be argued that the present Jukun have forgotten the past deeds of their ancestors because of the time involved. In fact, what is known about their external activities comes from non-Jukun sources. Thus, today, the whole Jukun history is quite obscure, only tentative speculations can be made...¹³

Looking at the circumstances surrounding the preservation and transmission of the Jukun history, it is obvious that even though Sa'ad's view seems too sweeping, it introduces very vital issues in the study of Jukun history. While we can not completely accept that the present Jukun have forgotten all the past deeds of their ancestors, and that the whole Jukun history is quite obscure, we agree that, due to the acute dearth of information on some vital aspects of the Jukun history, many historians seem to fall back on tentative speculations as Sa'ad contended. This gives credit to Professor Mahadi's remark that "...the details of every aspects of the early history of the Jukun are not available."¹⁴

Mahadi's contention bothered mostly on the origin and migration of the Jukun into their present location. Sa'ad, on the other hand, believes that, so far, no concrete evidence has emerged to convincingly substantiate the military and political achievements accredited to the Jukun when he stated that, "The traditions of the various Jukun groups do not give any indications that an extensive, fairly centralised empire existed in the past."¹⁵

The foregoing explains why Sa'ad argues that much of the sources about early Jukun history are of foreign origin. This equally explains why most of the sources lack internal and external consistencies in their approach, hence basing their conclusions on mere tentative speculations.

The phenomenon of Jukun origin is one of the thorny areas of Jukun history in which even Jukun scholars always seem to meander in between non-Jukun sources, particularly those of Meek¹⁶, Keates¹⁷ and Buxton¹⁸, to anchor their claims. Of all these colonial sources, the Jukun use Meek's account as their major referral document.

According to Meek, reinforced by the Jukun, the Jukun origin is associated with Egypt. This account employs comparative analysis of the Egyptian and Jukun religious worldviews. Nonetheless, as fascinating as this eastern hypothesis may sound between the Jukun, and other societies, it has since come under heavy attacks.

According to Oyigbelu,

The claim that the Jukun among many ethnic groups, for example, came from the east is typical of imperialist manoeuvre and it amounts to telling the black Africans that they have no concrete past to boast since they came from Egypt, which is the cradle of civilisation.¹⁹

Oyigbelu's argument, which represents the Africanist approach in explaining events in Africa, points to the fact that rather than looking elsewhere in attempts to explain their origins, African societies should look inward. Such attempts have to employ other tools like archaeology and linguistics rather than being basically premised on mere traditions.

Consequently, using linguistics as a tool, it is unrealistic to associate the Jukun with Egypt as it is commonly contended among Jukun traditions. According to Williamson kay²⁰, the Jukun belong to the Niger-Congo group of languages whose homeland, Proto-language and primary dispersal centre all fall within the area of Nigeria. Williamson classifies the Jukun under the Platoid group made up of the Lelna (Dakarkari) Kambari, Kamuku, Bassa, Atsam, Jaba, Baju, Eggon, Ninzam, Berom, Atyap, Tarok and Jukun.

Based on Williamson's hypothesis, it would be more tenable for us to look within the area of Nigeria in our attempt to trace the origin of the Jukun, and most Nigerian societies. On this note, others like Nom-hwange contended that most Jukun

traditions recorded by the colonial officials were done in Wukari area west of the Chad Basin. Thus to a local Jukun being interviewed at Wukari, the Chad Basin is still the east.²¹ In spite of the concerted efforts being made to resolve the question of Jukun origin, many conclusions still remain tentative speculations. This is why Mahadi²² laments that the scenario of Jukun origin is still unclear.

According to Sa'ad Abubakar, the waves of Jukun migrations that eventually brought them in their present habitat followed two main streams. Sa'ad declared that they,

dispersed in two migratory streams. One moving westwards to the Upper Gongola Valley where they established their stronghold at Kanam. The other migrated southwards to the Upper Benue Basin and then Westwards to the Lower Gongola Valley.²³

While the first stream seems to support Mahadi's and others claim that the Jukun and the Kanuri belong to the same stock, the second batch led the Jukun communities into the area of Wukari which forms the area under review. According to Abubakar Sa'ad, the Jukun related groups like the Gwana, Pindiga, Djen, Kunini, Jemuri, Dobel, Wurbe, Kam, Dampar, Awei, Kona, Gerkawa and Abusuin were the dominant groups in the Middle Benue Valley before the 18th century. Before their movement into the Middle Benue Valley, the Gongola Basin and parts of Upper Benue Basin remained their main habitat. It was at this base that they began to evolve a form of theocratic state, which was to influence areas even beyond the Gongola Basin. For instance, according to the Gazetteer of 1936²⁴, the Jukun dynasty at Byepi extended its influence across the Upper Benue as far as to Rai-Buba, believed to be located near modern Damaturu.

Similarly, the Kano Chronicle²⁵ believes that Byepi dominion stretched from Biyri to Panda. The debate on the precise location of Panda is, however, not yet conclusive. According to Sa'ad, while others point to the Panda of Igbirra, north of the Niger-Benue confluence, others suggest that Panda is located on the edge of the Tangale country - where some Jukun communities still exist. This assumption seems more convincing, since the Igbirra only merely claim to belong to the Jukun without serious practical evidence.

Other works by Palmer and Molyneux also point to the Gongola Basin as the possible main Jukun habitat before they moved into the Middle Benue Valley. While Palmer's account points to the Kalam Hills on the Upper Gongola basin²⁶, Molyneux points to the Atagora hill at the north of the Gongola-Hawal confluence²⁷. The predominance of Jukun influence in this basin is credited to the wealth of Jukun traditions preserved by some non-Jukun groups in the area. For instance, the Kanakuru found in the lower Gongola claim descent from the Jukun, and preserve political institutions very similar to those of the Jukun Kona. Before the 19th century, the Kanakuru had transmitted Jukun influence to societies like the Lunguda, Jera and several "other groups on the Lala Plateau and in the region north of the Gongola-Hawal confluence".²⁸ In the same way, the Tangale groups, the Pabur and the Bachama around the Gongola-Benue confluence adopted Jukun systems. Basically, the Gongola basin remained a base from where the Jukun organised devastating attacks on Borno and Hausaland.

The eventual defeat of the Jukun by Mai Ali b. Al-Hajj Umar (1655-84) marked the beginning of the process that was to take the Jukun to the Middle Benue region. Freemantle,²⁹ believes that it was in the process that some Jukun groups

moved into the area under the leadership of Katakpa, who later founded Puje, the new Jukun capital, in 1660 A.D. Unfortunately, even though Katakpa was able to spread Jukun influence over non-Jukun in the area, and also rebuilt Jukun institutions, the Puje phenomenon was more or less a theocratic arrangement that lacked military competence to exercise effective political control over others. Consequently, even when modern Wukari was founded "it became more of a spiritual than a political centre and the Aku (chief) owed his position to his religious role".³⁰ It equally served as a commercial centre.

No matter the military predicament of the new Jukun centre at Wukari, from the centre, Jukun influence had become firmly entrenched in the Middle Benue region. By the beginning of the 18th century, they evolved a number of chiefdoms like Awe, Dampar, Gerkawa, Gwona, Kona, Wurbo and Jibu. According to Meek,

Each had its chief surrounded by councillors comprising elders and religious dignitaries under an official equivalent to the Abo of Wukari. He was known as the Wuru in Kona, the Kekeru at Gwona and the Senzo at Dampar.³¹

According to Meek's account, reinforced by many Jukun informants, once founded, Wukari remained a centre from where Jukun and related groups spread to the west and east of the environs. According to Meek, "The Abusuin, for example, claims descent from Sagwum who had migrated with his followers from Wukari to the neighbourhood of Wase towards the end of the 18th c."³²

Similarly, according to the Karu traditions of origin as recorded by Meek,

The Karu, found north of the River Taraba, claim being a Jukun group even though they do not speak the Jukun language. But their political and religious institutions resemble those of the Jukun of Wukari.³³

In the same vein,

The Tigon and Ngoro, centred at Ashaku and Nama respectively, speak a language closely related to the Jukuns'. More over, the Chief of Ashaku claims descent from the Aku of Wukari, while that of Nama claims being Jukun and had under his control the Wukari cult of Aku-arhwa.³⁴

From the foregoing analysis, it implies that many societies in the Middle Benue Valley, particularly those related to the Jukun; do not trace their origin outside the area. In the same vein, the Williamson's classification of the Niger-Benue confluence languages implies that since the Proto-language to which the Jukun belong has its dispersal centre in Nigeria, it would amount to historical fallacy for the Jukun to seek origin outside the area of Nigeria. Lastly, the discussion has left no doubt in our minds that the Jukun had for centuries remained a dominant power both in the Gongola basin and the Middle Benue Valley before their history coiled into a theocratic arrangement, particularly in their new base at Wukari. According to Meek, the Jukun were variously known at different places in the course of their migration down to their present habitat. For instance, while at Gujba and Borno they were known as the Kwona and Kwana (Gwena) respectively, the Hausa referred to them as the Kwararafa in the glorious days of their Kwararafa kingdom. The Jukun, however, preferred to refer to themselves as the Apa in the hey days of their Kwararafa kingdom³⁵

There are unresolved arguments about the exact location of the capital of the Jukun kingdom founded in the course of their migration. While the Jukun groups living south of the Benue Basin claim that their capital was located at or near Bantaji, Meek points to the bank of the River Taraba at Kundi (Bakundi) south of the Benue. Meek's contention is premised on two main reasons. First and foremost, that Kundi was an ancient Jukun stronghold, hence capable of assuming the status of an imperial capital. Secondly, and strongly, too, that the king of Kundi was grandfather of Kenjo, the builder of Kororofa.³⁶ This provides a strong reason for the Kwararafa located near Bantaji or Bye Pi (Api) to be associated with Kundi.

The argument on the exact location of the capital of Kwararafa should neither be allowed to derail our focus nor to detain us for too long. Rather, our main concern is mostly on the shift in the power base from Upper Benue Region to the Lower Benue Region. The shift in the power base possibly implies the next phase in the process of Jukun migration down to the area of Wukari.

The jihadists decisive assaults on the already declining Jukun kingdom of Kwararafa could be said to be the last phase in the Jukun migration and spread in the area of Wukari. Following the collapse of the Kwararafa, many Jukun communities moved to different locations in the Benue Valley, with two main streams taking different routes into Wukari.³⁷ While one group journeyed from the north bank of the Benue and Gombe area through the Plateau highlands into Wukari, the other group shifted from Bye Pi through Puje into Wukari. The strong cultural ties existing between the Jukun and some Plateau communities like the Baribari, Ngas, Goemai, Alago, etc, reinforce the reality of the north bank of the Benue wave. It is possible

that some Jukun elements might have dropped along their migratory route to found some of these related groups.

According to some Jukun informants, the Plateau wave had its last base at Lafia. From Lafia, they moved through Keana, and across the Benue at Abinsi where they crossed to Akwana; a point some segments moved to Wukari. Yusuf³⁸ maintains that it was from Wukari that some pockets of Jukun communities moved to areas like Dampar, Rafin Kada, Donga, Takum etc. In other words, from Wukari, the Jukun established chiefdoms in places like Wukari, Dampar, Rafin Kada, Kente, Arufu, Nwokyo, Chinkai, Gindin Dorowa, Takum, etc.

1.8.1 The Jukun Factor

On arrival in the area of Wukari, and other parts of the former Wukari Federation, the Jukun co-existed with other satellite communities. Among these communities, who were later assimilated into the Jukun system, were the Itchen, Tigon, Ngoro, Nyivu (Kumbo), Chamba, Kuteb, Abakwariga, etc

The phenomenon of the assimilation of the Chamba in the area is more amazing. This bothers mostly on how a very distinct political and linguistic group was later completely overwhelmed by a group it over ran initially. There are records that indicate that the Chamba once effectively challenged Jukun authority. According to Abubakar, “the position of the Jukun in the Upper Benue Valley was taken by the Chamba who, in turn, were also to migrate to the south following the advent of the Bata... [who] remained in the Upper Benue Valley till in the beginning of the 19th century.”³⁹ Earlier, Sa'ad stated that, “... the Upper Benue Valley... received three migrant successive waves of immigrants (the Jukun, Chamba and Bata) each which had consecutively established its hegemony over the region.”⁴⁰ Anene reinforces

Sa'ad's views, arguing that “...the political effectiveness of the Jukun was seriously disrupted by the next conquering immigrants (the Chamba)... (who) were effectively well organised to impose their rule on the former subjects of the Jukun empire.”⁴¹

Anene's contention presupposes that the Chamba were able to effectively challenge the Jukun and their entire imperial possessions. The Chamba assault on the Jukun hegemony intensified as they moved south of the Benue Valley. Anene further argued, in this connection, that some Chamba groups,

moved into Donga Basin where they devastated the whole of the territory south of the line drawn between Yola and Katsina-Ala. It was here that the Chamba subjected the Jukun centre of Wukari to deadly raids from new Chamba strongholds established at Takum, Suntai and Donga.⁴²

It is important to stress that even in the area of Wukari, Chamba elements either founded some settlements like Nyankwala or were dominant in settlements like Rafin Kada, etc. In all these places, they remained a distinct group from the Jukun until the wave of Jukun assimilation caught up with them.

Our analysis of the early Chamba-Jukun relations indicates that no matter whatever might have become of their later relationship, historically and politically, the two groups are distinct from one another. The same story applies to the Abakwariga, who are believed to be a breakaway Hausa group from Kano. Both Meek and Erim give primacy to the Abakwariga for the foundation of some Jukun towns. Meek maintains that they were the first to settle in Jukun settlements like Api, Puje and Wukari.⁴³ Similarly, Erim argues that the Jukun were neither the founders of the Kororofa kingdom nor its early rulers.⁴⁴ Erim believes that the Abakwariga were the founders of Kwararafa, especially its next phase at Puje.

No matter whatever controversies Meek and Erim's arguments might raise, our focus is not necessarily to address such contentious issues, but rather, stress the fact that both the Chamba and the Abakwariga were distinct groups from the Jukun, and that their impact on the political history of the area can not be contested, even by the Jukun. The big question that forms the focus in this section of our study is, therefore, how the Jukun were able to assimilate these once very powerful groups.

Sources like Sa'ad Abubakar prove that by the close of the nineteenth century, the Jukun were able to revive their political power and institutions. This later development availed them with the opportunity to play overlord over existing communities in the Middle Benue Valley. In fact, between 1750-1820, their influence had spread across the Niger-Benue Confluence societies like the Idoma, Igala, Igbirra, etc. It is therefore little wonder that Obaro Ikime remarked that, "...there is no doubt that the Jukun were the most powerful group in the Middle Benue Region."⁴⁵

This second phase of their political history was very peculiar. At this time, their primary concern was not merely political domination, but rather very concerted efforts to culturally assimilate weaker and smaller groups. This was the time the Chamba entered into a session of drastic political and military decline. Sa'ad testified that it was through this process that the Chamba religious institutions were gradually replaced by those of the Jukun.⁴⁶ For instance, Jukun religious institutions adopted by the Chamba included the Abo, Voma cult in charge of rain similar to the Jukun Buhor, and the Mwa-Lebsa with similar functions with the Jukun Achu-Ayonda. Today, almost all the virtues of the Chamba culture, including their language, have been replaced by the Jukun institutions among the Chamba found in places like Nyankwala, Rafin Kada, Tunari; all in present Wukari Local Government Area.

Many might think that the process of the spread of Jukun influence in the Middle Benue Valley in the 19th century was accompanied with military raids. On the contrary, Sa'ad maintains that, "Jukun influence seems to have spread over non-Jukun within our area of study (Benue Basin) not by conquest, but through mutual contact and the subsequent adoption of Jukun institutions."⁴⁷

A number of reasons have been advanced in support of this mutual phenomenon. Among other reasons, it is argued that most of these weaker and smaller groups like the Itchen, Nyivu, Tigon, Chamba, etc, totally submitted to the Jukun in anticipation for protection from the Jukun. It was also the quest to identify with what appeared to be the superior culture in the area.

The cultural aspects of these societies that suffered total submission was language. This made the Jukun language to become a lingua franca in the whole of what later became known as Wukari Federation. Other groups like the Kuteb who still retained their language used Jukun language as the official language of communication. Similarly, the Ngoro at Wana and the Tigon at Ashaku adopted a language similar to the Jukun.

Consequently, through deliberate efforts by the Jukun, even before the entrenchment of colonialism in the area, the Jukun Factor had become evident. However, the process from the official entrenchment of the Jukun factor started with the advent of colonial rule in the area. And before the end of the regime, the Jukun Factor no doubt became the official instrument used by the colonial regime to actualise objectives. Colonial officials like Freemantle⁴⁸ for instance, claim that the Jukun religion and government provided the basis for the accomplishment of British Colonial interest in the area. His claim was, indeed, in the spirit of the colonial

philosophy which used local authorities in its indirect rule policy to govern over vast territories.

The phenomenon of the emergence of the Jukun Factor produced an obvious result in the Benue Valley Politics. This was the emergence of what the Jukun themselves prefer to refer to as the "Tiv Factor in our fatherland".⁴⁹ At the wake of the twentieth century, almost all the smaller groups in former Wukari Federation were assimilated into the Jukun culture. The fusion was so strong that even for distinct larger groups like the Kuteb and the Chamba, one hardly believed that they ever once existed as independent groups from the Jukun. The Tiv, on the other hand, uprightly challenged the attempt by both the Jukun and the forces of Islam to cause them to suffer similar fate. Since then, there has been deliberate struggle between the two factors in the area either to participate in governance or to control the instrument of governance. This struggle has kept recycling over the years due to the interwoven nature of the two groups in the area as shown on table 1 below.

1.9 TIV TRADITIONS OF ORIGIN AND MIGRATION

It is commonly agreed by all Tiv traditions of origin that the Tiv and the Bantu of Central and South Africa have common descent. This contention is premised on linguistic parameters, since there are still very impressive similarities between the Tiv and the Bantu words and vocabularies. What is, however, yet to be resolved in the said Tiv-Bantu connection is the point of dispersal. While some traditions point to South Africa, others point to Central Africa, particularly in the Congo Basin.

Premier works on Tiv origin equally dangle between Central and South Africa. For instance, John Gbor who presented about the first written account on the

subject also made, "a daring attempt to explain origin and migration of the Tiv in the context of the Bantu hypothesis."⁵⁰ Gbor, with the use of Greenberg's linguistic study, which brought the Tiv and the Bantu languages under one linguistic group, draws the conclusion that, "the nucleus of Bantu origin lies in the Luba Country of Katanga in the Congo Basin, thereby giving credit to the Tiv traditions of origin from that part of Africa."⁵¹

This conclusion is reinforced by comparative linguistic studies, which "have classified Tiv language variously as a Bantu, Semi or Proto-Bantu language or that it is at least genetically related to the Bantu languages".⁵² Linguistic studies by Abrahams, also indicate Tiv-Bantu connections. In his study of the grammatical structure and vocabulary of the Tiv and other Bantu languages like the Nyanza, Ekoi and Jav, Abrahams had no option than to conclude that these languages are related. This conclusion was made from the comparison of some Tiv and Bantu, Nyanza words as reproduced by Gbor.⁵³

Table 1: A Comparative Table of Nyanza and Tiv Words of Bantu Language

ENGLISH	BANTU NYANZA	TIV
Animal	Nyama	Nyam or Inyam
Navel	Chombo	Chombo or Ichombo
Axe	Sembe or Jembe	Jembe or Ijembe
Child	mwana	wan or wana
Dream	Nyam	Mnyam
Heel	Kishi	Ikishi
meat	Enyam	Inyam

Source: R.C. Abraham

Agber added that "since the Abraham study, other attempts have similarly been made to classify the Tiv language, leading to the addition of some more words to the Abrahams list of 67 words."⁵⁴ The Gbor's hypothesis founded on Abraham's linguistic studies is no doubt an attempt to legitimise the Central African theory. He locates three main areas regarded to be the nucleus of the Bantu race. These are the Northern Katanga,⁵⁵ Cameroun-Nigeria borders⁵⁶ and the Lake Chad Basin.⁵⁷ Other scholars like Norah Lathan also agree with the Lake Chad hypothesis; arguing that the original home of the Bantu people is South of the Lake Chad from where they spread over a great part of Central and South Africa.⁵⁸ He argues further that, "The beginning of the move from the homeland south appears to have occurred near the beginning of the first millennium A.D. at the same time after the introduction of iron working in the Sahara."⁵⁹ These points do not only indicate the points at which Tiv origin can be traced, but equally possibly suggest the migratory route the Tiv journeyed from the said Bantu nucleus into Nigeria.

Though it is not the scope of this study to go into the intricacies about the debate on the exact point of Tiv origin, and the Bantu-Tiv connection, one does not completely agree with the attempts by Gundu and others, like Agber, to want to argue on the contrary. There is no doubt that since the beginning of attempts to compare the Tiv and the Bantu languages, more revelations keep surfacing to reinforce the debate. One believes that the level of evidence available is much beyond the 4% similarity Gundu argues every two languages have.⁶⁰ Even though Gundu argues that this result from chance, the formula used to arrive at the 4% is still unclear. The attack on Gundu and others does not imply that more efforts should not be made for more concrete conclusions.

No matter the debate, there are other versions of Tiv origin which maintain that it was from the Congo that the Tiv migrated to Swem, a base they claim to have stayed for hundred of years before they left in search of a more commodious home.⁶¹ It was from Swem that they journeyed into their present locations in Nigeria. Iyo suggests that this movement must have taken place between c.1500 - c.1600 A.D.⁶²

Though one lacks the substance to either disagree or completely agree with Iyo on this issue, what is obvious is that the Tiv never remained forever at Swem. It is also beyond doubt that Swem plays a very central role in Tiv origin and migration. According to Agber, "traditions all point to Swem as the likely place where Tiv and his descendants became conscious of their identity. Swem therefore bears a special significance to all Tiv..."⁶³ Agber's contention can, however, be said to be a fallacy if he really means that the group came from somewhere without being conscious of its identity until it arrived at Swem. Going by this argument, it is more reasonable to say that the group originated from Swem where it was able to develop all its systems before moving into Nigeria.

Even though Swem occupies a very central position in the history of Tiv migration, the precise location of the area is still very contentious as Tseror lamented:

The controversy surrounding Swem cannot be resolved in the present state of knowledge. The scope of the debate is widened when Tiv elders and scholars themselves are divided on the actual characteristics of this Swem cradle.⁶⁴

It is important to stress that Tseror's pessimism does not impede concerted efforts to locate Swem. Both colonial officials and Tiv scholars have given, and are still giving, very useful inputs to the debate. For instance, while Dorward equates Swem with the Biblical Garden of Eden,⁶⁵ Bohannan⁶⁶ locates Swem at the NgoI Kedju hill in the

Bamenda Highlands in North Western Cameroon. Similarly, while Akiga,⁶⁷ who claimed to have visited Swem in 1934, maintains that Swem is a hill located in the sub-section of Ikurav-ya in the eastern Tivland. Makar claims that, "Swem is a mountain located about a mile south-west from the Cameroon Frontier."⁶⁸

Ikpa⁶⁹ on the other hand suggests that Swem is another name for Binda hills. According to him, the hill is located on the mountains bordering Nigeria. He finally equates the importance of Swem to the Tiv with the Jewish Mount Sinai. Recent studies, particularly by Tiv scholars, on Swem and Tiv origin and migration tend to point to Swem as the original home or the dispersal point of the Tiv people. One therefore believes that other than going too far to central or South Africa, more ethnographic, archaeological and linguistic studies about the Swem phenomenon will yield more meaningful conclusions on the subject. Lathan Norah even claims that the original home of the Bantu people is south of the Lake Chad found in the Cameroon. This could imply that the Tiv wave was one of the Bantu waves that left the original Bantu home in Lake Chad area to other parts of Africa. This argument reinforces Akpa's hypothesis that, "...Swem hills were the most probable nucleus of Tiv expansion."⁷⁰

It was from this base that the Great Dispersal among the Tiv occurred. While others like Makar attribute this phenomenon with quarrel with the Bafum, "...who lived in the kingdom of Kon in Bamenda Province of the Republic of Cameroun."⁷¹ The most popular view stressed by others like Orkar⁷² attributes the movement to increase in Tiv population, which Swem could not contain or sustain. The unending debate on the location of Swem leaves any doubt that Swem is a phenomenon outside the area of Nigeria; and is situated between the frontiers of Nigeria and the Cameroon

highlands. It further suggests that from Swem, the Tiv settled briefly on a number of hills before arriving at the last set of hills known as Nwange hills. The Nwange hills are located about ten miles south of Ikura v-ya frontier.

According to Makar, it was at the Nwange hills that the Tiv came into contact with some hostile groups of Atoatyev like the Ugee, Utange, Uchiv, Ukwese, Ulive, Ugbe and Iyon. Makar maintains that the hostility from these Atoatyev, particularly from the Utange and Ugee, was what compelled the Tiv to leave the Nwange hills, a phenomenon Downes⁷³ believes to have started at the turn of the nineteenth century. These were the beginning of movements into the area of Nigeria. The important development at the Nwange hills before movements into Nigeria started with the development of clannish arrangement among the Tiv. It was at these hills that the idea of clans was clearly spelt out. Henceforth, movement, particularly into the area of Nigeria, were organised on clan basis. Whether this is contested or not, what is certain is that before their final journey into their present home, the people became very conscious of their clannish arrangement. It was even in this manner that some Tiv clans like Shitire, Ugondo and Ukum migrated into what later became Wukari Federation in the colonial years. And, while Shitire and Ugondo migrated to Takum and Donga districts respectively, the Ukum and Gambe-Tiev moved into Wukari district.

Ukum and Gambe-Tiev (Shitire) followed one route into Wukari district. From the Nwange hills, they passed through present Nanev and Ipav in main Tivland. And from these points, they briefly stopped over at neighbouring plains of Gboko, from where they moved to settle on the west bank of river Katsina-Ala. From this point, they continued with the movement in company of Nongov, Ugondo, Mbalagh

and Ikurav-Tiev across the river Katsina-Ala and settled by a lake they named after the leader of their migrant group, Auna-Ber Auna⁷⁴ (Auna Lake). From Ber Auna, some Ukum kindreds, alongside with Gambe-Tiev, journeyed into the Akwana area in former Wukari district. While others remained in present Ukum Local Government area in Benue State, other Ukum kindreds crossed over into other parts of former Wukari district.

1.9.1 The Tiv Factor

It is still very contentious when the first Tiv elements crossed over into what later became known as Wukari district. Like both the Jukun and the Abakwariga, the Tiv claim to be the founders of Wukari town. The tradition claims that the name Wukari was derived from a Tiv idol in the area called waka. Until recently, most Tiv people, especially the elders, refer to Wukari as Waka. Though it is beyond the scope of this study to go into the details of this debate, the most important thing derived from the controversy is the fact that the presence of the Tiv in the area could also be traced to antiquity. It equally points to Jukun-Tiv contacts and interactions as well as the level of co-operation between the two communities in the area in the earliest time.

According to Tiv informants like Mtuem⁷⁵ and Simon Awua⁷⁶, the Tiv factor was very dormant during early Jukun-Tiv contacts. It did not offer any threat to the Jukun since the Tiv did not conceive any political agenda to challenge the Jukun leadership. More so, the Tiv communities in the area, according to Awua⁷⁷, were scattered all over without any central authority, which would have organised any meaningful campaigns against the entire Jukun leadership. Non the less, the mere appearance of the Tiv in the area marked the beginning of a factor that was later to pose a major threat to the entire Jukun community in the area.

Most Jukun informants like Jibrin Amfani⁷⁸, Sam Ahmadu⁷⁹, Dr. Yusuf Magaji⁸⁰, Princess Grace Atoshi⁸¹, and Bala Ajiduku⁸², argue that the Tiv Factor started to become a more notorious factor right from the first time the Tiv community at Akwana resisted the attempt by the Jukun leadership to bring it under control. This cross section of informants however believes that what reinforced the Tiv factor was the incident of later Tiv influx into the area. This later group was more politically informed, and more conscious of their independence. Dr. Yusuf Magaji sees some of these later immigrants not only as economic adventurers, but also as mischievous elements that had no regard to constituted authority.

It is deduced that the idea of the "Tiv Factor" in what the Jukun conceive as their "Father land" no doubt resulted from the stiff resistance of the Tiv to be integrated into the Jukun culture and rulership as other communities did. It is obvious that if they had yielded like the Chamba, Itchen, Kuteb, Abakwariga, etc, both the Jukun and the colonial authorities would not have considered their presence as a threat. Apparently, the attempt to remain independent in the midst of the Jukun influence was what created a gap between the Tiv and the Jukun. It is pertinent to state that the war against the growing Tiv Factor did not start in the colonial period as already pointed out. Before the colonial era, the Jukun leadership had started deliberate efforts to contain the growing Tiv factor. The first of these attempts came from Aku Uka, Angyu or Zikengyu. Elsewhere, we had mentioned Freeman's⁸³ account of the Aku Uka, Awudumanu (c.1871-1902) who, twice fell on the emirs of Muri Burba (1869-1873) and Muhammed Nya (1874-1896) to challenge the growing Tiv Factor in his domain.

Despite concerted efforts by both the colonial authorities alongside with the Wukari Native Authority to check the Tiv Factor in the area, the latter reinforced itself continually. This resulted, in part, from the unending Tiv influx into the area, particularly at the wake of the twentieth century. And in 1959, the Tiv Factor proved to be a stubborn factor capable of growing among thorns. This was demonstrated particularly by the victory of a Tiv, Charles Tangul Gaza, over a Pro-Jukun, Ibrahim Sangari Usman, in the 1959 general elections into the Federal House of Representatives. And since this election, the Jukun have continued to reconsider their relationship with the Tiv in the area. The table below shows the ubiquitous nature of the Tiv factor in the area as documented in 1990.

Table 2: Distribution of Jukun and Tiv Settlements in Wukari Local Government Area in 1990

S/No	DISTRICT	JUKUN SETTLEMENTS	TIV SETTLEMENTS
1	WUKARI	Wukari Idofi Hyuku Byepi	Tse Kachina Avenda Kyan Tse Jorchor Taakpe Pevikyaa Aondo Igbira Pila
2	PUJE	Gani Shakanjo Danladi Dankuru Yakubu Adi Nyajo Adi Shokonjo Soja Shokonjo Joshua Shokonjo Yusuf Joshua Gambo Mestai Ashu Nyajo Agyo Yongo Boshe	Ikyogbolum Shaapera Gyungu Tsough Adumgbe Kungureku Shabu Chiega Shongo Unyar Shongo Ambi Gyungu Uchile Nguun Aondover Taakpe Logo Abua Akaate Iorveer
3	TSOKUNDI/ GIDAN IDI	Tsokundi Gidan idi Hyuku Kinda Shaani Gami Avyi Abangaku Kun Gani Gbihiko Adigbondu Akuvyon Adibon Byepi (sprang up after the 1991/92 war in a former Jukun settlement of Agbu Nyajo displaced during the 1964 crisis)	Ayu Choko Zegeate Ikyernum Mbakuuv Ikwe Ihuwe Kyambe Ikyo Torruam Pande Iji Zun Amadu Deseer Sende Uwua Iordye Daa Suwe Shikaan Mbalumunga Akpar Haanongon

Iwar
 Andura
 Anyo
 Aperakaa
 Tor Orndiir
 Tsegba
 Agbough

 Abanyi
 Tse Gberindyer
 Tse Anza
 Ason
 Lanem
 Tse Ligom
 Tor Aindir
 Tsar
 Kimbi
 Shimakov
 Anenga
 Tse Time
 Mough Kaa
 Igila
 Ayamtyo
 Agbo B
 Ukende
 Torkwase Anaya
 Mkaa Mende
 Ayima
 Kyukyundu
 Kanve
 Tse Gbertyo
 Torkyomon
 Akumka
 Yuhwa Shagba
 Ugbede
 Akuraga Uja
 Imbiorvungu

4 NWOKYO

Nwokyo
 Kalkin (Adigbondu)
 Alamini
 Abe
 Ajitabako
 Zaria
 Agyo Akpiti
 Adi Kan
 Ato Gbondu

Pevikyaa
 Ortile
 Tse Igo
 Shii
 Tse Iwev
 Toho Abanyo
 Utaver Boyo
 Hingir
 Anenga

		Kinda Kan	Nengean Abechin Akondo Ityough Shamiga Agwabi Tema Iwaga Tom Yeke Atime Bar Orawua Tor Amenger Ukor Songo Tse Verato Kwar Utimve Ugo Ayilaga Nev Amase Ikyaalan Usen Tingi Kumaga Jem Gomna Abera Anyam Ajoko Puka Hongol Yawe Boyue
5	BANTAJE	Bantaji (Fulani/Jukun) Tunari Male Gidan Hamidu	Gborbegha Inyamhina Meeme Atsaga Tse Agusa Gurgur Tse Hindan Tse Kuku Awua Ikyausu Gundu Chaha Shiva Sukpe Tuse Chia Agata Tse Mbaiiga Tsaryange Tse Anongo Ormela Tortser Mkaha Akom Ikyar Abeda Ayaka Agongu Zendesha Gida Mahanga

			Chedia Chediya-Ugber Ijembe Jato
6	MATAR FADA	Gindin Dorowa Nyankwala	Ikperen Uyoo Mbishu Saamaya Aben Ingbian Anger Abuur Tyohuna Tse Ikyongur Asongu Yuhwam Adzou Tse Aulugh Nyian Wanyongo Emberga Akorga Nguga Yanmeer
7	AKWANA	Akwana Arufu Fyayi Gidan Ikwe Ando Katswen Kwatan Tsufa Angishi Fanu	Hemen Maor Tse Abiem Tse Agi Sur Gum Agan Akom Jato Asha Begha Anyam Pir Diyo Gor Kasar Tse Ndier Kaa Tse Dakpu Tse Uzagiir Tse Iordye Tiza Tsokwa Kaso Tarikyongo Aertim Tse Dwem Amaga
8	ASSA	Muchia Kare Zondoku Ada Kenjo Nwoban	Gbor Ucha Tse Jiinan Tse Kyanden Shange Sula Tse Ba

Kumutu
Kun
Rafin Soja
Adi
Danjuma
Ate
Agbu
Sabo

Tsegba Ajaver
Tse Bosh
Tse Anyagba
Tse Igo
Anyoosu Sar
Tse Ayaba
Tyoazer Nyajo
Ortser Nev
Tse Ugbo
Tse Ukpera
Tse Tyo
Awembe Uma
Nzaga Tswagh
Tse Tyungu Ialegh
Kwaghaondo
Adamgbe
Igyoor Anya
Atsaga Nan
Ihue Tseke
Wua Liv
Uban Igyaba
Ihyer Agundu
Shamange Ayaka
Toho Abanyo
Tse Ihonam

9 KENTE

Kente
Sondi
Gidan Igba

Sontyo
Gaku Tyo
Tyowua Uta
Taghernyi Gander
Toryem Acha
Gendega Manga
Damisa Ateka
Chia Agure
Yimave Ahen
Ian Swem
Nyikwagh Jato
Awua Baaki
Igbiyama Tsedugh
Tse Soho
Ajonto
Tse Baka
Orhena
Ade Gum
Iorlam Atura
Ishen Abanyi
Avga Tiokwange

			Ishima Une Agashi Atsenga Tse Shiva Ayakume Nember Aduku Ahura Ayakume Uguu Aure Nytse Amenger
10	RAFIN KADA	Rafin kada Ason Gaya	Ashitsa Mbaadega Saidu Azege Orhemba Dega Msooga Dooga Yawe Ahangе Adeoer Zegebera Gbechin Alakali Ugbo Abako Abogor Kajir Begu Igyuundu Dafa Maikyo Ishor Agena Ajuku Wajir Tarwa Makaa Kukwa Harga Achineku
11	CHONKU	Chonku Riti Chudan	Tar Orshi Tor Musa Tse Shiva Bidi Apirgwa Shabu Tse Avekaa

Gbabo
 Tse Aboki
 Ujinge Kukwa
 Aondokaa Mtsor
 Gusa Anda
 Genyi Vembo
 Tse Kyaabo
 Tse Uba
 Gborgbor
 Akaayar Akpesekpe
 Iornenge Tsungwe
 Ama Gater
 Deuna Gboko
 Iyou Ki Kough
 Tse Pev
 Nongo Atse Isho
 Tse Kwaghbula
 Tse Ajav
 Jime Wende
 Njoko Ashwe
 Tse Takera
 Dombo Agi
 Tse Dzor
 Tine Mangol

12 CHINKAI

Chinkai
 Gidan Yaku
 Walawa
 Ashuku

Sev-av
 Tse Avaan
 Tse Sharegh
 Tse Agbaa
 Tse Torkucha
 Tse Goosu
 Tse Loho
 Tse Dakar
 Tse Agere
 Tse Uwua
 Tse Orahende
 Akaabo Anyula
 Tse Aweghla
 Tse Oradi
 Tse Abanyi
 Usor Ityu
 Tse Yorhumbe
 Tse Abinki
 Tse Mula Mindi
 Tse Ihulugh
 Tse Uter

Abwa Gaku
Tse Akpeityo
Tse Uaa
Orbeega Abena
Tse Iorterna
Kuntu Azenge
Tse Kon
Tse Kwaghner
Peter Ikyokor
Tse Apaa
Tse Tsavnya
Iti Angula
Leva Ikuriche
Uke Kwembe
Tse Akume
Barnabas Vishigh

Source: Generated from
field work

The table above reinforces a number of issues in the Tiv-Jukun relations in Wukari Local Government Area over the years. Firstly, and foremost, it reinforces the wisdom of a Jukun elder who interlaced his ten fingers to describe Tiv-Jukun relationship. This implies that the Jukun and the Tiv cannot be separated. In fact, there is no district in the area whose history of Tiv-Jukun contact and interaction is a recent development.

Secondly, the table reinforces the comment by a colonial official that the Tiv and the Jukun are complementary to one another in all aspects of life. It cannot be contested that both communities joined forces together to build all the present thirteen districts in the Local Government Area. Apparently, any attempt to remove the Tiv Factor would amount to causing the entire system to suffer paralysis. No wonder, the attempt in 1917 by the colonial administration to remove the Tiv from Wukari failed because of the interwoven and complementary nature of the two communities. This was largely explained on the basis of their socio-economic co-operation in areas of trade and intermarriage.

Thirdly, the table no doubt shows the predominance of Tiv settlements in the entire Local Government Area. However, while we cannot dispute the predominance of the Tiv and their settlements in the area, an important point has to be stressed, in part, about the very small number of Jukun settlements in each of the districts. While the Tiv believe in small village settlements, accessible to adequate farmlands, the Jukun settlement pattern is a bit nucleitic in nature. This explains why as both communities arrived in Wukari; the latter developed relatively larger settlements which were later used as district or administrative headquarters. This explains why all the present thirteen districts in Wukari are named after Jukun settlements, and with

all their headquarters located in Jukun settlements. The Tiv , however, complain that this sweeping arrangement is a ploy by the Jukun to politically marginalize and contain the Tiv Factor in the area.

Lastly, one wishes to state that the list of settlements, as provided above, cannot be said to be exhaustive for both communities. Such omissions, including wrong spellings of names, are not deliberate, and apology is offered in each case. (It should also be stressed that just like the 1990-92 crisis resulted in the disappearance of settlements from both communities, so also was it the case with the 1964 Atem Tyo. In each of the crises, some settlements were either relocated or merged with other settlements thereby losing their initial identities.

ENDNOTES

1. Preswerk and Parrot, Ethnocentrism and History Africa, Asia and Indian America in Western Textbooks, London, 1978, p.37.
2. Okibe, S.A "Inter-group Relations between Agila Area of Idomaland and Ngbo area of Iboland from Precolonial times to the present days", M.A. Dissertation, University of Jos, 1995, p.1
3. Okpeh, O.O "The Idoma and their Neighbours in the 19th and 20th Centuries: A Case Study of the Inter-Ethnic Relations in Nigeria". A Research Seminar presented at the Department of History, University of Jos, on the 8th March, 2000.
4. Otite, O. "On the Concept of Nigerian Society", in A.O. Sanda, (ed.), Ethnic Relations in Nigeria : Problems and Prospects.No Publisher and date of Publication .
5. Sheriff, M. and C.W. Sheriff, Social Psychology, University of Oklahoma, U.S.A. 1969, p.88.
6. NAK/MAKPROF/4377
7. Iboje, N.P A New Geography of Nigeria, Longman, Nigeria Ltd, 1981, p.34
8. Ibid., p.38
9. Jesse Misha, "A Brief History of Wukari Local Government Area", Wukari, 1992, p.1
10. Sa'ad Abubakar, "The Middle Benue Region Upto.1850", Niger Benue Seminar Jos, 1974, p.1
11. Ibid., pp.3-4. Also see Gabosa, Labarun Chambawa da Alamuransu (Stories of the Chamba and their Activities) , MS, NHRS, Zaria, p.5.
12. Abubakar, The Middle Benue Region, p.5
13. Saad Abubakar, "Peoples of the Upper Benue Basin and the Bauchi Plateau before 1800", in Obaro Ikime (ed.), Groundwork of Nigerian History, a Production by the Historical Society of Nigeria, Oluseyi Press, Ltd. Ibadan, 1999, pp.169–170.
14. Abdullahi Mahadi, et al, History of Nigeria I: Nigeria before 1800 A.D. Longman, Nigeria Ltd., 1989, p.46.

15. Abubakar, *Peoples of the Upper Benue*, p.170
16. Meek, C.K. *A Sudanese Kingdom*, Paul Kegan, London, 1931, pp.23-24.
17. Keates E.H.O, "Notes on the Old Kingdom, Kwararafa", NAK/SNP/17/2441, vol.i
18. Buxton U.F, et al, "The Jukun or Kororofa", in Temple, C.L., (ed.) *Notes on Tribes, Provinces, Emirates and States of Northern Provinces of Nigeria*, Frank Cass and Co. Ltd. London, 1965, p.175.
19. Oyigbelu O.M, "Did the Jukun really Migrate from Egypt?", in *Sunday Standard*, 5th March, 1978, p.14.
20. Williamson Kay, "Indigenous Languages of the Niger-Benue Confluence Region: Their Classification and its Implication for Pre-History", A Paper presented at the Conference on Confluence Nigerians, Lokoja, 27th September, 1987, p.1.
21. Nomhwange B.O , "Changing Patterns of Intergroup Relations in the Benue Valley: The Jukun and Tiv as a Case Study". B.A. Project, University of Jos, 1979, p.16
22. Mahadi, et al, *op.cit.*, p.46
23. Abubakar, *op.cit.*, p.165
24. Freemantle J.N, *Gazetteer of Adamawa Province*, Kaduna, 1936, p.9
25. Palmer H.R, *Sudanese Memoirs*, vol.iii, Lagos, 1927, p.106
26. *Kano Chronicle*, Meek, *op.cit.*, p.xxxi
27. Molyneux cited in *Ethnology Gudu*, 1924, NAK
28. Abubakar, *Peoples of the Upper Benue*, p.169
29. Freemantle, *Gazetteer of Muri Province*, pp.32-39
30. Abubakar, *People of Upper Benue*, p.171
31. Meek, *op.cit.*, p.335
32. *Ibid.*, p.41
33. Meek, *The Kam (D.O's Office)*, Jalingo
34. Meek, *A Sudanese Kingdom*, pp.238-64

35. Meek, op.cit., p.xiv
36. Ibid., pp.35-36
37. Nomhwange, op.cit., p.23
38. Yusufu Audu Ahmadu (40 yrs), Member, Takum Traditional Council, Interview.
39. Abubakar, op.cit., p.166
40. Ibid.
41. Anene J.C, The International Boundaries of Nigeria 1855-1960: The Framework of an Emergent African Nation, Longman Nigeria Ltd. Ibadan, 1970. p.101
42. Ibid.
43. Meek C.K, Sudanese Kingdom, p.44
44. Erim O. Erim, "The Early Foundations of Kwararafa Confederacy 1331-1902", in Nigerian Magazine, vol.55, No.3, Sept., 1987.
45. Ikime (ed.), op.cit., p.173
46. Ibid., p.175
47. Ibid., p.172
48. Dorward D.C, "Precolonial Tiv Trade and Currency" in International Journal of African History (IJAH) vol.9, no.4, p.322
49. Atohinko Tanko Adi, Tiv-Jukun Clashes: A Reconsideration, Amune Press, Wukari, 1992, p.15
50. John Gbor W.F, "Traditions of Origin and Migration with Special Emphasis on Eastern Tiv Frontier to C.1900", B.A. (Hist), A.B.U., Zaria, 1974 p.25.
51. Ibid.
52. Kwaghkondo S. Agber, "Tiv Origins and Migrations: A Reconsideration", in Archaeology and Society: Proceedings of the 8th Annual Conference of the Archaeological Association of Nigeria, held at Minna, June 25th-1st July, 1989, p.149.

53. John Gbor W.F, Mdue u Tiv man mnyer ve ken Benue (Tiv origin and their migration into the Benue Valley, Gaskiya Press Corporation, Zaria, 1978, pp10- 15.
54. Agber, op. cit, p.149
55. Ogot B.A, et al (eds), A Survey of East Africa, Longmans, Nairobi, 1968, p.198.
56. Greenberg Joseph, Studies in African Linguistic Classification, New Haven, USA, 1955, p.40.
57. Malcom Guthrie, "Some Developments in the Prehistory of Bantu Languages", in Fage, J.D. and Oliver, B.A. (eds.), Papers in African Prehistory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970, p.139.
58. Norah Lathan, Africa: From Prehistory to Modern Times, Hutton Educational Publications, London, 1972, p.48.
59. Ibid.
60. Gundu Z.A, "Are the Tiv a Part of the Bantu? A Rejoinder, Nigeria in Antiquity," Journal of Archeological Society of .A, vol.ii, March, 1984, p.26.
61. Iyo J., "Tiv Nationalism and some aspects of British Rule", Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Calabar, 1989, p.46
62. Ibid.
63. Agber, op.cit., p.148
64. Timothy Tseror, Tiv and their Neighbours: A History of Relation in the 19th and 20th Centuries, PHA Press, Jos,1992, p.9
65. Dorward D.C, 'A Social and Political History of the Tiv 1900-1939,' PhD Thesis, London, 1971. p.11
66. Paul Bohannon, The Tiv of Central Nigeria, New Haven, London, 1952, p.12
67. Sai Akiga, Akiga Story, edited by R.N East, London, 1965, pp.216-217.
68. Tesemchi Makar, A History of Political Change among the Tiv in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Ph.D Thesis A.B.U. Zaria, 1975, p.26
69. Ikpa Ikyolun, A Political Economy of the Tiv Revolts, M.A. Dissertation, University of Jos, 1990, p.50
70. Ibid.

71. Makar, op. cit., p.27
72. Orkar J., "Swem: Tiv origin", in Benue Valley Project Papers, (BVPP),No. 24, pp.153-155.
73. Abraham R.C, The Tiv People, Crown Agents, London, 1933, p.53
74. Nomhwange, Changing Patterns of Intergroup Relations p.58.
75. David Mtuem (55 yrs), Interview
76. Simon Awua (48 yrs), Interview
77. Ibid.
78. Jibrin Anfani (55 yrs), Interview.
79. Prince Sam Ahmadu (45 yrs), Interview.
80. Dr. Yusuf Magaji (55 yrs), Interview.
81. Princess Grace Atoshi, op. cit., p.2
82. Prince Bala Ajiduku (40 yrs), Interview.
83. Freemantle J.N, Gazetteer of Muri Province, Kaduna December, 1919, pp.18, 38.

CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The literature that forms the basis of this study has been derived from a wide range of sources. This chapter analyses the major relevant sources used in the study. Inter-group relations are a multifaceted human phenomenon which does not reflect only areas of co-operation, but also the negative indices in the interactive process. In other words, as groups interact, there is continuous interplay of the incidents of compromise and conflicts, depending on which serves as the best alternative at any given time.

The growing need for man's interdependence and, of course, the widespread phenomenon of violence associated with inter-group contacts and interactions have captured the interest of many scholars in recent times. Both conscious and unconscious efforts are therefore being made to address the phenomenon of inter-group relations. These are attempts to unveil the areas of compromise and conflicts in the interactive process and what produces same.

As stated above, a vast array of sources were consulted in reconstructing the history of Jukun-Tiv relations. For the convenience of analysis, these are divided into to main categories: primary and secondary sources.

2.2 PRIMARY SOURCES

Two main primary materials constitute a significant part of the sources for this work: oral tradition and colonial accounts from the national and local archives. As elsewhere in Nigeria, oral traditions concerning the different ethnic groups in Wukari District only started to be documented at the beginning of the colonial period. Most of these were written by colonial officers posted to the area. These included government anthropologist like Meek C. K. While most of Meek's works have been published, those of the colonial officers are now deposited in the National Archives, Kaduna. Though there exist many of these materials, some of the relevant archival documents used in this study include files like MARPROF. Also within this category of sources are Government Gazatteers which were compiled largely by information derived from the colonial materials. Of great relevance to this is the one compiled by Freamantle, Gazatteers of Muri Province and Gazatteers of Adamawa Province.

Since the colonial period the collection of oral tradition by scholars has continued upto the present time. After going through the colonal materials, scholars have always found it necessary to undertake field work for the purpose of collecting oral accounts to supplement and compliment the archival sources. In this study, both archival and oral accounts collected during the fieldwork are discussed more fully in the methodology section.

2.3 SECONDARY SOURCES

This category of sources derived most of their information from the primary materials. There are two main types of these sources: published and unpublished works. Information from these sources may not necessarily be related directly to the area of study, but have provided very useful hints to the overall theme of intergroup relations. The published literature exists in the form of books, and articles in books, journals and magazines. Within the body of unpublished works are undergraduate projects by students, papers presented at seminars and conferences, Masters Dissertations and Doctoral Theses. A review of some of the published and unpublished works are done immediately below.

There also exist another category of materials under the rubric of tertiary sources. These consist largely of information derived from published News Papers. Given the contemporary nature of the theme of this study, inspite of the apparent problems associated with this body of information, it has been very necessary to make use of materials derived from tertiary sources. It should be stressed, however, that all amount of circumspection have been employed in the use of information from these sources.

2.3.1 Published Works

From the available studies, it is obvious that whatever the intent and purposes of inter-group relations, we agree with Professor Afigbo's contention that, "Inter-group relations presuppose contact and interaction between groups, each has an identity to make, some inputs into the relationship, in short, each of which has some scope and area of autonomous action."¹

Afigbo's contention introduces a very important subject which cuts across all forms of inter-group relations; that is, as groups interact, each contributes to the growth and development or otherwise of one another in diverse ways. Here, he states that:

Among its common facets are the political (which may be warlike or peaceful), the economic and technological, the cultural (which later includes arts, customs, modes of dress, etc). Other facets include interaction between legal and judicial systems, language and folklore, religion, philosophy and cosmology.²

Though writing on the Igbo and their neighbours, Afigbo's theory is very relevant in our understanding of the Jukun-Tiv relations, particularly in the precolonial era. Both communities benefited from one another in one way or the other. In the case of the Jukun, Obaro Ikime,³ Abraham, R.C⁴ and Sargent R.A⁵ talk more of military gains. All agreed that the Tiv gave assistance to the Jukun to check external aggression. In similar vein, some Tiv like Akiga⁶ and Ikpa tried to show how this development helped to cement relationship between the Tiv political titleholders and the Jukun leadership, arguing that:

By the 1850's most influential people in society (Tiv society) sought to enhance their influence through a combination of magico-religious power. To make it more effective, there was the need to import magical powers from the neighbouring ethnic group. The Jukun were reputed for having such powers, most influential men therefore paid homage to the Aku Uka at Wukari to acquire the Jukun "Tsav" (witchcraft).⁷

Whether the Tor Agbande institution and other magico-religious titles among the Tiv were more or less individualised, the preponderance of such title holders among the Tiv people suggested the level of co-operation between the Tiv and the Jukun. While

title holders depended so much on the Jukun at Wukari for royal regalia,⁸ the Jukun ruler, the Aku Uka, received various gifts from the Tiv recipients. The symbiotic nature of the politico-cultural ties between the Tiv and the Jukun compelled the two communities to employ all available avenues to sustain the union. Dewar⁹ specifically asserted that the Jukun who were the greatest beneficiary in the union did little or nothing to discourage their ties with the Tiv people.

Like Afigbo rightly pointed out in his discussion on the Igbo and their neighbours, no matter the level of peaceful interaction between the Tiv and the Jukun, conflicts still ensued, particularly in the colonial years. Others like Coser would rather hold to the opinion that the occurrence of conflict in the process of inter-group relations is a normal social process. He stressed that, "conflicts and social solidarity are mutually reinforcing; conflict promotes social integration..."¹⁰

It is no doubt that conflicts and social solidarity are mutually reinforcing. However, for inter-group relations, it is common knowledge that the nature and form of social solidarity resulting from the phenomenon of conflicts most often produces distinct rival identities, which harbour the potential for occasional conflicts. Here, the groups involved usually retire from hostility only when they seem to attain some level of balance of power; that is, a period of mutual fear and suspicion for one another.

Weber's theory seems to lean towards the foregoing debate. According to him, the immediate response to force is counterforce, hence in the short run, violence intensifies violence. In the long run, it does not.¹¹ While the first part of Weber's theory is easily discernable in the developments in various societies, the latter part of

the theory can hardly be grafted into the experiences of many other societies. It is no doubt that there are some societies in the world whose histories are basically explained by hostility. This explains why it seems safe to argue that the short run and long run should be construed essentially in relative terms.

Whether Weber's theory gives the impression that the violent world would eventually graduate into a peaceful world, Judith Asuni rather argues on the contrary that:

conflict is part of life, and often a part of growth and change. We can live with it, which implies learning about it, making choices, and seeking to transform it in a creative way: or we can live in it, and allow it to undermine objectives or become destructive.¹²

Both Weber and Asuni's theories are very relevant in our understanding of incidents of violence in inter-group relations. As long as collective resolves are not completely actualised, inter-group tension will ever remain a normal human phenomenon. Since no society will at any time achieve all its objectives, Fine and Macbeth are constrained to argue that, "Whenever people are in contact with each other, there is potential for conflict. This potential will vary according to the different degrees of combustibility of individuals."¹³

Fine and Macbeth's theory sounds very relevant in our understanding of the way and manner societies take to violence. It equally introduces a very important variable which needs an indepth analysis, that is, the contention that the potential varies according to the degree of combustibility of the individual. It is, indeed, true that the same conditions that may push one society into violence may not attain the potency to cause another to do same.

The issue under review no doubt introduces the idea of the culture of violence as remarked by the West African Pilot that, "...the culture of a particular people makes them prone to violent behaviour. The protagonists of this view refer to a warrior culture or the natural anarchism of a people for violence."¹⁴

While not attempting to dismiss the theory of the culture of violence as expressed by the West African Pilot, it should be stressed that the culture of violence is essentially a feature of all humans. The significant difference here remains only with the difference in which individuals stir up the potential into open hostility. Here, both Stuart Hall and the West African Pilot make very useful contributions. While Stuart Hall appreciates the fact that, "the context of the immediate situation is of greater significance to how people act and react than their personalities."¹⁵, the West African Pilot rather introduces a dramatic analogy, stating that, "...when harmless lambs are pushed to the extremity of the walls... and all chances of escape are impossible, will they not turn back and bite."¹⁶

In looking at the remote and immediate conditions that throw the Tiv at war with their neighbours, there is a general view that the people have a warrior culture. That is, the tendency to resort to war in the first of any provocation. In another perspective, it is common knowledge that in the glorious years of the then Kwararafa kingdom, the Jukuns devastated several communities in their wars. That trend is still discernable today. the Jukuns had maintained hostility with the Tiv since the colonial years.

The most important thing therefore is not necessarily that these two communities imbibe a warrior culture, but rather, what are those variables that keep

them at war. Even if these two communities, in the face of their aggression towards one another, still appropriate to themselves the "harmless lamb status", the most important thing remains about what have been bringing these "harmless lambs" at war with one another. This leads to the issue of what conflict means.

The incident of conflict in inter-group relations is basically perceived to be a dislocation in human relation. This dislocation is variously expressed, either through the channels of war or quarrel or by silence or rather cold war. Whatever might be used to explain this phenomenon, Fred Mehden introduces the debate in the most acceptable way, emphasising that:

there is no single cause... which is more or less important. In fact, usually, there are multiple causes and important contributing conditions rooted in historical relationships and brought to violence by a variety of catalysts... Each conflict has been unique.¹⁷

Mehden does not only ascribe to a pluralistic approach in the attempt to explain causes of violence in society, but also believes in the equal importance of all variables associated with any conflict. To him, it is the result of the accumulation of diverse factors that usually project one or more factors as the only best or most potent alternative.

Against Mehden or the orthodox theories are the Neo-Marxists who give primacy to the economic factor to explain socio-political and economic developments in the human society. The Marxists theory suggests that, no matter whatever people might say about all human actions, the fundamental objective is the struggle for survival. The struggle itself is a function of the structure of the economy. And like man, "Government is also locked up into the structure of the economy".¹⁸ Invariably,

all human actions, be they individual or collective, private or public, are basically determined by the developments within the structure of the economy. It is in the light of the central role played by the economy in human actions that the materialists tend to strongly argue that the economic factors offer the best inputs in the search for understanding the developments in society. Here, Stuart Hall sets the ball rolling, arguing that, "We know that the economic system co-ordinates many different decisions and activities - and thus helps to integrate society."¹⁹

Hall's theory needs a closer review, since it is very central in the understanding of our subject. The point to note here is that, though the economy is seen as an integrative ingredient, it can only assume this role effectively when its inherent contradictions are removed. Unfortunately, the strings that tie the economy to its contradictions are unbreakable; hence perpetually subjecting society to frictional relationships.

This debate informs us why Karl Marx, rather than bothering himself with how contradictions could be removed within the structure of the economy stated that, "The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life... the foundations on which arise a legal political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness."²⁰

To Karl Marx, the nature and form of mode of production, and production relations, condition the forces of development or otherwise in society. This implies that even the social and mental consciousness of man, which push him into acting in one way or the other are all functions of the nature and form of the production

relations. According to Marx, it is reactions against the injustices or the contradictions inherent in the production relations that propel the course of history.

Marx went further to anchor his debate on a firmer ground when he stated that:

In social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will... At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production.²¹

Marx sees this development as a general phenomenon of struggle for survival when he argued that, "Like all other animals, man is obliged to wage a struggle for his existence... the production relations determine all other forms of relations existing among people..."²²

Both views by Marx point to the fact that since material life is the essence of existence, man has to strive to live by active participation in productive activities. This involves ownership, and the use, of means of production, including land, which is very crucial in any agrarian society. The central role played by land in this case justifies how conflicts normally arise any moment man perceives any threat to deny him access to this crucial variable.

As valid as Karl Marx's arguments are, and as central as the economy is in determining most human actions, it seems quite sweeping to hold the economy as the only important parameter in explaining all forms of human actions. However, rather than accept the attack on the seeming fanaticism of most neo-marxist theorists, Plekhanov put up a firm defence, arguing that,

It has often been said... indeed it is still being said that... Marx slandered people in denying the existence of any other incentive except the economy - the striving to acquire material wealth. This is not true, and

to show you how false it is, I shall cite an example from zoology. You know, of course that an animal's entire anatomical structure, all its habits and instincts, are determined by... its mode of struggle for existence. But that does not mean that the lion has only a single need - devouring flesh, or that the sheep has only one desire - to nibble grass. Far from it, both herbivorous and carnivorous animals have many other needs and many other inclinations: the need to multiply their kind, the need to play and so on. However, the way in which these numerous needs are met is determined by the way an animal wins its food.²³

Plekhanov's analogy on the entire anatomical structure of animal is very relevant, and points to the crucial role the economy plays in life generally. This all-embracing illustration no doubt implies that even animals openly resist any attempt to frustrate their struggle to have access to material life. It equally explains why animals, like man, always abandon whatever engagement to search for food whenever such important need arises. In the same vein, it raises a very important point that the way the animal meets its numerous needs is significantly a function of how the animal wins its food. This underscores the importance of the amount of energy an animal always exerts in its attempt to win its food.

Even though it can not go unmentioned that Plekhanov is essentially emotional in his defence for Marx, his argument is very meaningful in our understanding of the origins of the downtrends in the Tiv-Jukun relations over the years. Available evidences show that both communities in the area began to feel that their opportunities to access over land as a crucial factor of production were being drastically slimmed down or threatened. This fear was expressed mostly by the Jukuns, who began to feel that the ever increasing grip over land and politics by the Tiv was/and is a dangerous signal to their politico-economic life. Since then, this fear

has continued to be expressed by both the Jukun leadership and the Jukun elite. For instance, while the incumbent Aku Uka, His Royal Highness, Mallam Shekarau Angyu Masa Ibi, Kuvyo II, laments that, "They came here to farm; we allowed them... now that their population has increased... the Tiv would not allow us to give land to our children."²⁴ Reverend Luka Agbu remarks that, "The Tiv who know fully well that they are settlers in Wukari Local Government Area, which belongs to the Jukuns decided on seizing the land."²⁵ It is explicit that even though both views fail to clearly explain how the Tiv "would not allow us to give land to our children", and how they "seized" the land, the views reinforce one another, and equally point to a common denominator, that is, the importance of land to man, and how man is always alert to dictate any possible attempts to deny him access to land.

Concerning the Neo-Marxist debate, many scholars still find it very difficult to completely submit to the acclaimed role of the economy as the only best alternative in explaining causes of changes and developments in society. Invariably, this group of scholars referred to as the traditional or orthodox theorists prefer other factors like the socio-political as essential ingredients in explaining developments in society. A number of these traditionalists lean more on politics in their attempts to explain causes of changes and developments in society.

In the area of politics and violence in society, David Potter introduces a clinching statement in the debate. According to him, "Societies are divided, individuals, groups and classes have many real differences of interests and outlook."²⁶

It is obvious that the presence of "real differences" harbours the potential for inter-group or interclass conflicts. It is however expedient to note that these differences in themselves alone do not convincingly explain the causes of inter-group frictions. Rather, it is the point at which these differences start to clash, and are being selfishly managed that the potency for conflict is laid bare. In other words, the presence of these differences only explains the potential for possible conflicts giving other variables like self-centredness in pursuing, achieving and consolidating group objectives. And since these variables continue to reappear, Remi Anifowose is constrained to assert that, "Violence or the threat of violence is a universal phenomenon."²⁷

Bruce Smith also underscores the point on the drawing board when he declared that, "Violence has always been part of the political process..."²⁸ While Smith may be criticised for making this sweeping generalisation, the important point, however, admitted is that violence as part of the political process is more or less the dominant political feature in developing societies.

Both Charles Tilly and Remi Anifowose give us the picture of the nature and form of violence accruing from the political process. Both look at political violence essentially as a collective resolve. According to Charles Tilly, for instance, "Collective violence has flowed regularly from the political process... Men seeking to seize, hold or realign the levers of power have continually engaged in collective violence as part of their struggle."²⁹

Anifowose in his work on the "Tiv and the Yoruba experience" in Nigerian politics in the First Republic argues that:

Violence has always been used by groups seeking power, by groups holding power, and by groups in the process of losing power. Violence has been pursued in the defence of order by the privileged, in the name of justice by the oppressed, and in the fear of displacement by the threatened.³⁰

While we can not refute both views by Tilly and Anifowose, this dominant feature is more common with developing societies. It is particularly common with immatured polities where political parties seem to assume the status of warring camps; a situation of an unhealthy competition where politics, particularly the cling over political power, is seen essentially as a do or die affair. This contention has direct bearing on the nature of political culture being exhibited by both the Tiv and the Jukun in Wukari since the colonial era. For instance, while the Jukun, who have always been on the throne, see the Tiv political manouvre as a threat to their much cherished position, the Tiv on the other hand, see themselves as a group that should be given the chance to be enthroned. These variant aspirations have, indeed, been the source of frictions between the Tiv and the Jukuns over generations.

Contributing to the debate on politics and violence in society, Lewis Coser asserted that violence, "...comes about when some groups can not get heard or when some groups feel that they have a vested interest in suppressing voices being raised and resort to violence rather than opening up the political structure."³¹

It is common knowledge that Coser's remark has been manifesting in the body politics, particularly of developing nations. In most of these nations characterised by diverse ethnic affiliations and conflicting interests, politics is being played with high sense of rivalry. And in most areas, the dominant groups usually refuse to open up the political structure in order to accomodate the underprivileged groups. In

some, where powerful groups co-exist, the result is always violence, particularly whenever one group suspects the other of trying to use the machinery of governance to exercise dominance. In the area of Wukari, the Jukun and the Tiv opinions as expressed by their elite explain why political violence has continued to be a dominant feature of the area over the years. For instance, while the Jukun opinion cautioned that, “Wukari is the only Local Government Area we can call our own. We have no other place. Is it wrong if we decide to die to ensure that Wukari remains ours?”³² The Tiv on the other hand remarked that “...are the Tiv going to depoliticise themselves to allow the Jukun take over as the Jukun want... The Tiv are getting more prepared to be politically involved in the local government administration.”³³

It is apparent that both positions by the two communities present an unhealthy political atmosphere. The orientations of both positions represent a society that has lost the essential integrative ingredients. The two dominant segments now see politics as the only instrument or weapon with which parochial group interests can be pursued, attained and consolidated. This growing posture, indeed, contravenes Plato and Siedentop's theories for healthy inter-group relations. Looking at what supposed to be an ideal society, Plato maintained that, “A community may be described as an aggregate of people occupying a common territory and sharing, not specific or limited interests, but the basic conditions of a common life.”³⁴ Siedentop pushes further Plato's argument to remark that for any community to enjoy peace, “...the members of the community must accept certain basic common beliefs, values and aspirations, without which the life of the group will lack the essential ingredients of coherence and integration.”³⁵

Looking at human society, since creation, the type of societies conceived by both Plato and Siedentop are merely utopian in nature. The interplay of other variables like colonialism, government actions and ethnicity add more ingredients to one's view. In the most condensed perspective, colonialism could be perceived as an alien rule over a people. And its most dominant feature is extreme selfish aggrandisement to the detriment of the colonised. Its divide-and-rule attitude did not only help to weaken internal cohesion, but significantly laid the foundation for inter-group rivalries.

It is common knowledge that in its attempt to weaken and, possibly, destroy all forms of opposition, the colonial machinery, wherever it found itself, did everything possible to destroy the essential instruments of internal cohesion and integration. This divisive attitude was earnestly pursued by instigating one group against the other. In this way, while recognising ethnic differences, the colonial machinery usually allied with some groups as means of weakening internal opposition. This attitude, of course, reinforces Samir Amir's remark that, "...colonial politics which exploited ethnic differences, when it was useful, and also in reaction to the ideology of colonialism placed emphasis on tribal identity."³⁶

What needs to be added to the position of Amir is that colonialism, like succeeding regimes, failed to perform the very important function of government which Hall conceives to be, "Linking, connecting, co-ordinating, integrating different groups, institutions and functions into some kind of unity."³⁷ Nieburg equally sees the fundamental role of government in Hall's context. According to him:

All state systems must integrate into power structure at least those groups who are self-conscious, organised, interested, and capable of exercising private power in some manner...Every regime... must set about building consensus somewhere... most importantly among those who themselves retain the capability of imposing high costs and risks through concerted action if they are arrogantly neglected.³⁸

Both the colonial and post-colonial regimes acted, and have continued to act, very contrary to Nieburgs' honest declaration. In fact, right from the inception of modern instrument of governance, conspicuous discrimination has continued to flow within the system. In the case of the colonial regime, it is important to mention that we cannot properly comprehend colonialism and inter-group rivalries without bringing into focus the intent and orientations of most colonial boundaries. Here, Akombo once stated that:

One of the most arbitrary colonial actions that had very negative effect on inter-group relations in most colonial territories... was the bastardisation of entities into administrative units otherwise known as countries, provinces, and Native Authorities. And the most counterproductive of this policy was the creation of divisions purported to serve not only as administrative units, but also as ethnic enclaves or reserves.³⁹

While one's declaration may sound like a victim of the colonial policy, those who seem to be protected by same, like Bulus Bauka, argues that administrative units were created on ethnic boundaries so that "...no tribe interfered with the affairs of the other."⁴⁰ In as much as it is difficult to accept Bauka's argument due to the interwoven nature of ethnic groups in most African societies, it is sad that in most colonial administrative units, groups that enjoyed the patronage and protection of the colonial regime used Bauka's yardstick to interpret administrative units and boundaries. It is

on this note that it can be said that colonial boundaries and ethnicity reinforced one another.

According to Anene, however, the colonial behaviour of conceiving administrative units, particularly Native Authorities, essentially as ethnic reserves was grossly in error because,

In some areas where there were no segmented communities and where probably no dramatic wars of conquest occurred, the extreme intermingling of splintered groups created intractable problems in the matter of demarcating a homogeneous community.⁴¹

Consequently, Anene went further to stress that:

The idea of a tribe as an isolated and closed group is certainly a myth for many parts of Africa. There were instances of overlapping and interlocking of diverse tribes. The migration of segments of one tribe and their intermingling with or absorption by other groups produced considerable complexity. New communities and languages were often the result.⁴²

Orr shares Anene's view when he tried to analyse the consequences of human migrations, declaring that, "...tribes roll upon another like the waves of the sea, and these human currents intermingle to form fresh combinations, the characteristics of whose various elements are barely discernable."⁴³

In his attempt to address the incident of perennial inter-group rivalries in the Middle Belt region of Nigeria, George Kwanasie, pointing, in part, to ethnicity, remarked that,

Ethnic cleansing is not an option for the region... Whatever might happen to other parts of Nigeria... and to Nigeria itself... the Central Nigerian area will remain an area of extensive ethnic, linguistic and religious mix⁴⁴

The remarks by both Anene and Orr, including Kwanasie, imply that, for many parts of Africa, including the area under review, administrative arrangements geared towards sanctioning exclusive ethnic reserves cannot be conceived beyond seeds of discord. Unfortunately, the 19th century European imperialism toyed along this line. Consequently, as Basil remarks, "Nineteenth century imperialism cut across boundaries and peoples and left for a later Africa, the problem of redrawing frontiers on a national plan."⁴⁵

While we can not deny concerted efforts being made by post colonial African States to redraw frontiers on national plans, it is sad, as Davidson Basil argued, that such attempts always follow the irrational and, of course, the frictious colonial draw boards. Here, in Nigeria, for instance, the creation of states, local government areas and other smaller administrative units always make fetish of the philosophy of the colonial draw boards. It is, indeed, too soon for us to be oblivious of the fact that the evolution of the first twelve states in Nigeria under Gowon's regime was an administrative exercise that consciously or unconsciously made fetish of the philosophy of the four regions expressed by the colonial regime.

What is more disturbing, and which has been responsible for some communal clashes, is that even in some demands for states, the ethnic factor is always romanticised. Since the regime of Shehu Shagari, many demands for states are always ethnic skew whiff. The demands for local government areas are more vulnerable to this ethnic orientation.

Sadly, government response to some of these ethnic or group oriented demands always sanctioned this negative and un-integrative tendency. If not a pointer

to this fact, what impression does it give when we hear names of states like Edo and Ekiti. And for local government areas, the proliferation of such ethnic or group oriented appellations can better be imagined than enumerated in a study of this nature.

The danger inherent in this enterprise is that if each of these geopolities were compact cocoons, serviced by single groups, peace and unity would have been their dominant feature. On the contrary, within most of these areas, ethnic or group identities are very highly conspicuously proliferated. Even along these border lines there are considerable levels of fluidity such that it becomes very difficult to define the exact terminal boundary points. Anene sees this as a problem situation when he stated that, "There are inevitable conditions of fluidity along most of the boundary zones of Nigeria... which are potential sources of boundary disputes."⁴⁶

Indeed, the fluidity question does not only result in inter-boundary disputes, but even to intra-boundary skirmishes. This results from the attempts by the communities to create for themselves exclusive reserves, even in places where history will never sanction. For instance, in the perennial Tiv-Jukun rivalry, many Jukun elite like Princess Grace Atoshi⁴⁷ and Luka Agbu⁴⁸ blame it, in part, to boundary issue. Many Jukun seem to believe that the borderlines are not "tight" enough to filter out the Tiv in what they believe to be their "father land". But one believes that this conception is grossly in error due to the fluidity along the Tiv-Jukun border lines.

Sadly, in our contemporary society, rather than learn to appreciate one another, due to hatred for one another, more energies are exerted in attempts to create exclusive reserves. In fact, the attack on this growing attitude formed the core of the address by the then Chief of General Staff, Rear Admiral Mike Akhigbe⁴⁹, who receiving the report of the Justice Mohammed Boundary Adjustment Committee set up by the Federal Government in 1997 to look into boundary oriented issues arising from state and local government creation exercises in the country.

While receiving the report, Rear Admiral Akhigbe lamented over the numerous cases of boundary disputes arising, in part, from state and local government creation in the country. He wondered why communities that had lived together for so long would now want to be separated from one another; even in cases where it is historically impossible. It was, in fact, as a result of the impossibility inherent in the attainment of these numerous selfish aspirations that Akhigbe concluded with a very solemn appeal to the people to learn to live together and appreciate one another instead of soliciting for separate enclaves.

To many political analysts like Chief Edet Bassey and the Punch Magazine, Akhigbe's declaration is mere hypocrisy. Elsewhere, we have mentioned how government policies and actions sometimes directly or indirectly result or promote inter-group rivalries. For instance, while Bassey subtly argues that it is, "...regrettable that some of these problems (communal clashes) can be traced to the bureaucratic indiscretions of some government functionaries especially in the location and relocation of local government headquarters in certain parts of the country."⁵⁰, The Punch harshly remarked that,

From the Warri carnage which consumed several lives and properties worth millions of naira, the Ife-Modakake internecine program, the Igbara-Oke/Laramoke scuffle, the Isua-oba-Akoko debates, the Ogbo-Lumbiri - Bassam clashes in Nembe and the recent Iju-Itaogbolu destruction of properties... all have combined to make nonsense of local government creation exercises... The Jukun/Chamba and Kuteb tribes of Takum in Taraba State were at each others throat toward the end of last year (1998) over the creation of two local governments from the old Takum local government.⁵¹

Whether Chief Edet and the Punch tighten the noose over the neck of government over the incessant cases of boundary oriented skirmishes, one still believes that the Akhigbe's appeal is very relevant to the situation in Wukari Local Government Area. Ever since the incident of colonialism, very fruitless, but destructive, attempts are being made by successive regimes in the area to give the erroneous impression that where the Tiv can not be completely removed from Wukari, he must suffer rejection as a settler. This negative policy first came into operation in the abortive colonial "Ring Fence Policy"⁵² during which the colonial regime attempted to separate the Tiv from the Jukun.

The continual reference to the colonial boundaries and violence raises a very crucial issue in our understanding of the way and manner colonial boundaries intensified inter-group rivalries. This is the idea of ethnicity as promoted by the colonial boundary policies. It is apparent that both ethnicity and boundary issues reinforced one another, and hence igniting inter-group tensions across former colonial territories.

The form of ethnicity that neutralises all ingredients of cohesion in society is the egocentric type; the type poisoned with the spirit of ethnic exclusiveness, and

founded on lack of tolerance and love for one another. Heinecke and Grove try to condense the debate when the former argued that, "Ethnicity is a strained and exaggerated feeling of difference in relation to other ethnic groups."⁵³ Grove takes the debate to the drawing board when he stated that, "...tension arises where one section of a community assumes that it is superior to the others and seeks privileges not accorded to the rest."⁵⁴

The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD, 1995:95) contributes meaningfully to the debate, declaring that, "Ethnicity is a deeply emotional basis of mobilisation that not merely distinguishes one group from the other but can also dehumanise and demonise the other group."⁵⁵ Gulliver, however, gives us a more subtle definition, arguing that, "We understand the term tribalism to be sentiments of allegiance generally felt towards an ethnic group... or to a culture or heritage."⁵⁶

All the views expressed above do not look at the concept of ethnicity as an integrative ingredient, especially where more than one ethnic group exist. Rather, all the views point to the fact that this type of consciousness normally degenerate into unhealthy inter-group consciousness devoid of all the essential variables of integration. In Nigeria, right from the period of the struggle for self rule, ethnic and regional allegiance crept into our body politics. This found expression from the fact that, in their attempt to evolve political parties to fight for independence, all the three leading Nigerian nationalists, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Obafemi Awolowo and Sir Ahmadu Bello, coiled back into ethnic and regional unions. It was, indeed, out of these unions that the country's three leading parties, the Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC), the

National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroun (NCNC) and the Action Group (A.G) emerged.

Both Amadi and Ade Ajayi expresses displeasure over the way and manner our political culture was evolved. Amadi was constrained to remark that, "...the pioneer leaders began the process of their political ideas within the crucible of... traditional institutions and tribal unions."⁵⁷ Ade Ajayi on his part lamented that, "...the driving force of nationalism in Nigeria was not loyalty to Nigeria as such, but racial consciousness."⁵⁸

In connection with the above views, the type of political culture evolved by our leading nationalists no doubt deflated the type of integrative ingredients the Nigerian Society needed for socio-political harmony. This unhealthy development constrained Anifowose to lament that:

For sometime, the feeling of Nigerian nationalism did develop but as inter ethnic rivalries and political manoeuvres became more intensive with the approach of self government, those who called themselves Nigerian nationalists came to behave less as Nigerians than as representatives of their various ethnic groups. After the achievement of independence, the lust for power and personal aggrandisement revived the myth of ethnic exclusiveness.⁵⁹

Amadi's contention does not only imply that our leading nationalists decided to lean more on the instrument of ethnicity in their attempts to build political pyramids, but also explains the basis of Awolowo's declaration in one of AG's rallies that:

It is our belief that any overall Nigerian unity which does not give due regard to the peculiarities and solidarity of the various ethnic groups in the country is bound to fail as it has done in the past. The AG believes in the solidarity of the west as a sure means to the Federal Unity of Nigeria.⁶⁰

Even if similar "clauses" were not contained in the constitutions of either the NPC or the NCNC, their activities showed that their programmes and policies did not diverge from the AG. In fact, the dominance of the Igbo in the NCNC, and the Hausa/Fulani factor in the NPC, and the way each party pursued group interest clearly demonstrated the point under review. It is evident that while these dominant parties believed in the "peculiarities and solidarity" of the various ethnic groups in the country, they did not seem to perceive this beyond their ethnic boundaries. It was this dangerous trend, which produced the minority, question, which has remained a cog in the attainment of meaningful inter-group harmony in the country.

Heinecke, in his study of the origins of ethnicity, and who promotes it, holds the elite to ransom. In his study, he stressed that, "the only few elite representatives who are close to the states' sources of strategic opportunity engage in ethnicity, stirring up acrimonious squabbles in their struggle to grab a share of the national wealth. Ethnicity is therefore an elite phenomenon."⁶¹

While Heinecke's broad view can not be refuted, UIF Himmelstrand, on his part, brings the point closer home when he asserted that, "The Nigerian tribalism of recent years is mainly a political tribalism stemming not from primordial ethnic loyalties as such, but from politically exploited and reinforced reactions... involving different ethnic groups..."⁶²

Himmelstrand's introduction of the concept "of political tribalism" is very relevant, in part, not only in our understanding of the perennial Tiv-Jukun rivalry, but also other similar experiences across the country. In the case of Wukari, it is apparent that right from the colonial era, both the Tiv and the Jukun had become very

conscious of their egocentric identities, and perceived with envy, any political gains enjoyed by the other. For instance, in his attempt to look at the major political developments that helped to dent the Tiv-Jukun relations particularly close to the attainment of independence, Tseror maintained that, “Tiv-Jukun political tension heightened in 1958 when a Tiv, Tangul Gaza, of the NEPU/UMBC Alliance decisively defeated Ibrahim Sangari (a pro Jukun) of the NPC in the Federal House of Representatives Elections in the Wukari constituency.”⁶³

This singular event generated lots of political issues, and above all pointed to the fact that the two groups were no longer in the mood to celebrate any political gains enjoyed by the other. Our discussion on ethnicity and inter-group violence can not be exhaustive without re-emphasizing the role being played by the elite in different societies in stirring up acrimonies. Heinecke, Amadi, Ade Ajayi and Anifowose clearly indicted the elite. In Wukari, the elite from both communities can not be exonerated. Assuming the central role of mobilising their communities, the elite in this area built up the consciousness that negated the virtues of corporate actions. For instance, in one of their campaigns, the Jukun students' body was cited rebuking some members of their community, stating that, “It is a pity those who championed the cause of our rejection of the Tiv people during the state creation in 1975 are the same people who for sheer vantage are dragging us into the doldrums of social and economic paralysis by associating our innocent electorates with the Tiv.”⁶⁴

Whatever might have informed the above declaration, it is obvious that the Jukun students' body has begun to initiate a course for the permanent and total rejection of the Tiv people in Wukari. The Tiv Cultural and Social Association,

however, speaking through its' leader, Andrew M. Nenshi, reiterated among its people that,

The Tiv of Taraba State today have taken a look at their history, and their history tells them that they are on the right path. Whereas the people who do not read their history books will tell you that the Tiv people of Taraba are immigrant farmers, our history tells us that we are the original settlers on the land they now want to take from us.⁶⁵

We do not have to look at the attitude of the elite in Wukari, and elsewhere in the country in stirring up inter-group acrimonies in isolation. We are constrained to tracing the genesis of this negative trend. Anifowose blames it on the attitude of our frontier nationalists. In their political engineering, all the three leading figures suffered from egocentric tendencies as the West African Pilot once cited Zik thus,

It would appear the God of Africa has created the Igbo nation to lead the children of Africa from the bondage of the ages... The martial prowess of the Igbo nation at all stages of human history has enabled them not only to conquer others, but also to adopt themselves to the role of preserver... The Igbo nation can not shrink its responsibility from its manifest destiny.⁶⁶

Whether this is an exaggerated assertion, Awolowo's comment, possibly in reaction to the Igbo acclaimed status, clearly demonstrates the way and manner in which our leading nationalists leaned more on ethnic forces in their search for new political pyramids. According to Awolowo, "It seemed clear to me that the policy was to corrode the self respect of the Yoruba people as a group, to build up the Igbo as a master race."⁶⁷

Ahmadu Bello's "Northernisation Policy" as it affected the Hausa-Fulani Factor was similar to Zik and Awo's attitude which has continued to influence the attitudes of

most successive Nigerian elite in their struggle to hold unto power. It is on this note that one seems to agree with Heinecke when he argued that ethnicity, in the context of what affects our socio-political life process, is an elite phenomenon; a phenomenon passed unto successive generations by predecessors.

2.3.2 Unpublished Works

As pointed out earlier, this body of literature largely consists of students undergraduate projects from tertiary institutions, papers presented at seminars and conferences, masters dissertations and doctoral theses. While many of these sources have provided very useful insights in this study, only a few of them will be reviewed. Though the doctoral thesis of John Nengel on Precolonial Intergroup Relations in the Kauru and Pengana Polities of Central Nigeria does not deal directly with the case of the Jukun and Tiv societies in Taraba State, it is a path breaking work on intergroup relations in the Middle Belt which provides a very useful source of inspiration and insights for the analytical framework of this study. The thesis has been published by Peter Lang (1999) as *Precolonial African Intergroup Relations in the Kauru and Pengana Ploties of Central Nigeria 1800-1900*. In spite of the fact that the study focuses mainly on the precolonial period, it nenvertheless provides a classical framework of analysis between two widely different cultures, who theoritically had no dealing with each other except war, as permitted between Muslims and non-Muslims societies. Yet, through the establishment of non-aggression pacts, popularly known as *amana* relations, peaceful coexistence formed the bedrock of economic and political relations between the Muslims and non-Msulim in the Kauru and Pengana societies.

This provides one of the best practical examples for basis of peaceful coexistence in the case of the Jukun and Tiv in Wukari District.

The Doctoral Thesis of Binbiana F. Bawa on the Economy and Society in the Lowland Division of Plateau Province 1900-1960: A Study of the Impact of Colonialism, also provided very useful insights for this work. Her extensive assessment of the impact of colonial rule especially on the worrying problems of inter ethnic conflicts in the Lowland Division has been very enlightening and instructive. This also compares with Iyo's thesis on Tiv Nationalism and Some Aspects of British Rule, whose critical evaluation of the impact of colonialism has demonstrated that this has stirred up intergroup acrimonies in the Beneue Valley thereby laying the basis of recurrent conflicts experienced today in the area. Both Bawa and Iyo have spent much efforts in associating colonialism with intergroup rivalries, without necessarily looking at the internal dynamics that have been the underlining causes of some of the ethnic rivalries.

The study by Amadi O. Levi on The Problems and Prospects of Political Integration in Nigeria 1923-1966, has been of great relevance to this work. The thesis stresses the role of politics in inter-group rivalries. Though the work is well researched, its emphasis on the role of politics does not provide a balance analysis of ethnic rivalries in Nigeria. The theoretical framework of the study however contains some useful insights for the present study.

As regards the master dissertations, though many of these were consulted, among those found relevant to this study are works of Lawson E.H on the Kuteb, Kpanzu, Chamba Peoples of Takum: A Study in the History of Inter-Ethnic Relations

from 1900-1993; Yohanna S., The Colonial State and the Evolution of Social Stratification in Central Nigeria, The Case of Southern Zaria; Yabracks S.I, The British Colonial Conquest and its Impact on Tangale-Waja 1900-1960; Moriki M.L.B, The Alibawa Fulani Factor in the History of North-Eastern Zamfara, and Ninyio S.Y The Struggle for Atyap Chieftdom 1902-1995.

Like the doctoral theses, information from these dissertations were very useful in supplying ideas, concepts, and hypothesis for this study. Most of the contemporary communal and religious crises that have shaken the basis of the corporate existence of the nation are associated to the nature and forms of British colonial policies imposed on the country during the period of foreign rule. Besides information from theses and dissertations, others not discussed in this review but which were also relevant for this work were papers read at various fora.

2.3.3 Tertiary Sources

Materials derived from this category of sources comprise of published essays and other write ups in News Papers, Magazines and Pamphlets. Since information from this body of sources are largely meant for public enlightenment, entertainment, they are often fraught with sentiments, biases and lacking in objectivity. On account of this, tertiary materials are used with a great deal of caution. Despite the inherent problems associated with them, some contain very reliable information especially when used together with other primary sources. Among some of the major news papers used in the study are the Nigerian Magazine, West African Pilot, National Concord, Vanguard, The Punch, and Sunday Standard.

2.4 METHODOLOGY

There has been an increasing range of works of the Tiv and their neighbours, which include the Jukun. At present, much has been covered on the subject due to the growing conflicts between the Tiv and their neighbours, particularly with the Jukuns. Unfortunately, apart from the fact that much still remains to be covered, most available materials on the subject are not only scanty, but partisan in nature. The dearth of written source materials for the pre-colonial period is more worrisome. To address these numerous problems associated with the study of Tiv-Jukun relations since 1850, one decided to adopt a multi-dimensional approach, stretching across the following source materials.

Primary sources constituted one of the most important source materials used in the study. The sources used here were oral interviews, questionnaire, archival materials, Gazetteers and commissions. Oral interviews were of particular importance to the pre-colonial period. This is because of the lack of written materials for the period. Elders from the ages of forty-five years and above were interviewed from both communities on a variety of issues. A lot of problems were encountered in the use of oral interviews. Among the problems were lack of co-operation from some informants due to suspicion, identification of resourceful elders, supply of wrong information, much money, time and patience desired. In the face of these numerous problems, one employed patience and critical analysis of all information received.

Written questionnaires also proved very important. This was used on literate members of both communities from the ages of thirty years and above. The questionnaire provided a variety of useful information. Like oral interviews, some

informants, apart from being un-co-operative, misplaced their questionnaires. Others either refused to attempt questions or deliberately gave wrong responses. These numerous problems were tackled by patience, critical analysis of responses, including the use of other source materials for the purpose of cross-examination.

Archival materials were also of great importance in this study. The materials provided the researcher with wide range of colonial policies in the area, clearly showing how the policies sowed the seed of discord between the Tiv and the Jukuns. The major problems encountered were how to locate the relevant materials, and the money involved in looking for the materials. Similarly, very classified reports of commissions and gazettes were not easily released. However, through patience and the use of money, much archival materials were acquired.

The secondary sources consulted included books and journals, including unpublished thesis. These materials provided useful information on issues of origins, migrations, contacts and interactions between societies. They also provided useful materials on the areas of conflict and compromise in the process of inter-group contact and interaction over the years. In as much as these materials were useful, they had inherent shortcomings which were addressed by careful analysis of issues raised.

Tertiary sources like newspapers, magazines, radio and television were also very useful. As a result of the currency of some of these issues, these sources supplied wide range of materials. Some of the materials did not only portray high sense of ignorance, but were also very partisan in nature. These problems were tackled by constant cross-examination of information received from these sources.

ENDNOTES

1. Afigbo A.E, Igbo and their Neighbours: Intergroup Relations in South Eastern Nigeria to 1953, Ibadan University Press, Ibadan, 1987, p.18
2. Ibid., p.19
3. Ikime, Obaro "The British Pacification of the Tiv 1908", in Journal of Historical Society of Nigeria (JHSN), vol. viii, No 1, December, 1973, p. 106.
4. Abraham, op.cit. p.19
5. Sergent R.A, Anglo-Tiv Relations 1855-1914: The Era of Aggression, BVPP, No. 10, p.20.
6. Akiga, op.cit. p.364
7. Ikpa, op.cit. pp.83-84.
8. Ortese Abelaka, Interview; cf. Makar, The Political Change Among the Tiv p.160.
9. Dewar K., "Assessment Report on Ukan and Ikov", in NAK, quoted by Makar, op.cit., p.160.
10. Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflicts, New York, Free Press, 1956, p.95
11. Ferry Feierabends, "Violent Consequences of Violence", in Herbert Hirsch and David Perry (eds.) Violence as Politics, New York, Harper and Raw, 1973, p.218.
12. Asuni Judith (ed.), Handout for Community Leaders on Conflict Management, Lagos, 1998, p.2.
13. NicFine and Fiona Macbeth, "Playing with Fire", in Youth Work Press, 1992, quoted by Judith Asuni, op.cit., p.5.
14. Remi Anifowose. Violence and Politics in Nigeria: The Tiv and Yoruba Experience, Nok Publishers International Ltd., Enugu, 1982, p.17.
15. Stuart Hall, "Conformity, Consensus and Conflict", in David Potter, et al (eds.) , Society and the Social Sciences, Open University Press, London, 1981, p.157.
16. Anifowose, op.cit. p.257

17. Fred R. V. Mehden, Comparative Political Violence, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1973, pp.113-114,
18. Coates, "Politics, Legitimacy and the State", in David Potter, et al, Society and the Social Sciences, Open University Press, London, 1981, p.221
19. Hall, op.cit., p.259
20. Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1973, pp.20-21.
21. Georgi Plekhanov, "The Materialistic Understanding of History", Handout, History Department, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, 1983, p.31.
22. Ibid., p.32
23. Ibid., p.35
24. The Times Week Magazine, No. 43, February 3rd, 1992, quoted by Avav and Myegba, The Dream to Conquer, Swem Kalegbe series, p.15.
25. Luka Agbu, Report on Conflict between Jukun and Tiv in Wukari Local Government Area, MAMSER Office, Wukari, 1992 p.155
26. Potter, et al, op.cit., p.155
27. Remi Anifowose, Violence and Politics in Nigeria: The Tiv and Yoruba Experience, Nok Publishers International Ltd, Enugu, 1982, p.1
28. Bruce Smith, "The Politics of Violence: How Effective is Violence?", in Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, xxx, 1, 1968, p.111.
29. Charles Tilly, "Collective Violence in European Perspective", in Hugh D. Graham and Ted Gurr (eds.), The History of Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives, New York Press, New York, 1969, p.4
30. Anifowose, op.cit., p.1
31. Lewis Coser, quoted by Henry Bien, in Violence and Social Change, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968, p.24.
32. African Concord, 29th October, 1990, quoted by Timothy Tseror, Tiv and their Neighbours: A History of Relations in the 19th and 20th centuries, PHA Press, Jos, 1992, p.69
33. Mason Myegba (45 yrs) Interview.

34. Plato, The Republic, p.115
35. Larry Siedentop, The Nature of Political Theory, Oxford University Press, London, 1983, pp.53-75
36. Samir Amir, (ed.), Modern Migration in West Africa: Studies presented at the Eleventh International African Seminar, Dakar, April, 1972, Oxford University Press, 1974, p.117.
37. Hall, op.cit., p.
38. Nieburg H.L, Political Violence: The Behavioural Process, New York: St. Martin Press, 1969, p.104
39. Akombo E. I, "Community Co-existence, Peace and Harmony: The Case of the Tiv-Jukun in former Wukari Federation", A Paper presented at the instance of the Vision 2010 Committee, Taraba State Chapter, Investment House, Jalingo, 23rd Oct., 1997, p.6.
40. Bauka B. A. "Position Paper on Community Strategies for Stemming Communal Violence in Nigeria", at African Leadership Forum, Jos, 26th-28th January, 1995, pp.4-5
41. Anene J.C, The International boundaries of Nigeria - 1885-1960: The Framework of an Emergent African Nation, Longman, London, 1970, p.12
42. Ibid., p.5
43. Orr, C.W.J The Making of Northern Nigeria, Faber, London 1911, p.67.
44. Kwanashie George , "Ethnic Conflicts and Communal Violence in Nigeria: Some Reflections on the Experiences of the Middle Belt", A Paper Presented on the Theme: Inter-ethnic Harmony and Community Relations in the Middle Belt and other parts of Nigeria, at the instance of African Leadership Forum, Sampati House, Jos, 26th-28th January, 1995, p.12.
45. Davidson Basil, Old Africa Rediscovered, Faber and Fager, London, 1959, p.268
46. Anene, op.cit., p.xvi
47. Atoshi Grace, The Story of the Jukun/Tiv Crisis: Why and How they Happened, Amune Press, Wukari, 1992.
48. Agbu, op.cit., p.3
49. NTA Network News, 9 p.m, 25th August, 1998

50. National Concord, vol.17, No.3772, 5th March, 1998
51. The Punch Magazine, February 24th, 1998
52. SNP 17/9/C: Munshi Tribe, Necessity for Providing for Expansion in the South Western Area, 1932.
53. Heinecke P., Popular Fallacies in the Nigerian Social Sciences, Zaria, 1984, p.43
54. Grove A.T, Africa, 3rd Edition, Oxford University Press, 1978, p.55.
55. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (URISD) Report, 1995, p.95.
56. Gulliver P.A, "Anthropology", in Robert A. Lystad (ed.), The African World: A Survey of Research, quoted by Remi Anifowose, op.cit., p.36
57. Amadi L. O. 'The Problem and Process of Political Integration in Nigeria, 1923-1966,' Ph.D Thesis, University of Jos, 1992, p.206.
58. Ajayi A. J.F, "Nineteenth Century Origins of Nigerian Nationalism", in Journal of Historical Society of Higeria (JHSN), vol.ii, No.2, December 1961, pp.196-209.
59. Anifowose, op.cit., p.36
60. Awolowo, Obafemi , "Text of an Address delivered at an A.G. Rally at Glover Memorial Hall, 26th August, 1951".
61. Heinecke, op.cit., p.44
62. Himmelstrand Ulf, "Tribalism, Nationalism, Rank Equilibrium and Social Structure", in Journal of Peace Research, vol.2, 1969, pp.81-103.
63. Tseror, op.cit., p.62.
64. Adi Atohinko, et al, "The Tiv Factor in our Fatherland", in the Analyst vol.6, No.1, 1991.
65. Nenshi A.M. "Goodwill Message from the Tiv People of Taraba State on the Occasion of Tiv Day, September 21st, 1991, cited by Atohinko, in Tiv-Jukun Communal Clashes: A Reconsideration, Wukari, 1992, pp.28-29
66. West African Pilot, July 8th, 1948
67. Awolowo Obafemi, The Autobiography of Chief Obafemi Awolowo, Cambridge University Press, 1960, p.135.

CHAPTER THREE

PRECOLONIAL JUKUN-TIV RELATIONS IN WUKARI LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA 1850-1899

3.1 AN OVERVIEW OF JUKUN-TIV RELATIONS

To many scholars, the Tiv people are a very intractable group that speaks and hears only the language of violence.¹ It is contended that this natural instinct makes it difficult for the group to create and sustain any lasting peaceful relationships with its neighbours. This general conception has been rationalised by the echoes of the violent experiences recorded between the Tiv and their neighbours, and even among Tiv communities in recent times.

In Wukari Local Government Area, the events of 1959², 1964³, 1977⁴, 1990-92⁵, and 2001-2002⁶ give the general impression that the Tiv-Jukun contact and interaction in the area has been significantly characterised by confrontation, conflict and violence. Since this period, particularly from 1990, Tiv-Jukun relation has gone to an alarming fragile level that one hardly believes that the two groups ever lived peacefully with one another.

A very close look at the pre-colonial history of the relationship between the Tiv and the Jukun does not support such a gloomy picture. While it is true that the Tiv have a difficult nature, particularly when it comes to attempt to assimilate and integrate them into a foreign tradition, it is quite erroneous to associate the history of early Tiv-Jukun contact and interaction in Wukari only in terms of stories of woes. Both the Tiv and Jukun sources are emphatic that they had maintained amicable relations right from the early times. For instance, while the then secretary, Wukari Traditional Council, Joseph Tahwa⁷ was quick to refute the claim that the two groups

started contact in the atmosphere of conflict, Yusuf Magaji, a one time Sole Administrator of Wukari Local Government Council remarked that "the two communities once co-existed fantastically, wonderfully well".⁸

Even long before Tahwa and Magaji's remarks, in 1854, at Ibi, when the leaders of Second Royal Niger Company Expedition, Dr. Baikie W.B and. Crowther S.A⁹ demanded to know the Tiv-Jukun boundary line, and their relationship, their informant, a Jukun elder, only interlaced his ten fingers to describe the nature of their boundary line and relationship. This implied an indivisible union. In the same vein, a colonial official in the area had no reservation when he remarked that the Tiv and the Jukun are complementary to one another.¹⁰ Luka Agbu, a Jukun, reinforced this point when he stated, in connection with the unending Tiv influx into the area, particularly in the colonial years, that, "Wukari Native Authority which was scantily populated then found good companionship in their new settlers (Tiv)."¹¹

Similarly, looking at one of the major effects of the perennial Tiv-Jukun aggression, particularly the 1990-92 episode, Luka Agbu lamented that, "Two good friends have been torn apart. It is the handwork of the devil."¹² It is important to note that while the Tiv do not accept the status of settlers in the context being used by the Jukuns, they can not refute Agbu's remark that "two good friends have been torn apart".

From the available sources, it is obvious that neither Agbu, Tahwa, Magaji nor the colonial official were wrong in their conclusions. It is no doubt that the two communities enjoyed very impressive symbiotic relationship before certain antecedents circumvented the process of good neighbourhood. What is not yet certain about early Tiv-Jukun contact and interaction in Wukari is the precise date the event

occurred. Both the Tiv and the Jukun always introduce this debate by claim over the ownership of the area, particularly Wukari town. The energies always exerted on this debate, especially resulting from the current developments, no doubt portrays the enterprise as a tug of war. However, while it is not one's intention to add energy to this tug of war, one wishes to use some variables in the phenomenon to establish a very vital issue in the early Tiv-Jukun contact in Wukari.

Oral claims from both communities trace their presence in Wukari to many centuries before the incident of colonisation in the area. Most early works on this subject point to the fact that Tiv-Jukun contact in the area took place in the first half of the nineteenth century. In his contributions to this debate, Timothy Tseror claims that Tiv-Jukun contact occurred after the nineteenth century Great Tiv Dispersal.¹³ Dr Hassan goes on to argue that it may be possible to see early Tiv-Jukun contact as an eighteenth century phenomenon.¹⁴

Earlier on, Meek stated that modern Wukari was founded in the 1840s by the Jukuns who crossed from Chinkai.¹⁵ Though the number of the Tiv at this time was not known, Freemantle maintained that in the 1870's Aku Uka Awudu Manu Abiten (1871-1903) was already at war with the growing Tiv factor in his domain.¹⁶

Although it is not our intention to reopen the debate on the original founders of Wukari town, Meek's contention that "Modern Wukari" was founded in the 1840s by the Jukuns compels us to reconsider the issue. It implies that before the Jukun founded what Meek refers to as modern Wukari, the area was already inhabited. It also implies that the arrival of the Jukun might have only changed the nomenclature of the area due to the domineering force the Jukun brought to bear on the pre-existing societies. The Tiv could also claim to be one of such pre-existing societies.¹⁷ Meek

also gives primacy to the Abakwariga over the Jukun as the originators of Wukari Town.¹⁸

The tripartite claim over the foundation of Wukari by the Jukun, Abakwariga and the Tiv raise important historical points. First and foremost, it implies that the presence of the three groups in the area is of remote origin. It also implies that Tiv-Jukun contact and interaction is not a recent phenomenon. Downes argues that it was in the course of this early contact that the Jukun referred to the Tiv as Mbichi or Bichi.¹⁹ While some Jukun presently attached a derogatory meaning to the term bichi, the original Jukun meaning for the term implied "stranger settlers" or directly interpreted means "come and settle".

In the context of Downes' contention two important issues are raised. By the time of the report, the Jukun had already held claim over Wukari as their land, in defiance of whether other groups like the Abakwariga or the Tiv had held similar claims. Secondly, it implies that if the Bichi concept means "come and settle",²⁰ it signifies that later Tiv influx into the area was a result of warm invitation by the Jukun. Whether or not these assumptions are tenable, what is very certain is that early Tiv-Jukun contact and interaction in Wukari, particularly between 1850 to the dawn of the twentieth century, was very peaceful. The questions that come to mind, for this period, therefore bother significantly on the areas of co-operation and conflict between the two groups.

3.2 PRECOLONIAL ECONOMIC INTERCOURSE

Tiv-Jukun economic intercourse in the area of Wukari cannot be perceived in a straightjacket fashion. Even though our main focus is on Wukari Local Government Area, attempts will be made to widen our scope to cover the entire former Wukari

Federation and other parts of the main Tivland. This is informed by the fact that the atmosphere of production relations, especially in the primitive economy, characterised by trade by barter, compelled man to open up to wider areas. More so, production did not only entail the creation of goods and services, but most importantly the process of distribution, which transcended wider commercial environment.

Like in any other economic intercourse, the differences in factor endowment helped to shape and facilitate the nature and form of economic relations between societies. This was partially the case with pre-colonial Tiv-Jukun intercourse. While the Tiv were better farmers, the Jukun and the Abakwariga were more specialised in textile works and salt production as well as fishing activity. On the whole, the economies of the two communities - Tiv and Jukun- were more diversified than specialised in the strict sense of the word. There were significant areas of occupational cross carpeting. For instance, farming and textile works were essential aspects of both the Tiv and the Jukun economies. It was this arrangement, which compelled the two communities to rely upon one another to facilitate trade as well as to improve on their technologies.

According to Sargent²¹, the first Tiv-Jukun contacts took place outside what the Jukun refer to as Jukunland. He maintained that the Iharev-Tiv were the first to come into contact with the rive rain Jukun, Banu, at the banks of the River Benue. It was through this contact with the Banu, a predominantly fishing Jukun community, that the Tiv, according to Sargent, copied the technology of canoe building. Sargent's contention was corroborated by the information from a body of informants among the Iharev.

Elsewhere at river Katsina-Ala, another contact between the Tiv and a pro-Jukun group, the Chamba, took place. Even though this contact resulted in some quarrels involving minor skirmishes, the two groups soon settled for more gainful and peaceful relationship. Many Tiv sources maintain that this early Tiv-Chamba contact availed the Tiv with the arts of net making and fishing. In fact, the gains derived by both groups in their early contacts explained why they soon embraced the spirit of good neighbourhood, particularly in Takum and Donga Districts of former Wukari Federation.

In Wukari District, both the Tiv and the Jukun had entered into symbiotic production relations. Here, the textile industry was one of the major economic activities pursued by both communities. Both groups depended upon one another to advance their works. For instance, though the Tiv were already advanced in their textile works, David Mtuem²² contended that they still needed some skills from both the Jukun and the Abakwariga in order to improve on some aspects of their textile works, like dyeing. In the same vein, Mtuem stated that the Jukun adopted some weaving patterns from the Tiv textile industry.

Just as the Tiv-Jukun contact added ingredients to both groups to advance their textile works, so did Jukun-Abakwariga contact at Wukari contribute immensely in the advancement of the Jukun textile industry. Some among the Abakwariga, a breakaway Hausa group from Kano, came with the acquired textile skills to Wukari. For instance, the entire Jukun textile in the late nineteenth century was dominated by the Abakwariga. According to Churcher's report: "Much of the Jukun industry was dominated by the Abakwariga... the proportional statistics of the

194 industrial workings in Wukari by the late 19th century was 87 weavers, 39 dyers and 22 blacksmiths. But none of these was Jukun, they were all Abakwariga.²³

Reference to the Abakwariga in the Jukun textile industry introduces three important issues. It is possible that even if the Abakwariga never evolved the Jukun textile industry, their dominance in the Jukun textile workforce could suggest that they came to add important ingredients in the upliftment of the Jukun textile industry. Long before this contact, the Hausas had developed elaborate textile and leather technologies through their contact with the Arabs in the North African trade.

Another important possibility in the mention of the Abakwariga in the Jukun textile industry points to the Jukun-Hausa-Tiv relations in the area. The Abakwariga influence came at a time both the Tiv and the Jukun needed one another to develop their textile industries. One of such needs was an elaborate trade network for both Tiv and Jukun textile products. According to David Mtuem,²⁴ the Hausas provided this dynamic, since they were essentially in charge of the organisation of long distance trade from Hausa land across the Jukun and Tiv territories to the south. The atmosphere of trade helped to establish important links between the Tiv and the Jukun communities.

Churcher's contention further implies that in the union between the Jukun and the Abakwariga, if the Jukun ever owned all the textile industries at Wukari, then it might have been a master-servant relationship. It also stressed the process of absolute assimilation and integration of the Abakwariga into the Jukun system. For instance, today, both at Wukari and Takum, where the Bakwariga elements are still found in substantial proportions, it is almost impossible to draw a clear distinction between an

Abakwariga and a Jukun. In fact, the Abakwariga identity has melted into the Jukun identity. They now constitute an indivisible one group.

According to Ishimakou²⁵, technological co-operation between the Tiv and the Jukun involved the borrowing of skills from one another for the advancement of individual technologies. He argued farther that both communities produced items of identical patterns in weaving and dyeing. Through this process of interdependence, both communities perfected their skills in the production of the kwase dress and other textile products.

Apeekaa Kajo²⁶ maintained that both the Tiv and the Jukun produced reputable textile materials, which were used for short and long distance trade. While short distance trade in this context referred to inter trade networks between Tiv and Jukun settlements, long distance trade referred to trade involving the Tiv, Jukun and other communities, particularly the Hausa. In these trade relations, while the Hausas brought leather and other products, the Tiv and the Jukun textile materials were used in exchange. According to Mza Ate,²⁷ while the Tiv produced textile materials like bente, akpen, tugudu, gere, kwase and ashisha, the Jukun produced, among others, adere, afia and kwase.

Apart from co-operation in the development of their textile industries, both the Tiv and the Jukun shared the wealth of their skills to advance an elaborate pottery. According to Apeekaa, the two communities produced items of identical functions like pots and other materials, including pavements used for decoration, frying, storage, etc. According to well-placed informants, especially from the Tiv elders, there were aggressive efforts from both communities to learn and copy from one another. This, in part, explains why a colonial official remarked that the Tiv and

the Jukun are complementary to one another. The only technology which was established and developed only by the Jukun was salt mining. Even here, Mbakighir²⁸ and some Jukun informants maintained that the evolution of the salt industry among the Jukun resulted from salt deposit in the area. Even among the Jukun, Agyo²⁹ stated that only those Jukun within the vicinity of Akwana settlement developed the salt mining technology. Nenshi³⁰ argued that even though the Tiv never directly contributed in developing the Jukun salt technology, indirectly, they provided some conditions that encouraged the Jukun to perfect and expand their salt technology. Among other incentives, the Tiv helped to provide an expanded market which gave impetus to the Jukun to improve on their methods and workforce in order to satisfy the growing demand for salt.

Jukun-Tiv co-operation did not emanate only from the sharing of technology, but also, most importantly, from the atmosphere of trade. Trade, indeed, helped to promote Jukun-Tiv relations. According to Abeke³¹, the exchange trade between the two communities was sustained essentially by peaceful relationship existing between the communities. Available evidence points to the fact that there were elaborate trade networks linking the two communities at different levels. According to Dorward, for instance, "Tivland was transverse and bounded by a number of major indigenous trade routes linking Hausa Savannah States with the forest and Bight of Biafra to the South."³²

Dorward identified four main networks stretching across the Benue Valley to far places. He identified the first network to have originated from Abinsi along the River Katsina-Ala to Obudu and Ogoja and terminated at Calabar. The second route started at Ibi, along the river Benue, to Wukari and terminated at Takum. The third,

and the most important of these started from Wukari through Donga and terminated at Takum.³³ Dorward maintained that, “Takum was a major crossroad, with little trails branching off eastward along the Upper reaches of the Comona tributary to Kentu and then south to the major kola centres of Bafum, or westward across Tivland to Katsina-Ala or southwest of Kashimbilla and onto Obudu passing through Turan and Ikurav-Ya Tiv.”³⁴

The mention of Wukari, Donga, Ibi and Takum reveals important areas in our discussion. In all these districts in former Wukari Federation, the Tiv and the Jukun coexisted. Apparently, the incidence of trade in these areas points to corporate commercial interaction between the two groups. The trade routes stretching from these areas to Katsina-Ala and other areas in Tivland suggests that the atmospheres of trade did not only result in interactions between the Tiv and the Jukun, but also between the Jukun and the Tiv in main Tivland. The atmosphere of peace reported along the trade routes suggests cordial ties between the Tiv and the Jukun, including other traders like the Hausas. The lack of harassment to traders along these routes facilitated free flow of commercial goods. This led to the emergence of more trade routes and centres.

One of the multiplier effects from the development of trade between the Tiv and the Jukun was the emergence of more settlements, which served as trade centres. Some of these centres like Wukari, Ibi, Donga, Takum, Akwana, Bantaje, etc, transformed into major towns, some of which today serve as headquarters of either Local Government Areas or Districts. The rise of some settlements among the Tiv, like Zaki-Biam, Kyado and Katsina-Ala was partly a function of their commercial importance. The Tiv could not evolve many larger settlements because, up to date,

they believe in scattered village settlements than compact settlements.³⁵ Both Jukun and Tiv informants were unanimous that trade was an essential factor that helped to shape and sustain the good working relationship between the Tiv and the Jukun. Atohinko³⁶ maintained that both communities interacted favourably well with one another in the course of trade. According to Elias M. Lokoja,³⁷ it was in the course of their commercial shuttles that members of both communities passed through each other's territories, during which they exhibited impressive sense of hospitality towards one another.

It is expedient to conclude that trade cannot be fostered in an atmosphere of conflict. In the same vein, rival groups cannot be involved in any meaningful trade relations. Similarly, trade promotes peaceful inter and intra group relations. Invariably, trade was a very important integrative ingredient between the Tiv and the Jukun in the pre-colonial years. The atmosphere of trade resulted in the emergence of cross-cultural ideas between the two groups, which affected their socio-political and economic life. This situation is reciprocal of the experience by the Niger-Delta area as reported by Obayemi. According to Obayemi,³⁸ while Benin was claimed to have been founded by an Ife prince, Oranmiyan, it was, also, through Ife that brass and bronze technologies were introduced into Benin. And today, no matter what ever remains of Benin-Yoruba relations, we cannot be oblivious of the once very cordial socio-political and economic ties between the two communities.

3.3 SOCIO-CULTURAL RELATIONS

The commonest characteristic of the peasant Tiv farmer was and is still the history of continuous movement in search of better economic opportunities. The continuous search for better opportunities is, indeed, a common feature of all

humans. This is why Orkar remarks that, "Man's history is a story of movement, of a constant, restless striving for something better."³⁹ Orkar's logical argument invalidates Tseror's remark, in connection with the Tiv migration from Swem, that, "...the ancestors of Tiv left Swem also because it is the character of the Tiv to keep on moving."⁴⁰ Tseror's argument about Tiv migration is highly unacceptable. Even animals do not just move for nothing. When an animal moves, it implies that either its environment has become unfriendly or incapable of supplying its growing needs, like food, shelter, protection, leisure or that its movement will yield something better. It is on this premise that one disagrees with Tseror's contention.

The constant restless movements in search of better opportunities usually bring man into constant contact and interaction with his fellow beings, since man is not an island, and hence can not strive better in isolation. The bane of inter-group relations, in spite of some of its inherent negative trends, is basically the pulling together of opportunities from diverse groups to shape and sustain better socio-economic and political environments.

Professor Kessler gives a more elaborate description of the main crux of the purpose of inter-group relations when he stated that,

Zoology and those sciences, which deal with man continually, insist upon what they call the pitiless law of struggle for existence. But they forget the existence of another law, which may be described as the law of mutual aid, which law, at least for animals, is far more essential than the former... I am inclined to think that in the evolution of the organic world - in the progressive modification of organic beings - mutual support among individuals play much more important part than their mutual struggle.⁴¹

Professor Kessler's law introduces an important dimension in the history of inter-group relations. It implies that in most relationships, early contacts and interactions are always founded on the atmosphere of peace and harmony. This is applicable to all forms of relationships, be it between a highly developed society and a developing society, or between societies operating at the same levels of development. This peaceful atmosphere usually persists until the groups involved start to manifest selfish tendencies or start to suspect one another of undermining their objectives. This implies, therefore, that the phenomenon of inter-group relations, though principally founded on the principle of mutual trust and benefits, is not devoid of frictions as the situation may demand.

In the case of the Tiv, their movement from Swem between C.1500 A.D. - c.1600 A.D.⁴² into their present habitat in the Benue Valley brought them into contact with many groups, like the Udam in Upper Cross River, the Chamba in Takum and Donga, the Jukun basically at Wukari, the Alago in the former Lafia Province, the Idoma to the east of Tivland, etc. The phenomenon became more preponderance between c.1805 A.D.-c.1835 A.D.⁴³, since by this time the Tiv had become the most dominant and, of course, the most rapidly expanding group in the Benue Valley. In each of these initial contacts, violence hardly occurred. Even contacts with Udam, which many conceived to be founded on hostility shrouded in the phenomenon of gber ityo⁴⁴ from both sides, Tseror⁴⁵ still identifies important areas of co-operation, like trade and intermarriages.

As regards the Tiv-Jukun relations at Wukari, the story has the same echo. The tentacles of their relationship did not stop at commercial levels, they cut across

socio-political and military spheres. There were distinct areas of co-operation which resulted in mutual trust other than conflicts.

3.4 SETTLEMENT PATTERN AND INTERMARRIAGES

By the first half of the nineteenth century, the Tiv and the Jukun were already in contact with one another at Wukari. From Meek, Hassan, including inputs from a cross section of Tiv elders interviewed, such contacts were not accidental. They resulted from deliberate search for better homes by both groups, a movement that eventually resulted in each group holding claim over Wukari as it's new found home.

There is no conflict of opinion from both the Tiv and the Jukun elders over the very peaceful atmosphere that characterised their early contacts and interaction in their new found home. Mbakighir⁴⁶ maintained that the peaceful atmosphere reflected the very keen nature with which each of the communities admired the systems and traditions of one another. Among areas of co-operation was the incidence of intermarriages. David Mtuem maintained that there was an impressive degree of intermarriage between the two groups across the area under review. However, the rate of intermarriage was higher between the Tiv and the Jukun in areas like Akwana, Kente and Sondi. Mtuem observed that the Tiv were more generous in giving out their daughters in marriage to the Jukun than the latter.

From the foregoing, it is obvious that one of the major features of the early Tiv-Jukun contact at Wukari, and up to date, has been the interlocking nature of the Tiv and the Jukun settlements. According to both Jukun and Tiv informants, this was one of the factors that promoted intermarriages between the two groups. In the same vein, the phenomenon, in part, accounted for the sharing of socio-cultural ideas.

Both the Tiv and the Jukun adopted two peculiar settlement patterns. While the Tiv adopted the dispersed or scattered settlement pattern, the Jukun took to the nucleic or compact system. This explained why, as the population of the Tiv increased, their settlements were clustered around Jukun settlements like Akwana, Gidan Idi, Sondi, Kente, Rafin Kada, Jibu, etc. There is much to show that with time, the Jukun began to adopt the Tiv pattern whereby farm settlements emerged among them. This, invariably, intensified the level of interaction between the two communities.

Elias Mnongo Lokoja⁴⁷ argued that early Tiv settlement pattern in the area was on clanish basis. He maintained that the clannish arrangement provided a concrete framework for the subsequent migrations of other Tiv population into Wukari. For instance, later Tiv groups from Mbaterem/Ukum, Ucha, Torov and Shitire clans traced the routes of their kith and kins already residing in the area of Wukari. This accounted for why it was very difficult to distinguish early Tiv communities in the area from later immigrants. This explained, also, why both the colonial authorities and the Jukun tended to sweepingly refer to all Tiv communities in Wukari as either strangers or settlers, a term that did much to soar Tiv-Jukun relations in the area.

The growing Tiv influx into the area on one hand, and the attempt by the Jukun leadership to integrate the Tiv into the Jukun system, on the other hand, was the singular factor that began to introduce the atmosphere of confrontation in their relationship. This was a drift from the atmosphere of co-operation to that of confrontation. This development conforms with Otite's contention that,

Consensus and conflict though apparently
contrasting and incompatible, are co-existing

features of the Nigerian society. Both consensus and conflict theories may thus apply to different times, or even at the same time, to various socio-territorial units in Nigeria.⁴⁸

Otite's theory is very relevant to the Tiv-Jukun situation. The drift from compromise to conflict resulted from the growing attitude of the Jukun leadership to subject the Tiv under Jukun dominion. The colonial alliance with the Jukun leadership added more energy to this growing phenomenon. The patronage given by the colonial authorities to the Jukun leadership was explained from the fact that the former was said to have found stability and order in the Jukun religion and government.⁴⁹ This spontaneous Jukun agenda, in partnership with the colonial regime, represents Okpe Ochayi's fifth stage of inter-group relations identified as "the stage of assimilation and integration".⁵⁰ In the case of the Tiv-Jukun relations, this stage could be moderated as the stage of attempt to assimilate and integrate the Tiv into the Jukun system.

It is apparent that it was the Tiv resistance to be integrated into the Jukun system, particularly at the inception of the colonial regime, that introduced one of the most disturbing chapters ever evident in the Tiv-Jukun relations. Even though similar attempts were made before the incident of colonialism in the area, up to the take off of the colonial era, there were still very glaring areas of co-operation between the two communities. For instance, according to the incumbent Aku Uka, His Royal Highness, Mallam Shekarau Angyu Masa Ibi, Kuvyo II, as paraphrased by Jibrin Amfani and others,

His predecessors had the policy of utilising the numerical strength of the Tiv as helpers in Jukun farms, in return for parcels of land on lease with which the Tiv could cultivate their farms. It was during the period of Aku Uka Zikengyu who

reigned from 1815-1885 that this symbiotic and open door policy was started. He was adjudged to be a friendly Aku as he had established cordial relationship with neighbouring tribes, especially the Tiv. They would pay him visits and respect. "in appreciation, he gave them parcels of land to farm and settle. His successors also maintained the same cordiality with the Tiv."⁵¹

Putting the paraphrase side by side with the last two sentences, which represent the undiluted submission of His Royal Highness, one perceives two probabilities. While His Royal Highness seems to be an unbiased informant whose recipients only interpreted his innocent facts to rationalise their sentiments and orientation, the latter seemingly suffer from an orientation which impliedly sanction the present attempt by the Jukun to seize from the Tiv the land given to them by the past Akus. For one, if the Aku was directly quoted, as the last two sentences imply, then, it becomes contradictory as well as suspicious to try to reconcile or equate the relationship between an item given in appreciation with that leased out, as the paraphrasers tried to do. Nonetheless, whatever emotions and sentiments the paraphrasers may have wanted to portray, they could not conceal how much the Jukun cherished their early contact with the Tiv, as they sufficed that, "... the early contact between the Tiv and the Jukun appears to have been a profitable business for the latter..."⁵²

No matter whatever impression sought to be portrayed, interviews with a cross section of Tiv elders indicate that Tiv-Jukun relationship was far from master-servant in nature. It was basically founded on mutual trust and co-operation, with each group still upholding to its fundamental human status.

3.5 POLITICAL RELATIONS

According to all Tiv and Jukun informants, the political ties between the Tiv and the Jukun up to the inception of the colonial regime were very harmonious. This

harmonious relationship cut across the entire Tiv land. This accounted for the warm reception accorded to later Tiv immigrants by the Jukun as testified by Luka Agbu⁵³, Jibrin Amfani⁵⁴ and His Royal Highness, Mallam Shekarau Angyu.⁵⁵

The predicament of the Tiv political system as at then, and their stamina, as described by a colonial report, explain why the Jukun "found good companionship" in the Tiv. According to the report, "The Munshi [Tiv] has appeared in the past to be incapable of developing a political machinery or of bringing to the surface chiefs capable of effective rule over more than a small group. But he is prolific and energetic farmer."⁵⁶

With respect to the Jukun, elsewhere, Palmer lamented that: "the Jukun are rapidly dwindling in number. They live in communities apart from performing no manual labour."⁵⁷ Even though Palmer's contention seems to be an exaggeration, recently, the Jukun raged their anger on the first Executive Civilian Governor of Taraba State, Reverend Jolly T. Nyame, for allegedly declaring that "the Jukun are a lazy race". In a rejoinder, Adihincho Iche⁵⁸ never spared the Governor, and whoever would want to pitch camp with the latter. Similarly, Atohinko Adi,⁵⁹ in another rejoinder, frowned at Paulinus and Alhaji Shehu Danladi, a one time Wukari Council Chairman, for describing the Tiv as the economic life wire of Wukari Local Government Area.

Even though it is not one's intention to dabble into the controversy, it is obvious that Jukun contact with the Tiv exposed them to a vibrant labour force. In the same vein, it was a windfall, also, to the Tiv, since the Akus gave them land in appreciation for the labour and respect they accorded to them.

According to Shausu Ahur⁶⁰, one of the major factors that guaranteed a very peaceful political atmosphere between the Tiv and the Jukun in Wukari District, and

wherever the two communities co-existed, was due to the fact that the early Tiv communities were politically less conscious. Other Tiv informants like David Mtuem⁶¹ argued that the Jukun, having lost a once very powerful empire, and turning round to evolve smaller chiefdoms, really found good companionship with the Tiv, who lacked any central authority that could challenge the new Jukun agenda. The preponderance of the Tiv in all the three districts of Wukari, Donga and Takum as well as the context of the Jukun term Bichi as applied to the Tiv by the former implies invitation to actualise an important political objective.

While the Tiv within and outside Wukari remained politically passive, and glued to farming activities, as the Jukun made concerted efforts to build their chiefdoms, it is important to note that up to the period of colonial take over in the area, the political union between the two communities was not founded on subjugation. This marked the period of voluntary cross culture of political ideas, particularly by the Tiv. This validates Atohinko's remark that, "As a result of their contact with the Jukun, the Tiv political system was modified."⁶²

Atohinko's remark reinforces the argument by David Mtuem⁶³ and Gbagede⁶⁴ that Tiv contact with atoatyev, especially the Jukun, did not necessarily originate the institution of Tor Agbande, but rather only reinforced it. Both informants strongly argued that before contact with the Jukun, Tor Agbande title holders had already emerged among the Tiv. These were said to be individuals whose wealth of tsav (witchcraft) power bestowed upon them leadership status with their groups.

Even though Mtuem⁶⁵ could not refute the claim for the emergence of some set of mystic title holders, following contact with the Jukun, he argued that most Tor Agbande title holders were still the beneficiaries of the new titles. What gave the

wrong impression that the Tor Agbande institution was introduced as a result of contact with the Jukun was because, by the new arrangement, both the Tor Agbande title holders alongside with the new title holders began to go to the Aku Uka of Wukari to be turbaned. Other individuals also went to Wukari to reinforce their tsav power. According to Alagoa,

The Tiv are reported to have sent their chiefs (ator) to serve a period of apprenticeship to learn the ceremonial and obtain insignia at the Jukun courts at Wukari and Katsina-Ala. For this the Tiv paid fees to their Jukun hosts, and did not consider themselves subject.⁶⁶

The foregoing debate invalidates Atohinko's argument that, "the emergence of the first forty drum chiefs or Tor Agbande was as a result of their (Tiv) contact with the Jukun."⁶⁷ While Tiv historians like Tseror and Ikpa would not necessarily associate the origin of the institution of Tor Agbande with contact with the Jukun, they seem to establish a very strong link between the source of powers of the Tor Agbande title holders and the Jukun leadership at Wukari. On his part, Makar argued that the emergence of a broader political institution among the Tiv in the nineteenth century resulted from the Tiv-Chamba wars. According to him, the war experience informed the Tiv of the great need to evolve a broader and more centralised political system like the atoatyev, to be able to effectively co-ordinate migrations and military campaigns in the wake of the Great Tiv Dispersal in the nineteenth century. According to him, for instance, the problems of migrations, colonisation of new lands, wars, etc. created the need for a, "...new military leadership in order to match the similar pattern that existed among the atoatyev, particularly the Chamba."⁶⁸ Makars' argument weakens Akiga's theory that: "The institution of Tor Agbande came into existence not because it was felt by the tribe to fill any constitutional need

but as a result of the peoples' inveterate love of imitating what they have seen practiced by their neighbours.”⁶⁹

Elsewhere, Ikpa⁷⁰ argued that men who sought to wield influence in society wore the Tor Agbande crown since it was then the most esteemed socio-political title among the people. This automatically dissolves Akiga's theory of merely copying or imitating what neighbours' do. It is not accepted that the Tor Agbande title was not intended to serve any constitutional function, especially when we can not refute the claim that the institution was directly or indirectly an important flashpoint for the eventual emergence of the institution of the Tor Tiv among the Tiv people. This explains why Akiga's argument would have followed the mainstream, which maintains that the adoption was a voluntary act, other than derailing into a sinking ground.

The problematic issue is, what effect did contact between the Tor Agbande title holders and the Jukun leadership have on the entire Tiv-Jukun relations in the second half of the nineteenth century? David Mtuem⁷¹ maintained that the contact had far reaching consequences on Tiv-Jukun relations. Among other effects, it enhanced Tiv-Jukun political unity as Atohinko has remarked, “The Tor Agbande later on migrated with their various groups to negotiate with the Aku Uka for the acquisition of farmland in which Aku Uka gave the various forty drum chiefs and their groups in the area later called Tivland?”⁷² Even though we do not intend to dwell much on the contradictions inherent in Atohinko's remark, his failure to be specific on very vital issues makes his argument sound like a rootless generalisation. For one, apart from failing to state from where the forty drum chiefs migrated from, he could not specify the areas said to have been given to the chiefs, which, by his he

could not specify the areas said to have been given to the chiefs, which, by his argument, was later to be called Tivland.

The strong setback associated with Atohinko's remark notwithstanding, reveals an important issue in Tiv-Jukun political relations. First and foremost, that the chiefs came to negotiate for land with the Aku Uka, and that the negotiations were harmoniously concluded, is enough evidence to suggest that there was an elaborate political union between Tiv title holders and the Jukun leadership. According to Tseror, for instance, “many Tor Agbande from distant Tiv clans are said to have travelled to Wukari. For example, Tor Agbelagba from Shangev-Tiev (southern Tiv) went there”.⁷³

When we juxtapose Ikpa and Ajayi's views with the general contention among the Tiv, it becomes obvious to conclude that the entire Tiv land, not only the Wukari Tiv, had entered into a political union with the Jukun in such a manner that the widening Tiv political horizon was essentially nourished by their contacts with atoatyev, particularly the Jukun. Tiv informants from Tiv clans domiciled in Wukari like the Ucha, Torov, Mbaterem/Ukum and Gambe-Tiev did not also disagree with the said close contact between their titleholders and the Jukun leadership.

The nature of influence the Jukun political system had on the Tiv system resulted in inter-ritual practices. This, according to Orlaade Ahur⁷⁴, resulted from the fact that the political titles were accompanied with some magico-religious powers. Invariably, to acquire certain titles, one had to acquire certain amount of Tsay or magical powers. Apparently, the process of turbaning and initiation handled significantly by the Jukun leadership amounted to the adoption of certain Jukun magico-religious powers.

Orlaade Ahur, however, argued that the Tiv were not the only beneficiaries in the Tiv-Jukun magico-political fusion. The Jukun adopted certain rituals performed by the Tiv. Among the common idols performed by both groups, according to Mtuem,⁷⁵ were Agasi, including the idol for hunting variously referred to by the Tiv and the Jukun as awasu and asita respectively. This idol was a device for camouflage for hunters. The ritual practices associated with this idol were similar between the Tiv and the Jukun.

Another important area of co-operation between the Tiv and the Jukun resulting from their political ties was the dependence of the former on the latter for items of royal regalia. Alam Musa⁷⁶ argued that before Tiv contact with the Jukun, the former were not exposed to elaborate royal regalia. Similarly, it was not very common among them to beat drums to either announce the presence of a chief or as an entertainment for the royal father. However, following contact, particularly with the Jukun, these practices were transformed.

According to Ortese Abelaka,⁷⁷ Tor Agbande and other titleholders among the Tiv obtained items of royal regalia from the Jukun like the Pabagu (a long flowing gown), afia (a kind of royal hat) and iron tongs. Other royal instruments like the alakita (a kind of flute) and drums were adopted from the Jukun. Alam Musa⁷⁸ maintained that during coronations, the melody from the royal musical instruments usually filled up the air. Ikpa⁷⁹ stated, in this connection, that the institution of Tor Agbande even derived its name from the special fanfare accompanied by the beating of drums which usually characterised coronation exercise. Prior to the adoption of these instruments, the magico-royal instruments among the Tiv were the ilyu, indyer and anyianor.

Ishimakou⁸⁰ and Mtuem⁸¹ identified some common traditional practices exhibited by both the Tiv and the Jukun. According to the former, ukari⁸² and shav⁸³ were forms of traditional marks made by members of both groups. He identified swaki⁸⁴ as a kind of traditional cap worn by both Tiv and Jukun elders. However, the Jukun and the Kuteb have, today, adopted swaki as their only traditional cap. The use of a common cap could be explained from the mutual relationship that existed between the Tiv and the Jukun textile industries. Mtuem, on his part, stated that some Tiv elders even used to ta injor⁸⁵ (plaiting of the hair at the back) as Jukun elders used to do, and still do. He claimed that his grandfather, Zege Iguve Tamgbenda, did so.

It is argued that Tiv-Jukun political ties benefited the Jukun political institution in diverse ways. Apart from helping to promote the supremacy of their political system over that of the Tiv, it yielded economic dividends. According to Tseror, and many others interviewed, in return for the items of royal regalia obtained from the Jukun leadership, various gifts ranging from livestock like cows, goats and chickens to foodstuffs like guinea corn and millet were presented to the Aku Uka by the Tiv Magico-political title holders. In fact, both parties cherished this mutual relationship, and thus employed all possible means to sustain it. This was observed until the emergence of the colonial power, which broke the peaceful ties in an attempt to forcefully bring the Tiv under the Jukun.

3.6 MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE JIHAD PERIOD

It is no doubt that the Tiv have been construed by many to possess a warrior culture. This claim finds expression in the references always made to the Tiv wars in the course of their migration and expansion in the Benue Valley. Most of these claims also capitalise on the Tiv-Chamba wars in Donga and Takum, including the

bitter Hausa-Fulani experience with the Tiv in the former's attempt to take Islam into the shores of Tiv-land. The British rugged experience with the Tiv in the former's attempt to conquer Tivland is also one of the major flashpoints. The prevailing skirmishes between Tiv communities, including their rough experiences with their neighbours all around, make it very difficult for the Tiv to redeem their image.

But between 1850 up to the time of the British takeover of the area in 1900, Tiv-Jukun relations in all spheres in the area of Wukari was not explained in terms of conflict and confrontations. Both Tiv and Jukun informants like Professor Hagher,⁸⁶ Shausu,⁸⁷ Atohinko⁸⁸ and Jibrin Amfani⁸⁹ emphatically stress the good relationship up to the close of the nineteenth century. According to Professor Hagher, for instance,

The Jukun Empire also collapsed and they were defeated by the Fulanis (jihadists), and after their defeat came to meet the Tiv at their locations in present day Nasarawa and Taraba States. Since then, they had existed in a symbiotically beneficial relationship, the Jukun as fishermen and the Tiv as farmers. This relationship remained very cordial until the British under Lugard sought to place the Tiv under the Aku Uka during the colonial period.⁹⁰

Even though the Jukun cannot deny the fact that the once powerful Kwararafa collapsed before the nineteenth century, and that they also suffered defeat from the Fulani jihadists, they will not want to accept that they came and met the Tiv in their present locations in Nasarawa and Taraba States as Hagher claimed. What is, however, important is not necessarily the validity of the three positions, but rather the atmosphere of peaceful co-existence between the Tiv and the Jukun in Wukari prior to the inception of colonial rule in the area. Between 1850 and 1899, the only notable conflict between the Tiv and the Jukun took place at the vicinity of the Jukun salt

town of Akwana. According to Makar⁹¹, this resulted from the attempt by the then Aku Uka Zikengyu, to establish political control over the Tiv community, Gambe-Tiev, residing in the area. Henceforth, frantic efforts began to take shape in order to terminate further Tiv influx into the Aku's domain. It is, however, argued that it was Aku Uka Awudu Manu I Abita (1871-1903) who intensified the campaign against the Tiv Factor, either to establish control over the Tiv communities in his domain or to halt further Tiv influx into his territory.

Naturally, this change of attitude towards the Tiv Factor was the singular factor that first injected very disturbing variables in the Tiv-Jukun relations. Apart from embarking on the process of mobilising his people against the Tiv Factor, Awudu Manu sought external support to accomplish his goal. For instance, Freemantle⁹² stated that the Aku Uka enjoyed the support of emirs of Muri, Burba (1869-1873) and Mohammed Nya (1874-1896) in his short term successful campaigns against the Tiv at Akwana, and even as far as Katsina-Ala. These attacks set the ball rolling for subsequent Tiv-Jukun conflicts. For instance, Makar⁹³ reported a counter attack from the Gambe-Tiev, during which Akwana was completely burnt down, and with loss of lives from both sides.

From the perspective of the socio-cultural and political histories of the Tiv and the Jukun it is clear that the source of eventual conflict between the two communities was over political control. According to Jibrin Amfani and others, while, "the Jukun are extremely conservative people who are very proud of their historical past,... the Tiv, on the other hand, are essentially classless and segmented people devoid of any central authority."⁹⁴ For the Jukun, Retired Lieutenant General Theophilus Yakubu Danjuma added that "the Jukun are slaves to their past"⁹⁵ while,

Professor Robert Collis, a former colonial health worker, stated, in the case of the Tiv, that, they are interestingly peasant people... proud and independent,... fiercely individualistic outlook, tribal consciousness... particularly in the face of threatened interference from outside.⁹⁶

Concerning the ego tendencies inherent in the Tiv, Jibrin Amfani remarks that, The Tiv believes that his language is superior to any language. Even if he is in minority he would like to impose it on the majority.⁹⁷ Sir Bryan Smith, former Governor of Northern Nigeria, added that "They (Tiv) would not lightly let their independence slip"⁹⁸ It was therefore with this nature that the Tiv did not only refuse subjugation by the Islamic jihadists, but also vehemently resisted British attempt to conquer Tivland, even in the face of the very superior British military might over the former.

From the foregoing analysis of the two cultures, it is neither a surprise why the Jukun wanted to bring the Tiv community at Akwana, and elsewhere, under their control nor is it strange why the Tiv employed all available energies to resist same. However, inspite of these contrasting orientations, the two communities were never perpetually at war during the pre-jihad and jihad periods. Their early contact and interaction were very cordial. Just like in Donga and Takum Districts in former Wukari Federation, in Wukari District, the Akwana episode aside, the two communities co-existed peacefully. Even in the confusion and seed of discord sown by the colonial regime in the area, the two groups never thirsted for each other's throat until subsequent developments began to initiate the ugly trend.

According to the available records, there were some instances when the Jukun leaned on the Tiv to challenge external aggressions. For the jihad period,

Abraham⁹⁹ referred to two instances when the Tiv teamed up with the Jukun to save the latter from humiliating defeat. According to him, the Aku Uka, Agbumanu Agbu (1845-1860) solicited for the Tiv military assistance to challenge the Fulani rulers of Wase and Misau, who were raging assaults on the Jukun capital of Wukari. There are also claims by other sources that the Jukun leadership enjoyed Tiv assistance in its efforts to check the jihadist attacks. The stiff resistance the Tiv gave to the jihadists could be used to substantiate this claim.

Other instances of military cooperation, even in the post Jihad period, between the Tiv and the Jukun included the help the former gave to the latter in 1906 to crush a dispute between the Hausa and the Jukun communities at Abinsi. Dugate Richard reported, in this instance, that “the Jukun community then called in the Munshis, fellow pagan and main local tribe, and together they attacked the Hausa killing and driving the rest into the river Benue”¹⁰⁰. The clash ensued as a result of a misunderstanding between a Hausa trader and a Jukun woman. Suffice it to say that it was the pre-existing military tie between the Tiv and the Jukun in the pre jihad and in the jihad periods that the Jukun had the confidence to seek support from the Tiv to fight the Hausa community. It is equally relevant to assert that the phenomenon of the jihad helped in no small measure to unite the pagan communities against the Muslim community in their attempt to Islamise the non Muslims. It was this same spirit that was demonstrated by the Tiv and the Jukun in what used to be former Wukari District, and in the rest of the Tiv and Jukun land.

From the foregoing discussion, one has enough grounds to conclude that Tiv-Jukun contact and interaction between 1850 to 1899 was for the most part peaceful. It was a period of mutual co-operation between the two communities. This cut across

areas of trade, culture, politics and defence. In fact, the atmosphere of mutual trust and co-operation overshadowed the incident of intermittent skirmishes.

ENDNOTES

1. Obare Ikime, "The British Pacification of the Tiv 1900-1908", in Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria (JHSN), vol.vii, No.1, December, 1973, p.104.
2. The 1959 marked the victory of a Tiv, Charles Tangul Gaza, over a Pro Jukun, Ibrahim Sangari Usman, into the Federal House of Representatives. This victory resulted from the NEPU/UMBC Alliance against the NPC which presented Gaza and Usman as candidates respectively. The victory was seen by the Jukun as the beginning of a very dangerous trend in their political history. Consequently, apart from the personal threats to Gaza's life which led to his leaving his home in Wukari to sojourn in present Jootar, in Benue State, there were clear indications of the beginning of general rivalry between the Tiv and the Jukun in the area. This was born out of the fear by the Jukun that the Tiv may eventually eclipse them politically.
3. The 1964 marked the year of "Atem Tyo" (head breaking) in Tivland. This incident spilled over into the area of Wukari. The "Atem Tyo" was basically an attack on all Tiv NPC supporters. When this episode spilled over into Wukari, it was misconstrued to be a Tiv-Jukun political rivalry, since while the Tiv were predominantly UMBC supporters, the Jukun were predominantly NPC followers. Indeed, activities of some mischievous elements from both sides added more force on the crack already created between the two groups following the 1959 Federal Elections.
4. The 1977 witnessed the attacks on Ayu and Ikyogbolun by the Jukun youths. In the same year, other Tiv villages were under threats of attacks from the Jukun youths. For details see Akombo, Elijah, I., "The origin of the 1991/92 Tiv-Jukun Aggression in Wukari Local Government Area of Taraba State", M.A. Dissertation, University of Jos, 1976, pp. 120-121.
5. The 1990-92 marked the first very bloody Tiv-Jukun aggression in Wukari. Many Tiv villages were destroyed in the crisis. Even after the crisis, Tiv villages between Wukari and Gidan Idi were forcefully ejected, and in the place of their villages Jukun and Pro-Jukun villages sprang up. This was seen by many Tiv political analysts as a deliberate political agenda by the Jukun to systematically deal with the "Tiv Factor" in what they consider to be their "Fatherland". This singular incident clearly wrote the handwriting on the wall.
6. The 2001/2002 aggression is considered by many Tiv people as the continuation of the Jukun process to completely get rid of the Tiv in Wukari Local Government Area in particular, and possibly, supported by other communities, to take the campaign to the shores of the entire Taraba State. Ironically, this conflict started between the Tiv peasant farmers and the Fulani graziers. The Jukun, however, took advantage to complete their age long

campaign against the Tiv, since they envisaged that only a combined force against the latter will successfully carry out their campaign to the end.

7. Joseph Tahwa (45 yrs), Interview
8. Dr. Yusuf Magaji (55 yrs), Interview
9. Samuel Crowther and J.F. Schon, (eds.) Journal of an Expedition up to the Niger and Tsadda Rivers Undertaken by Macgregor Laid Esq. in Connection with the British Government in 1854, London Church Missionary House 1855. Also see Avav and Myegba, op.cit., p.3.
10. MAKPROF/FED/4/1/4377. Tiv in Wukari Division /a Memo to the Secretary Northern Provinces, Kaduna 11th May 1948, par.20, p.6, by I.G. Gunn, D.O.
11. Agbu Luka, op.cit., p.7
12. Ibid., p.4
13. Tseror, op.cit., p.56
14. Newslink, vol.2, May, 1991.
15. Meek, Sudanese Kingdom, pp. 23-24.
16. Freemantle, Gazeteer of Muri, 1919, pp.18 & 38.
17. John Gbor, Mdue u Tiv man mnyer ve ken Benue (Tiv origin and their migration into the Benue Valley), Gaskiya Press Corporation, Zaria, 1978, p.52.
18. Meek, Sudanese, p.44
19. Dorwan P.M , The Tiv Tribe, p.1
20. Note that the Fulani concept of "Munchi" does not originate from the Jukun concept of "Bichi" or "Mbichi" and vice versa. The former predates the latter; and the former is a Fulani playmate appellation to the Tiv, as the latter equally refers to the former as "bawa" (slave). The playmate relationship between the Tiv and the Fulani are, indeed, an age long phenomenon.
21. Sargent R.A, "Northern Tiv Migrations: Migration, War and Societal Transformation," in Benue Valley Project Papers (BVPP) No.23 1975, p.16. Also see K.Dewar,MAPROF/FED/4/24/AR/INT/W/1,Wukari Native Administration...paras.32-33 and 46, pp.11 and 16; I. Gunn, Tiv in Wukari Division, Reorganisation of 1947, paras.1-3 and 25, pp.1 and 9, MAPROF/FED/4/1/4377.
22. David Mtuem (66 yrs), Interview.

23. NAK/SNP/10/68p/1913, Churcher, Report on Jukun Textile Industry, 1913.
24. David Mtuem, op.cit.,
25. Ishimakou (55 yrs), Interview.
26. Apeekaa Kajo (70 yrs), Interview.
27. Mza Ate (65 yrs), Interview.
28. Mbakighir (64 yrs), Interview.
29. Wunuji Agyo (55 yrs), Interview.
30. Nenshi (50 yrs), Interview.
31. Abeke (60 yrs), Interview.
32. Dorward, "Pre-colonial Tiv Trade and Currency", in IJAH, vol. ix, No. 4, 1976, pp. 577-579.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Mbakighir, op.cit.
36. Adi Atihinko, (42 yrs), Interview.
37. Elias Mnongo Amachigh Lokoja (53 yrs), Interview.
38. Obayemi A., "The Yoruba and Edo speaking peoples and their Neighbours before 1600", in Ajayi, J.F.A. and Michael Crowder (eds.) History of West Africa, vol.i, Longman, Nigeria Ltd., 1976, pp. 368 & 234.
39. Orkar, Swem Tiv Origins pp.153-155.
40. Tseror, op.cit., p.9
41. Amechi Okolo, Foreign Capital in Nigeria: Roots of Underdevelopment, Heartland Publishing House, 1987, p.183 end note.
42. Iyo, Tiv Nationalism..., p.46.
43. Ibid.

44. The Concept of "Gber Ityo" among the Tiv implies "head cutting". This concept developed from the Tiv-Udam relationship. This was a phenomenon during which each group hunted for heads from one another to bury with an influential personality who died. This alleged practice polluted the other good aspects of the Tiv-Udam relations.
45. Tseror, op.cit., pp.42-52
46. Mbakighir, op.cit.
47. Elias Mnongo Amachigh Lokoja, op.cit.
48. Otite O., "On the Concept of a Nigerian Society", in Sanda, A.O. (ed.), Ethnic Relations in Nigeria: Problems and Prospects, Ibadan: The Caxton Press, West Africa Ltd. p.3.
49. Dorward, "The Development of British Administration among the Tiv, 1900-1949" in African Affairs, vol.68, No. 279, Oct., 1969, p.322.
50. Okpeh O. O., "The Idoma and their Neighbours in the 19th and 20th Centuries: A Case Study of Inter-ethnic Relations in Nigeria", A Ph.D. Research Proposal, University of Jos, 8th March, 2000, p.16.
51. Vanguard Magazine, Monday, November 19th, 2001, p.35, "Tiv/Jukun Inquest: Scourge of Tiv infiltration into Taraba State", A report of the Four-man Adhoc Committee appointed on September 25th, 2001, by His Excellency, the Executive Governor of Taraba State, Rev. Jolly T. Nyame, to produce a comprehensive reference document of the recurrent crises between Tiv-Adamu. Fulani/Jukun. The Four-man Committee comprised Jibrin Amfani, John A. Mamman, Senator (Barrister) U.J. Yohanna and Mallam Danjuma.
52. Ibid.
53. Agbu, op.cit., p.7
54. Amfani Jibrini, et al. op.cit., p.35
55. Ibid.
56. NAK/SNP/17/8/K.2002 (1926-28) cited in Ibid.
57. NAK/SNP/250/1913
58. Hotline Magazine, June 21st-27th, 1993, cited by Samuel Adda, in For Posterity, Target Publicity, Jos, 1993, pp. 48-56.
59. Adi Atohinko, Tiv-Jukun conflict..., pp. 30-32

60. Shausu Ahur, op.cit.
61. David Mtuem, op.cit.
62. Adi Atohinko, op.cit. p.30
63. David Mtuem, op.cit.
64. Jacob Gbagede (47 Years), Interview
65. David Mtuem, op.cit.
66. Ajayi, & Crowther, op.cit. p. 336
67. Adi Atohinko, op.cit.
68. Makar, op.cit. p. 142
69. Sai B. A. , Akiga's Story, p. 364
70. Ikpa Ikyolum, op.cit., pp. 83-84
71. David Mtuem, op.cit.
72. Adi Atohinko, op.cit., p. 30
73. Tseror, op.cit., p. 64
74. Orlaade Ahur (65 Years), Interview
75. David Mtuem, op.cit.
76. Alam Musa (68 years), Interview
77. Ortese Abelaka, cited in an interview by Tseror, op.cit. p. 160.
78. Alam Musa, op.cit.
79. Ikpa Ikyolun, op.cit. p.84
80. Ishimakou, op.cit.
81. David Mtuem, op.cit.
82. "Ukari" is a pair of tribal marks, with one mark on each side of the cheek beneath the eye in a slanting position.
83. "Shav" is another form of tribal marks with three perpendicular lines on each side of the mouth or lips.

84. "Swaki" is a form of traditional cap used to be worn only by the Tiv and Jukun elders. It was, and it is still, traditionally woven and dyed with blue detergent.
85. "Injor itan" or "ta injor" is a form of hair style by Jukun elders in which the elder shaved his head and left hair at the back to be plaited. Jukun elders still practice this.
86. Hagher Iorwuese, "Tiv Cleansing Agenda: From Lugard to Obasonjo" (2), in Vanguard, 13 December 2001, p.39.
87. Shausa Ahur, op.cit.
88. Adi Atohinko, Interview
89. Amfani Jibrin, Interview.
90. Hagher Iorwuese, op.cit.
91. Makar, op.cit. pp. 122-123
92. Freemantle, op.cit.
93. Makar, op.cit. 126
94. Amfani Jibrin, et al, op.cit.,
95. Northern Nigeria in Perspective (NNIP),vol. I, No.2, October, 1992.
96. Professor Robert Collis, cited in The News Magazine, 19th November, 2001, p.64, by Sebastine Hon, "Siege on the Tiv Nation".
97. Amfani Jibrin, et al, op.cit., p.29
98. Sir Bryan Smith, cited by Sebastine Hon, op.cit., p.64
99. Abraham, op.cit., p.19
100. Dugate, R.H., The conquest of Northern Nigeria,
Fran Cass, London, 1985, p.237

CHAPTER FOUR

TRENDS IN COLONIAL POLICIES AFFECTING INTERGROUP RELATIONS 1900-1960

4.1 AN OVERVIEW OF COLONIAL POLICIES

Most anti-colonial theorists like Rodney¹, Nnoli², Hailey³, Skinner⁴, Hilyard⁵, Keane⁶, Tuore⁷, and a host of others, viewed the incident of European imperialism in Africa not only as the strongest weapon for African underdevelopment, but also as one of the main factors that laid the basis for the prevailing endemic group identify crises in both colonial and post colonial Africa. Prior to European imperialism in Africa, Gandu argued that “Conflicts between and within states was not based on ethnic differences, but on the drive to conquer others and subject them to the whims and caprices of the existing dominant political kingdom or empire⁸” By implication, in the pre-colonial African society, most wars were between states or kingdoms rather than between ethno-religious groups as it has become the order of the day.

Generally, the advancement of European capitalist imperialism in Africa “had a negative impact on the pattern and process of social formations in Africa⁹ From the period of the colonial era, African socio-cultural consciousness has been reduced from broader cross-cultural perspective to ethnic egoism. Skinner viewed this as a colonial phenomenology arising from “the creation of social boundaries and other forms of identity differentiation between and within groups”¹⁰ In this context, Gandu argued that “ colonial social and economic settings instigated and generated ethnic consciousness and identify contest...¹¹” “Individualistic and

group cleavages cultivated by colonial capitalistic modernisation weakened inter ethnic bonds and led to the emergence of new patterns of social interaction and power alignments in ethnic relations.¹²”

In essence, the pattern of consciousness of pre-colonial societies was based on legends or myths of common descent which had no negative consequence on inter and intra group relations. Three major policies have been identified as the main causes of inter-group crises in colonial and post colonial Africa. The first of these policies was linguistic and cultural classification, which Gandu described as the “colonial policy of creating and redefining identities among African linguistic groups.¹³” The negative consequence of this setting accrued from the philosophy of this phenomenon. By this arrangement, some linguistic groups were scaled or rated superior to others; and hence worthy of respect.¹⁴ Yet others were regarded as more progressive and more intelligent than others.¹⁵ This was the basis of the racist rationalisation that some ethnic or social groups were better human than others. The rest of the others, by this racist rating formulae, were branded primitive. For instance, according to Nnoli (1980:4), “the Dogon, some Bambara, and Senufo of Mali; the Bete of Ivory Coast; the Pygamies of Zaire; the Masai of East Africa; and the Karamojong of Uganda were regarded as primitive than their compatriots.”¹⁶ In the Central Nigerian area, while the Hausa-Fulani were branded as civilised and better organized, other groups, like the Tarok¹⁷ in the low lands of the Jos Plateau; the Tiv in the Lower Benue, etc, were referred to as savage worthy of harsh treatment.

The second colonial policy that helped to lay the basis for inter-group rivalry was basically the principle of indirect rule, which, apart from dealing with the people through their local rulers, bastardised the unity that had existed among groups. Among other effects, the principle of indirect rule, left Africa with very ambiguous and conflicting socio-political boundaries. Most of these floating ethno-geo-political boundaries incubated ethno-religious rivalries being hatched in postcolonial Africa. In Nigeria, the sharp ethnic divisions between the west and east; and between the north and the south were rooted in the bastardisation of the country into three regions: Northern, Eastern and Western region. The incidences of ethnic related conflicts in the country arising from arbitrary colonial boundaries can be discussed in volumes of books. The third colonial policy, which originated from the foregoing analysis, was the adoption of the principle of segregation. In most colonial territories, some groups were preferred against others. And the former were used by the colonial regime not only to achieve objectives, but also to socially and economically subdue the latter. Here, the case of South Africa comes to mind. Deliberate policies were enacted for the purpose of establishing white supremacy over the blacks. Among such policies was the “Group Area Act” of 1950 in which “Africans living in Johannesburg were removed far beyond the city. This operation was carried out in other cities in Southern Africa with the Africans driven into Shanty suburbs.”¹⁸ It was this singular policy which gave birth to other racial colonial policies like the Force Labour, Job Discrimination and Reservation, etc; the foundation on which the Apartheid Regime emerged.

In the Rift valley, in Kenya, the discrimination against the Masai by the Kikuyu is said to have taken origin from the negative colonial attitude toward the former¹⁹. In the Central African Republic of Rwanda, both Tandon²⁰ and Hilyard²¹ linked up the bloody genocide war of 1994 with the German and Belgian Policy of “ethnic distinction”. Hilyard argued in this connection, that:

New sources of power and privilege also emerged under colonial rule and these accrued almost exclusively to the white rulers and those designated Tutsi. Jobs in the administration and the army, for example, were reserved almost exclusively for Tutsi.²²

In Nigeria, many inter-ethno-religious conflicts are linked up with the colonial experience. For instance, the Zangon Kataf bloody episode was blamed, in part, on colonial experience by Southern Kaduna political observers like Kukah²³, Yohanna²⁴, Kaza-Toure²⁵, etc. Both Kukah and Yohanna believed that the crisis took root from the colonial policy, which placed the Hausa elements in the area above non-Hausa majority, believed to have predated the former in the area. And in the Tangale Waja area, Yabracks²⁶, contended that the colonial policy of forcing the leadership of the Ok-Chongwom under Mai Lamiyi on other groups, particularly, the Billiri, was responsible for inter group tension. Yabracks viewed the arbitrary colonial boundary policies in the Tangale Waja area as being one of the major causes responsible for some colonial and postcolonial inter-communal conflicts in the area, particularly the 1990 Kaltungo and Billiri boundary dispute.²⁷

From the foregoing preview of colonialism and inter-ethnic and inter racial relations across Africa, it is obvious that other than being an integrative ingredient, colonialism remained very corrosive to the fabrics of communal and racial unity.

Colonialism, indeed, remained an effective dividing force. This resulted from the way it exploited the diversity of ethnic affiliations in colonial territories to achieve objective. In fact, the policy of entering into partnership with some communities against others; under scaling other groups and demarcating of arbitrary boundaries, etc, were the effective weapons used to translate the philosophy of divide and rule. These were and are the main factors of inter ethno-religious conflicts in colonial and postcolonial territories.

4.2 COLONIAL JUKUN-TIV RELATIONS 1900–1960

The consideration of the policies of colonial left no doubt that colonialism was cancerously a dividing force other than a unifying factor. The colonial policies of alignment and realignment were basically intended to diffuse any possible opposition from the conquered people. In this way, while other groups were marginalised, others were selected and promoted on the basis of racial classification. The consequences of such policies led to the instigation of groups against groups and widespread religio-communal conflicts.

In the former Wukari District of the then Wukari Division, the dominant ethnic groups, the Tiv and the Jukun, could no longer sustain peaceful relationship in the colonial period. This was rooted in the fact that out of the three Districts in the division, it was only in Wukari district that colonial policies did not only prefer the Jukun, but also created situations which made it impossible for the Tiv and the Jukun to be harmoniously integrated. Such was not the case in Takum and Donga Districts where efforts were made to promote harmonious integration of the two communities. Generally, however, colonial policies in the entire Wukari Division

tended to favour the Jukun above the Tiv. For instance, apart from refusing to grant the Wukati Tiv separate Court and Sub Native Authority as was done to the kith and kins in Takum and Donga, they were not meaningfully involved in the act of governance.

The Tiv-British relations in the formative years of the British occupation of Northern Nigeria underlined the attitudes towards the Tiv in the colonial period. It will be recalled that right from the administration of the Royal Niger Company in the Benue Valley, particularly at the Ibi Post, relations between the company and the Tiv had been chequered. This resulted from the strong opposition the Tiv put up against the activities of the company and its agents in Tiv land. The Tiv attack on the telegram party sent by Lord Lugard to continue with the construction of the telegram line from Lokoja to Ibi, across Tivland, was one of the determining factors that shaped British attitude towards the Tiv. It was observed that the Tiv were generally opposed to the British occupation and their activities in Tiv land. This, therefore, explained the general hostile attitude the British put up against the Tiv

In another related development, at the time of the British occupation of northern Nigeria in 1900, the Tiv had entered into an uneasy relationship; with the northern leadership over their stern rejection to embrace Islam. It was also at the same time that the Jukun were under serious threat from Tiv expansionism²⁸. The efficacy of the Tiv campaigns was associated with the fact that “by the time Lugard began his administration in Northern Nigeria, the Tiv had established themselves as dreaded warriors” in the middle Benue Valley.²⁹

Being proud of their military invincibility, the Tiv were able to contain all internal challenges and effectively defended themselves against external aggression. The Jukun, on the other hand, whose political and military status had drastically declined were compelled to remain passive even in the event of any provocative external aggression. The effective march over their territory by the Fulani jihadists and later the colonial power all testified to this predicament.

The passive response of the Jukun to the British conquest in the Benue Valley viz-aviz stiff resistance of the Tiv was one of the factors that instituted the partnership between the former and the British against the latter in the area. According to Jibrin Amfani,

Unlike the situation in other parts of Nigeria where there were prolonged resistances, the British colonisers in Jukun land fired no single shot when a protectorate Over Northern Nigeria was declared in 1900. The Jukun offered no resistance. They therefore whole heartedly welcomed the British and embraced their Colonizing mission³⁰.

Amfani further mentioned of the cardinal benefits of the Jukun-British partnership, stating that it was for the reason of the Tiv expansionist policy, “which threatened the Jukun that their supporters, consisting of colonel Foulkes and Boyd, led by J. M. Freemantle, decided to adopt a policy that would preserve the Jukun. They therefore initiated the resuscitation of the Jukun empire...”³¹ This was reinforced by Professor Hagher’s contention that:

It was not the Jukun that manufactured Kwararascism. It was the British. The British Empire found the relics of the dead Kwararafa

Empire a fascinating instrument of their indirect rule policy. The British sought to rekindle the passion of the superiority in the Jukuns who had dwindled significantly in number.³²

Both views by Amfani and Hagher implied that the Jukun saw the colonial instrument as an effective weapon to tame the Tiv ;factor in their midst. This informs Tseror’s remark that “at the dawn of the 20th century, the British arrived and in them the Jukun found allies in their struggle to contain the Tiv”³³. Frantic colonial efforts to “make the Mushis (Tiv) return to their proper sphere, with a view to leaving Jukun land open to Jukun development”³⁴, formed the basis for Tseror’s declaration.

The colonial machinery was very concerned about protecting Jukun land, particularly Wukari, from total eclipse by the Tiv. Also, viewing the colonial action in this perspective, Amfani remarked that, “one issue that worried the colonial officers was the encroachment of the Tiv into Jukun land. The Tiv had for sometimes encroached on Wukari territory and were gradually ‘swallowing it up and making the whole atmosphere Munshi instead of Jukun’, observed Freemantle who was resident of Muri province in 1918.”³⁵ The same issue was raised in Dewar’s intelligence Report when he remarked that,

“ Towards the end of the 19th Century, the Tiv, increasing in numbers, began to press on Wukari... It is even recorded that in 1897, Lieutenant Engelbach save Wukari’s existence by dashing from Sinkai and attacking a Munshi beleaguering force camped just outside Wukari”³⁶.

It was in the light of this development that on his tour of Wukari in 1921, the then Lieutenant Governor of Northern Nigeria, Richard Palmer, declared that

“I consider Wukari worth preserving”³⁷. This was followed by deliberate measures adopted to protect the Jukun from the Tiv source³⁸. Among such measures, were the Ring Fence Policy and the ambiguous colonial boundaries, as in the case of “the north side of the Wukari–Ak wana road which was accepted as a rough boundary.... and the Tiv were evicted wholesale from their homes and farms”³⁹. There were other discriminatory policies against the Tiv in Wukari District; like the non granting of sub native authority and a Tiv court as opposed to the case in Takum and Dongo Districts.

It is relevant to stress at this juncture that the Tiv in Wukari District suffered more of the weight of the Jukun-British alliance. This was particularly due to the fact that while the Sarkis (Chiefs) of Takum and Donga Districts proved friendly to the Tiv⁴⁰, both the Sarki (chief) of Wukari District, the Aku Uka, and the British had fairly long considered the Tiv in the area to be a common threat⁴¹. This opinion was echoed by Gunn, the then Wukari District Officer, when he stated that

At all events during the 60s and 70s the Tiv, though steadily increasing in numbers and encroaching on Jukun domains, were not considered a menace to Wukari, an opinion that was to undergo radical change when in 1897 they penetrated to within 20 miles of Wukari and the Jukun had to seek help from the Chattered Company at Ibi, Lieutenant Engelbach then at Sinkai stepped in with his troops and ensured the safety of Wukari and neighbouring Jukun hamlets.⁴²

This and other benefits accruing to the Jukun as a result of their union with the colonial authority watered down Amfani’s earlier argument that Jukun obedience

to the colonial power was a function of their law abiding culture. While this could be part of the coin, one is pressed to contend that the action was primarily more or less a function of the anticipated gain therein. In addition to his view above, Gunn further reinforced one's contention when he asserted that:

Prior to this event however the relations between the two tribes had started to assume a chequered hue... the Tiv must have been restless and intractable neighbours and there can be little doubt... but that the Jukuns welcomed the advent of the British. It is generally considered that their arrival alone saved the Jukun from being submerged by the "Munshi hordes."⁴³

Successive colonial actions and policies towards the Tiv, particularly in Wukari District, no doubt reinforced Gunn's remark. Some of the rough boundaries demarcated, like along the Wukari-Akwana road, including the Ring Fence Policy and high tax rates among the Tiv in the district were all measures adopted to flush out the Tiv as Gunn declared below:

My proposals are:

- (D) To increase tax to an amount greater than that paid by neighbouring Tiv clans, as a means of checking frivolous migration.
- (E) To consider the possibility of prohibiting further Tiv expansion north of the Benue or east of the Donga River, with the same object as in D above.⁴⁴

It is important to stress that all the above proposals enjoyed His Honour's (The Governor of Northern Nigeria) approval. But sadly to the desired objectives, non of the policies yielded any positive short or long term results. They only pulled the two groups further apart.

4.3 COLONIAL RING FENCE POLICY AND THE JUKUN-TIV RELATIONS

By the turn of the 20th Century, Tiv advance into what became Wukari Federation in 1926 was increasingly assuming an unprecedented dimension. Successive Tiv immigrants followed the routes of their clans already settled in the area. These Tiv waves targeted the virgin agricultural lands in the three Districts of the Wukari Federation. Describing the nature of these movements, Gunn reported that,

Tiv immigrants contact neither the Aku Uka nor their own People and with the absence of natural barriers it is the easiest thing in the world for them to move to vacant land in Wukari...The latest trend that I could observe was for new comers to leapfrog some of the long established Tiv near the border and to establish themselves along or near the Wukari-Ibi road.⁴⁵

Though there were no statistics to indicate the increasing scale of migration, the steady influx of Tiv movement into the federation gave rise to many Tiv settlements interlaced by those of the Jukun and the Chamba. An extract from Wukari annual tax census between 1933 and 1946, as presented in table I, clearly shows that Tiv population surpassed those of other groups like the Jukun and Chamba.

Table 3: Wukari Annual Tax Census between 1933 and 1946

YEAR	TOTAL POPULATION	TIV POPULATION	OTHERS
1933	74,432	26,172	48,260
1937	76,870	27,876	48,994
1938	76,870	27,876	48,994
1941	85,494	31,514	53,980
1943	90,596	34,439	56,157
1946	97,775	38,518	59,257

Source: MAKPROF/FED/4/1/4377: Report on Tiv in Wukari Division by
Gunn.

Analysing aspects of the data, it should be noted that:

- (i) In the context of the report, the “Others” refer to the Jukun and all other non Tiv in the Division
- (ii) The same source added that:

Between 1933 and 1946, Tiv increased by 12,346 and “others” increased by 7,004 showing therefore a small but constant increase of Tiv over “others”. A real strict census (general census) would probably reveal actual total numbers to be greater than those shown above which are taken from Wukari Annual Tax census figures.⁴⁶

The scenario from the foregoing analysis indicates that by the first half of the 20th century, both the Tiv and the Jukun had taken positions in the entire area of Wukari Division. The way and manner Tiv settlements leapfrogged over certain Tiv settlements in Tiv division created the difficulty in demarcating clear cut boundary lines. This informed Gunn’s remark that to, “there is no natural feature or features which indicate the boundary between Wukari and Tiv Division.”⁴⁷

In the Wukari District, the situation was same as in Takum and Donga Districts. Tiv and Jukun settlements were interlocked in an inseparable fusion such that even

when Tiv division was created in 1933, some 13,000 Tiv were left domiciled in Wukari proper. They have now increased to almost 22,000 forming almost 50% of the Aku’s subjects and are composed largely of large segments of the three Ukum clans, Torov, ucha and Mbaterem together with Gambe Tiev, Turan, Gambe Ya, Ndzorov and Saghev.⁴⁸

Going by the same colonial report, and as the situation on the ground shows, even up to date: "... none of the Tiv groupings live wholly within one of the Jukun "Quadrants". (Four Districts) with the exception of Gambe Tiev who almost all came under the jurisdiction of the District head of the North Western Quadrant (Kato Bangha District)."⁴⁹

This explains why most Tiv clans appeared in almost all the four quadrants of Wukari District as is contained in Dewar's intelligence report on Wukari⁵⁰. Some of these clans like Ukum, Mbaterem, Ucha, Torov, Gambe Tiev and Gambe Ya stretched across into Tiv proper thereby creating a thorny problem in boundary delineation. This rationalized Gunn's remark that:

... the Wukari Tiv maintain fairly close contact with their clansmen in Tiv proper, particularly those who live close to the border. Inter marriage, communal hunting, common market, e.g. Arufu market, common religious leaders and so on... Such contacts are inevitable and indeed wholly admirable provided they do not lead to or encourage political activities inimical to the Jukun regime. My own impression, and it is shared. By the Aku, is that the Tiv are loyal and entirely Amenable to their Jukun overlords.⁵¹

The amenable nature of the Tiv, coupled with their economic advantage to Wukari District, explained why both the colonial and the Jukun leaderships relaxed their efforts in checking further Tiv immigration into the area. Consequently, by 1937, the Tiv were placed above all other groups in the district as indicated in the Year's population in table four.

Table 4: Population of ethnic groups in Wukari District in 1937

YEAR	ETHNIC GROUP	POPULATION
1937	TIV	13,939
	JUKUN	8,042
	ABAKWARIGA	1,024
	HAUSA	2,509
	WURBO	1,205
	FULANI	793
	CHAMBA	596
	KANURI	577
	NUPE	378
	KENTU	297
	WURKUM	270

Source: MAKPROF/4/31/AR/REP/W/7

The above demographic representation clearly demonstrates that the Tiv had, at this time, 1937, assumed a central position in Wukari district. And by 1946, the total population of the different clans in the district stood at 40,773. The analysis per clan is contained in the table 5.

Table 5: Population of Tiv clans in Wukari District in 1946

YEAR	CLAN	POPULATION
1946	UCHA	2,472
	MBATEREM	3,921
	TOROV	2,393
	GAMBE-TIV	7,028
	GAMBE-YA	1,362
	UGONDO	886
	TURAN	543
	TOMBO	523
	NDZOROV	484
	SAGHEV	146
	OTHER ELEMENTS	21,031

Source: MAKPROF/FED/4/1/4377, paragraph 5, p.2

From the facts and figures presented in tables 4 and 5, it is obvious that by the first half of the twentieth century, both the Tiv and the Jukun were well established in Wukari District. They constituted, and still constitute, the only two dominant ethnic groups in the area. These and other sources showed that the Tiv, in particular, constituted an important revenue base for the District. It was on this ground that efforts were made, particularly in Takum and Donga, to positively integrate the Tiv into the administrative arrangement in the Districts. This was in line with Delves-Broughton L.R's (Acting Resident, Benne Province) advice on 11th May, 1946, to the Secretary, Northern Provinces, that:

On the question of immigration, I agree with Mr. Gunn that...within another generation the Tiv will be numerically the Dominant element in Wukari, Takum and Donga Districts, and that it is most important that they should as soon as possible be integrated with the existing Native Authorities, in such a manner that they will have an interest in maintaining continuity in the process of adaptation to changing conditions.⁵²

The proposal by Delves-Broughton pointed to the fact that they were some colonial officials who considered the Tiv factor as an important force that needed to be positively integrated into the system they helped to sustain. Unfortunately, for Wukari District in particular, most of these well-meaning proposals were not implemented. While the Tiv in Takum and Donga enjoyed independent sub native courts and native authorities, the Tiv in Wukari District were denied this. This was on realization that the Jukun Courts and Local Administration were not commensurate to the Tiv Judicial and Administrative set up. Invariably, the r

refusal to grant the Wukari Tiv the same measure of judicial and administrative autonomy eroded the spirit of harmony and general sense of belonging.

Other colonial legislation, particularly the Ring Fence Policy of 1918, was practical expressions of the series of measures adopted by the colonial administration to put the Tiv and the Jukun apart⁵³. Among other considerations, the Ring Fence Policy was a measure adopted by the colonial administration not only intended to halt Tiv advancement into the Aku's domain, but also attempted to completely evict the Tiv, even the long established clans, from the area. This followed cry by the Jukun leadership over the unprecedented increase in Tiv encroachment on Wukari and Takum Districts.⁵⁴

Even though the Ring Fence Policy was aimed at protecting the entire former Wukari Division from Tiv encroachment, the effect of the attempt to implement the policy was, more on the Wukari Tiv. For instance, according to Dewar's intelligence report of 1938,

The alternative policy, for sometime vaguely contemplated but first initiated as a definite system in 1918, was the resuscitation of the Jukun empire in which it was possible that the whole of the present Wukari (Jukun speaking) Division might in some way or another come to be included. In consequence, in 1918 the Tiv were evicted wholesale from their homes and farms on the north side of the Wukari – Akwana road, which was accepted as a rough boundary.⁵⁵

The incident along Wukari-Akwana road in Wukari District was very peculiar. In both Takum and Donga Districts, no such drastic measures were adopted to separate the Tiv from their age long once good neighbours. In Takum District, apart from the floating boundary adjustment in the Kashimbilla area, which officially brought

sizeable chunks of Tiv communities in the area under Takum District, the pre-existing Tiv communities were not subjected to any contemptuous discriminatory measures as experienced by those in Wukari District. In Donga District, this policy was not imposed.

In comparison, the recent Tiv-Jukun crisis of 2001–2002 in Taraba state appeared to be related to the agenda sought to be implemented by the colonial Ring Fence Policy of 1918. Some Tic sources perceived this as an attempt aimed at ethnic cleansing, allegedly master minded by some Jukun leaders⁵⁶. The situation appeared to be similar to what happened elsewhere in Rwanda and Kosovu. Jukun opinion leaders like Danlami Ikenya refuted the allegation stating that “we were only dragged into the crisis.”⁵⁷

It is most regrettable that the current leadership in Nigeria has failed to study the root causes of the Tiv-Jukun crisis in Taraba State. These were rooted in the Ring Fence Policy. The current demand by the Tiv to participate in the development of the area should be seen as the right attempt to do away with such divisive policy. Unfortunately, hard-line policies have continued to be adopted, over the years, in Wukari to make the Tiv mere spectators of the system that determine their fate. This predicament is better illustrated by the Jukan position on the Tiv demand for a seat in Wukari traditional council. According to Amfani, et al:

One of the issues that has always featured in discourse with the Tiv is the demand by the Tiv for enlargement of Wukari Traditional Council and traditional institutions to include the appointment of Tiv indigenes into them. The question to ask is: Are the Tiv (who have distinct culture) part of Wukari Traditional Council. The

appointment of any traditional council is done in accordance with the tradition of the indigenous people. Since the Tiv has no common culture with the Jukun and are not indigenes of the area, they have no business with Wukari traditional council.⁵⁸

As much as we can blame the Jukun for closing up their systems to the Tiv, one believes that more blame should be apportioned to the colonial authority, which pursued divisive policies in the area, particularly the Ring Fence Policy. In his interpretation of the Ring Fence Policy, in particular, Professor Hagher argued that “the British Ring Fence Policy was a policy of ethnic cleansing... It is the same ring policy that is being rigorously pursued today...”⁵⁹

Amfani’s declaration seems to reinforce Hagher’s contention. According to him, “it was the reasons of the Tiv expansionist policy, which threatened the Jukuns that Jukun supporters consisting of Colonel Foulker and Boyd, led by Freemantle J.M, decided to adopt a policy that would preserve Jukun.”⁶⁰ It is one’s utmost belief that if Amfani’s position was what Jukum colonial supporters meant, then, the entire enterprise was grossly counter productive for the attainment of inter group affection in the area. Indeed, this predicament across all colonial territories where certain socio-cultural groups were preferred against others by the colonial authority. This faulty foundation demands that for inter group unity to be attained in most post colonial Africa territories, current socio-cultural revival in Nigeria, and Africa at large, should aim at promoting unity and not division. Ethnic and cultural associations should serve as umbrella to embrace other groups as opposed to serving as canopies for particular group(s).

It is important to note that even in the colonial years the policy adopted to

preserve the Jukun from the Tiv could not achieve positive results. Apart from its failure to check further Tiv advancement into the area of Wukari, it severely affected the revenue base of Wukari District as could be inferred from table six (6). Infact, being the most populous group, the Tiv produced more tax payers than any other single group. According to Dewar's intelligence Report, for instance,

In deed the District Officer of Ibi in 1922 wrote of "the cry of the land rendered barren" by the eviction of the Tiv. That they should not only farm the land and bring trade but also pay tax to Wukari Native Treasury was of course doubly advantageous. Economically, it was advantageous to Wukari that the Tiv should farm their waste land.⁶¹

It was in the light of this timely advice that the Ring Fence Policy was soon abandoned to allow for the reintegration of the Tiv in the economic system in which they constituted the backbone. Even the subsequent transfer of nine independent Tiv Districts from Abinsi to Wukari in 1926 was basically to achieve an economic motive as Dewar clearly stated:

Nine independent Tiv Districts with a population of approximately 120,000 Tiv were however transferred to the new Division (Wukari) from Abinsi. The immediate reason for the inclusion of these Tiv Districts was that they supplied the revenue which was one of the conditions essential to the development of Wukari Central Administration...⁶²

The declaration by both the Ibi District Officer, and Dewar above, were clear indications that the colonial authority was conscious of the enormous contributions of the Tiv to the Wukari revenue base. This was clearly reflected in the fiscal or budgetary policies in the area. For instance, the contribution of the Tiv in the

1935/36 estimated revenue was greater than other ethnic groups in the area of shown on the table six.

Table 6: Estimate Revenue for Wukari Division 1935/36 Fiscal Year

SUBHEAD	WUKARI	TAKUM	DONGA	KENTU	TOTAL	TOTAL
General Tax (50%)	£ 1469	£ 928	£ 469	£	£ 2856	£ 2856
General Tax (60%)				186	186	186
Jengali	20	-	-	-	20	20
Court Fees (a)	55	25	10	10	100	70
(b) fines	70	40	20	5	135	85
Interest on Investment	60	35	15	5	115	115
Other Receipts:						
Other Receipts: Market Rents:	6	-	-	-	6	6
School fees:	1	1	1	-	3	3
Miscellaneous	16	9	5	-	30	50
Dispensary Receipts	30	20	10	-	60	60
Motor Receipts	32	18	10	-	60	120
Tiv Contribution to Roads	210	125	65	-	400	30
Tiv Contributions to Drugs	16	9	5	-	30	
	£ 198	£ 1210	£ 605	£ 205	£ 4001	£ 3601

Source: MAKPROF/FED/4/24/AR/INT/W/1/ paragraph 26, p.9.

The detail of the table above clearly showed that the Tiv contributed more than any single ethnic group to the revenue base of Wukari District and the Division at large. It was more so with Wukari District where the Tiv were, in 1933, reported to form almost 50% of the Aku's subjects.⁶³ Apart from their general contributions to such subheads as i, iii, iv, v (a-e) in the revenue, they made exclusive substantial contributions as reflected in other subheads such as "f" and "g".

In spite of the general Tiv contributions to the revenue base of Wukari Division, in Wukari District in particular, little or nothing was done to meaningfully integrate them in the scheme of affairs. It is one's contention therefore that, the colonial maneuver in the area, in partnership with the Jukun, to Tiv disadvantage deflated all possibilities for Tiv-Jukun and Tiv-Colonial harmonious relationship. The Tiv felt uncomfortable with the colonial regime because they believed that by attempting to implement the Ring Fence policy, and subsequently enacting laws against same, colonialism created conditions for their predicament in the area. Notable among such conditions were the counter policy statements abolishing the Ring Fence Policy, which officially instituted the settler stigma on the Tiv. For instance, according to one of such policy statements "...this Policy was abandoned and the Tiv were allowed to resume their wandering it being understood that their status was that of "guests" and they must live under the jurisdiction of the Aku"⁶⁴.

According to Dewar's report, in respect to the abolition of the Ring Fence Policy, His honour made the following statement of policy:

- (b) that the Mushis should be allowed to move into and farm unoccupied lands in Wukari or Takum territory provided that it is clearly understood that it remains Wukari and Takum territory, and that the immigrants are administered Through the chiefs of these units.⁶⁵

The details of the table above clearly show that the Tiv contributed more than any single ethnic group to the revenue base of Wukari District, and the Division at large. It was more so with Wukari District where the Tiv were, in 1933, reported to form almost 50% of the Aku's subjects⁶⁶. Apart from their general contributions to such subheads as I, iii, iv, v(a-e) in the proposed revenue in 1935/36, they made exclusive substantial contributions as reflected in other subheads such as "f" and "g".

In spite of the general Tiv contributions to the revenue base of Wukari Division, in Wukari District in particular, little or nothing was done to meaningfully integrate them into the scheme of affairs. This was in total defiance of the fact that even before the colonial era, there had had existed some degree of cultural admixture between the Tiv and the Jukun. In our earlier analysis, for instance, we pointed out how the Tiv from within Wukari, and even from far Tiv land, copied some religio-magical and cultural aspects of the Jukun system. This resulted in a fusion between the two groups, which was a source of unity between the communities. The level of Socio-cultural and political cooperation was reinforced by the incidence of inter marriages between the two groups. By and large, by the inception of the colonial administration members of the two communities considered themselves more or less as good neighbours and co-tenants.

It is one's contention that the colonial maneuver in Wukari District, in partnership with the Jukun, to Tiv disadvantage, severed the cord that had held the groups together. It equally affected the relationship between the Tiv and the colonial authority. The Tiv felt uncomfortable with the colonial authority because they believed that by implementing harsh policies against them, colonialism directly or indirectly created conditions for their predicament in the district. Notable among such conditions was the counter policy statement abolishing the Ring Fence Policy. The counter policy, among other things, officially instituted the settler stigma on the Tiv.⁶⁷

This reversed policy in respect to the abolition of the colonial Ring Fence Policy explains the extent to which the colonial administration sowed the seed of discord between the Tiv and the Jukun in the area. For one, the circumstantial guest status accorded to the Tiv eroded all forms of unity that had existed between the two groups since colonial administration began to officially treat the two groups as different articles. The policy pointed to the fact that the colonial regime was out to create conditions that would either compel the Tiv to leave the area or to suffer perpetual discrimination⁶⁸. Even though the colonial policy did not stop the Tiv and the Jukun from mixing in social activities, the degree of level of understanding and trust was greatly altered. Even in Donga and Takum where the Tiv were allowed to regulate their own affairs, the colonial policy showed that the Jukun were preferred. For instance, according to one colonial report, in respect to Donga Tiv, "...though the Tiv of Ugondo have no right to a voice in the central administration of the District, they have a right to regulate their own internal

affairs on land on which they were the first to occupy.’⁶⁹

Another colonial report, in respect of Takum Tiv, stated that “While having no right to a voice in the Central Administration of the District, the Tiv of Shitire have a right to regulate their own affairs on the land which they were the first to open up.”⁷⁰

The two reversal policies unveil the level to which the colonial machinery had fostered disharmony between the Tiv and the Jukun. Having established the fact that the Tiv were either the first to occupy or open up the areas under review, they were denied participation in the Central administration of the areas. The situation was worse in Wukari District where the Tiv were not only denied the right to participate in the Central Administration of the area, but were equally denied the right to regulate their own internal affairs. By preferring and fostering the Jukun leadership to be able to contain the Tiv factor, the colonial administration laid the foundation for the unfortunate downtrend in the Tiv-Jukun relationship over the years.

4.4 THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF JUKUN AND TIV IN WUKARI NATIVE AUTHORITY AND THEIR EFFECTS ON INTERGROUP RELATIONS

Available colonial records for Wukari District show that by 1948, the Tiv constituted almost fifty percent of the Aku’s subjects⁷¹. Their predominance over other ethnic groups in the District resulted, in part, from their high birth rate on one hand, and by increase in Tiv influx into the area on the other hand. This fact was echoed by I. G. Gunn, the then Wukari District Officer, who declared on the

27th November, 1947, that:

When I took over Wukari Division in early 1945, I was surprised at the lack of records regarding the Tiv who even then formed nearly 40% of the total population of the Division (excluding Kentu mandated Territories) and at the complacency with which all the three chiefs (the Aku, Sarkin Donga and Sarkin Takum) viewed the constant Tiv infiltration into their domains... The Tiv are now (1947) increasing at 2½ times the rate of the indigenous people by reason of immigration and higher birth rate...⁷²

Among other reasons, the high birth rate among the Tiv was attributed to their polygamous practice motivated, mostly, by socio-cultural and economic factors. With an ever-increasing population rate, the Tiv turned out greater number of taxpayers than the Jukun and other groups in the area put together⁷³. For instance, out of the estimated revenue of Wukari Native Treasury to the tune of one thousand Nine hundred and eighty pounds (£1,980.00) for the year 1935/36, the Tiv alone contributed seven hundred and fourteen pounds two shillings and six pence (£ 714. 2s. 6d) as reflected in the next table.

Table 7: Tiv Contribution to Tax in the Four Districts in Wukari Native Authority 1935/36

	DISTRICT	SPOKESMEN	APPROV.TAX 4s 6d
Kata Bangha	Ukum/Rumbuv	Aka	57
	Ukum/Tsaa v/Mbawar	Baka	25
	Ukum/Tsaa v/Mbadwem	Agor	26
	Ukum/Tswerev	Bunde Aba	20
	Ukum/Ukemberagya	Gusa	73
	Ukum/Ukemberagya	Nyaka	4
	Ukum/Mbavuur	Beriki	50
	Shitire-Mbadzar	Adi Usu	29
	Shitire/Mbawar	Wankucha	108
	Shitire/Mbavihi	Adege	28
	Shitire/Mbagesa	Iga	41
	Shitire/Mbadwem	Inyongo	9
	Shitire/Turan	Nenger	18
	Ugondo/Nondzov	Afono	21
	Abon Zeke	Ukum/Mbazun/Mbayuhwa	Ayu
Ukum/Mbazun/Mbadam		Ayam	1.2.6
Ukum/Mbayenge/Mbavaa		Madaiki Suwa	7
Kinda Achumo	Shitire/Mbagir/Mbagen	Adi Abako	92
	Shitire/Mgagir/Mbadam	Ugande	13
	Shitire/Mbagir/Mbatsavazum	Dze ver	60
	Shitire/Mbazum/Mbadam	Ayaki	23
	Shitire/Mbayenge/Mbatia v	Kyan	13
	Shitire/Mbayenge/Mbavaa	Abunakase	
	Shitire/Mbadzende/Mbapanaku	Moi Kur	7
Kinda Kuvio	Nongov/Ndzorov	Aka	

Source: MAKPROOF/FED/4/24 AR/INT/W/I, paragraph 50(b), pp.18-19.

It should be emphasized that the above table is a very conservative estimate of general Tiv contribution to tax in Wukari District. For one, it did not reflect Tiv contributions to other subheads like court fines and dues, market receipts, dispensary receipts, motor receipts, contributions to roads and drugs, including other undefined miscellaneous subheads.

From this analysis, one would have naturally expected the Tiv to assume a central role in the Wukari native authority administration. The reverse was, however, the case. The Tiv suffered marginalisation more than any group in the district. There was no deliberate effort to cater for Tiv interests and peculiarities as was the case for the Muslim Hausa elements in the area. This was at variance with the arrangements in Takum and Donga districts where separate Tiv courts and sub native authorities were established in 1935⁷⁴. By these arrangements, the Tiv communities in Takum and Donga had the privilege to regulate their internal affairs, with little interference. This naturally diffused inter-group tension, since the Tiv felt that their interest and peculiarities were duly appreciated. In Donga where the Shitire elements were not granted subordinate native authorities and therefore administered directly by the Chief of Donga, some selected elders among them served as assessors on the Donga court⁷⁵. This policy was to ensure that the Shitire elements in the area did not suffer undue deprivation.

The concession given to the Tiv in both Takum and Donga Districts was a function of the cordial relationship that existed between the Chiefs of these districts and the Tiv. H. S. Bridel confirmed in his report on the 31st December,

1932, that “the District Heads of Takum and Donga are both keen on the Tiv settling within their areas”⁷⁶. I. G. Gunn stressed further, in the case of Takum that the Chamba and their Sarki considered the Tiv to be “Loyal to their” hosts” and law abiding which is indicative of their stability and coherence⁷⁷.”

It is not our intention to dabble into the debate of how a people earlier considered by some colonial records to have arrived in the area about the same time with the Chamba were over night considered to be guests to the latter. Rather, our main concern is the atmosphere of peaceful ties between the two groups. Similarly, in the case of Donga, Dewar stated that the Ugondo are not only “accepted by the chief of Donga as loyal citizens, but also... regarded as indigenous to the area and with the right therefore to be treated in the same way as the indigenous Kentu Village areas, and the Ugondo kindred groups were given a measure of autonomy under their overlords, the Chambas, in much the same way as the Chambas were given a degree of autonomy by the British”⁷⁸.

It is still cloudy how the Chambas were later considered to be the overlords over the Ugondo who were clearly given primacy over the former in their history of origin in the area. But like in Takum, our concern is also that the two groups were able to nurture and sustain a history of cordial relationship.

In view of this consideration, the chiefs of Takum/Donga could not support the enactment of any repressive policies against their Tiv subjects. This was at a time the colonial machinery had entered into partnership with the Jukun leadership at Wukari to check further Tiv advance into the area⁷⁹. For instance, in its effort to create an exclusive Jukun reserve, particularly in the Akwana salt mines, the

moribund colonial Ring Policy, in 1918, evicted all the Tiv from their homes and farms on the north side of Wukari-Akwana road. This enterprise was the first official action that was to become a stubborn dividing line between the Jukun and the Tiv along the Wukari – Akwana axis, an effect being experienced up to date. The immediate effect of this colonial action was great. Even when the policy was repealed, and the Tiv were allowed to return, both the Jukun and the colonial officials still found reasons to appropriate the guest status to the Tiv in the area. This demoralised the Tiv, who saw the colonial administration as an instrument in the hands of the Jukun to undermine their legitimacy in the area. Unfortunately, this atmosphere of suspicion was to become age long, affecting the basic variables of meaningful unity between the two groups.

It is important to note at this instance that the warm reception accorded to the Tiv elements in both Takum and Donga by the chiefs of the Districts compelled the colonial machinery to relax its policies against the Tiv. In the same vein, the chief of Wukari could not impress on the colonial authority to compel the Takum and Donga chiefs to join in his crusade against the Tiv on the ground that:

the districts – Takum and Donga.... Are described as ‘Satisfactory’, and ‘well organised’. It would, it seems, be somewhat anomalous to place the Aku in a position of authority over Districts Heads whose districts are so much better administered than his own.⁸⁰

It is important to note, also that the colonial administration allowed the chiefs of Takum and Donga to function independently of the Aku Uka on the understanding that:

What does not seem to be fully realised until Dr. Meek's investigation is that the Chamba, the founders of both Takum and Donga Chiefdoms, stand to the Jukuns in the position of conquerors rather than of conquered, the fact that they have to some extent become Jukunised does not necessarily imply that they were subservient...Moreover, the effect of the Chamba conquest of the Jukunised tribes south and east of Wukari was to remove all recollection of Jukun political supremacy if ever such supremacy existed...⁸¹

Consequently, while the chiefs of Donga and Takum were not allowed to be controlled by the Aku, as the Donga and Takum Tiv were allowed some measure of independence in the area, Dewar's Intelligence Report on the administration of the Tiv in Wukari District, under the Aku, as recommended by the Colonial authority, was demonstrative of the way and manner the colonial machinery helped to intimidate and castigate the Tiv community in the area. According to the Report:

The Tiv are very recent intruders into territory which for many generations has belonged to the Jukun. It is therefore felt that the Aku should not be legally bound in any way to apply the principles of indirect rule to their administration; and it is accordingly recommended that he should only apply them as a matter of administrative convenience, retaining the rights, should circumstances arise which make it seem desirable, to administer the Tiv direct and according to his methods. The justification of such action would be that any disoriented Tiv are always at liberty to return as, indeed, they were once compelled to return "to their proper sphere."⁸²

The quotation marks used in the description of the Tiv "Proper sphere", as contained in the colonial report, point to a number of possibilities. That the colonial administration was not certain as to the exact extent and limits of what

was considered to be the Tiv proper sphere. It also suggested that the Tiv and the Jukun were so fused together in a common geo-political entity that only the connivance play of political and administrative confusion would attempt to separate the two. Unfortunately, the colonial regime found reasons to venture into this unpopular ground.

Given this stark reality of the Tiv predicament, arising from such colonial policies, even their membership in the Akus' Advisory Council could not prevent the system from pursuing discriminatory policies against them. For instance, even up to 12th October, 1953, the Wukari District Officer reported that there was no Tiv representative in the Wukari court⁸³. The same report stated that even the Tiv spokesmen who attended the Wukari court as assessors on quarterly basis were lukewarm due to poor treatment or non-recognition. On the whole, the positions of the Tiv members in the Aku's Advisory Council as well as those of the assessors in the Aku's Court were, according to Ihuwe Tseke, mere rubber stamps⁸⁴. The two categories of officials were surprised by the Jukun District Heads, and resolutions on Tiv matters in council placed Jukun interest above the former.

The general attitude of subjecting the Tiv to Jukun system without due regard to their peculiarities and interests marked the beginning of Tiv-Jukun rivalry. This became so alarming that on his visit to Wukari District from 24th – 25th February, 1947, Sir, John Patterson, the Chief Commissioner of the Northern provinces, lamented that “Despite the fact that the Tiv out number the Jukun by 21,000 to 9,000, the former have no representative on the Aku's council nor is

there a court administering Tiv laws and customs to which members of the Tiv tribe can go.”⁸⁵

Patterson’s remark was anchored on the fact that even though the Tiv had adopted some aspects of the Jukun magico-political system, there were still some glaring areas of differences which called for separate Tiv Courts as was in Takum and Donga Districts. Consequently, on the strength of his findings, and in his capacity as the Chief Commissioner of the Northern Provinces, Patterson recommended “for a general reorganisation for Wukari Native Authority in order to enable the Tivs in the area to have an effective say in their own affairs”⁸⁶. He went further to “emphasise the importance of ensuring that the interests of the Tiv in Wukari District were adequately represented in the administrative organisation”⁸⁷

In as much as these recommendations came from a superior office in an effort to bring harmony, and also to make the Tiv in the District to have a general sense of belonging, some of the colonial officers did not always agree on matters of implementing policies. This was one of such contentious matters that gave the district officer in charge of the area, Mr. Findley, the boldness to authoritatively oppose his superior. In his reaction, Findley authoritatively remarked that “there must be no question of the Tiv margining that their migration put them in the position of overlords of the lands into which they moved and outnumber the original inhabitants.”⁸⁸

Consequently, in accordance with the general colonial attitude towards the Tiv in the area, it was the view of the subordinate which prevailed simply because the colonial regime did not see reasons why the Tiv in Wukari should be treated fairly.

It is quite baffling why the superior could not check the excesses of his subordinate over a very sensitive administrative issue of this nature. Of course, that there was a covert understanding between the regional and local administration. Invariably, the lack of concerted and joint action by the regional and local administration on the problem of the Tiv in Wukari throughout the colonial period sowed the seeds of disharmony between the Tiv and Jukun.

Although others may argue that the Tiv were involved in subsequent administrative arrangements in Wukari District in the forties and fifties as court assessors and members in the Aku's advisory council, the essential questions that remain to be answered are, to what extent, and at what levels, were they involved?; and what general influence did they exert on the entire system? The need for answers to these questions becomes paramount when one considers the fact that on the 6th August, 1953, the Tiv Progressive Union, Wukari branch, petitioned to the Resident, Benue Province, over lack of proper representation in the Aku's council⁸⁹. The petitioners, in paragraph 10, complained particularly about the contemptuous manner in which the chief of Wukari, the Aku Uka, related to them in respect to their demand⁹⁰. A copy of the petition is attached in appendix one at the end of the work.

The sharp response attracted by the Tiv petition from the then resident, Benue Province, Mr. Cole C. W. On the 22nd October, 1993 pointed to the fact that he was not only unprepared to listen to the complaint, but also that the Tiv had no other place to seek redress. The sharp rejection of the petition by the resident blocked all chances of appealing to the Chief Commissioner. Cole sharply reacted,

for instance, that:

I am quite satisfied that your statement “the Wukari; Tiv’s are suffering untold ill-treatment and misadministration and nobody seems to care for our interests” is both irresponsible and inaccurate...I am not prepared to recognize your status to make representations on matters which are the affairs of individuals who also have available to them the normal process of Law. In conclusion, I wish to say that, while I am prepared to listen to and give consideration to any well intentioned, reasonable and accurate Representations made to me by any person or body of persons I am not prepared to listen to irresponsible and inaccurate statements.⁹¹

From the tone of Cole’s reply, even an average thinking being can quickly know that Cole was uncontrollably very emotional. And it was in such a Spirit of emotion and sentiment that the petition was treated. Invariably, the petition the people exerted a lot of energy and resources to produce with the hope that it would yield positive dividend was only squeezed into the dustbin by the office that was the people’s last hope.

In accordance with the general colonial attitude towards the Tiv in the District, little or nothing was done to give the above petition the desired attention. This was particularly in Wukari District where most of the issues in dispute were very applicable. The tone of Cole’s reply, in particular, shows that the colonial regime was not ready to listen to any demand that would place the Tiv on equal footing with the Jukun. Cole’s position indeed, grossly undermined the comments on the petition by the Wukari District Officer, who, on the receipt of the petition, had identified some areas of neglect suffered by the Tiv thus:

There are five Tiv members on the Wukari N.A. (Native Authority) Council but none on the

Wukari Court...There are separate Grade D Courts for Shitire Tiv in Takum District and the Ugondo Tiv in Donga District. The rural Water supply programme was unfortunately confined to main towns and villages. The main reason for the lack of any development projects in purely Tiv areas appears to have been because of their habit of living in scattered farms and not forming any villages.⁹²

The least one can say at this instance is that the District Officer was better informed about the situation on ground than the resident who resided in, Makurdi. In this perspective, it is surprising why the resident could not point out the weakness of the report of the District officer, but simply concluded that the entire content of the petition was “irresponsible and incorrect statements”. Similarly, looking at general Tiv experience in Wukari District, it is still surprising that Cole declared in the first paragraph of his reply to the Tiv petition that “ I am quite satisfied that there has been no discrimination against the Tiv in the Wukari Division as regards the amenities supplied to rural areas”⁹³. In the same vein, the contrast in opinions by the District Officer and the resident in respect to the petition suggested the level of disagreement expressed by some colonial officials in respect to Tiv experience, particularly in Wukari District. This explained why as some colonial officials like Patterson and Counsel appreciated the neglect of the Tiv in the district, others like Cole and Freemantle preferred to give deaf ears to Tiv complaints in the area.

4.5 ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN WUKARI DISTRICT AND JUKUN-TIV RELATIONS 1935–1959

We have earlier mentioned that the Tiv and the Jukun are two distinct socio-cultural groups operating different laws and customs. These differences

created the problem of subjecting them under one traditional judicial system. It was in the light of this that the Tiv in Takum and Donga Districts were granted separate courts and sub-native authorities⁹⁴. This was to cater for the divergent interests and peculiarities of the people.

The treatment enjoyed by the Takum and Donga Tiv raised the hope of those in Wukari for same treatment as contained in Mr. Gunn's report that "there has been some expectancy on the part of the Tiv (in Wukari District) of being granted a court or courts."⁹⁵ This expectancy came from the understanding that their kith and kins in Takum and Donga were privileged to enjoy separate courts dealing purely with Tiv matters. It was also informed by the difficulty faced by them in traveling to Wukari monthly for court sessions. According to one colonial memorandum:

The Tiv domiciled in Wukari District have been in the habit of coming to Wukari on the 10th day after the new moon appears in each month and dealing with purely Tiv matters as assessors in the Aku's Court... The elders met me at the end of December and asked if they could be allowed to have their own native courts. I sympathise with such a request.... I informed them that it was highly unlikely that such a proposition would be agreed to and that probably they would have to continue to meet at Wukari under the aegis of the Aku as assessors to his court.⁹⁶

From the face of it, it appears that the presence of Tiv assessors in the Aku's court was enough to satisfy the yearnings and interests of the Tiv in the District. In reality, however, the role played by these assessors was nothing short of mere observers and rubber stamps who exerted little or no influence on court

proceedings and rulings. This was even one of the issues that compelled the Wukari Tiv to agitate for a separate court in the 1953 petition. Unfortunately, the District Officer's reaction to the Tiv demand was demonstrative of the general colonial attitude towards the Tiv in the area. According to the District Officer:

After a careful consideration, I have come to a conclusion that to accede to this would be inadvisable. Gambe-Tiev has now the status of a clan and it is possible that the three Ukum units would agree to federate but I am against the proposal and the Aku concurs with my point. To call the Tiv leaders in as councilors and make them members of the Aku's Courts is a very different matter and might quite well lead to the disruption of the "guest" status which has long been recognised by both peoples.⁹⁷

Mr. Gunn's concern contains a very thorny issue in Tiv-Jukun relation in the District. It clearly showed how the colonial administration in preference to the Jukun and their leadership, was out to explore all possible avenues not only to dampen Tiv unity, but also to silence any joint Tiv effort to seek for an arrangement that would properly appreciate their interests and peculiarities. Even on the guest status claimed to have been long recognised by both the Tiv and the Jukun, Tiv elders like Ihuwe Tseke⁹⁸ contended that the said agreement, if ever existed, was a frame up, by the colonial regime. More so, the fact that the word guest was put in quotes suggested that the said status was not contextualised in its strict meaning. In the same vein, the fact that Gunn did not favour the eventual federation of the three Ukum units, and that the Aku concurred, clearly showed that the two organs were jointly at work to check the emergence of any formidable factor in the district.

This was the general colonial attitude towards Tiv interests in Wukari District. It was therefore not surprising that Mr. Gunn's ruling that there should not be a separate Tiv court in the district was shared by Delves Broughton L.R, the then Acting resident, Benue Province. For instance, in his reaction to the Tiv demand for a separate court in the district, Broughton remarked that:

I think it unfortunate that separate Tiv courts were ever instituted in Takum and Donga District to the Tiv. the grant of a "court" at once suggests local sovereignty, the same word "jir" (judgment) and the same place and meeting being normally used both for court and for administrative council. But the object of the purely Tiv courts could have been better achieved by extending membership of the Takum and Donga Chiefs' courts to include properly authenticated Tiv representatives. However the Tiv courts exist and appear to be giving Satisfactory service, and it is inadvisable to abolish them now.⁹⁹

This position from the highest hierarchy in the province summed up the unwillingness of the colonial authority to give any judicial concessions to the Tiv in areas that would guarantee the proper management of Tiv judicial matters. Naturally, it was expected that since separate Tiv courts existed in Takum and Donga Districts in Wukari Division, and were performing satisfactory functions, the same would have been extended to the Wukari Tiv. More over the Mohammedan units in the District were granted a separate court that heard only Muslim cases¹⁰⁰. It was expected that if given this same privilege like the Mohammedan units, the Tiv would have had the impression and satisfaction that their interests were also being taken care of. This would have also impressed on the Jukun leadership that the Tiv also belong, and must also be treated on equal

basis.

Sadly, however, the impression created in the minds of the Jukuns in the administration of Justice in the area was that the Tiv did not properly belong and, as such, did not possess the right to be properly represented in the Wukari Judicial System. This was based on the forceful “guest” status ascribed to them in the District by the colonial regime. Giving this general attitude towards the Tiv in the area by both the colonial regime and the Jukun, clear-cut margins began to emerge between the Tiv and the Jukun. It was such margins that soon began to dictate the nature and forms of socio-political relations between the two groups over the years.

One blames this down trend in Tiv-Jukun relation in the District on the colonial arrangement in the area for its stubborn neglect to properly integrate the two groups into a harmonious entity. For instance, condemning the marginalisation of the Tiv in the District, Counsel, the then Resident, Benue Province, declared in unequivocal terms that:

Wukari District still tends to live on past glories and the Traditional councilors both still wish to dominate all spheres of thought and activities, ignoring the aspirations of the people for a share in government. This of course is particularly thorny problem where it affects the very large number of Tiv in the district who assert what they consider to be their right. The fact is that the Tiv are here to stay and, because the Jukun depend on them to a certain extent economically, must be given recognition.¹⁰¹

Unfortunately, this positive position in the attitudes of some colonial officials to the Tiv in the District was belated. It began to gather momentum at the apex at the

time the colonial regime was preparing its handover note to an indigenous government in Nigeria. Little wonder, therefore, that the tone of Counsel's well meaning position was neither reflected in the status still experienced by the Tiv in the area on the eve of independence nor did it exert any influence on the hand over note in the District; hence an unfortunate carry over into the era of indigenous administration in Nigeria.

Nonetheless, one must not fail to appreciate the presence of some colonial officials, like Counsel, who believed in equality of the Tiv and the Jukun in a geopolity both found themselves in.

4.6 JUKUN-TIV POLITICAL RELATIONS IN THE COLONIAL YEARS 1950–1960

The Nigerian body politics in the colonial period was characterised by the phenomena of confrontation, antagonism, and intimidation. This negative political culture shaped the philosophies of political associations in the formative years of the country's nationalism. This, no doubt accounted for the unhealthy political competition between supporters of the first dominant political parties – the NPC (Northern People Congress), the NCNC National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroun) and the A.G. (Action Group) in the country.

This negative trend was based on the divide and rule policy of the colonial administration. The colonial regime did little or nothing to integrate the country into a harmonious political entity. The emphasis placed on the polities of the four regions greatly affected the unity of the emerging nation. Members of each of the regions were suspicious on one another, and always tried to interpret policies and actions in the light of their effect on individual region. Within this development,

Sir Ahmadu Bello, had to delay the pace of Nigeria's independence in order to groom the Northern Region to be able to compete favourably with the other regions in the event of political independence. After the eventual attainment of independence, this spirit of suspicion continued.

In former Wukari District, the same political culture was displayed. This was an interplay between the Tiv and the Jukun who constituted the two dominant ethnic groups in the area. Here, the marriage between the Jukun and the colonial instrument against the Tiv dampened any hope for the two groups, to maintain any meaningful political alliance. In fact, the discrimination suffered by the Tiv under the Colonial Jukun rule provided the basis for political differences right from the colonial era.

Before 1955, however, both the Tiv and the Jukun, including the Hausa – Fulani elements in the District found themselves in one political camp – the NPC. Many Tiv political activists in the area like David Mtuem¹⁰². Viewed this as a marriage of incompatible bedfellows. According to Shausu Ahur¹⁰³, this was only explained by the fact that the NPC, to which these groups belonged, was the only popular political option for the North. He maintained that given any other popular option, the Tiv would have explored such virgin land devoid of discrimination and derogatory name-calling. Similarly, the growing rivalry between the Tiv and the Hausa-Fulani leadership due to the former's upright refusal to be islamised also explained the difficulty for the two to flow together. The case of the Jukun whose leadership was in close cooperation with the Hausa-Fulani leadership was different. Already, many Hausa-Fulani elements were domiciled in Wukari

proper, with cases of inter marriages commonplace among them. This development resulted in the Jukun easily appreciating the Islamic faith, with some already drifting towards it. The reverse was, however, the case with the Tiv who resisted every attempt by the Hausa-Fulani leadership to extend Islamic influence among the Tiv. All these antecedents, helped to explain why most Tiv political activists saw the coming together of the Tiv, Jukun and the Hausa-Fulani elements under one political umbrella the caging together of sheep with wolves.

The formation of the UMBC (United Middle Belt Congress) in 1955 by the then Tiv political leader, Joseph Saawuan Tarkaa, was the singular political development that blotted all chances for the Tiv, the Jukun and the Hausa-Fulani to be under one political camp. This was indeed the opportunity most Tiv people had been yearning for due to the unhealthy relationship between them and the ruling NPC. The Tiv found themselves in the bad books of the NPC administration due to their strong opposition to embrace Islam, which then seemed to be one of the cardinal agenda of the NPC Government.

The eventual emergence of the UMBC among the Tiv was therefore interpreted as a revolt by the Tiv leaders against the jihadist attitude of the NPC Government on non-Islamic groups, particularly in the North. And even though this political development had its roots in main Tiv land, it had a spill over effect on Wukari Division, particularly on Wukari District. Consequently, majority of the Wukari Tiv decamped from the NPC into the UMBC, which was more or less a Tiv political party. The Jukun, on the other hand, remained intact in the NPC due to their cordial working relationship with the NPC government. This

development also found root from the fact that quite a number of the emerging muslim elements in Wukari had mixed parentage of Hausa-Fulani and Jukun origins. This naturally made the dividing line between the Jukun and the Muslim community in the area and even beyond, very slim. This was even the basis of the remark by Tseror that “at this time, whereas the Jukun belonged to the Northern Peoples’ Congress (NPC), Tiv in Wukari were predominantly in the NEPU-UMBC alliance”¹⁰⁴. The Tiv action to team up with NEPU was informed by the fact that even though the party was led by a Muslim, Mallam Aminu Kano, his socio-political ideology significantly diverged from that of the NPC. Moreover, NEPU was, by origin, a rival political association to the NPC in the north.

This political gang up was soon to produce a very detrimental consequence on Tiv-Jukun unity, particularly in Wukari District. Most Jukun informants like Gambo Agbu argued “the rivalry between the Tiv and the Jukun on the eve of independence began as a result of their allegiance to two different political camps.”¹⁰⁵ This view was shared by Tiv political activists like David Mtuem, who responded in similar manner that “the beginning of serious conflict between the Tiv and the Jukun in Wukari found origin from their allegiance to different political association.”¹⁰⁶

The views by both the Tiv and the Jukun political analysts on Tiv-Jukun relation as from 1955 cannot be contested. Even before this date the relationship between the two groups had started to become chequered due to the gross neglect of the Tiv by the colonial administration in preference to the Jukun. More so, the Jukun became more conscious of the need to check the growing Tiv influence in

what they considered to be their land. Consequently, the pendulum in their relationship became simply graphical of a hostile atmosphere; an indication that most integrative ingredients disappeared. Invariably, when the UMBC was formed in 1955, the Tiv found reasons to part way with the Jukun politically. Found in different political camps, politics of rivalry intensified, since in the erroneous context of Nigerian politics, political differences was simply misconstrued to represent hostility or confrontation. Unfortunately, this was the political evil that the political leaders of both the Tiv and the Jukun were grappling with in Wukari District. While Ibrahim Sangari Usman emerged as the Jukun political searchlight at this time, Charles Tanguil Gaza and Ova Vaase assumed similar role among the Tiv in same.

4.6.1 Election of Charles Tanguil Gaza into the Federal House of Representatives in 1959 and its effect on Jukun-Tiv Relations

The events preceding the 1959 Federal Elections left no doubt that the Tiv and the Jukun were significantly marching on parallel lines into the 1960s. The alleged attempt by Uva Vaase, a Tiv political activist, to be enthroned as the Aku Uka in 1954 added ingredients to this political development. Vaase's action among other reasons, was premised on the emerging awareness among the Tiv in Wukari District that by their history of origin, numerical strength and role in the area, they also possessed the unflinching right to part-take in all levels and categories of administration in the District. Non-the less, the action was resisted; for the Jukun viewed the ambition as over stepping the boundaries. This consideration trapped Vaase in a physical assault as Grace remarked that, "The Aku did not take this kindly. Manu later regretted his action and paid dearly for

the non bloody political crisis.”¹⁰⁷

Notwithstanding the fact that Vaase’s action was checked, the development began a disturbing process of complications in the Jukun-Tiv relationship. The climax of the complications arising from the growing political differences between the Tiv and the Jukun was attained in 1959. This marked the victory of a Tiv, Charles Tangul Gaza, over a Pre Jukun, Ibrahim Sangari Usman, in the 1959 Federal Elections into the Federal House of Representatives. On the eve of this epoch making election, it was obvious that the two groups had lost the basic instruments of cohesion.

The dividing line became broadened, in part, by Vaase’s action, and the growing political consciousness among the Tiv that politics was, and is, a game of numbers, and that he who controls political power controls all spheres of human life. The epoch making victory of Charles Tangul Gaza, courtesy of NEPU-UMBC alliance, dashed all hopes of peaceful co-existence between the Tiv and the Jukun in the District for the moment. The Jukun saw their defeat as a giant step towards losing their much-cherished political position to the Tiv; and the latter who were making earnest political calculations to redeem their lost image in the area. Both Tiv and Jukun sources shared the opinion that Tangul’s victory nearly pushed the two groups into an open confrontation. There were allegations on both sides over the conduct of the elections. For instance, while a Jukun princess, Atoshi Grace, alleged that “many Tiv from Tiv Division found their way into Wukari during the election and voted for a Tiv candidate under the umbrella of the UMBC.”¹⁰⁸ Ishima Ayati, a Tiv, on his part, alleged that “Jukun NPC agents openly

intimidated Tiv at the polls and some were not even allowed to cast their votes, while all the presiding and returning officers working in Wukari were Jukun.”¹⁰⁹

While the truth in Atoshi’s Grace’s allegation cannot be easily appreciated, Ayati’s allegation, on its part, cannot be easily dismissed. Since the Jukun were in control of power, and were also conscious of the inherent danger in the event of the Tiv seizing political power, it became obvious that all available avenues must be explored to stop the impending doom. And from what followed the release of the election results, it was apparent that the series of allegations from both sides over the conduct of the elections provided useful insight into the nature of relationship that had began to emerge between the two communities. This reinforces Avav’s remark that “the defeat of the Jukun candidate by the Tiv marked the beginning of a political hostility between the two ethnic groups.”¹¹⁰

This trend was aggravated by the court verdict in favour of Charles Tanguil Gaza. It could be recalled that other than accepting the election result, Ibrahim Sangari Usman took the matter to the court. The political atmosphere, that proceeded the court verdict significantly determined the nature of relationship between the Tiv and the Jukun in the District. After the verdict, what was initiated interpreted as a political struggle between the entire Tiv and Jukun communities in the entire Wukari Division assumed a new dimension. Mtuem contended that “it became significantly an affair between the Tiv and the Jukun in Wukari District”¹¹¹. This found origin from the fact that apart from the fact that both candidates came from the district, there was a disagreement among the Jukun over the choice of Sangari from Wukari District. Atoshi Grace filtered this

development succinctly when she asserted that:

There was also a breakdown in the NPC intra-party alliance over the choice of a candidate from Wukari. The non Tiv who were part of the alliance decided to change their mind by voting for Tangul Gaza... The break in the accord within the NPC supporters made Gaza to win the election.¹¹²

Prior to this election, the Jukun from Takum and Donga Districts counted it as their turn to present a consensus candidate for the election. Since the Jukun communities in the two districts were not in full support of Sangari's candidature, they refused to be carried by the waves of the Wukari action. Moreover, on comparative terms, the relationship between the Tiv and Jukun communities in the two districts was still favourable. Consequently, as the Jukun in Wukari District resorted to hostility towards Tangul and his people, the Jukun in the other districts remained calm. Ityohemba Bee testified that "the Jukun in Wukari district did not only resort to attempts to frustrate Tiv political ambitions in the District, but also attempted to physically eliminate Tangul Gaza."¹¹³

Imewa added that "the Jukun swore to take his life at the slightest opportunity"¹¹⁴. Even though the Jukun refuted all these allegations, the steaming effect of the entire development produced an aggressive ethnic consciousness among the Tiv and Jukun communities in the District. It was this development which determined the level and form the Nande Ior and the Atem Tyo episodes in 1960 and 1964, respectively assumed in Wukari District, and the Division at large.

4.7 SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROGRAMMES AND THEIR EFFECT ON JUKUN-TIV RELATIONS IN THE COLONIAL ERA 1918–1960

From the foregoing analysis, it is clear that the colonial regime did little or

nothing to meet the yearnings and aspirations of the Tiv people in Wukari District. It is also clear that no colonial policies were consciously designed to favour the Tiv in the area, nor were there programmes designed to enable the Tiv and the Jukun to operate on equal basis. The Tiv were not positively encouraged to integrate into the system that determined their fate. This explains why most Tiv informants, like Akomi Ahur declared that “their administration was more or less suppressing the Tiv under the Jukun system in the area.”¹¹⁵

It will, however, be too sweeping to accuse the entire body of colonial officials of being totally opposed to the Tiv. There were some colonial officials who tried to ensure that the Tiv received fair treatment. The attack on the Ring Fence Policy by colonial officials like the Secretary, Northern Provinces as well as Patterson’s discontent over the non-integration of the Tiv in the administrative process in Wukari District, etc, made pro-Jukun political activists like Jibrin Amfani¹¹⁶. To accuse such officials of taking side with the Tiv. For instance, in his reaction against the Ring Fence policy, the Secretary of Northern Provinces asserted that “the policy of attempting to confine a rapidly increasing tribe like the Munshi (Tiv) within a ring fence is impracticable.”¹¹⁷

Apart from this reaction, the Secretary issued a policy statement allowing the Tiv to move into Wukari and Takum to farm unoccupied lands¹¹⁸. Similarly, by the policy, all displaced Tiv people were allowed to go back to their old farms in the two districts¹¹⁹. Patterson’s attack on the discrimination against the Tiv in Wukari District was also one of the factors the Jukun and their supporters used to accuse some of the colonial officials of taking side with the Tiv. The positive

attitudes of some of the colonial officials towards the Tiv constrained Jibrin Amfani to remark that:

At this time, opinion were sharply divided amongst British Political officers. There were those who favoured the Tiv and even encouraged their expansion to lands of their neighbours. Notable among Tiv admirers was F. H. Buxton, who was credited with faithful and successful execution of British policy of peaceful penetration of Tiv land.¹²⁰

While we give credit to the colonial officials whose good attitudes towards the Tiv motivated the above remark, it is important to note that in as much as they abolished the Ring Fence Policy, the policy statement in this respect instituted a very thorny issue which laid the foundation for Jukun-Tiv confrontation in the area over the years. The same document that abolished the Ring Fence Policy officially gazettes the Tiv in the area as either “guests” or “immigrants”¹²¹. For instance, according to one colonial report:

As in Takum, the government alarmed by the influx of Tiv into Wukari adopted the “ring-fence policy and the Tiv were forced back over the “Gordon” line. However, this policy was abandoned and the Tiv were allowed to resumed their wanderings it being understood that their status was that of “guests” and that they must live under the jurisdiction of the Aku.¹²²

By this official declaration, the status of even the Tiv clans who had stayed in the area long before the colonial era was altered. It was even in the light of this declaration that the Jukun concept of Bichi or Mbichi, in reference to the Tiv, metamorphosed. Henceforth, both the Jukun and the colonial authority had the impression that the Tiv were immigrating into what became officially defined as

Jukun land; and hence the call among the Jukun to the Tiv to “come and settle”; literally translated into Jukun language as “Bichi” or Mbichi”. The Jukun interpreted this concept to mean that the Tiv were henceforth coming in to settle as their guests. But this is highly very contentious among the Tiv, especially by those Tiv clans whose history of existence in the area is age long.

4.7.1 Road Construction Projects and Jukun-Tiv Relationship

Road construction was one of the notable projects the colonial regime executed in Wukari Division which enhanced cordial contacts between the Tiv and the Jukun in the area. Much efforts were made to develop road networks in the three districts in the Division. According to Bridel’s Report of 1932:

The people are well served in the way of communication. The rivers (Benue, Donga and Katsina Ala) are supplemented by a system of motor roads connecting Ibi-Wukari-Donga-Takum-Katsina-Ala-Makurdi. All roads have been constructed and are maintained by the Native Administration.¹²³

These roads provided important channels for positive commercial contacts and interactions between the Tiv and the Jukun within Wukari Division, and far into main Tivland. Among the motorable roads constructed within Wukari District were the Wukari-Ibi, Wukari Chonku, Wukari Bantaje, Wukari-Rafin Kada, Wukari-Akwana and Wukari-Ayu.¹²⁴

According to Tiv and Jukun sources, the road projects provided good opportunity for the Tiv and the Jukun to embark on common self-help projects. In most of these road projects, Iorwa¹²⁵ stated that the two communities shared the lengths of the roads among themselves for construction. Each community handled

the areas across its environ. Such projects were supervised by the spokesmen of such communities. For instance, in the case of the Ayu road project in 1959, Elias Lokoja¹²⁶ maintained that the project was entrusted in the care and supervision of Ayu Lokoja, the then spokesman of the Ukum, Mbazun and Mbayuhwa clans¹²⁷. Mnongo maintained that the trust resulted from the good working relationship between Ayu and the then Aku Uka, Agbumanu Atoshi. David Mtuem¹²⁸ affirmed that Atoshi drove in the first vehicle to travel along the Wukari-Ayu road to officially commission the road in 1959. The least one can say about the social effect of this road is that, apart from providing a link between Tiv and Jukun communities, including Wukari, for economic activities, it provided the basis for the social interaction between the two communities.

One important thing to be noted about the road projects is that they were largely handled by the Local communities. The only role played by the colonial administration was in the area of maintenance and construction of bridges. Even in these areas, the revenue for the functions accrued from taxation, which equally fell on the shoulders of the local communities. According to one colonial report, for instance:

Little work has been done on the roads during the half year (1932) beyond maintenance, owing to the energies of the Native Administration having been concentrated on the construction of the hospital at Wukari and the building of the new dispensary at Takum. The roads have been maintained in a motorable condition. A considerable sum is needed to make them really all-season roads but it is hoped that the policy of building one or two bridges a year will not have to be abandoned, However, at present time little more than simple maintenance can be ventured upon, the commitments of the Native

Administration in this direction are almost the limit of practicability.¹²⁹

It is one's strong contention that the mere supervisory role played by the colonial authorities in the area of road construction must not lead us into undermining the important contribution of the entire system in this respect. Credit must be given to the colonial system for sanctioning and overseeing the successful execution of road projects in the District. Of importance to note is the fact such roads would not have been constructed at the time they were if the projects were not sanctioned by the colonial regime.

There are every indications that the motivating factor for the road projects was not necessarily the desire by the colonial administration for the communities to merely interact. Rather, the clinching consideration was trade; the desire to link up the communities with the main centres of trade in the District. This economic determinant explained Downes', the then Wukari District Officer, strong desire to continue with road maintenance, even in the face of numerous projects being executed by the District in 1932¹³⁰. Consequently, having laid down the road net works, much efforts were made by the colonial administration to develop trade across the District, and in the Division at large. Apart from encouraging the production of cash crops like beniseed, trade centres were developed across the division. The development of commerce was so pursued and encouraged by the colonial authority that on the 30th June, 1932, Bridel was happy to report that:

The Division is well provided with buying centres for Produce. The principal economic crop is beniseed. The main growers of beniseed are the Tiv but other tribes have been encouraged to cultivate the crop to improve their standard of living.¹³¹

The beniseed trade, in particular, provided the opportunity for many Tiv peasant farmers to travel to many trading centers, mainly in Jukun towns, like Wukari, Gidan Idi, and Akwana, to sell their produce. According to Tiv elders like Apeekaa¹³², Kumaga¹³³ and Tsavav¹³⁴, the beniseed trade provided their people with the opportunity to extend trade relations with both the Jukun and European agents. They recalled the good times they used to count their sales and return into the markets to do some purchases.

Trade relations between the Tiv and the Jukun, including other traders, particularly of Hausa origin, were reportedly very impressive. According to one colonial Report... “vendors of all kinds of goods are to be seen as usual in the markets... And the primitive method of barter is actually being used not merely in certain Tiv markets, but in Donga and Wukari markets.”¹³⁵

The same report touched on the general prices of trade items in Wukari market for both Tiv and non-Tiv items thus:

...some three years ago a fair horse would fetch £10.0.0 or more at Wukari.... Recently, a fair sized bull was sold at Wukari for £1.10.0 and a cow and calf actually fetched £1.5.0 A ram could rarely be bough under 10S to 15S...the price of a Munshi cloth (fari) only a short while ago was 5s now vendors are glad to receive 2/6d for the same. Foodstuffs also are ridiculously cheap; the usual price for guinea corn at this time of the year is 1d to 1½ a bowl=2 lbs weight now is sold at 4 to 6 bowls for 1d–8 to 10 lbs for Id.¹³⁶

From the above quotation, it is relevant to state that the atmosphere of trade enhanced contact and interaction not only between the Tiv and the Jukun in Wukari, but also between the Tiv and other non-Jukun traders. Available records

confirmed that apart from beniseed which was largely produced by the Tiv, and was the main cash crop; in the area at the time, they also produced the greater bulk of other foodstuffs like yam, guinea corn and millet that serviced Wukari Market. The truth was that the Tiv were, and are still, predominantly very industrious peasant farmers.

It can be concluded at this juncture that by improving communication – road and trade net works in Wukari District, and the division at large, the colonial administration unconsciously helped in no small measure in promoting Tiv-Jukun relations. Such commercial contacts softened the degree of tension that would have existed between the two communities as a result of the repressive and discriminatory colonial policies against the Tiv in preference to the Jukun.

4.7.2 The Colonial Education Policies on Jukun-Tiv Relations

Another important area the colonial administration unconsciously promoted Tiv-Jukun relations in Wukari District, and with main Tiv land, was in the education industry. The desire to produce indigenous manpower to man the native authority administration necessitated the establishment of schools. This project was pursued in partnership with the missionaries who had the same need to produce church workers. According to one Colonial Report, there were three elementary schools in the entire Division, one for each of the three districts of Wukari, Takum and Donga¹³⁷. The schools produced mainly low cadre administrative staff and church workers.

The schools also provided good opportunity for both Tiv and Jukun boys and girls to interact. Among such Tiv elders who expressed satisfaction with the

way they interacted with Jukun youths were Shipine¹³⁸ and Emberga¹³⁹. This good working relationship was extended to Tiv and Jukun parents. Here, the Jukun happily received children from Tiv parents who stayed with them to attend school. All the Tiv parents interviewed attested to this fact. And in Wukari District the only elementary school in the area provided the golden opportunity for this level of interaction. In fact, the receptive attitude of the Jukun encouraged Tiv parents who happily gave their children and wards to attend schools.

The establishment of a Middle School in Katsina Ala in 1932 was another golden opportunity, which the colonial administration provided to enhance contact and interaction between Tiv and Jukun youths. According to Orlaade Ahur¹⁴⁰, the middle school remained the only higher school in the area established to cater for the elementary schools in both Tiv land and Wukari division. For instance, according to one colonial report, “It has been decided that eight of the senior boys from Wukari School shall go to the Middle school (at Katsina-Ala) at the next session, commencing July 25th (1932). The Aku Uka and his advisers together with the parents, appear pleased with the arrangement”¹⁴¹

The fact that the Aku Uka and his advisers, including the Jukun parents, were pleased with the arrangement leaves no doubt in our minds that the process of positive interaction between the Tiv and the Jukun was reinforced significantly, in part, by the education industry. This was particularly evident when Jukun parents were happy for their children and wards to be taken to main Tiv land. In fact, given an atmosphere of an unhealthy interaction between the Tiv and the Jukun in the District, the latter would not have allowed their children and wards to

be taken to far Tiv land. The implementation of the middle school system was therefore the practical manifestation of the point under review. This fact was reinforced by one colonial report which stated that “the first party of eight Jukun boys from Wukari commenced their Middle school course at Katsina-Ala in July, (1932) “they have made a promising start and mix well with the Tiv.”¹⁴²

What can be said about the Jukun-Tiv interaction in the education industry within and without Wukari District is that it availed the two communities with the opportunity to appreciate each other. Tiv and Jukun informants shared this view. It was however in the 1960s that the level of contacts and interaction was intensified due to the establishment of full-fledged primary schools in the area by both the colonial administration and Christian mission bodies like the Sudan United Mission and the Roman Catholic.

The foregoing development aside, it can be concluded that throughout the colonial period, no serious efforts were made by the colonial administration to foster harmony between the Tiv and the Jukun in Wukari District.¹⁴³ Even in some cases where some colonial officials tried to create conditions for the Tiv to feel some degree of belonging, such efforts were frustrated by some of their colleagues who refused to implement such positive policies. Among other effects, this general negative colonial attitude towards the Tiv, in preference to the Jukun, in Wukari district, only helped to create and sustain the process of Tiv-Jukun rivalry in the area in the colonial period; the legacy, which is very much around with the present generation.

Whether conflict with the British, the forces of Islam and the Jukun, rivalry

between the Tiv and their neighbours can basically be explained in the context of Tiv diplomacy. It is evident that in as much as the Tiv are accommodating, they are very opposed to any system or arrangement that seeks to undermine their system, independence and participation. This accounted for why they eventually fell out with the Hausa-Fulani oligarchy in its attempt to take Islam into the shore of Tiv land. The same was the case with the British whose policies in Wukari District were nothing short of deliberate attempts to marginalise the Tiv in preference to the Jukun. Similarly, the Tiv rivalry with the Jukun in the area over the years can also be understood in the context of Tiv diplomacy, which strongly advocates for equal access to opportunities and privileges without the suppression of any party by another in any form of relationship.

ENDNOTES

1. Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, Dares-Salam, Tanzanian Publishing House, 1972.
2. Nnoli Okwudiba, Ethnic Politics in Nigeria, Enugu Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1980. Also see Nnoli Okwudiba in Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa: Intervening Variables, Lagos-Molthou Press Ltd, 1994.
- 3 Lord Harley An African Survey, London, Oxford University Press, 1939.
4. Skinner G.W, "The Nature of Loyalties in Indonesia," in J. Wallstein, (ed.) Social Change: The Colonial Situation, New York, Wiley, 1966.
5. Hilyard Nicholas, "Blood, Babies and the Social Roots of Conflicts", in Ecology, Politics and Violent Conflict, edited by Suliman Mohammed, London and New York, 1999.
6. Keane F, "No Man is an Island," in a letter to Daniel Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1996, quoted in Hilyard Nicholas op.cit.
7. Tome Kazah-Toure, "Inter-Ethnic Relations and Nationalism in Zango Katab Area of Northern Nigeria: Historical Origins and Contemporary Forms," Paper presented at the 8th General Assembly on Crises, Conflicts and Transformation: Responses and Perspectives, Dakar, Senegal, 26th June–2nd Uly, 1995.
8. Yohanna Kagoro Gandu, "Colonial Mutation Contemporary forms of identify Construction and Ethno-Religious Violence in Northern Nigeria," A Manuscript Submitted to The Editor-in-Chief, JOSUGA, Faculty of Arts Journal, University of Jos, Nigeria, 2002 p.3.
9. Ibid. p. 4.
10. Skinner, op. cit.
11. Gandu, op. cit. p.5
12. Ibid. p.3
13. Ibid. p.4
14. Ibid.

15. Ibid. p.5
16. Nnoli, op. cit. p. 4
17. Bawa B.F, “Economy and Society in the Law Land Division of Plateau Province 1900–1960: A Study of the Impact of Colonialism” Ph.D. Thesis, History Department, University of Jos, 1995.
18. Raphael Olu Afolalu, A History of Africa Since 1980, Onibonjo Press, Ibadan, 1972, p. 278
19. Weekly Review, October, 1993, p. 8
20. Yash Tandon, Root Causes of Peacelessness and Approaches to Peace in Africa, Durban, Umtapo Centre, 1999.
21. Hilyard, op. cit.
22. Ibid.
23. Kuka M.H, Religion, Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria Ibadan, Spectrum, 1993.
24. Simon Yohanna, “The Colonial State and the Evolution of Social Stratification in Central Nigeria: The case of Southern Zaria, 1902–1960”. M. A. Dissertation, University of Jos, 1988.
25. Kaza-Toure, “The Political Economy of Ethnic Conflicts and Governance in Southern Kaduna, Nigeria: (De) Constructing a contested Terrain”, in Africa Development, vol. XXIV, Nos. 1 & 2, 1999, pp.112–126.
26. Yabracks Sale Isa, “The British Colonial Conquest and its Impact (History Project) University of Jos, 1995, p.113
27. Ibid. p.114
28. Ikime, “The British Pacification of Tiv Land...” p. 104.
29. Dorward, “The Development of British Administration among the Tiv 1900–1949”, in African Affairs, vol. 68, No. 279, Oct. 1969, p. 319.
30. Jibrin Amfani, et al, op. cit. p. 35
31. Ibid
32. Hagher, “Tiv/Jukun Inquest: Tiv Cleansing Agenda: From Lugard to Obasanjo(2)”, in Vanguard, Thursday, December 13th, 2001, p. 39.

33. Tseror, op. cit. p. 58
34. MAKPROF/FED/4/24/AR/INT/W/1. Intelligence Reports on the Wukari Native Administration of Wukari Division of the Benue Province by K. Dewar, para. 23 p.8 1935.
35. Jibrin Amfani, et al, op. cit.
36. MAKKPROF/FED/4/24/AR/INT/W/1, paragraph 16, p.5 of Dewar's Intelligence NAK/MAKPROF/4131/AR/REP/W/18...
37. MAKPROF/FED/4131/AR/REP/W/18, Richard Palmer 1922, Checking Tiv encroachment of Jukunland. Also see Amfani, et al, op.cit p.35
38. MARKPROF/FED/24/AR/W/1. op.cit. paras.19 and 23, pp.5 and 8
39. Ibid. paragraph 23, p. 8 of Dewar's Intelligence Report
40. MAKKPROF/FED/4131/REP/W/1... paragraph 47, p. 14 of Bridel's Report No. 14, 1932. NB. This report asserted that "The District Heads of Takum and Donga are both keen on the Tiv settling within their areas". This could, in part, be due to the socio-economic advantage to be derived by accommodating the Tiv.
41. MAKPROF/FED/4/24/AR/WT/W/1... paragraphs 21-23, pp. 7-8 of Dewar's Intelligence Report on Wukari Native Authority.
42. MAKPROF/FED/4/1/4377, paragraph I, p. 1 of I. G. Gunn's Report. 11 pages.
- 45 Ibid., paragraph 2
44. Ibid., paragraph 14, p. 4
45. MARKPROF/FED/4/1/4377: paragraph 13(B), P.4, of Gunn's Report On "Tiv in Wukari Division, Reorganisation of 1947."
46. Ibid., p.12
47. Ibid., paragraph 13(b), p. 4
48. Ibid., paragraph 4, p. 1

49. Ibid, Paragraph 7(b), p. 2
50. MAKPROF/FED/4/24/AR/INT/W/1, paragraph 50(b), pp.18-19, of Dewar's Report.29 pages.
51. MARKPROF/FED/4/1/4377, paragraphs 12 and 13, pp.3-4
52. Ibid., paragraph 3, p.2, of Delves-Broughton's note to the Secretary, Northern provinces.5 pages
53. MAKPROF/FED/4/24/AR/INT/W/1.paragraph 23 and 24, p.8, Dewar's Intelligence Report on of Wukari District.
- 54.Ibid., paragraphs 15-16, p.5,
55. Ibid. paragraphs 22-23, p.8,
56. Vanguard, 29th & 30th Nov. 2001, "Tiv in the Valley of the Shadow of Death" by Brigadier-General John Atom Kpera (Rtd) and Professor Iyorwuese Hagher. All the Tiv people interviewed accused the Wukari Local Government Area of master minding the offensive against the Tiv in Taraba State. Their claim was hinged on the argument that the episode started in the area, from where it spread like harmattan fire to other Jukun controlled areas, (excluding Takum) and other areas that shared the agenda. This view was however refuted by all Jukun sources interviewed
57. Danlami Ikenya, Interview. He was a member of Taraba House of Assembly from Wukari during the crisis.
58. Vanguard, November 23rd, 2001, "Scourge of Tiv Infiltration in Taraba State(5)", by Jibrin Amfani et al
59. Ibid
60. Ibid., "Tiv Cleansing agenda. From Lugard to Obasanjo", Dec. 13th, 2001, p.40
61. MAKKPROF/FED/4/24/AR/INT/W/1, op. cit., paragraph 26, p.9.
62. Ibid. paragraphs 27-28
63. MAKPROF/FED/4/1/4377, op.cit., paragraph 4, P.1
64. Ibid, paragraph 3

65. Dewar. Intelligence Report on the Wukari: Native Administration of the Wukari Division of Benue Province. MAKPROF/FED/24/AR/INT/W/1 paragraph 25(b), p.8 29 pages.
66. MAKPROF/FEO/4/1/4377. paragraph 4., p.1
67. Dewar, op. cit. Intelligence Report by K. Dewar, 1935–37, para.25, p.53
68. MAKPROF/FED/ 4/24/AR/INT/W/1, paragraph 43, pp.14-15. Intelligence Report by K. Dewar, 1935 n- 36, P.8
69. SNP 17/3/24678 (A): Donga District, Wukari Division, Benue Province, Intelligence Report by Dewar, K. 1935-37, para.104, pp.53-54.
70. Dewar, K. (1935) Takum District. Wukari Division, Benue Province. SNP/3/24898 (B), paragraph 36, para.21, p.8.
71. Patterson J.R, Minute by Chief commissioner SNP/17/8/K.4049, Extracted from 31611, p.137 6th March, 1947. Also see KPROF/FED/4/1/4377. paragraph 4, p.1.
72. Gunn I.G, Wukari Tiv: Report to the Resident, Benue Province, MAKPROF/FED/4/1/4377, paragraph 2, p.1, 27th November 1947.
73. Dewar, op. cit. Intelligence on Wukari Native Authority of the Wukari Division of the Benue Province. MAKPROF/FED/4/24/AR/INT/W/1 paragraph 50 (b) pp.21-22.
74. Delves-Broughton I.R, Tiv in Wukari Division MAKPROF/FED/4/1/4377. Paragraph 6(b), pp.3-4. 11/5/1948. Also see I.G. Gunn, Report on Tiv in Takum District of Wukari Division, op. cit. paragraph 16, p.3 11 pages.
75. Gunn, Administration of Tiv units in Donga District of Wukari Division. op. cit., paragraphs 29 and 31 (c), pp.10-11.11 pages.
76. Bridel .H.S, Annual Report No.14 on the Wukari Division of Benue Province. MAKPROF/FED/4131/AR/REP/W/3, paragraph 47, 1932, p.14.
77. Gunn, Administration of Takum Tiv MAKPROF/FED/4/1/4377. paragraphs 20 and 22 (b) pp.6-7 11 pages.
78. Ibid, paragraph 26 and 28, p. 9
79. Dewar, op. cit. MAKPROF/FED/4/INT/W/1. paragraph 16,p.5.

80. Ibid, paragraph 29, P.9-10
81. Ibid. paragraph 30, p.10
82. Ibid. paragraph 43, p.15
83. MARKPROF/FED/4/1/4377 paragraph 5, p.1 of Wukari District Officer's covering note to The Tiv petition in Wukari Division For onward dispatch to the Resident, Benue Province, Makurdi 12th October 1953. 1 page document.
84. Ihuwe Tseke (100 years). Interview.
85. J. R. Patterson, Response to Tiv request for separate court contained in REF/SNP/17/8/K.4049 (b) 6th March, 1947, para.5, p.137.
86. Ibid, para.4
87. The Resident (Benue Province), Wukari Tiv. Extract from P.C.J. 2913, vol.II, p.264. contained in MAKPROF/FED/4/1/4377, p.1. 10/11/1947
88. Findley, in Ibid. para.3, p.284 (a)
89. Tiv Progressive Union, Wukari Branch c/o Ova Vaase Improvement of condition of Tivs in Wukari Division, 4377, contained in MAKPROF/FED/4/1/4377, p.47, 1953 6TH August 1953. 4 pages.
90. Ibid. paragraphs 10 .
91. Cole C.W, Improvement of condition of Tivs in Wukari Division: A reaction to Tiv petition. 4377/53, contained in MAKPROF/FED/4/1/4377, Paragraphs 2, 3 and 5, 22nd October 1953.
92. Wukari District Officer, Covering note to the Tiv petition onward dispatch to the resident, Benue Province, Makurdi. No.147/330, contained in MAKPROF/FED/4/1/4377, paragraphs 3,8 and 10,12th October, 1953.
93. Cole. para.1, 22nd October 1953.
94. Gunn, Takum Tiv paragraph 16, p.3. Also see Tiv in Wukari Division, paragraph 6 (b), pp.3-98. paragraph 10, p.3.
95. Ibid. para.10, p.3
96. The District Officer (Wukari District) Memorandum to the Resident, Benue province, on the Administration of Justice for the Tiv in the District

No.321/38 MAKPROF/FED/4/24/AR/INT/W/1, paragraphs 1-2, pp.1-2, 2nd February, 1938.

97. Gunn, Reaction to the Tiv request for a separate court in Wukari District paragraph 10, p.3.
98. Tseke, op. cit.
99. Delves-Broughton, Memorandum to the Secretary Northern Provinces on the Tiv demand for a separate court in Wukari District, No.4377/12, paragraph 6(b), pp.3-4, 11th May, 1948.
100. Gunn, op. cit. paragraph 9 (a), p.3
101. E. M. H. Counsel, Annual Report on Benue Province, 1960.
102. Mtuem, op. cit.
103. Ahur, op. cit.
104. Tseror, op. cit.
105. Agbu G., (55 years) Interview
106. Mtuem, op. cit.
107. Atoshi, op. cit p.11
108. Ibid.
109. Tseror, op. cit. p. 68
110. T. Avav, and M. Myebba, op. cit. p.7
111. Mtuem, op. cit
112. Atoshi, op. cit
113. I. Bee, Interview
114. Tseror, op. cit. p.68
115. Ahur, (85 years) Interview

116. Amfani, op. cit.
117. Dewar, Extract of the remark of the Secretary, Northern Provinces Kaduna on the Ring Fence Policy and the Tiv in Wukari Division op. cit. paragraph 24 (b), 1922, p.8.
118. Ibid, paragraph 25 (b)
119. Ibid paragraph 25 (c).
120. Amfani, op. cit.
121. Gunn, op. cit. paragraph 3, p.1
122. Ibid
123. Bridel, H., S. op.cit. paragraph 24, p.8.
124. E. M. Lokoja, (45 years). Interview. Also see Ibid.
125. I. Akombo, (57 years) Interview.
126. Lokoja, op.cit.
127. Dewar, op. cit. paragraph 50 (b), p.19.
128. Mtuem, op. cit.
129. R. M..Downes, Report of the Wukari Division (No.13) of Benue Province for the Half Year ending June 30th, 1932, MAKPROF/FED/4131 AR/REP/W/3, paragraph 65, p.16.
130. Ibid
131. Bridel, H.S. op. cit paragraph 25, p.8
132. Apeekaa, (65 years), Interview
133. Kumaga, (50 years), Interview.
134. Tsavav, (60 years), Interview.
135. Downes, op. cit. paragraph 55, P.13
136. Ibid.

137. Ibid. paragraph 95.
138. S.Ahur, (60 years), Interview
139. E.Tor, (55 years), Interview
140. O. Ahur, (65 years), Interview
141. Downes, op. cit paragraph 92, p.24
142. H.S. Bridel, op. cit. paragraph 107. p.29
143. Ahur, op. cit

CHAPTER FIVE

JUKUN-TIV RELATIONS 1960–1979

1. INTRODUCTION

The political antecedents on the eve of the 1960s blotted any chances for cordial relationship between the Jukun and the Tiv, at least in the first half of the period. The nature of political awareness and strategies adopted by the two communities neutralized any hope for continued friendly fusion between the two. A critical appraisal of Tiv¹ and Jukun² sources points to the fact that the frictious relationship between the two ethnic groups in the first half of the 1960s was conditioned by three major socio-political developments. These were the 1960 Nande Ior³ and the 1964 Atem Tyo⁴ episodes, as well as Tangul's socio-political campaigns among the Tiv. Non the less, many Tiv and Jukun sources contended that in the absence of the acidious effects of the colonial policies in the area, the aforementioned episodes in themselves alone would not have attained the potency to throw the two communities farther apart. Moreover, as it will soon be uncovered, both the Nande Ior and the Atem Tyo episodes were not originally Tiv-Jukun frictions.

2 THE NANDE IOR EPISODE 1960

Nande Ior is a Tiv concept literally interpreted to mean “burn people” Many Tiv elders argued that this episode was not originally a Tiv-Jukun aggression⁵. The sources maintained that Nande Ior was a movement among the Tiv against Tiv NPC supporters. Others argued that the Tiv-Jukun factor was

introduced into the movement when the Jukun leadership at Wukari began to accommodate and give protection to pro NPC Tiv elements that fled Tiv land in fear of attack⁶. The Jukun version presented by some Jukun elders did not invalidate the Tiv claim⁷.

It is generally accepted by Tiv sources that the Nande lor aggression started at Agasha, in Tiv land, in 1960, after a protest meeting held in the area.⁸ The protest was a reaction to oppression and wrongful arrests and imprisonment of UMBC members by the NPC government both in Tiv land and Wukari Division. This explained why the meeting was attended by some Tiv political and opinion leaders in Wukari District, like Uva Vaase, Indyeryo and Tangul Gaza. Among other resolutions, the meeting resolved in favour of the adoption of harsh measures against Tiv elements identified to have enlisted their support for the Baja⁹ party, the NPC.

It is important to stress that the Agasha protest meeting was a milestone in shaping Tiv-Tiv and Jukun-Tiv socio-political relations in the first half of the 1960s. Some Tiv elders argued that the phenomenon arising from the meeting did aggravate the already soared relationship between Tiv UMBC supporters and the Tiv elements in the NPC¹⁰. Apart from the fury exerted on the latter, they were not only disowned by the generality of the Tiv nation, but also referred to as Baja, a derogative appellation for the NPC and its supporters. And, by extension, therefore, the movement was obviously to affect Tiv-Jukun and Tiv-Hausa/Fulani relationship, since both were largely in the NPC.

Even though the prosecution of the Nande Ior agenda affected Tiv-Jukun relationship, Tiv sources argued that in most cases where the Jukun were affected, it resulted from either their attempt to give protection to Tiv decedents or the misconception on both sides that the aggression was an inter-ethnic confrontation¹¹. This development, arising particularly from the misconception, deepened the nature and form of the prosecution of the confrontation on inter-ethnic basis. This phenomenon was widespread in Wukari District, where the Headquarter, Wukari, served as a reception point for Tiv NPC elements. For instance, some Tiv sources stated that apart from Tiv NPC supporters in Wukari District, like Tor Musa, Tor Ioryina, Ikyambe Ngibo, Ama, Tar Orshi and Gbuura, who took refuge in Wukari town, some Tiv NPC elements from main Tiv land even ran to take refuge in Wukari¹². Some of these decedents, according to the same sources, included Ishima Iortsofo (Ngyenev, from Zaki-Biam), Anam Mtsar (Ngyenev, also from Zaki-Biam), Apwar (Torov, from Zaki-Biam), Tyowua Yakubu (from Kyado), Igba Baka (from Katsina-Ala) and Bagidi (from Gboko). All these, except Bagidi, were traditional rulers.

According to a Tiv source, the attack on Gbuura in October 1960, a Tiv village, near Wukari town, now taken over by the Jukun and renamed Idofi, was the singular incident that mobilised particularly the Jukun to launch out against the Tiv¹³. The close ties between Gbuura and Wukari town made the Jukun to consider attack on Gbuura as a direct attack on Wukari. Similarly, the Jukun considered the attack on Gbuura, and other Tiv NPC supporters in the area, as an insult and disregard to the entire Wukari leadership, which was largely in support

of the NPC, and also gave protection to Tiv NPC elements, including Gbuura. The source argued that it was in this consideration that the Jukun in Wukari began to attack Tiv UMBC supporters residing in and around Wukari. The same sources contended that this created a chaotic situation and an inter-ethnic suspicion such that even the Tiv who took refuge at Wukari began to feel insecure, with the entire District becoming engulfed in the episode. We cannot deny the fact that at this point what started as a political friction among the Tiv spilled over into Wukari District, and was misconstrued as a Tiv –Jukun aggression. Jukun sources also had no basis to refute the unfortunate development.¹⁴

One important fact to be noted about the Nande Ior episode was that the main target was not life. In most cases, it was only houses and property that were affected in the destruction. Tiv sources agreed that in most, if not in all cases, Tiv NPC supporters were always forced out of their homes before the consuming fire was let loose. The sources maintained that people who did not want to give immediate compliance were thoroughly beaten and forced out before allowing the wild fire to execute its judgment. The effect on relationship was aggravated as the tempo increased. This affected both the Tiv and the Jukun as members of the two communities soon misinterpreted the origin and motive of the uprising.

Fortunately, the Nande Ior phenomenon was short lived. Before the end of 1960, the skirmish, which ensued at the wake of the forth quarter of the year, was over. Most Tiv sources attributed the credit to the tireless efforts of the then Aku Uka, Adi Byewi, who was said to be the unflinching friend to the Tiv people¹⁵ . His history of service in Tiv land, in the then Government Secondary School,

Katsina-Ala, reinforced this claim. Of course, his good working relationship with the Tiv people, particularly in his domain, constrained a Jukun source to argue that “the then Jukun leadership, particularly Adi Byewi, were at fault for accepting the Tiv people without giving them the impression that they were settling on Jukun land”¹⁶. On the contrary, the paramount ruler did not see the basis for discriminating against the Tiv people, and as such employed every avenue to reconcile his people with the former. This reveals an important fact about the role of Jukun leadership in sustaining Jukun-Tiv relationship. That even though at one point or the other a Jukun leader may be accused of aiding and abetting frictious relationship with the Tiv, we should note that many Jukun leaders like Atoshi, Adi Byewi and Abe Ali, among others, did value, and maintained good working relationship with the Tiv people.

While we commend particularly the efforts of Aku Uka, Adi Byewi, for ensuring that peace returned in his domain in 1960, we must not be oblivious to the fact that the action of the NPC government against AG and UMBC supporters for their alleged role in the Nande Ior aggression made it difficult for the divide to be blurred. Available Tiv sources corroborated one another on the fact that only AG and UMBC supporters were surcharged for the payment of compensation to victims, even when NPC members were also involved in the wanton destruction.¹⁷ More so, AG and UMBC supporters accused the government of paying compensation to only NPC supporters. Similarly, there were cases of indiscriminate arrests and imprisonment, without fair trial, of AG and UMBC supporters in Wukari and in main Tiv land. This claim can not be easily thrown

out, since the NPC controlled the government in which the AG and the UMBC were in strong opposition. More over, the Nande Ior was an AG and UMBC coordinated phenomenon to crack down the dominance of the NPC, at least in Tiv land. This development generally undermined all efforts being made, particularly by the then Aku Uka, Adi Byewi, to reconcile UMBC and NPC supporters in his domain. It was this state of discontent which produced the circumstances that resulted in the Atem Tyo aggression in 1964.

3. THE ATEM TYO EPISODE 1964

It would be gross historical misconception to construe the 1964 Atem Tyo episode in Wukari District as an essentially Tiv-Jukun aggression. Like the Nande Ior skirmish, the Atem Tyo started in Tiv land and only spilled over into Wukari Division, and in Wukari District, in particular, owing to obvious socio-political reasons. The uprising, according to Tiv sources, was politically motivated.

Among other major factors, the Atem Tyo aggression resulted, in part, from the harsh treatment the NPC government exerted on the Tiv people for their role in the Nande Ior stalement. Some Tiv sources argued that the main cause of the Atem Tyo was the strong feeling among the people that the Nande Ior operation had failed, and that other than compel the NPC government to positively re-examine its attitude and policies towards the Tiv people, the government became more punitive and repressive¹⁸. The protection and favour enjoyed by Tiv elements in the NPC was, however, the over riding determinant. Some Tiv sources maintained that the instrumentality of the Atem Tyo was the only way the Tiv nation thought they could exert deadly blows on the NPC and its supporters in Tiv

land. This explained why the Atem Tyo operation, literally translated to mean “head breaking”, spread like wild fire in Tiv land. The operation was not only intended to destroy life and property, but also to wipe out NPC followership in Tiv land. The strong conviction of the people in the pursuance of this agenda accounted for the difficulty encountered by the law enforcement agents deployed to Tiv land to bring the Tiv bows and arrows under control.

Some Tiv elders maintained that the modus operandi employed by the Atem Tyo campaigners was very inhuman¹⁹. Very brutal and inhuman methods were applied on victims in all areas the operation was carried out. Apart from brutally eliminating life, in some cases victims were subjected to brutal treatment, like either being forced to sit on very hot flat iron objects or some had their wrists cut round. Similarly, in some cases considered to be mild, victims were forced to eat very hot pepper, mgbakpa, having received thorough beating. All these brutal methods were aimed at passing the message across to NPC supporters in Tiv land that the people were no longer prepared to tolerate them.

Similarly, in the case of Wukari District, when the Atem Tyo spilled over in the area, two battle lines were clearly drawn. The first was essentially between Tiv UMBC supporters and their kith and kins in the NPC. The second was between the Tiv and the Jukun. The major cause of this development was the Nande Ior operation, which threw the Tiv and the Jukun farther apart. More so, it deepened the rivalry between the Tiv and NPC supporters across the Northern region. Consequently, the aggression exerted on Tiv NPC supporters, the Jukun and other NPC supporters in the area by the Atem Tyo militants made it very

difficult to conceive the confrontation in Wukari District as a Tiv-Tiv affair. Infact, the Atem Tyo campaigners, popularly known as the Iyongo Pania²⁰, an adulterated Tiv pronouncement of the word “The Young Pioneers”, properly defined the borderlines. And, by their operation, the aggression was essentially an encounter between the Tiv UMBC supporters and all NPC supporters in the area, irrespective of ethnic and religious affiliations. It was the sweeping nature of this operation which made the aggression to be later code named Kura chacha,²¹ literally translated to mean, “clear all”. And in Wukari District, since there were more Jukun in the NPC than the Tiv, and other ethnic groups put together, the confrontation soon adopted a Tiv- Jukun posture ²². This formed the basis why most Jukun sources could not interpret the aggression beyond a Tiv-Jukun confrontation. The same applied to many Tiv sources in the area.

We have already touched on the cruelty exhibited by the Atem Tyo campaigners on victims. Like in Tiv land, the operation in Wukari District involved two main strategies. Apart from organized raids on homes, and also ambush, there were sporadic attacks, at times coordinated or spontaneous. This created a general state of insecurity for the opponents, including even the law enforcement agents deployed to the area to maintain peace. According to Tiv sources, the cruelty associated with the Atem Tyo operation, particularly on Tiv NPC elements, compelled many Tiv NPC adherents to either reconsider their political identity or to take long term refuge in Wukari town.

4. THE NANDE IOR AND THE ATEM TYO EPISODES AND TIV-JUKUN RELATIONSHIP

No matter the level and speed of reconciliation between the Tiv and the Jukun after these two episodes, we cannot deny the fact that both had negative imprints on Jukun-Tiv relations in Wukari District. Both episodes had related effects on Jukun-Tiv relationship, especially when we consider the fact that it was the spirit of the Nande Ior which matured to be translated in a more aggressive confrontation otherwise known as the Atem Tyo

In the case of Nande Ior episode, many Tiv and Jukun sources contended that the incident alone could not have had any lasting negative effect on relationship. Some Jukun sources remarked that “even if there was Nande Ior, many Jukun were less aware, since the incident itself was very brief.”²³ Others maintained that “many of them came to hear about it from the Tiv when it had ended”²⁴. As rightly observed by the above sources, Tiv sources also argued that the episode itself was so brief to create an immediate widespread and lasting effect on relationship. Both sources reinforced one another on the fact that immediately after the confrontation, the Tiv who ran away returned to their homes in Wukari unmolested, so did the Jukuns who fled from Tiv dominated areas. More interestingly, members of the two communities were quick to re-establish cordial relationship as opposed to the situation in Tiv land where inter-personal and party rivalries worsened.

On a general note, the most notable negative effect of the Nande Ior was the emergence of sharper inter-party differences, particularly between the UMBC

and NPC supporters. This was more evident between Tiv supporters of the NPC and the UMBC. The Jukun and Hausa NPC members were, however, not completely left out; what affected the goose affected the gander. And since the Jukun dominated the NPC in the area, as did the Tiv in the UMBC, the differences adopted a more or less Jukun-Tiv posture. It was this consideration which determined the main rival groups during the Atem Tyo uprising in the area.

Comparatively, the effects of the Atem Tyo on Tiv-Jukun relationship was more devastating. Some Jukun sources maintained that the uprising had adverse effect on relationship²⁵. The sources, however, agreed that most of the effects were short lived. The same view was shared by Tiv sources, who stated that this resulted from the fact that most of the bands of Iyongo Pania who invaded Wukari District came from main Tiv land.²⁶ This helped to reduce the level of distrust and suspicion after the unfortunate incident. Similarly, both Tiv and Jukun sources attributed the quick return of normal relationship in most areas to the fact that, in some instances, members of both communities gave protection to one another in times of sudden attacks.²⁷ Naturally, the memories of such caring attitudes towards one another helped to diffuse the spirit of sharp hatred and suspicion that would have emerged after the operation.

The ability to mend fences and re-accommodate one another notwithstanding, the brutality exhibited by the Iyongo Pania in the prosecution of the uprising laid the basis for the emergence of the perennial inter-ethnic suspicion and hatred being observed between the Tiv and the Jukun over the years. A Jukun source argued that the brutal manner in which the Iyongo Pania employed in the

prosecution of the aggression made it very difficult for many Jukuns to forget their ordeals in the hands of the Tiv militants²⁸. For instance, the source counted the pains the passed through as some were either thrown into deep wells to die or being tricked to be trapped to experience death by the poisonous Tiv arrows. Many other Jukun sources agreed with the view of the source above, stating that the memories of the bitter experiences are issues the Jukun will hardly forget.

The foregoing points of emphasis were corroborated by most Tiv sources. Tiv sources also admitted the lost of lives and property during Jukun raids. There emerged a general state of insecurity on both sides resulting in the relocation of both Tiv and Jukun settlements in areas both felt more secured. For instance, between kilometers sixteen and seventeen along Wukari-Tsokundi road the Jukun settlement of Agbu Nyajo relocated to Rafin- Kada.²⁹ Along Wukari-Akwana axis, Jukun settlements like Sondi and Gidan Igba relocated along the Wukari-Akwana road. In the same vein, some Tiv settlements were relocated. Along the Wukari-Gidan Idi axis, Tiv settlements like Tse Gaza and Tse Upia relocated to present Jootar, a border settlement between present Benue and Taraba States.³⁰

It is relevant to emphasize that the resettlement phenomenon arising from the incident of the Atem Tyo translated the phenomena of inter-ethnic suspicion, division and hatred to a more alarming rate. Among other effects, the increasing attitude among members of the two groups to de-emphasise their co-existence in common settlements, as used to be the case, significantly altered the spirit of inter-ethnic fusion. The consequence of this unfortunate down trend was the emergence of the concept of Tiv Ka Tiv tso, man Jukun ka Jukun tso,³¹ meaning Tiv is Tiv,

and Jukun is Jukun irrespective of all other considerations. This concept assumed a more negative dimension as the resettlement syndrome became widespread among members of the two communities. This formed the basis for the declaration by the Analyst Magazine that, “ the 1964 episode no doubt made the Jukun to reassess their relationship with their closest neighbour the Tiv. Since then, political observers conclude that mutual distrust was created between the Jukun and the Tivs.”³² This view was reinforced by available Tiv sources. Unfortunately, it was almost at the climax of this development that the 1964 General Elections were held.

5. THE 1964 GENERAL ELECTIONS AND TIV-JUKUN RELATION 1964-1966

The 1964 General Elections into the Federal House of Representatives were held at a very critical stage in Tiv-Jukun relationship. The elections came at a very critical stage when the two groups were thrown apart by the Nande Ior and the Atem Tyo aggressions. The sharp division and rivalry that emerged between the groups eroded any chances of the two teaming up in the electoral process. This was particularly the case with the Jukun who suffered defeat in the 1959 General Elections into the Federal House, and were anxiously waiting for the next chance to vote out any Tiv candidate. The Tiv also considered the moment as a critical opportunity not only to retain their seat, but most especially as the elections were coming up at a time their relationship with the Jukun was entering into a dark phase. To members of both groups, therefore, victory in these elections was considered as a matter of life or death. Not with standing this grave consideration, it was the Jukun who emerged victorious.

The Tiv reaction, led by Charles Tangul Gaza, to the election verdict aggravated the already fragile phenomenon. Some Tiv elders maintained that their defeat was given many interpretations by Tangul and other Tiv political opinion leaders in the District³³. Among other considerations, Tangul was of the opinion that the scattered settlement pattern among the Tiv was socio-politically non productive. Apart from preventing them from enjoying many social amenities as Gunn and Mc Bride once lamented, it hampered the process of socio-political mobilization among the people. Many Tiv sources argued that it was in search of a panacea to this predicament that Tangul invigorated a campaign for the evolution of larger settlements among the Tiv.³⁴ One of the considerations was that the settlements would provide strong bases where they could be easily mobilized for socio-political campaigns. It was also hoped that the process would enable the Tiv to exert due influence on the general scheme of affairs in the District. The foregoing development marked the formal emergence of the Tiv. Factor in Wukari District. There emerged a general consciousness among the Tiv that they had come of age to pursue socio-political opportunities independent of the Jukun. The vigour exerted in the pursuance of this objectives undermined all the basic variables of corporate existence, and function, at least for the moment. It is common knowledge that any society so compartmentalized essentially on ethnic chauvinism stands the risk to experience inter-ethnic frictions as was evident in the area under review.

It is relevant to stress that the misconception given, particularly by the Jukun, to Tangul's resettlement campaign reinforced the settler status ascribed to

the Tiv by the colonial regime. This was informed by the fact that Tangul himself led another group of Tiv to settle at Jootar, a border settlement between the then Wukari District and Tiv Division.³⁵ The settlement is at present a border town between present Benue and Taraba States. Most Jukun sources considered the action as a quiet exit from their land to where Tangul and his kith and kins properly belonged. The Tiv, however, hold the contrary view. Whether this could be true of the group Tangul led, Tangul's campaign had some dividend within Wukari District. A number of bigger Tiv settlements emerged. Among these were Toho Abanyo, Uyoo, Mbishu, Atoza, Iorshagher, Henda Baka, Iorza and Ikyernum.³⁶ Many of these settlements were enlarged as a result of the relocation of some communities into them. Others, like Jootar founded by Tangul, were located on unoccupied lands.

The argument whether bigger Tiv settlements did emerge within Wukari District, and some in virgin or unoccupied areas is not our primary focus. Our primary concern is the effect of the phenomenon on relationship. And sadly, it would be repeating ourselves to mention that it threw the two groups farther apart. This heightened ethnic consciousness, resulting in inter-ethnic confrontation and suspicion among the Tiv and the Jukun in the District. Suffice it to say, therefore, that the issues arising from the Jukun victory in the 1964 General Elections, and Tangul's campaign for the evolution of bigger Tiv settlements, brought much negative effects to bear on Jukun-Tiv relations up to the 1966 coup.

6. JUKUN-TIV RELATIONS 1967-1979

This period could best be described as the period of the resuscitation of cordial relationship between the Tiv and the Jukun. To most Tiv and Jukun sources it was a period of recounting old mistakes with the view to rebuilding peaceful socio-political environment. In all the six axis in the District, both Tiv and Jukun elders agreed that there were no longer visible instances of co-ordinated Tiv –Jukun rivalry. Where rivalry did occur, it assumed a more or less inter-personal misunderstanding between members of the two communities. Generally, the period proceeding the 1966 military take over halted the mounting rivalry between the two groups.

By the beginning of the 1970s, the Tiv and the Jukun had significantly reconciled. According to one influential Jukun source, “by this period it was difficult to know whether the two communities ever experienced any physical assault against one another”³⁷. The source reinforced its position on the high degree of symbiosis evident between the two groups. Some Tiv sources reinforced the Jukun argument. This accounted for why even in the face of minor skirmishes between some Tiv communities and the Jukun in areas along Wukari-Tsokundi and Wukari–Akwana roads, the two communities still teamed up in the 1979 General Elections.³⁸ In these elections, members of both groups were largely NPN (National Party of Nigeria) supporters. What demonstrated the level of co-operation was the way and manner the Jukun joined the Tiv to vote two Tiv, Messrs David Mtuem (from Wukari-Tsokundi axis) and Simon Awua (from Wukari-Akwana axis), into the then Gongola State House of Assembly.

7. Relationship along Wukari -Tsokundi Axis

This Axis comprised Tsokundi, Matar Fada, Gidan Idi and Bantaji Districts. The Tiv and the Jukun formed , and still constitute, the dominant ethnic groups in the area. Tiv and Jukun sources maintained that the 1966 military take over witnessed a period of reconciliation between the two groups along this axis. Very remarkable achievement was made in respect to Jukun-Tiv co-operation. Consequently, members of the two communities settled down to embrace one another for good and common function. Evidence abounds to show that through corporate function, important commercial centers like Tsokundi (Ayu), Gindin Dorowa, Gidan Idi, Bantaje and Mahanga, including Chediya, flourished. In addition to the establishment of educational institutions, particularly primary Schools, elaborate feeder roads were developed through corporate efforts. These amenities facilitated the process of unity between the two communities.

At Tsokundi (Ayu), the headquarter of Tsokundi District, Tiv-Jukun relationship was very impressive. Even though the settlement was compartmentalized into the Tiv and the Jukun sections, each with its leader, the arrangement did not affect relationship. Both Tiv and Jukun sources stated that both communities had respect for each other, and valued the contributions of one another in the development of the area.³⁹ The surrounding Tiv settlements, which helped to service the market, also enjoyed warm reception from the Jukun. A Tiv elder stated that “Tiv men and women who did not make sales were never stranded, since the Jukun always readily accepted their goods for safe keeping for the next market day.”⁴⁰ Needless to even say that members of both communities,

particularly men, made merriment in common drinking places. Also at the social level, both communities did not discriminate against one another in the area of inter marriage.

Another notable area of good working relationship, particularly in and around Tsokundi (Ayu) was the sharing of farmlands. Another Tiv source argued that in some cases, the Jukun had to request the Tiv for some farmlands⁴¹. This was done on the understanding that the Jukun were conscious of the fact that the area was jointly owned; and that each group owned the place it first occupied or farmed. This understanding neutralized the possibilities for major land related disputes.

In spite of the general cordial fusion between the Tiv and the Jukun along this axis at the close of the 1960s, by the beginning of the 1970s, an ill wind began to sweep across, causing stains on the good relationship. This was the emerging consciousness among the Jukun that they exclusively owned the land; and so must reclaim whatever thing imagined to have been lost to the Tiv.⁴² Some Tiv sources argued that this was triggered by the Jukun attempt in the early 1970s to officially change the name of the District headquarter from Ayu to Tsokundi⁴³. Even before this time, the Jukun had begun to nurse the intension to change the nomenclature of the settlement. Among other considerations for this action was the growing commercial and administrative importance of the settlement.

The efforts by the Jukun to change the nomenclature of the settlement pushed their relationship with the Tiv in the area into a trying period. This affected particularly the Mbayuhwa clan, which shared the settlement with the Jukun. As

the struggle intensified, Tiv-Jukun relationship in and around the area was also affected. Other sources argued that from this time, members of the two communities began to build an egoistic consciousness aimed at defending and promoting exclusive ethnic interests in the area⁴⁴. In the case of the Jukun, a Tiv source contended that the Local Government Council began to show keen interest in the whole affairs, with the view to officially establishing Jukun overlordship in the entire District.⁴⁵ The involvement of the Local Government in the affairs generated grave consequences. This was a change of attitude from believing that the area was jointly owned by both the Tiv and the Jukun to the feeling of an exclusive Jukun land.

The issues and controversies arising from the Jukun efforts to unseat the Tiv position in the District attained a climax at the close of the first half of the 1970s. By 1977, members of the two groups took offence over trivial issues. Apart from rampant inter-personal conflicts, at times interpreted on inter-ethnic basis, in April and 5th May, 1977, angry Jukun youths burnt down Ikyogbolun and some Kparev Tiv in Ayu (Tsokundi) respectively.⁴⁶ This was the first collective assault on Tiv communities in the District since after the Atem Tyo. Even if the Jukun would want to say that the assault on Kparev elements at Ayu (Tsokundi) was an attempt to chase out the new comers alleged to be dominated by lawless and troublesome elements,⁴⁷ the attack on Ikyogbolun raised a lot of dust, since the latter had been an age long settlement in the District.

The important thing to note at this juncture is that the development in Tsokundi District cannot be treated in isolation. The Ayu and Ikyogbolun episodes

were directly an extension of the series of skirmishes that began to affect Tiv-Jukun relations in the entire Local Government Area. For instance, elsewhere, Avav and Myegba stated that “Tiv villages along Wukari-Akwana and Wukari-Bantaje roads were burnt down between February and April , 1977.”⁴⁸ The same source argued that this widespread action was a deliberate attempt by the Jukun to shake up the emerging Tiv Factor in the area, even if force must be the last resolve. This claim cannot be easily waved aside, since the action was conceived at a time the entire Local Government Area was being flooded by Tiv settlements, and with the Tiv beginning to dominate the socio-political and economic spheres of life in the area. Naturally, this provoked Jukun envy and suspicion, which eventually led to the 1990/91 Tiv- Jukun aggression in the area. Reinforcing this argument, Sam Ahmadu declared that:

the war even came late. By my knowledge of the two communities this would have occurred in the 1970s, but for the intervention of the Jukun elders. In fact, precisely speaking, it would have started in the late1970s when the Jukun community attacked Ayu and Ikyogbolun and were compelled to pay up to seventy thousand naira. Since then, tension has been mounting⁴⁹.

In the context of the above argument, it is very likely that the situation in Tsokundi District was an extension of the growing phenomenon of aggression blowing across the entire Local Government Area. It matured from being pockets of unco-ordinated disputes between individual Tiv and Jukun settlements to co-ordinated inter-ethnic rivalries in the area. For instance, both Sam Ahmadu⁵⁰ and Ter-rumun Avav⁵¹ maintained that the Local Government was compelled to pay compensation to Tiv victims by the then Gongola State Military Governor, Major

General Mohammed Jega. The order came after the government was convinced that the Local Government either aided and/or co-ordinated the attacks. The government action itself widened the dividing line between the Tiv and the Jukun, since the Jukun interpreted the actions as aiding and abetting the Tiv and their efforts to take over the area.

Despite the growing friction in Jukun-Tiv relationship, particularly in Tsokundi District, over the attempt to change the nomenclature of the headquarter, relationship within neighbouring districts like Gidan Idi and Matar Fada remained relatively impressive. Non of the communities allowed itself to be overwhelmed by the frictious waves around them.⁵² They jointly patronised the Gidan Idi, Gindin Dorowa, Bantaje and Mahanga markets. Infact, the level of socialisation between members of the two groups in the area crippled the possibility of being over taken by mere sentiment over the down trend in the Tsokundi District. Even within the Tsokundi District, by 1979, the tides of the emerging political atmosphere across the entire Bantaje constituency, made up of Matar Fada, Tsokundi, Gidan Idi and Bantaje Districts, significantly reconciled the Tiv and the Jukun.⁵³ By this time, David Mtuem who had been the opinion leader among his people in the District reconciled greater proportion of his people with the Jukun into the dominant party from the constituency, the National Party of Nigeria. The subsequent choice and election of David Mtuem into the then Gongola State House of Assembly in the constituency by both the Tiv and the Jukun further demonstrated the strong resolve by the two communities to bury their differences.

This, indeed, accounted for the relative socio-political harmony between the two groups throughout the Second Republic.

8. Relationship along Wukari-Akwana Axis

This axis comprised Kente, Chonku, Assa and Chinkai Districts. The Tiv and the Jukun are the predominant groups in these Districts. Unlike in other Districts in the Local Government Area, many Jukun Communities in the area such as Idofi, Sondi, Gidan Igba and Kente are believed to have migrated from Buruku in present Benue State. While these groups prefer to call themselves Nyifu, the Tiv refer to them as Iordaa.⁵⁴ These groups still maintain very close socio-cultural ties with their kith and kins in Buruku. Invariably, right from their history of migration, and down to their present location, the Tiv have remained their most closest neighbours. Apart from common socio-cultural practices, they freely inter-marry with the Tiv, bear Tiv names and speak Tiv language. Given this age long history of common association, relationship between the Jukun communities and the Tiv in these areas remained significantly very cordial until the colonial policy in 1932 sowed a seed of discord. This was the attempt to eject all Tiv communities in the Akwana region with the intension of making it an exclusive land for the Jukun.⁵⁵ The eventual emergence of Tiv political leaders in the area like Uva Vaase deepened the gully. This accounted for the fury that accompanied the execution of the Atem Tyo campaign by the Tiv in areas like Adazenke⁵⁶ (Riti) Akwana and Tseke (Chinkai).⁵⁷

Despite the consequences of the colonial policy and the Atem Tyo on Tiv-Jukun relation in this area, by 1967 the two groups had began to rebuild their

relationship. The sincerity observed by most communities in the area in pursuit of peace yielded much dividend. Invariably, by 1979, most Tiv and Jukun communities in areas like Ikyaior, Jandekyula, Igbongom, Chinkai, Kente, Sondi and Arufu had meaningfully reconciled.⁵⁸ One of the most visible index to demonstrate relative unity in Tiv-Jukun relationship at this time was in the area of party politics. Greater proportions of members of the two groups belonged to one party, the NPN, in which both elective and appointive positions were equally shared.⁵⁹ More so, like in the Bantaje constituency, during the 1979 General Elections, the Jukuns teamed up with the Tiv to elect a Tiv, Simon Awua, into the then Gongola State House of Assembly courtesy of the Kente constituency. Infact, politics served as a canopy under which meaningful Jukun-Tiv relationship was rebuilt and sustained in the area.

From both political developments in the Bantaje and Kente constituencies, it could be pointed out that politics, when conceived, and practiced as an integrative variable is, indeed, a unifying factor for diverse socio-cultural groups. For instance, it was politics, more than any other factor, which united the different regions of Nigeria in the formative years of the country's nationalism. Even within regions, politics provided one of the canopies for meaningful unity. The present South African political experience equally serves as one other example. Unity between the blacks and the whites came about only when the latter were compelled to move along with the former in an atmosphere of peaceful and fair political life.

9. Relationship within Wukari Metropolis and Rafin Soja Axis

This area comprised Wukari, Puje and Nwoky Districts. In each of the Districts, relationship between the Tiv and the Jukun in the period under review, 1967-1979, was very cordial. In and around Wukari metropolis, otherwise known as Wukari District, Tiv and Jukun sources testified to the very good working relationship built and sustained between the two groups.⁶⁰ The sources maintained that the level of unity between the groups made many Tiv settlements to emerge within the environs of Wukari metropolis. The same spirit of oneness accounted for the way and manner the Tiv patronized Wukari market.

A cross section of Igbo, Hausa, Jukun traders, including Jukun local beer [burukutu] sellers strongly argued that the presence of the Tiv really gave meaningful life into their businesses.⁶¹ In the same vein, motor park or transporters maintained that the presence of the Tiv was a real boost to their transport business.⁶² The sources stated that their transport business was largely sustained by the number of Tiv farmers who trooped into Wukari market with their produce from Wukari-Tsokundi, Wukari-Rafin-Kada, Wukari-Rafin Soja, Wukari-Chonku, Wukari-Akwana and Wukari-Gidan Idi roads. A similar remark was made by some Igbo beer parlor managers who stated that most of their customers were Tiv farmers, who always patronized the centers after making their sales.⁶³ Many Jukun burukutu (local beer) sellers equally maintained that they very much cherished the way and manner Tiv customers patronized their business.⁶⁴ Many of these women could not conceal the love they had for their very lively and generous Tiv customers.

The point of emphasis to be deduced from the foregoing analysis is the issue of good working relationship between the Tiv and the Jukun in the District. It is obvious that given an atmosphere of conflict between the two groups, the Tiv would not have had the confidence to mix freely with the Jukun the way they did. It was as a result of the good relationship that by 1979 many Tiv settlements emerged within Wukari metropolis. Some of such Tiv settlements like Tse Kachina, Tse Jorchor, Pevikyaa [Aondo Gbira], Pila, Avenda Kyan, and Taakper were, however, of remote origin in the area.

Similarly Tiv reports from Nwokyo District, particularly in major areas like Rafin Soja, Toho Abanyo, Tse Igo, Tse Iwev, Utaver Boyo, Nengean, to mention but few, revealed the same phenomenon of friendly relationship between the Tiv and the Jukun. In most of these settlements, the level of interaction between the groups was very impressive. In Rafin Soja, one of the biggest settlements in the district, where the Tiv and the Jukun coexisted, both Tiv and Jukun sources maintained that relationship between them had been very cordial right from the inception of the settlement.⁶⁵ Findings from the area revealed that members of the two groups lived together peacefully, shared farmlands together, inter married, and with the Jukun in particular speaking Tiv language. The two groups also benefited from or shared common social amenities like schools, water, health facilities, and attended common market. In all these `sphere of interaction, both communities valued and respected the contributions of one another in the socio-economic advancement of the area.

There are evidences to show that the good working relationship between the Tiv and the Jukun in the area was even reflected in the Local Government policies in the area. Such policies helped to cement the relationship between the two groups. Among such policies was the establishment of a primary school in Rafin Soja to serve members of the two communities. Tiv sources maintained that even when the school was later transferred to Gindin Waya in 1971, the number of Tiv enrolment was still very high, since they suffered no discrimination. Similarly, until much later, the traditional Administration at Wukari dealt directly with the Tiv village head, Tsema Iwaga.⁶⁶ Both Tiv and Jukun sources stated that even when a Jukun, Usman Shishi, was later appointed as the Rafin Soja ward head, relationship was not strained, since he still sought the counsel of Tsema Iwaga in dealing, particularly with the Tiv. Generally, up to 1979, both communities co-existed very peacefully. This view was shared by the Jukun Ward Head of Rafin Soja, Mallam Kwase Andokari and other Tiv elders like Wanbume Boyo, Utov Malu and Mbaadega Malu.

Similarly, both Jukun and Tiv communities in and around Toho Abanyo, another big settlement in the District, also maintained that since the inception of their settlements, their relationship had been very friendly.⁶⁷ A cross section of Tiv elders interviewed reinforced the above claim. The same opinion was shared by Jukun Ward Heads in the area. Both Tiv and Jukun sources contended that up to the outbreak of the 1991\92 Tiv-Jukun crisis in the Local Government Area, there had been no rivalry between the two groups in the area that attained an inter-ethnic magnitude. Most misunderstanding were always over pieces of land; and

were inter-personal, which were always amicably resolved. The same sources argued that even the origin of the 1991\92 Tiv-Jukun crisis in the local government was not associated with any emerging factor in the District.

From the available information along the Wukari-Rafin Soja axis, it is safe to conclude that Tiv-Jukun relationship in the area was very friendly until the 1991/1992 Tiv-Jukun conflict reared its ugly head. Before then there was little or no discrimination against the Tiv, particularly in Rafin Soja and Toho Abanyo. The advantages availed to the Tiv in the Education Department need to be re-emphasized. Apart from the number of Schools established, the Toho Abanyo community, in particular, commended the way and manner one of its illustrious sons, Stephen Ahulegwa, rose from the rank and file as a classroom teacher to a supervisory Headmaster in the Education Department. Indeed, members of the two communities enjoyed an atmosphere of a symbiotic relationship in the socio-political spheres of life. They attended common markets, schools, and also joined common political parties and shared both elective and appointive positions without discrimination. Both Tiv and Jukun sources unanimously agreed that this peaceful arrangement witnessed the transition into the 1980s.

The same phenomenon of friendly relationship was reportedly observed in Rafin Kada District between the Tiv and the Jukun. Like in other districts, there were cases of inter-marriages, sharing of a common commercial center, Rafin Kada. Both Tiv and Jukun sources attributed the rapid growth and development of the market to the level of co-operation between the two groups.⁶⁸ Generally, like in other Districts, up to the 1991\92 Tiv-Jukun crisis in Wukari Local Government

Area, no cases of conflict in the area were interpreted on an inter-ethnic bases. Rather, conflicts between individuals were settled on individual levels without igniting inter-ethnic sentiment. This is a normal phenomenon in any society where communities maintain friendly relationship. It is obvious, for instance, that the blacks in South Africa can no longer take much offence at any little action against any black by any white as it used to be the case in the days of apartheid in the region.

Our foregoing findings across the ten Districts in Wukari Local Government Area indicated that Jukun-Tiv relationship in the area between 1967-1979 was, for the most part, relatively cordial. The effect of both the Nande Ior and the Atem Tyo episodes of 1960 and 1964 respectively, on Tiv-Jukun relationship was short lived. Throughout the last phase of our period under review, 1960-1979, the two groups enjoyed friendly relationship.

10 SOCIO-POLITICAL ISSUES IN THE 1970s AND JUKUN-TIV RELATIONSHIP

In spite of the sporadic attacks on some Tiv communities along Wukari-Tsokundi and Wukari-Akwana roads in 1977, the 1970s still remained a period of peaceful co-existence between the Tiv and the Jukun in Wukari local government area. One of the cardinal effects of the cordial relationship was the increase in Tiv emigration into the area, and in other Local Government Areas in the southern part of the then Gongola State. By this time, new Tiv emigrants were at liberty to move in, and take positions in areas of their choice, as was permitted by the pre-existing communities, Tiv or Jukun, within which they chose to settle. In his assessment of the waves of Tiv emigration, a Jukun source remarked that “apart

from the first incidence of Tiv emigration to the area, no other period witnessed an unprecedented incidence of Tiv infiltration into Wukari like in the period under review.⁶⁹ The same remark was given by many Tiv sources interviewed.

The most important relevant thing to be deduced from the unprecedented growth in Tiv emigration into Wukari in the 1970s was the level of good working relationship between the Tiv and the Jukun. Most Tiv and Jukun sources argued that given any problem in the relationship, the Jukun would not have accommodated these waves of latter Tiv immigrants, who were compelled to relocate, mainly from main Tiv land, as a result of land hunger on one hand, and in search of more fertile agricultural land on the other hand.⁷⁰ The emergence of pockets of new Tiv settlements in and around Wukari Metropolis further reinforced the point of emphasis.

While we cannot deny the fact that the increase in latter Tiv emigrants in Wukari in the 1970s was demonstrative of good working relationship, we must not also lose sight of the fact that it was the same incidence, which later resulted in the spirit of envy and suspicion; and subsequently frictious relationship. The circumstances surrounding the whole period informed the Jukun about the danger inherent in the entire system being swamped by the Tiv, as the case was fast proving itself. Infact, it is even over flogging the issue to mention that the socio-economic and political systems were being dominated by the Tiv. It was only in this period that more Tiv were employed, particularly in the Education Department; and with many primary schools established in Tiv settlements.⁷¹ The same period saw the first Tiv who served as Councilors in the Local Government

Council. The climax in the political arena was attained in 1979 when two Tiv, Messrs David Mtuem and Simon Awua, were voted under Wukari tickets into the then Gongola State House of Assembly. And, incidentally, these were the only seats allocated to the Local Government in the House of Assembly.

It was at this climax that the Jukun began to ponder over a number of socio-political questions. On the other hand, the Tiv became more calculative and consentaneous in the pursuit of their socio-political and economic objectives in the area. For instance, a Jukun prince contended that “the growing Tiv population raised alarm to the Jukun as to where they will accommodate and feed their families.”⁷² In the same vein, Ibrahim Sangari argued that;

They (Tiv) migrated in great number to our land in search of fertile farmland. At first we welcomed them...The Tiv, like the proverbial Oliver Twist, kept on asking for more land... but we also need land as 90% of our people are agriculturalists.⁷³

Elsewhere, the Jukun Paramount ruler, the Aku Uka, Mallam Shekarau Angyu Masaibi, Kuvyo II, lamented that, “They [Tiv] came here to farm; we allowed them... now that their population has increased, they believe they are many enough to colonize us... The Tiv would not allow us to give land to our children.”⁷⁴ This cry by the Jukun, alongside with their paramount ruler, suggested that the Jukun had started to reconsider their relationship with the Tiv in the area. It also indicated that they had begun to regret any socio-economic and political concessions they might have claimed to accord to the Tiv. For instance, according to the Jukun students’ body:- in respect to the 1979 General Elections,

A review of the 1979 General Elections and careful study of the development in our place will reveal a

very dangerous trend of development as far as politics is concerned. These elections have come and gone, but their lessons and effects are still very much alive with us. We cannot run away from the fact that we committed blunders and the repercussions have been biting. However, what is most disconcerting is that we seem not to have learnt anything from those elections. It is a truism that it is only in Wukari Division where you have a different ethnic group[Tiv] representing the indigenous ethnic group in various legislatures in the country.⁷⁵

The point of emphasis in the above remark is the fact that the Tiv and the Jukun had began to tread along parallel lines. While efforts were being exerted on one hand to avert an emerging trend, greater energies were being mobilized at the other end to entrench and sustain the emerging trend. This development accounted for the mounting friction in the Tiv-Jukun relationship at the close of the period under review.

The 1976 state creation exercise also added negative ingredients to the souring Tiv-Jukun relationship. This exercise sharpened the dividing line between the two communities. Before this time, the line was thinly drawn by the Nande Ior and Atem Tyo episodes. We can discern a casual link between these two events, which eventually made the Jukun to nurse the agenda to be separated from the Tiv.

In the politics of state creation in 1976, the Jukun in former Wukari Division openly declared their unwillingness to remain with the Tiv in one geo-political arrangement. This was contrary to the Tiv desire to continue to move along with their age long neighbors in the area. In their sharp response to the Tiv demand, the Jukun of former Wukari Division declared that,

We the people of Wukari disassociate ourselves from the demand by the Tivs that in the event of breaking up of Benue - Plateau State, each of the former provinces should remain intact to form two separate states... It is our fervent wish that Benue-Plateau be split so that Wukari Division should be merged with former Plateau province to form a new state⁷⁶

By this declaration, the Jukun demonstrated clearly the level of the difference, and rivalry, between them and the Tiv. This declaration, indeed, contradicted the fact of history as contained in the colonial records that both Donga⁷⁷ and Takum⁷⁸ were first opened up by the Tiv; and that in 1933 when the Tiv division was created and the Wukari Tiv were forcefully merged to it, there were still over thirteen thousand Tiv domiciled in the Aku's domain.⁷⁹

In this perspective, it became counterfactual to imagine any arrangement that would throw off the Tiv from the Jukun completely. Ironically, the Jukun erroneous demand seemed to receive the support of the Federal Government when states were created in 1976. In this exercise, even though the Jukun demand to merge with Plateau province to form a state never materialized, Wukari Division was surprisingly removed from former Benue Province, where she originally belonged, and merged with Muri and Adamawa Provinces to form the then Gongola state.

The effect of this action was very grave, particularly on Tiv-Jukun relationship in former Wukari District. According to a Tiv political activist, while the Donga and Takum Jukun did not see the creation much as their separation from the Tiv, the Wukari Jukun celebrated the action on the ground that their land was at last cleared of the Tiv⁸⁰. Tiv sources contended that it was as from this

period that the Tiv were subjected to very discriminatory treatment. According to many Tiv elite in the area, it became very difficult for Tiv students seeking scholarship to obtain indigenization certificates from Wukari. Similarly, the role of the Tiv in both Local Government and Traditional Administrations were reviewed to comply with the new identity imposed on them. All these measures were contrary to the very fair treatment enjoyed by the Donga and Takum Tiv. This development was a clear indication that the process of Tiv-Jukun struggle was now being coordinated at the Local Government level, in addition to individuals and socio-cultural organizations who added energy to the momentum. From this period, both the youth and socio-cultural organizations from both communities began a dangerous process of propaganda in total disrespect to the effects this enterprise will have on peaceful relationship. The involvement of the youths, particularly the elite, in this enterprise made the whole scenario more vulnerable to open aggression, as the case soon unveiled.

11. THE ROLE OF JUKUN LEADERSHIP AND JUKUN-TIV RELATIONSHIP IN THE 1960s AND 1970s

Most Tiv elders agreed that the Jukun leadership within this period must be commended for the maintenance of good working relationship between the Tiv and the Jukun in their domain.⁸¹ To many Tiv sources, Akus like Atoshi, Adi Byewi and Abe Ali were very peace loving and diplomatic in dealing with the Tiv. These, and among other factors, accounted for their ability to unite the Tiv and the Jukun in their domain. This view was also expressed by some Jukun sources.⁸²

While not undermining the role of Atoshi in building and sustaining friendly relationship with the Tiv, most Tiv elders maintained that Adi Byewi constituted the central figure in the period under review.⁸³ The same sources commended Adi Byewi for his tireless efforts not only in assimilating the Tiv, but also, most importantly, in maintaining friendly relationship between his people and the Tiv. His role in quelling the Nande Ior uprising in his domain corroborated the points at stake. His habit of attending ceremonies in Tiv villages, and also periodic tours of Tiv villages, during which he spent nights with the people, add ingredients to our discussion.⁸⁴

The diplomatic approach adopted by both Atoshi and Adi Byewi, including Abe Ali, by appointing Tiv leaders through whom they administered the people was also commended. Most Tiv communities maintained that during these regimes, they were always duly consulted to select their leaders, who were in turn, only endorsed by the Akus.⁸⁵ This diplomatic approach checked cases of conflict between the Tiv and their leaders on one hand, and between the Tiv communities and the Jukun leadership on the other hand. Most Jukun sources also acknowledged the important roles played by the aforementioned Akus in building friendly relationship with the Tiv in their domain.⁸⁶ Some of these sources argued that the number of Tiv settlements in the area would have been much reduced if their leaders were not friendly with the Tiv. One of such sources even argued that “the former Jukun leadership, particularly Adi Byewi, were at fault for accepting the Tiv without giving them the impression that they were settling on Jukun land.”⁸⁷

The last remark by a Jukun source not with standing, one is of the strong opinion that the attitude of these Akus serves as a good lesson to leaders who desire to maintain harmony in their domains. It goes to explain that a leader in any society is a father or leader for all, irrespective of his ethno-religious and political affiliations. Unfortunately, such leaders are scarcely found. Most Tiv sources argued that the present Jukun leadership, headed by the Aku Uka, Mallam Shakarau Angyu Masaibi Kuvyo II, copied less from his predecessors.⁸⁸ They contended that the present leadership, on its inception in 1976, came with a contrary spirit which has been one of the major causes of the perennial conflicts between the Tiv and the Jukun in Wukari local Government Area . Such sources based their argument on the fact that in the twenty sixth year of the present leadership, the Tiv and the Jukun were involved in two most bloody encounters never experienced before in the history of the two communities. This formed the basis for Avav's argument that,

The Aku Uka of Wukari, Mallam Shekarau Angyu, is the President of Wukari Traditional Council. As the president, the Aku is supposed to be the father of all ethnic groups in Wukari Local Government Area. However, since his ascension to the throne in 1976, the paramount ruler has been operating as a defender of Jukun parochial interest as though he is the Aku of the Jukun...Gone are the days when Akus, like the Late Ashumanu Adi Byewi [1960-70], made peace between communities even under tense political situations...Whatever the past Akus have gained seems to have been destroyed by the incumbent Aku.⁸⁹

There is no doubt about the fact that what appears to be an emotionally sentimental remark by Avav and Myegba is the common assessment of the

incumbent Aku Uka by the entire Tiv community in the area. This Tiv view is however not shared by my Jukun sources.¹⁰⁰ All of the Jukun sources interviewed gave a very positive assessment of the Aku; arguing that he is very tolerable, especially to the very unbecoming attitude of the Tiv in the area.

What most Tiv sources failed to appreciate is the fact that the growing Tiv political ambition at the wake of the present Aku's [Shekarau Angyu Masa Ibi Kuvyo II] enthronement could not provide the type of socio-political atmosphere that existed between the Tiv and the Jukun, most especially with their past leaders. It is common knowledge that the present Tiv community is more politically informed and ambitious than ever. Their growing political ambition no doubt sees the Jukun and their leadership as obstacles that must be surmounted by the use of political alliance devoid of the Jukun. In this enterprise, the Hausa offered to be the right alternative. We have already mentioned the fact that the Tiv could not pretend on the fact that their political "romance" with the Hausa in the area will definitely aggravate the already fragile relationship between them and the Jukun. It is therefore normal that the Tiv action arose Jukun suspicion and confrontation alongside with the Aku, who is himself a Jukun.

Another point of emphasis is that it was not possible for the Tiv to fall out with the Jukun community without tempering with their relationship with the Aku, who is himself a Jukun as afore mentioned. This is even one of the inherent defects of traditional ruler ship, especially where particular ethnic groups produce leaders, like in our reference area. In such situations, one would naturally expect such leaders to be inclined to their kith and kins in their domain. This is even more

obtainable in communities where the different groups develop and pursue diverging interests. It is in this context that one contends that the Tiv cannot expect the Aku to remain a saint in their eyes in an atmosphere of an unprecedented rivalry between them and the Jukun.

12. CONCLUSION

From the foregoing findings, it is safe to conclude that the Tiv and the Jukun began their journey into the period under review, 1960-1979, on a frictious platform. This resulted principally from a number of socio-political antecedents stage managed by the colonial machinery. The Nande Ior and the Atem Tyo episodes in 1960 and 1964 respectively, including the General Elections in 1964, were however the internal factors that provided the basis for ethnic egoism, which eventually conditioned the process of inter-ethnic struggle between the Tiv and the Jukun in what became Wukari Local Government Area.

However, after these unfortunate trends the Tiv and the Jukun managed to maintain an atmosphere of relative peace, particularly after the 1966 military coup. Very impressive degree of socio-economic and political co-operation was observed in all the communities that later constituted the ten districts in the Local Government Area. It was in this same atmosphere that the 1979 General Elections were conducted. On this note, one can sum up that despite the 1960 and 1964 uprisings in our reference area, Tiv-Jukun relationship did not suffer any significant setback in all the districts in the area as the table below reflects.

Table 8: Tabular description of Tiv-Jukun Relationship in the ten Districts of Wukari Local Government Area between 1967 and 1979.

S/NO	SETTLEMENT	DESCRIPTION	NATURE OF RELATIONSHIP
<u>PUJE DISTRICT</u>			
1.	Gani Shakanjo	Jukun	Cordial
	Danladi Dakuru	“	“
	Yakubu Adi	“	“
	Nyajo	“	“
	Adi Shakonjo	“	“
	Soja Shakonjo	“	“
	Joshua Shakonjo	“	“
	Yusuf Joshua	“	“
	Gambo	“	“
	Mestai	“	“
	Ashu Nyajo	“	“
		“	“
	Boshe	“	“
	Agyo		
	Ikyogbolum	Tiv	Very Cordial
	Shaapera Gyungu	“	Cordial
	Tsough Adumgbe	“	“
	Kungureku Shabu	“	“
	Chiega Shongo	“	“
	Unyar Shongo	“	“
Ambi Gyungu	“	“	
Aondover Taakpe	“	Very Cordial	
Logo	“	Cordial	
Abua	“	“	
Akaate Iorver	“	“	
	“	“	
	“	“	
2/3	<u>TSOKUNDI/ GIDAN IDI DISTRICT</u>		
	Tsokundi/Ayu	Jukun/Tiv	
	Gidan Idi		Very Cordial the 1977
	Hyuku	“	Skirmish not withstanding
	Kinda Shaani	“	Very Cordial
	Gani	Jukun	Cordial
	Avyi	“	“
	Abangaku	“	Cordial
	Kun	“	“
	Gani Gbihiko	“	“

	Adigbondu	“	“
	Akuvyon	“	“
	Adibon	“	“
		“	“
	Tse Choko	Tiv	Very cordial, the 1977 Skirmish not
	Zegeate	“	withstanding.
	Ikyernum	“	Very Cordial
	Mbakuuv	“	Cordial
	Torruam	“	“
	Ikwe	“	“
	Ikyambe	“	“
	Daa	“	“
	Tse Anza	“	“
	Ason	“	“
	Lanem	“	“
	Agbough	“	“
	Kimbi	“	“
	Anenga	“	“
	Ugbede	“	“
4.	<u>MATAR FADA</u>		
	<u>DISTRICT</u>		
	Gindin Dorowa	Jukun	Cordial
	Nyan Kwala	Chamba/Jukun	“
			“
	Ikperen	Tiv	“
	Uyoo	“	“
	Mbishu	“	“
	Aben	“	“
	Tse Ikyangur	“	“
	Yuhwam	“	“
	Tse Aulugh	“	“
	Tyohuna	“	“
	Asongu	“	“
		“	“
5	<u>BANATAJE</u>		
	<u>DISTRICT</u>		
	Bantaje	Fulani	Cordial
	Tunari	Chamba/Jukun	Very Cordial
	Male	Jukun	Cordial
	Gidan Hamidu	“	“
	Gborbegha	Tiv	“
	Inyamhina	“	“

Atsaga	“	“
Tse Hindan	“	“
Awua Ikyausu	“	“
Gundu Chaha	“	“
Shiva	“	“
Chediya-Ugber	Hausa/Fulani/	Very Cordial
Jembe	Jukun/Tiv	Cordial
Abeda Ayaka	Tiv	Very Cordial

6 AKWANA
DISTRICT

Akwana	Jukun	Relatively cordial
Arufu	“	Cordial
Gidan Ikwe	“	“
Ando	“	“
Katswen	“	“
Kwatan	“	“
Tsufa	“	“
Angishi	“	“
Fanu	“	“
Begha-Anyam	Tiv	Cordial
Tiza	“	“
Tse Iordye	“	“
Tse Abiem	“	“
Tse Ndier	“	“
Kaa	“	“
Aertim	“	“
Tse Dwem	“	“

7 ASSA
DISTRICT

Muchia Kare	Jukun	Cordial
Zandoku	“	“
Ada Kenjo	“	“
Nwoban	“	“
Kumutu	“	“
Kun	“	Very cordial
Rafin Soja	“	Cordial
Adi	“	“
Danjuma	“	“
Ate	“	“

	Agbu	“	“
	Sabo	“	“
	Gbor Ucha	Tiv	Relatively cordial
	Tse	“	“
	Kyandem	“	“
	Tse Boshu	“	“
	Ihuwe Tseke	“	Cordial
	Uba Igyaba	“	“
	Tsegba	“	“
	Ajaver	“	Relatively Cordial
	Wua Liv	“	“
	Jandei Kyura	“	“
	Tse Uboo	“	“
	Tse Igyo	“	“
	Ihyev	“	“
	Agundu	“	“
	Awambe	“	“
	Uma	“	“
8	<u>CHINKAI</u>		
	<u>DISTRICT</u>		
	Chinkai	Jukun/Hausa	Cordial
	Gidan Yaku	Jukun	“
	Walawa	“	“
	Ashuku	“	“
	TseTor	Tiv	“
	Kucha	“	“
	Tse Avaan	“	“
	Tse Goosu	“	“
	Tso Loho	“	“
	Tse Abanyi	“	“
	Tse Abinki	“	“
	Uke	“	“
	Kwembe	“	“
9	<u>KENTE</u>		
	<u>DISTRICT</u>		
	Kente	Jukun	Very Cordial
	Sondi	“	Cordial
	Gidan Igba	“	“

	Sontyo	Tiv	“
	Gaku Tyo	“	“
	Toryem	“	“
	Acha	“	“
	Awua Baaki	“	“
	Tse Baka	“	“
	Tse Shiva	“	“
	Nyitse	“	“
	Amenger	“	“
10	<u>CHONKU</u>		
	<u>DISTRICT</u>		
	Chonku	Jukun	Very Cordial
	Riti	“	Cordial
	Chudan	“	“
	Tar Orshi	Tiv	“
	Tor Musa	“	“
	Tse Avekaa	“	“
	Ikyaior	“	“
	Gborgbor	“	“
	Tse Pev	“	“
	Tse	“	“
	Kwaghbula	“	“
	Jime Wende	“	VeryCordial
	Tine Mongol	“	“
	Ioryina	“	“
11.	<u>WUKARI</u>	Jukun/Hausa	Very Cordial
	<u>DISTRICT</u>	Jukun(Nyifu)	“
	Wukari	Jukun	Cordial
	Idofi	Jukun	“
	Hyuku	“	“
	Byepi	“	“
	Tse Kachina	Tiv	Very Cordial
	Venda Kyan	“	“
	Tse Jorchor	“	Cordial
	Taakpe	“	Very Cordial
	Pevikyaa	“	Cordial
	(Aondogbira	“	“
	Pila	“	“

12	NWOKWO DISTRICT		
	Nwokyo	Jukun	Cordial
	Kalkin	“	“
	(Adigbondu)	“	“
	Alamini	“	“
	Abe	“	“
	Ajitabako	“	“
	Zaria	“	“
	Agyo Akpiti	“	“
	Adi Kan	“	“
	Ato Gbondu	“	“
	Kinda Kan	“	“
	Ortile	Tiv	“
	Tse Igo	“	“
	Shii	“	“
	Tse Iwev	“	“
	Toho		
	Abanyo	“	“
	Utaver Boyo	“	“
	Hingir	“	“
	Anenga	“	“
	Abechin	“	“
	Usen Tingir	“	“
	Ukor Songo	“	“
	Tom Yeke	“	“
	Yawe Boyue	“	“
13.	RAFIN- KADA DISTRICT		
	Rafin Kada	Jukun	Cordial
	Ason	“	“
	Gaya	“	“
	Ashitsa	Tiv	“
	(Iorshagher)	“	“
	Mbaadega	“	“
	Saidu Azege	“	“
	Dega	“	“
	Alakali	“	“
	Ugbo	“	“
	Abako	“	“
	Ajuku	“	“

Harga	“	“
Achineku	“	“
Dafa	“	“
Wajir	“	“
Kukwa	“	“

Source: Random sampling of opinion from Tiv and Jukun settlements during field work.

END NOTES

1. Interview with Ingyeren Igbinde (100 years), a Tiv elder, in his compound on 30th October, 2003.
2. Interview with Agyo (50 years), a Jukun elder at Wukari, 2nd November, 2003.
3. Literally translated, Nande Ior is a Tiv concept meaning burn people. This was a political uprising among the Tiv between UBC (United Middle Belt.Congress) and NPC ((Northern Peoples' Congress) supporters. Property, other than lives, were the main targets during the uprising.
4. Atem Tyo is also a Tiv concept literately translated to mean head breaking. This uprising otherwise code named Atem Tyo resulted from the failure of Nande Ior to achieve the required results. It was still an uprising among the Tiv between UMBC and NPC supporters. However, like Nande Ior, at Wukari the uprising tended to be a more or less a conflict between the Tiv and the Jukun.
5. Separate interviews with Tiv elders like Iorter Musa (53 years), Alam Musa(62years) and Tavershima Agata (83 years). All interviews were conducted in November, 2003.
6. Interview with D.K.Tingir (55 years) at Anyiin in November, 2003. The respondent had his primary education at Wukari.
7. Interview with Gani Adi (52 years) at Chia Orabum village in November,2003. The respondent strongly argued that the Nande Ior aggression was not extended to the Jukun as others claimed.
8. Group interview with Iorter Musa and Alam Musa at Musa village in November, 2003.
9. Baja was a Tiv derogatory appellation for Hausa/Fulani Muslims and their northern-based political party, the NPC. The term was demonstrative of the strong Tiv hatred for Islamic religion.
10. Interview with Johnny Iwar Tingir at Anyiin in November, 2003.
11. Group interview with Alam Musa and Iorter Musa at Musa's village in November, 2003.
12. Ibid
13. Interview with D.K.Tingir and Johnny Iwar Tingir in November, 2003.

14. Bulus Angyu Bauka in his contribution during a joint Jukun-Tiv session at the instance of the Taraba State Governor's (Reverend Jolly T. Nyame) effort to resolve Jukun-Tiv conflict at Wukari in 2001.
15. Group interview with Tiv elders like Ihuwe Tseke (110 years), John Tseke (70 years), etc. at Jande Kyula in October, 2003.
16. Interview with Reverend Yohanna Irimiya Elawa at Christian Leadership Training Center, ShereHills, Jos in August, 2003
17. Group interview with the Tiv community at Akomiyar, headed by Michael Akomiyar (90 years) in October, 2003.
18. Ibid
19. Group interview with the Tiv community at Ioryina, led by Apeichienyi Nyiswem (52 years), in October, 2003.
20. Iyongo Pania was the Tiv adulterated pronouncement of the English word, the 'young pioneers.' This resulted from their difficulty in pronouncing the concept in its correct English tonation. This was common to other English, including other non Tiv words. The word referred to the Tiv youth wing in charge of the prosecution of the Atem Tyo campaigns.
21. The Tiv word Kurachacha literally translated means clear all. This concept was adopted by the Atem Tyo campaigners when non Tiv became targets of attack. Such non Tiv groups were mainly the Jukun and Hausa/Fulani adherents of the NPC.
22. Group interview with Tiv elders at Jandeikyula, led by John Tseke (81 years), in October, 2003.
23. Interview with Reverend Yohanna Irimiya Elawa.....
24. Gani Adi, Interview....
25. Interviews with some Jukun.
26. David Mtuem (55 years), interview at Jalingo, May, 2002.
27. Ibid
28. Bulus Angyu Bauka, op.cit.
29. Interview held at Tor-ruam with Iorwa Akombo (58 years), in September, 2001.

30. Interview with Andrew M. Nenshi (42 years), in Jalingo, October, 2003.
31. The phrase Tiv ka Tiv tso, man Jukun ka Jukun Tso literally translated means “all Tiv are Tiv, and all Jukun are Jukun.” This concept emerged as a result of the growing ethnic consciousness among the Tiv and the Jukun founded on the spirit of distrust and suspicion for one another. As a result, members of the two groups preferred to deal with individuals as a group rather than on individual basis. This trend heightened inter-ethnic distrust and suspicion, and even hatred, between the two groups.
32. The Analysis Magazine, vol.6, No.1 1991.
33. Ihuwe Tseke, op.cit.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Group interview with Alam Musa and Iorter Musa...
37. Interview with Dr. Yusuf Magaji in Jalingo, March, 1995.
38. David Mtuem, op.cit.
39. Group interview with some Jukun .
40. Interview with Igo Zun (65 years) at Zun village, September, 1995.
41. Interview with Elias Mnongo Lokoja in Jalingo, September, 1998.
42. Ibid.
43. David Mtuem, op.cit.
44. Interview with Agyo Agbu at Wukari, November, 2003.
45. David Mtuem, op.cit.
46. Ter-rumun Avav and Mson Myegba, The dream to conquer...
47. Dr. Yusuf Magaji, op.cit.
48. Avav and Myegbe, op.cit.
49. Interview with Sam Ahmadu (46 years) in his residence, Safani Quarters, Jalingo March, 1995.
50. Ibid.

51. Avav and Myegba, op.cit.
52. Interview with Shausu Ahur (55 years), at Tor-ruam, June, 1998.
53. Interview with Tyobee Angough at Ikyernum, September, 2000.
54. Random interview with Tiv and Jukun elders in and around Kente District,
55. This action was taken following the fear that the Tiv might eventually swamp the Jukun in the area, and possibly subject them to discrimination.
56. Adezanke is a Jukun settlement referred to by the Jukun as Riti. The settlement was devastated by the Tiv Yongo Pania during the Atem Tyo aggression in the area.
57. Tseke is an adulterated Tiv pronouncement for the Jukun settlement of Chinkai. The Tiv, like any other society, were used to adulterating the pronouncement of foreign words and terminologies they could not properly pronounce
58. Random interviews with Tiv and Jukun elders in and around Kente and Chinkai Districts.
59. Ibid.
60. Random interviews with members of the Tiv and Jukun communities in Wukari and Nwokyo Districts. These interviews were conducted between September and October, 2003.
61. Random interviews with business communities in Wukari town comprised Ibo, Hausa and mostly Jukun women who sale local beer (burukutu). These interviews were conducted September and October, 2003.
62. This fact was raised by an Wukari motor park worker
63. Interview with some beer parlour managers. The interview was part of the series of interviews held with different business communities at Wukari between September and October, 2003.
64. Random interviews with Jukun women dealing with local beer (burukutu).
65. Random interviews with members of the Tiv and Jukun communities in Rafin Soja in October, 2003.
66. Random interviews with Tiv and Jukun elders on the effect of Tiv-Jukun relationship following the transfer of Rafin Soja ward leadership from the Tiv to the Jukun..

67. Random interviews with the Tiv and Jukun communities in and around Toho Abanyo on Tiv- Jukun relationship in the area.
68. Interviews with members of the Tiv and Jukun communities in Rafin-Kada District in October, 2003.
69. Sam Ahmadu, op.cit.
70. Interview with influential Tiv and Jukun leaders in the area like David Mtuem and Dr. Yusuf Magaji.
71. The list of schools established in Tiv settlements included Tor-ruam, Ikyernum, Ngyer Chia Da'a, Gborbegha, Abiem, Demelu, Vaayem, Aben, Amokaha, Nyamhina,, Kwaor, Agan, Tsar, Ason, Deke, Igbogodo, Tor Musa and Atsaga. Even though some of these schools, like Tor- ruam, metamorphosed from community efforts, and also from the UPE program in 1976, we can still not deny the fact that this development resulted, in part, from the good working relationship between the Tiv and the Jukun in the Local Government Area.
72. Sam Amadu, op.cit.
73. Ibrahim Sangari Usman, "press conference on Tiv-Jukun clashes," 2nd June, 1992, Jos, cited by Grace Atoshi, op.cit., p.3
74. Aku Uka, Mallam Shekarua, Angyu Masaibi, Kuvyo II, cited by Avava and Myegba, op.cit., p.15.
75. Atohinko T. Adi, Jukun-Tiv communal clashes..., p.16
76. New Nigerian Newspaper, 18th December, 1974, "The stand of the people of Wukari Division on creation of more states in Nigeria," cited by Northern Nigeria in Perspectives (NNIP) Magazine, vol .I. No. 2, 1992 p.60.
77. SNP 17 /3 / 24478 (A): Donga District, Wukari Division, Benue Province, Intelligence I Report on by Mr. K. Dewar, (1935-1937), p.53.
78. SNP 3 / 24898 (B): Takum District, Wukari Division, Benue Province, Intelligence Report on by Dr. K. Dewar.
79. SNP 17 / 8 / K. 4049.
80. Shausa Ahur, op.cit.
81. Random interviews with Tiv elders.
82. Random interviews with Jukun elders

83. Random interviews with Tiv elders,
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid.
86. Random interviews with Jukun elder.
87. Reverend Yohanna Irimiya Elawa,
88. Avav and Myegbe, op.cit.
89. Ibid.
90. The Tiv assessment of the incumbent Aku, Mallam Shekarau Angyu Masaibi, Kuvyo II was refuted by Jukun sources like Bala Ajiduku, Rev. Elawa, Sam Ahmadu, Grace Atoshi, etc. All the sources rated the Aku as a peace loving leader, who accommodated everybody, and even the challenging attitude of the Tiv in his domain

CHAPTER SIX

THE ERA OF GROWING AGGRESSION 1980-1991

6.1 INTRODUCTION

The preceding chapter took us through an undulating conduit in Jukun-Tiv relationship. Both Nande Ior and the Atem Tyo, including the 1964 General Elections, produced some undesirable effects in the relationship between the two groups. This trend was, however, punctuated by a period of socio-political co-operation between the groups. But by the beginning of the period under review, 1980-1999, the Jukun began to rethink their political relationship with the Tiv. This was attributable, in part, to the growing importance of Tiv population in the politics of both state and local government. This emerging awareness made the Tiv to begin to count more on their numerical strength, and their alliance with other politicians and political groups, in their struggle to assume political ascendancy in the area. The consequences of this development were that the spirit of co-operation that hitherto characterized Tiv-Jukun relationship was undermined.

This development made the two groups to begin the race into the eighties with self-images, characterized by ultra disregard for one another, and the clinching variables that bound the groups together. Consequently, other than seeking to rebuild the relationship for the better, there emerged centrally controlled manoeuvres from both communities in desperate effort to outplay one another. In consequence, also, members of the two communities were henceforth, mobilized above individual and interpersonal levels in relating to issues that involved their

members. Apparently, this explained the hostile socio-political struggle the two communities entered into in the eighties.

The Tiv-Jukun episode in the wake of the eighties cannot be seen in isolation. In many societies across the country, the seventies opened up chapters that conditioned the nature of crisis that characterized the areas in the eighties. For instance, the Nigerian civil war of 1967-1970 laid the foundation for the hostility that characterized the relationship between the Agila (an Idoma speaking group and the Ngbo an Igbo speaking group) in the eighties through the nineties, and even up to date.¹ Similarly, the Kuteb and the Chamba-Jukun in Takum entered into the eighties and nineties in an atmosphere of hostility as a result of factors associated with the circumstances of the seventies.² Other Nigerian societies like Zangon-Katab were also not free from hostile contacts between communities. In the case of this area, it was particularly the friction between the Atyab and the Hausa-Fulani communities that dominated the scene.

In our reference area, Wukari Local Government, the growing friction between the Tiv and the Jukun was primarily a function of the unprecedented successive political gains achieved by the Tiv in the eighties, in particular, in the midst of the Jukun envy. This constrained a Tiv political observer to remark that the 1980s was “the Golden Period when the Tiv population became potent, relevant and influential; when they exerted considerable political control in Wukari. The Tiv may never again have these opportunities the Second Republic presented.”³

As much as one also accepts that the period was a “Golden Period” for the Tiv in the area, one does not want to be overwhelmed by the waves of Avav’s pessimism. It is true that after the 1991 Tiv-Jukun crisis, the political relevance of the Tiv population, both at state and local Government levels, significantly diminished. Having been largely replaced in many areas, and also largely under registered by the Electoral Commission in successive elections, the Tiv were also not in any doubt about their political predicaments. It will, however, amount to a defective foresight to imagine that the Tiv population will forever remain politically irrelevant as a result of the aforementioned factors. One is equally not much in tune with Avav’s pessimism that “the Tiv may never have these opportunities the Second Republic presented”. One would ask, when the Boers instituted the apartheid regime on the majority blacks in South Africa, did they ever imagine that at one time the black population will become politically relevant as it became in the nineties. The same was the case in Zangon-Katab when the Atyp, in 1992, snatched the council leadership from the Hausas’ who felt their unchallenging divine role was / is to rule over the non Hausa communities in the area.⁴ The same story can be told of the entire Nigeria Leadership when the impression was almost built that the North, would forever remain in control, especially in any democratic process.

It is therefore one’s contention that if the opportunities came to the Tiv as a result of normal socio-political process, the same variables will represent the same opportunities, the time lapse notwithstanding. One tends to believe, however, that Avav’s pessimism might have been founded on the fact that some of the political

gains came as a result of political manoeuvres that undermined the variables that sustained the symbiotic socio-political relationship between the Tiv and the Jukun. This, of course, could explain the phenomenon of hostile political struggle which characterized Jukun-Tiv relationship from the beginning of our period under review. The following cardinal phenomena accounted for this unfortunate development.

6.2 THE APPOINTMENT OF SIMON IORTER MUSA AS WUKARI LOCAL GOVERNMENT CHAIRMAN 1981-83

We have stated that soon after the 1979 General Elections, the importance of the Tiv population in the politics of both the State and the Local Government came to limelight. This was attributed to the numerical strength of the entire Tiv population in the Local Government Area, and the state at large. Even as in 1937 colonial census in the area, while the Tiv population was put at only thirteen thousand nine hundred and thirty nine, that of the Jukun was put at only eight thousand and forty two.⁵ Back in 1933, the Tiv population was said to be almost fifty percent of the Aku's subjects.⁶ And since then the Tiv population continued to swell up due to high birth rate among them, and the waves of immigrants who followed in and across the area. Apparently, being one of the most populous ethnic groups in the Local Government, the great need arose to woo their electorates for support in subsequent elections. The then Great Nigeria Peoples' Party (GNPP) government in the then Gongola State under Governor Abubakar Barde pursued this objective with every seriousness.

The appointment of Simon Iorter Musa in 1981 as the chairman of Wukari Local Government Council was one of those earnest measures adopted by the Barde's Party, and the regime, to win the support of Tiv electorates. A Tiv political observer remarked that "the appointment was not a surprise to many of them who were monitoring the political manoeuvres of the GNPP in its effort to still outplay the NPN in subsequent elections."⁷ It also came as a result of persistent struggle by the Tiv to be involved in the act of governance, particularly in Wukari Local Government Area.

It must be pointed out that while the Tiv considered the appointment as a dream come to reality, the Jukun saw it as a political ill wind. Infact, both the Tiv and the Jukun received the news with great surprise. Even though the Tiv have been agitating to be involved in the scheme of affairs in the area, they did not believe that the opportunity will come at the time it did.⁸ This was particularly due to the fact that the GNPP, though the ruling party in the state, was a minority party in the Local Government Area. More so, majority of the Tiv electorates belonged to the NPN, which had greater majority of the Jukun electorates as its members. It was therefore conflicting for a member of a minority party in the area to assume the leadership of a council whose majority belonged to a rival party. The contradiction in the process of selecting Simon Iorter Musa as the council caretaker chairman therefore made the Jukun to suspect the Tiv of conniving with the Barde's GNPP to sideline them in the council they considered to be their inheritance.⁹ Moreover, before this appointment no Tiv had served in the council, even as a councillor.

Even though the Tiv rejoiced over Musa's appointment, we must not be over taken by the waves. We have to state that no matter how much the Tiv interpreted the advantages and opportunities therein, the appointment in itself, for the moment, was counter productive for the sustenance of peaceful co-existence between the Tiv and the Jukun. Among other factors, the appointment came at a time the socio-political relationship between the two groups was under a trying moment. Similarly, having conceded the only two seats from the area into the state House of Assembly to the Tiv, as the Tiv did to them both in the House of Representatives and the Senate, the Jukun expected the Tiv to have conceded the Chairmanship of the Council to them, no matter whatever political pyramids the Tiv intended to build both in the State and the Local Government Area in particular. We have already mentioned the interwoven nature of the Council and Traditional administration in the area, and how the Jukun feel they have the prerogative to head both, by virtue of their arrangement. It is even not debatable to say that both the Jukun and the Tiv, including other groups, like the Hausas, in the area are very conscious of this bare fact. It would therefore amount to turning the truth on its head if the Tiv would claim that they were ignorant of the fact that their appointment was likely to sacrifice their good working relationship with the Jukun.

The appointment of Simon Iorter Musa and the attendant effects on Jukun-Tiv relationship in Wukari is a lesson that cut across the length and breadth of this nation, and the world in general. It is not debatable that wherever inter-ethnic relations reach a very fragile cross road, the groups involved hardly tolerate one to be placed above the other in terms of leadership. This is premised significantly on

the level of suspicion, envy and hatred for one another. And where the position is appropriated by appointment other than by election, the level of protest is more. Even by election, the loser would always want to protest. The matter is worsened when the leader is absorbed in the sentiment of his group. The case of Takum Local Government Area under the Chairmanship of Dr. Andokari Shiaki in 1989 readily comes to mind at this point. Analyzing Shiaki's role in aggravating tension in inter-group relation between the Kuteb and the Chamba-Jukun in Takum, Hassan Lawson remarked that:

Dr. Andokari Shiaki, as a Council Chairman embarked upon an aggressive pro-Kuteb policies that ensured that the Kuteb (especially, the elites) got the best out of the administration in terms of allocation of resources, job opportunities and contract awards. He was outright in antagonizing the other groups to the extent that many of their members lost their jobs and suffered lack of promotions in the Council, while their business kindred could neither get the payment for jobs they had done nor secure new ones from the Council. They were generally marginalized and made to feel that they did not belong to the area.¹⁰

The same source added that Shiaki's hard line approach toward promoting the Kuteb course to the utter neglect of the other groups, particularly the Chamba/Jukun, "set inter-ethnic relations on a serious collision course that had never been experienced before in the history of inter-ethnic relations in the area."¹¹

The activities of the Tutsi-led government in Rwanda under Habyarimana in 1994 in relation to its effect on the majority Hutu and the outbreak of the Rwandan genocide war is yet another related issue.

We need to also point out that while in some cases, the incumbent leader might choose to adopt deliberate measures to promote his group interests, as Shiaki did, others may only be caught up in the web as was the case in Zangon-Katab under the Chairmanship of Juri Babang Ayok in 1992. Even though Ayok, as a person, would not have wanted to openly delve into controversial issues, like the relocation of the Zangon-Katab market, which was the immediate cause of the bloody clash between his people, the Atyap, and the Hausas in February and May 1992, pressure at home compelled him to compromise, as Ninyio remarked,

Since fruitless efforts were made in both colonial and post colonial times to build a new market in Zangon-Katab, opportunity came when an Atyap man was elected as a Local Government Chairman of Zangon-Katab. The Atyap used this chance to mount pressure on the Chairman to find a lasting solution on the issue, by relocating it.¹²

Both the Takum and Zangon-Katab incidents highlighted by Lawson and Ninyio, respectively, suggest that where inter-ethnic relation is at a cross road, members of each group always use the mantle of leadership, whenever placed in such position, to promote selfish group interest. This, in itself, intensifies and complicates tension in inter-group relations. And among other issues, it promotes inter-group suspicion, envy and confrontation. This was also evident in the case of Wukari where the Tiv suddenly assumed the leadership of the Council by appointment. Simon Musa's testimony added ingredients to this contention. He maintained that on assumption of duty, the point was made bare to him that "no matter the level of unity and co-operation that may have been imagined to exist between the Tiv and the Jukun, the latter never considered the former legible to head the council"¹³ This reinforced

Avav's remark that Musa's "appointment marked the genesis of renewed political misunderstanding between the Jukun and the Tiv."¹⁴

Both Musa and Avav's remarks point to the negative level Tiv-Jukun relationship attained following that singular incident. The point to be considered, also, is Musa's policies towards rebuilding friendly relationship between the Tiv and the Jukun. Unfortunately, like Shiaki and Ayok in Takum and Zangon-Katab, respectively, Musa could not operate outside the prevailing sentiments. As much as he was cautious due, particularly to his personal relationship with the Aku, he was largely pro-Tiv in his policies.¹⁵ His attitude, at times, in promoting Tiv interests led him to stepping on the toes of the Traditional Administration headed by the Aku. This, and among other issues, accounted for the physical assault on him by the Jukun youths in 1982.

In the same way as Musa's policies were suspected and challenged by the Jukun, so were the activities of the two Tiv members in the state House of Assembly under attack by the Jukun students' body. This was also in connection with the persistent efforts by the two members to champion the course of the Tiv, both at the state and Local Government levels. For instance, the students argued that,

From the 1979 elections and the activities of the elected Tiv into the state House of Assembly, we can see the misfortunes that lie ahead---- They are trying to get legislative backing to ensure their perpetuity on our land. This is exemplified by their demand for the Tiv language to be spoken on our Radio House on the speculative ground and false claim that they form the largest

population in Wukari, Takum, Bali and Sardauna
Local Governments.¹⁶

The above remark raises important issues that need to be analyzed. That the Jukun began to question or rather suspect the activities of the Tiv members in the State House of Assembly is not refutable. Contrary to what the Jukun expected, the members deviated from promoting party manifesto to promoting and defending Tiv interests. While one of the members, David Mtuem, could not refute the claim, he argued that since their party was in minority in the state Assembly, they were grossly handicap in promoting and ensuring the execution of their party (NPN) programmes, which was after all in opposition in the state.¹⁷ Reinforcing Mtuem's argument, his counterpart, Simon Awua, stated that even if their party formed the government, they would not have had any greater interest to represent other than those of their ethnic group, which was at the time being suppressed, particularly at the Local Government level.¹⁸

Taking the two members by their words, and the eventual hand picking of Simon Iorter Musa, amidst Jukun protest, as Wukari Local Government Chairman, it became difficult for the two to debunk the Jukun claim that “ they are trying to get legislative backing to ensure their perpetuity on our land”. Even if they were not directly involved in the process for the hand picking of Musa as the Chairman, the endorsement of the appointment by the state legislature gave the clear indication that they also supported it. Even if other members of the Assembly objected to the appointment, the only two Tiv members would not have voted on

the contrary, since it was the type of representation they were looking forward to achieving for their people, even in the NPN.¹⁹

Similarly, it was true that the two members jointly moved a motion for the inclusion of the Tiv language in the State Radio. Sentiments aside, one believes that the demand was not out of place. Even if the Jukun will argue that the Tiv did not constitute a majority in the aforementioned Local Government Areas, it would be difficult to convince any objective observer, whether the Tiv or non Tiv, that the Tiv did not constitute a significant language group in the southern part of the then Gongola State and present Taraba State. This claim is reinforced by table II in chapter four, and in endnotes 5&6 in this chapter. This is further reinforced by the 1946 population census for former Wukari Division reflecting the major ethnic groups in the area as shown in table 9.

Table 9, 1946 Population of Former Wukari Division per Ethnic Group

TRIBE	TOTAL POPULATION. (108,342)	% TOTAL	WUKARI DISTRICT	TAKUM DISTRICT	DONGA DISTRICT
TIV	40,400	37	15%	32.8%	33.8%
KUTEB	20,384	19	0.25%	54.6%	0.31%
JUKUN	10,867	10	24.4%	2.35%	0.59%
ITCHEN	6,775	6	0.65%	0.99%	27.23%
HAUSA	5,287	5	8.85%	1.66%	4.14%
CHAMBA	4,500	4	1.08%	5.38%	10.29%
62 OTHERS	20,229	12	13.79%	2.22%	23.64%

Source: NAK/MAK PROF/4377

The above detail aside, it is one's contention that the inclusion of any language in any radio station is not necessarily neither to perpetrate the language on the radio station nor on the audience, but rather to ensure a wide scale coverage of information dissemination as it affects the immediate and global community. This is why Hausa language is widely spoken in world renowned radio stations like the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Voice of America (VOA), Voice of Germany, the Dutch Radio, to mention but few.

This revelation therefore compels us to go beyond the Jukun statement. And the only possible interpretation is that the relationship between the Tiv and the Jukun had started to deteriorate. Otherwise, the motion for Tiv language to be spoken on the state radio would not have raised a serious concern for the Jukun, whose language was spoken or represented in the same radio station. From the global example given, the only interpretation one could give is that the relationship between the two groups had reached a critical state of suspicion and confrontation that sentiments always determined the way and manner members of the two groups related to issues that affected one another. It equally pointed to lack of ability to contain emotions. It is plain, for instance, that by maturity to contain emotions, even in the face of the religious affiliation between Hausa language and Islam, Western Radio Stations, even the BBC and VOA, still give adequate audience to the Hausa language programmes without prejudice.

It was however very unfortunate that both the Tiv and the Jukun allowed themselves to be controlled by emotions to interpret any advances and achievements made by one another. It was in this perspective that other than looked at the political

gains the Tiv began to achieve in the area as opportunities or advantages to all, both groups became self centered in interpreting issues. In this way, while the Tiv looked at their position in the state House of Assembly, and the Local Government Council, as golden opportunities to champion Tiv interests, the Jukun saw same as a rape on their unalienable right. These and other considerations, therefore, created spirit of fear, envy and confrontation in the Jukun, who were soon to lament that, “Wukari is the only Local Government Area we can call our own. We have no other place. Is it wrong if we decide to die to ensure that Wukari remains ours.”²⁰

The Jukun network only explained the level at which the two groups had fallen apart. It is one’s reasoning that given a cordial working relationship, one would have expected the Jukun to celebrate alongside with the Tiv in their political gains. While it is not tenable to disassociate the Jukun from Wukari as a geo-political entity, it is therefore not realistic to say that the mere appointment of a Tiv as the Local Government Chairman displaced the Jukuns as legitimate indigenes of the area; the status the Tiv also cling unto as Avav remarked,

... it is imperative to remind the Jukun that the Tiv of Wukari do not have any other place outside Wukari that they can boast of. Yes, there is Tivland in Benue state. Unfortunately, the Tiv of Wukari and indeed Taraba State have no claim thereto.²¹

From both the Jukun and the Tiv declarations, it is obvious that there emerged a strong spirit of an unhealthy contest between the two groups over the control and active participation in the spheres of activities in the area, especially at the wake of the nineteen eighties. Both communities shifted ground from a symbiotic political

fusion to ethnic Chauvinism, which had adverse effects on relationship. For instance, elsewhere a Tiv source declared that,

... are the Tiv going to depoliticize themselves to allow the Jukun take over as the Jukun want. The Tiv are getting more politically involved in the Local Government administration than ever before.²²

It is obvious that the tone of this declaration was not only a declaration of a hostile political contest, but also that the Tiv decided to throw off the Jukun for other alternatives in their search to actualize their political objectives. One of such better alternatives was the Barde's GNPP led government of the then Gongola State through whose patronage the Tiv, for the first time, headed Wukari Local Government Council. The other alternative at the Local Government Level was to be found in the Hausas as will be discussed soon. The persistent close ties between governors Barde and Bamanga Tukur in 1979–83 and 1983 respectively, as well as the Hausas at the Local level, were crucial issues in explaining the emergence of serious hostility between the Tiv and the Jukun.

The election of Bamanga Tukur in 1983 as the then Chief Executive of the then Gongola State made the political ties between the Tiv and the government to be stronger, amidst serious concern by the Jukun. Within the three months' regime which was terminated by the December 31st, 1983, coup, the two Tiv members re-elected into the State Assembly were at greater advantage to project and promote Tiv interests. This was particularly evident by the intimate relationship that developed between Bamanga Tukur and David Mtuem.²³ Through this relationship, even though a Tiv was no longer appointed the Local Government Chairman, a Tiv from the area,

Emmanuel Yawe, was elevated to an exalted position to serve as the Chief Press Secretary to the governor. It was also for the first time ever for a Tiv, Dr. Samuel Tor Agbidye, from Donga Local Government Area, to be appointed in the capacity of a commissioner, and assigned to the Ministry of Health.

It is relevant to point out that the appointment of Emmanuel Yawe was one of the formative policies of the Bamanga's regime which added more injury to the wound already sustained in the Tiv-Jukun relationship by the pro-Tiv policies of the Barde's regime. Apart from protest over the Tiv enjoying such a position under Wukari ticket, the Jukun feared that Yawe would use his position to advance Tiv interests. Needless to say that given time, this would have been obvious. Yawe no doubt never relented in pressing on to promote Tiv interest. His frequent consultations with the people left no one in doubt about the possibility of realizing his pro-Tiv agenda. Even the governor himself could not hide his planned package for the Tiv in his electioneering campaigns. The appointment of some Tiv in the highest echelon in the state administration, including boards' membership, and the likes, were all demonstrative of his resolve to make the Tiv have a sense of belonging both at state and Local Government levels.²⁴

The fortunes in stock for the Tiv both at the state and the Local Government levels were truncated by the 1983 military coup, which terminated the Second Republic. Even then, the spirit of envy, jealousy, suspicion and, even, hate between the Tiv and the Jukun had been evoked by the pro-Tiv policies pursued by the Barde and the three month Bamange's regimes. Of all the policies or actions was Musa's

appointment, which laid the basis for the emerging hostile political relationship between the Tiv and the Jukun.

The foregoing trend or analysis raise important issues for consideration by those vested with the mantle of leadership. That where leadership tends to favour one segment or group against the other, the action is capable of raising or intensifying complications in inter-group relations. This is more applicable in societies where frictions are already evident in relationship, as was the case between the Tiv and the Jukun. The analyses also point to the fact that where leadership emerges by appointment from the highest hierarchy, there is the tendency for one section or the other to feel dissatisfied. This is more so when the action is unilateral. Records show that even through an elective process, groups always protest, especially where there is no good rapport between them. Government is therefore advised to be always fair to all groups whenever appointments are to be made. No appointment should come to any group as a way of redemption to the disadvantage of the other(s).

6.3 THE TIV-HAUSA POLITICAL ALLIANCE OF 1987

The political experience across the country resulting from the zero party and two-party arrangements instituted by the Babangida's regime in 1987 and 1990 respectively hampered the process of inter-religio-ethnic harmony. Among other things, the SDP (Social Democratic Party) and the NRC (National Republican Convention) became canopies under which contending groups took refuge to exhibit hostile political culture toward one another. The zero party system laid the basis for this unfortunate development. In most societies, where the gang up was not religiously inclined, they had ethnic connotations. Even within groups, there were

intra-affiliations reciprocal of the differences that characterized the relationship between the different communities that made up the societies.

On the national level, for instance, the arrangement reflected the religio-political differences between the South and the North. While the Muslim North was predominantly NRC, the Christian South was predominantly SDP, the election of Abiola, a Muslim South, notwithstanding. And in states where the communities involved were in disagreement, their affiliation to the two parties also reflected the differences. So was the arrangement at the Local Government level. The arrangements in Local Government Areas like Zangon-Katab in Kaduna State,²⁵ Takum²⁶ and Wukari²⁷ in the then Gongola State, to mention by few, reflected the differences among the different communities therein. For instance, while in the case of Zango-Katab, the Atyap (predominantly Christians) took to the SDP, the Hausas (mostly Muslims) took to the NRC. And in the case of Takum and Wukari, while Kuteb and the Tiv were predominantly in the NRC, the Jukun and the Chamba-Kpanzun were in the SDP respectively. By this arrangement, based on pre-existing differences, the groups intensified their hostilities towards one another either during campaigns or in the control of the mantle of leadership.

Another dominant feature with the one party and two-party arrangements was the phenomenon of political alliances. Where one group could not do it alone in its struggle against the opponent, the group sought alliance with a neutral group or with a group that had common experience or aspiration with it. No matter whatever shape this arrangement took in the case of the two-party, for instance, it ended up to produce two “warring” camps formed by the SDP and the NRC. Like in the Zangon-

Katab case, while the majority of the groups that formed what was the Atyap Community aligned in the SDP, the Hausa-Fulani communities melted into the NRC.²⁸ And in Takum, as the different Kuteb communities concretized their unity in the NRC, the Chamba and the Kpanzu who had common aspirations, and history of origin, demonstrated their spirit of brotherhood in the SDP.²⁹ In Wukari, while the Jukun and their satellite communities like the Abakwariga and Nyifu took position in the SDP, the Tiv were later to form a political bloc in the NRC with the Hausa elements who became disgruntled with the domineering attitude of the Jukun. In all the societies mentioned, the gang ups produced complications that later resulted in open hostilities in the history of inter-group relations in the areas.

In the case of Wukari, prior to the Tiv-Hausa alliance in 1987, the military regime that ousted the civilian regime in 1983 embarked on a number of reforms. The reforms were more or less solutions to the yearnings of different communities in respect to their inclusion or otherwise in Local administration. And for the Tiv, the reforms were more or less the reincarnation of the Barde and Bamanga's policies towards their Socio-political emancipation. Apparently, the Jukun did not only see the military as an instrument in the hands of the Tiv to actualize their objective, but also as trying to consolidate the Barde and Bamanga's pro-Tiv policies, especially in Wukari Local Government Area. For instance, following Tiv protest for non inclusion in the Local administration, a Tiv, John Shimave, was appointed councillor in 1986 by Colonel Yohanna Madaki, the then Military Governor of the former Gongola State.³⁰

Many interpretations were given by the Jukun to Shimave's appointment. While some did not see any thing wrong in the appointment,³¹ others strongly condemned it; accusing Madaki of trying to consolidate Tiv position in the area.³² Other Jukun remarked that "the appointment was like opening an old wound created by the first appointment of a Tiv as Council Chairman in 1981."³³ The Tiv, on the contrary, did not interpret the appointment in the light of Angyu and Agyo's stand point. To them, it was a timely windfall, arguing that they had come of age to be represented in all spheres of life in the area.³⁴ This was why as the Jukun did not feel comfortable with the reappointment of Emmanuel Yawe in 1987 by Governor Jonah David Jang as his Chief Press Secretary, the Tiv counted it as one of the many opportunities that will begin to come their way.

These developments under the zero-party arrangement had far-reaching consequences on Jukun-Tiv relations in Wukari Local Government Area. The landmarks gave the Tiv the confidence that they could consolidate their position, and eventually assume what they claimed to be their rightful position both at state and Local Government levels. But the Jukun accused the government of the day of patronizing Tiv interest and agenda. This development threw the two groups farther asunder to the extent that politics, which used to be a superficial fusion between them, could no longer perform same role. The same situation was reported in respect to the Kuteb and the Chamba-Kpanzu (Jukun) in Takum Local Government Area.

In the case of Wukari, the sudden introduction of the zero-party system by the Babangida regime in 1987 witnessed some efforts, particularly by the Tiv to realign with the Jukun. Unfortunately, like in the case of Takum and elsewhere, the Tiv

attempt failed as a result of the crack that developed in their relationship. The crack became so deep that even efforts by the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), Wukari Branch, to fuse the two into a political bloc against the Muslim factor in the area failed.³⁵ In this way, none of the five Jukun candidates for Chairmanship accepted to take any Tiv as his running mate.³⁶ It could be recalled that the election came at a time Christian – Muslim religious politics was almost at a conflict level.

The failure of the Jukun to accept any Tiv as running mate, as demanded by the Tiv, laid the basis for the Tiv-Hausa political alliance in the area. It is relevant to state that the Jukun political error was effectively utilized by the only Hausa (Muslim) candidate, Alhaji Shehu Danladi, who readily accepted a Tiv, Shinja Abako, as his running mate.³⁷ Princess Grace Atoshi also attributed the defeat of the five Jukun candidates to the strong political fusion that emerged between the Tiv and the Hausa; arguing that,

When the ban was lifted the Federal Government declared Local Government Council election on non-party basis in 1988 six candidates emerged to contest the Chairmanship of Wukari Local Government Council. They were Mr. Andrew Tsokwa , Mr. Samuel T. Adda, Alhaji Dan – Ladi Shehu, Alhaji Yahaya Fari, Mr. James B. Orume and Mr. Atoshi Zaku. Out of these contestants, it was only Alhaji Shehu Danladi who promised the Tiv the post of Deputy Chairmanship.... But the remaining five Jukun candidates decided to go it individually without the type of promise Alhaji Shehu made. The Tiv voted enmass for Alhaji Shehu who won...³⁸

It could be asked why the Jukun candidates refused to accept any Tiv as running mate, and at the same failed to realign themselves to produce a common

candidate to challenge the Shehu Danladi's front. It could also be asked how the Jukun candidates imagined victory for themselves in the face of the over bastardization of their innocent electorates. The obvious possibilities to the issues raised were the bitter hatred that ensued between the Tiv and the Jukun. The atmosphere could not allow them to imagine sharing the leadership of what they considered to be their Local Government Area with the Tiv, especially at such a high level. Unfortunately, the sharp division between the Jukun candidates could not warrant anyone of them to surrender to the over. The obvious consequence was their defeat at the polls. The recent disagreement among the Igbos to produce a common candidate for the presidential race in the 2003 election in Nigeria was reciprocal of the Jukun experience in 1988. One wondered how the over four Igbo presidential candidates imagined victory to come their way, if not woeful defeat, as it did happen. Even the inability of the Christian South to produce a common front against the then candidature of Alhaji Shehu Shagari in the 1979 presidential race was equally reciprocal of an intra-disagreement. All these experiences had their attendant consequences.

In the case of Wukari, the events proceeding Tiv-Hausa political alliance blotted any remaining variables that bound the Tiv and the Jukun together. This fact was echoed by most Jukun informants. For instance, according to Prince Sam Ahmadu, "the alliance between the Tiv and the Hausa sold out the peace that existed between the Tiv and the Jukun".³⁹ Similarly, Simon Angyu and Mike Agbu contended that "the Tiv-Hausa political alliance closed up any chances for Jukun-Tiv co-operation".⁴⁰ These sources associated this phenomenon with Danladi's efforts to isolate the Jukun as he enjoyed the

political romance with the Tiv. Other Jukun sources refer to Alhaji Shehu Danladi, and other Tiv politicians like David Mtuem, Simon Iorter Musa and Simon Awua as desperate politicians who brought the Tiv and the Jukun into conflict in their hide and seek political game.⁴¹ Princess Grace Atoshi added that:

Alhaji Shehu thought that the best way to punish the Jukun was to gang up with the Tiv in the Local Government Area to frustrate and disregard the Jukun. So, even when he had been relieved of his position as the Chairman ... he continued with his meeting with the Tiv against the Jukun, his mother's tribe.⁴²

No matter the lapses in any of the above sentimental statements, what is obvious is that the Tiv-Hausa political fusion set the ball rolling for an inevitable Tiv-Jukun crisis.⁴³ This was due, primarily, to the major political and administrative land marks the Shehu's regime accorded to the Tiv. For instance, apart from a Tiv serving as his running mate, three other Tiv, David Tor Ayua, David Aulugh and Tsavdoo Kertyo, served as councillors in the Local Government Council. Out of these, David Tor Ayua was assigned portfolio to oversee the Health Department. This was, indeed, the first major political gains the Tiv ever enjoyed in the history of the Local government Area. By this set up, the Tiv and the Hausas had virtually taken over the council administration, with the Jukun acting as mere spectators in the land they claimed to be their own.

Both Tiv and Hausa informants asserted that Danladi's policies towards the Tiv did not only evoke Jukun hate for the Tiv, but also on Danladi himself. These informants used the physical assault on Danladi by the Jukun youths on 4th April, 1989, to reinforce their claim.⁴⁴ It is not just enough to sharply challenge the Jukun

action. It is most likely, also, that any other group found in the situation the Jukun eventually found themselves, and the shaky political future they anticipated in the face of Tiv-Hausa alliance, could not have easily reacted the other way round. Moreover, to claim that both the Tiv and the Hausas did not begin to disregard the Jukun in the process of the alliance is turning the truth on its head. This is why claims by some Jukun like Adihinchu Angyu that the Jukun had no problem with the alliance, neither did they harass any Tiv councillors, can not be accepted on their face values.⁴⁵ For instance, Princess Grace Atoshi remarked that “ while the Jukun were brooding over the consequence of the alliance, Shehu was brewing trouble by not only preaching to the Tiv to take over the control of Wukari Land...”⁴⁶

It is no doubt that the Tiv-Hausa alliance had become a concern to the Jukun, and also that by his policies towards the Tiv, the Jukun saw Danladi as brewing trouble and conscientising the Tiv that the land also belong to them. Most Tiv sources interviewed accepted that Danladi made them to become more conscious of their rights in the area. The same sources maintained that the regime provided more confidence in them to challenge the Jukun over issues of land ownership. It was, of course, as a result of this that Grace remarked that Danladi was not only brewing trouble, but also preaching to the Tiv to take over the control of Wukari land. This situation was reported, also, in Takum when Shiaki assumed office in 1989 with his hard line pro-Kuteb policies. Here, also, the type of awareness and consciousness arose in the Kuteb made them to demonstrate some sense of exclusive ownership never exhibited before. It was the same spirit, like in Wukari, which brewed the

extreme spirit of ethnicity in its negative perspective. Little wonder, therefore, that in both areas, bloody inter-ethnic clashes soon ensued.

If we must detain ourselves further on Atoshi's remark, one would also assert that whether her comment is sentimental or not realistic to the core, one does not have to dismiss the central issues in question. That the Jukun were much worried over the Tiv-Hausa alliance and its consequences is a matter that cannot be contested, as proceeding Jukun testimonies showed. Her remark, and the issues that preceded the alliance, even counteracted Angyu's claim that:

No body quarrels over Danladi Shehu being the Chairman or Abako his deputy. In fact, even during and after the incident, nobody picked Abako for harassment. He and other Tiv councillors are not detasted or intimidated by any body. They enjoy co-operation in their working place and in the community.⁴⁷

For the singular fact that Shehu Danladi did not belong to the Jukun camp, and was working in alliance with the Tiv, implied that he was not the Jukun choice for the Council Chairmanship. Similarly, since none of the five Jukun candidates chose a Tiv as running mate showed that the position of a Tiv, Shinja Abako, as Deputy Chairman was also not appealing to the Jukun. The presence of many Tiv councillors in the Council administration was equally a matter of protest by the Jukun. This was the view shared by David Tor Ayua, who was physically assaulted in the Council Chambers.⁴⁸ All these antecedents invalidated Angyu's claim that the Tiv councillors were neither detasted nor intimidated. It should be pointed out, also, that Angyu even contradicted himself when he remarked that,

Since the reign of the late Aku Uka, Atoshi, Danladi Shehu developed into a problem and insolent child. He had problems with Atoshi and subsequently with all the chiefs that have followed him up to the present Aku. His lawlessness and insults against the Akus are indelible in the minds of all the Jukun people. The Jukuns hold their chiefs in high esteem, and in fact a Jukun king is regarded as the personification of God here on earth... Danladi Shehu knows this very well but as a rascal, he preferred to take the tiger for a ride.⁴⁹

Except Angyu would say that his analysis was founded on falsehood, it will be difficult to admit that the Jukun would go for such a person who had such a serious history of disrespect to their leaders as a Chairman. Danladi himself could not deny having problem, particularly, with the incumbent Aku, Mallam Shekarau Angyu Masaibi Kuvyo II. He argued that the disagreement emanated mainly from the political development in the area. But whatever the cause, it is not expected of an individual to allow his disagreement with leadership to degenerate into a major concern to the wider community. Similarly, the action of the Tiv for pinching political tent with Danladi presupposed that the Tiv directly or indirectly supported Danladi's attitude toward the Aku. Moreover, by the time of the alliance, the Tiv were not ignorant of the fact that the person they were allying with had entered into a shaky relationship with the Aku. It will even amount to untruth to deny that the Tiv themselves had begun to accuse the Aku of misrule over them. By implication, therefore, the Tiv action amounted to joining forces with the Hausa to challenge the Jukun and the Aku's misrule.

This development eroded any hope for Tiv-Jukun co-operation in the area. For allowing themselves to be used by Danladi to actualize his political objectives, and vice versa, the action had yielded multifaceted effects. It resulted in Tiv-Jukun rivalry on one hand, and Jukun-Hausa confrontation, on the other hand. Subsequently, when in 1990 the nation was poised for a two-party local Government elections, it became obvious that the Jukun must have to mobilize their electorates against the Tiv-Hausa bloc. Already, the chances for the Tiv moving along with the Jukun politically were long blotted. This explained why as the Jukun were predominantly in the SDP, the greater proportion of the Tiv and the Hausas were in the NRC.⁵⁰ According to Tiv political activists like Gbagede, the line up was more or less reciprocal of two hostile camps, seeking victory by all means.⁵¹ The sharp division was reflected even in the sharing of elective and party positions. For instance, as the Jukun dominated the SDP and all the wind falls therein, the Tiv and the Hausa did same in the NRC. Infact, a Tiv or Hausa in the SDP was not considered for any position as was the case for the Jukun in the NRC where the Tiv and the Hausa dominated. This was evident in the NRC during the 1990 elections when a Hausa, Sale Danboyi was tipped for Chairmanship; as a Tiv, David Orbee Uchiv emerged the running mate and with a Hausa to serve as Council Secretary.⁵² And on party level, a Tiv, John Kwaghngu, emerged as the party Chairman.

It is relevant to stress that the problem of inter-ethnic relations in Wukari, indeed, miniaturised the status of both the NRC and the SDP in the area. Both parties were largely ethnic based. The rivalry that characterized the followers of these parties in the area left much to be desired. And as inter-ethnic rivalry intensified, the parties

became more ethnic based in out-look and in their programmes. This formed the basis for the remark by a Jukun elder in the NRC that,

Some of us, the Jukun in the NRC have now understood the plan of the Hausa/Tiv faction. They want to destroy us. We shall never be foolish enough to give them the knife with which to cut our throats.⁵³

Elsewhere, Princess Grace Atoshi remarked that a vote for the NRC will tantamount to “selling our birth right to become strangers and slaves in our land.”⁵⁴ It is, indeed, not clear how a vote for the NRC would amount to selling the Jukun birth right to become strangers and slaves. Does it also imply that a vote for the SDP was tantamount to selling the Tiv/Hausa birth right to become strangers and slaves? The fact is that the Tiv and the Hausa are as much legitimate indigenes of the area as the Jukuns are. Non-the less, one does not have to dwell much on Grace’s very emotional assumptions. The most important consideration is that by this time there emerged a centrally controlled Jukun campaign to redeem what they considered to be their land from the Tiv/Hausa political manoeuvre. This was also the case with the Kuteb in Takum, where deliberate efforts were made by both the Kuteb on one hand, and the Chamba-Kpanzu (Jukun), on the other hand, to politically out play one another. This, like in Wukari, intensified inter-group rivalry and antagonism. A Jukun source declared, in the case of Wukari, that in the wake of the December 8, 1990 Local Government elections,

The Jukuns decided to call for unity among all their community wherever they may be to prepare to defend their mother land or else their Tiv and some of their Hausa neighbours would one day through political manoeuvre over throw them.

Politics, which was hitherto left in the hands of the more vocal Hausas was found to be a better means of counteracting the new threat to their existence.⁵⁵

Agbu's remark was informative of the political culture developed by different ethnic groups across the country in pursuit of group interests in the wake of the two party experiments. Affiliation to the two parties by groups or a group was determinant of common interests, aspirations and experiences. We have already mentioned the case of Takum where the different Kuteb communities ganged up in the NRC against the Chamba-Kpanzu, and other satellite communities, as the former melted into the SDP to defend common interests during the two party experiment. The case was also with Atyap communities in Southern Kaduna, particularly in Zangon-Katab, where the Hausa community had been suppressing the indigenous non-Hausa communities.

Back to our reference area, Agbu's assertion relayed a similar message. It implied that by the time of the election, the Hausas and the Tiv in the Local Government Area were considered by the Jukun to be common political opponents whose political manouvres threatened the latter. This clearly suggested, as Grace observed, that to surmount the emerging political opponents, unity among the Jukun was paramount. It was only through such unity, in addition to other strategies, that the Jukun were victorious at the polls as a Jukun source remarked,

In the 1990 Chairmanship and Councillor elections, the Jukuns started serious campaign for unity among themselves. In those elections both Moslems, Christians and traditionalists Jukuns teamed up and defeated the settlers in the elections.⁵⁶

By Agbu's analysis, religion was no longer a dividing force for the Jukuns. Already, the Tiv decided to team up with the Muslim Hausas to pursue their socio-

political objectives. The irony on the part of the Muslim Jukuns was, however, that Islam which remains a very strong binding force for all Muslims could no longer perform this function as Agbu stated. Rather, the determining factor to the Jukuns was ethnicity and common interests as Grace stated; “So, when the election came up on December 8, 1990, using an open ballot system, not only the SDP members but also the Jukun faction of the NRC publicly voted for the SDP in order to prevent what the members called the “doom” that might befall the Jukun and the land should Alhaji Shehu’s candidate wins.”⁵⁷

Both Agbu and Grace’s arguments have stressed that time has come to a point at which the political fusion that hitherto characterized Tiv-Jukun/Hausa relationship in the Second Republic was severed. The remarks further pointed to the fact that the Jukun found themselves at a crucial stage that for them to vote for either the Hausa or any arrangement that would promote and protect Tiv interests, religion and party affiliations must not be an impediment for them to team up enmass for their candidate. Similarly, that the Tiv/Hausa political alliance had created conditions that made the Jukuns very uncertain and uncomfortable about the future in what they considered to be their fatherland. This fear originated from the diverging socio-political interests the two groups began to pursue, using politics as a driving force. It was within this same spirit that Samuel Tsovini Adda emerged victorious in the December 8, 1990, Chairmanship election.

6.4 THE ELECTION OF SAMUEL TSOVINI ADDA AS WUKARI LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCIL CHAIRMAN ON DECEMBER 8, 1990

The sharp political division that emerged between the Tiv/Hausa and the Jukuns, and the great threat the former constituted to the latter, made the Jukuns to consider the election of Samuel Tsovini Adda as an epoch making event. This victory was primarily conceived by the Jukuns as a golden opportunity to check the growing threat of the Tiv/Hausa alliance. Elsewhere, Grace declared that it was for the first time for a true-blooded Jukun to come to ascendancy as Wukari council Chairman.⁵⁸ From the campaigns and strategies adopted by both the Jukuns and the Tiv/Hausa blocs to mobilize themselves for the elections, the Jukun joy over their victory can only be imagined than described.

No matter the joy expressed by the Jukun over their victory, one would have expected Samuel Adda, as a leader for all in the Local Government Area, to have buried all differences to carry everybody along. Unfortunately, his posture and comments immediately after his victory showed that he was profoundly over taken by the wave of ethnicity. Of course, one would argue that the Tiv-Hausa example in their short period of control over the Local administration laid the foundation on which Adda helped to build up. Infact, the gallant approach the Tiv-Hausa force adopted in entrenching itself in the Local administration produced a negative spirit which made it very difficult for members of the two contending forces to pursue unbiased policies towards one another. But no matter the justifications one may have to explain the genesis of the style of leadership Adda adopted, especially as it affected the Tiv and the Jukun, one still holds the view that a leader for all is a leader for all in content and action, no matter the injuries sustained from any of the groups.

Found in the helm of affairs at a time ethnic politics and sentiments largely controlled people's actions, Samuel Adda could not be representative of the type of leader described above. He was more or less overwhelmed by efforts to defend the area from the Tiv/Hausa threat. Needless to say that both Adda and the Jukun never pretended on this agenda. The Tiv were the first target, since they were the major instruments used by Shehu Danladi to institute a largely non Jukun Council leadership. For instance, in one of his major post election speeches, Samuel Adda declared that,

Certainly, the recent victory of our people at the polls is just the beginning of the end of our problem with the Tiv. Now having won the Election...I think we should now be thinking seriously about our land administration. How do we check the incursion of strangers, particularly the Tiv, on our land... Until we tackle the issues decisively posterity will judge us and the future generation will not forgive us.⁵⁹

It cannot be refuted that the Tiv presence in the Local Government Area was becoming increasingly felt. This resulted primarily from their roles in the socio-economic and political life of the area. Infact, their increasing influence enabled them to begin to play roles the Jukun considered to be a great threat. Their roles in the Local Government Council administration over the years, and their persistent agitation for proper representation in traditional administration signalled the fact that they have graduated from being a politically dormant group to a very highly politically agitating community. Above all, their increasing political ambitions threatened the Jukuns, as Samuel Adda pointed out. Apart from beginning to have the confidence in their numerical strength, and their alliance with the Hausas, in pursuing

group objectives, the Tiv openly made the Jukun to understand that they (the Jukun) no longer deserve the type of recognition hitherto appropriated to them. It was this development which informed the Jukun to embark on deliberate campaigns to nib in the bulb the Tiv threat.

From Samuel Adda's policies, and how he openly addressed Tiv issues, it was clear that he was out to advance a Jukun course against the Tiv. All Tiv sources contacted contended that Adda neither delayed nor pretended in executing anti-Tiv policies. It was this very factor, which produced series of events that eventually led to open bloody hostility between the Tiv and the Jukun during his tenure in 1991/92. A Tiv source declared, for instance, that "Adda behaved as if nothing is unlawful when it comes to defending Jukun interest for the purpose of redeeming their political position".⁶⁰ His choice of Nicolo Machiavelli's quotation to introduce his book, For Posterity, clearly reinforced the Tiv claim in the way and matter he related to them in the pursuit of his group interest. According to Machiavelli, as quoted by Samuel Adda,

When it is a question of saving the fatherland, one should not stop for a moment to consider whether something is lawful or shameful, but putting aside any other consideration, one ought to follow out to the end whatever resolve would save the life of the state and preserve its freedom.⁶¹

Even though one would argue that Samuel Adda had no state to preserve, his ethnic group was greatly threatened by Tiv incursion on all spheres of life in the area. Similarly, the fact that Tiv-Jukun conflict dominated his two tenures as the Local Government Chairman without deliberate efforts, on his part, to arrest the situation

presupposed that he allowed the Machiavelli principle to take its course in addressing the Tiv threat. His untimely removal from office in 1992 by Governor Jolly T. Nyame of Taraba State in connection with his involvement in the 1991/92 Tiv Jukun conflict reinforced one's claim.⁶²

The point of emphasis here is that Samuel Adda came into office in an atmosphere of conflict, and was removed from office as a result of his involvement in same. This was enough reason to prove that his election, and the spirit with which he functioned as a partisan leader, could not allow him to disregard the use of violence as a means of achieving group objectives. In this way, he greatly fanned inter-ethnic rivalry in his area.

Samuel Adda's case cannot be treated in isolation. Across the country, and even on the global level, cases of inter-ethnic rivalries emanating from partisan leadership are commonplace. The cases of the Hutu-Tutsi in Rwanda under Habyarimana, the former Zaire under Mubutu Seseseke, Uganda under Idi Amin, and the Blacks versus the whites in the then racist regime in South Africa, are all issues that readily come to mind. Infact, the prevalence of violence in present Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda, to mention but few, is well linked with the partisanship of past regimes.

In Taraba State, Dr. Andokari Shiaki seemed to have set the example for Samuel Adda. Adda's policies were, indeed, reflective of Shiaki's example in Takum Local Government Area in 1989. Shiaki's hard line approach toward promoting the Kuteb course against the other groups, especially the Chamba-Kpanzu, pushed the history of inter-ethnic relations in the area to a very critical stage. Lawson argued, for

instance, that, “Doctor Shiaki’s no – non sense but pro-Kuteb policies and militant approach to the problem of inter-ethnic relations ... set the scene for the communal clashes of 199-93, which marked the climax of inter-ethnic suspicion and conflicts in recent times.’⁶³

From the global, to national and Local examples, it is evident that a partisan leader is not only an enemy to the phenomenon of healthy inter-group relations, but also a threat to global peace. The cases mentioned above rationalized this claim. For instance, the complexities in inter-ethnic politics in Rwanda resulting from partisan leadership was not only a problem to the Tutsis and the Hutus in the nineties, but also a global concern. The same are the cases in present Congo Republic and Uganda. And, in Nigeria, the Tiv-Jukun conflict, of late, became an issue of Local, national and, even, global concern. There are numerous other such cases in Nigeria and other countries of the world. From these examples, partisanship is a feature that must be resisted by any purposeful leadership that desires, among other things, to unite its diverse socio-cultural groups into a harmonious entity.

6.5 LAND ISSUES AND WORSENING JUKUN-TIV RELATIONS BETWEEN 1980–1999

To hold unto the land factor in isolation in the attempt to explain the persistent Tiv-Jukun crises in Wukari Local Government Area is chasing the shadow other than the object . Up to the 1991/92 Tiv-Jukun hostility, the possibility of land becoming an issue to bring members of the two groups into conflict was very remote to most communities in the area. This formed the basis why many Tiv and Jukun political

observers like David Mtuem, Simon Awua and Grace Atoshi considered the land factor as a scapegoat used by politicians to achieve objectives.⁶⁴

Prior to the manipulation of land by politicians, Tiv elders like John Tseke argued that the process of land use was one of the factors that cemented unity between members of the two groups.⁶⁵ Wherever the two co-existed, land was harmoniously shared. However, looking beyond land as a source of unity, the same source maintained that the political attitude of the early Tiv communities was another factor that averted the possibility of conflict with the Jukuns. He argued that initially, and even up to early 1970s, the Tiv were politically indifferent. They were significantly an aggressive agrarian group whose whole interest was on exploiting the resources of land by farming. While the Jukun were also an agrarian group, they were already politically inclined, as their past history even showed. This, of course, formed the basis for David Mtuem's argument that "the Jukun who were politically conscious could not have easily aligned with any other politically ambitious group seeking political ascendancy in the area."⁶⁶ Rather, they were more comfortable embracing any group, like the Tiv, to promote their political objectives. And prior to the 1980s, in particular, the Tiv conducted themselves as if they were such an option the Jukun were looking for.

However, by the 1980s, the Tiv began to change their political attitude, from being a politically dormant group, to a group yearning for political recognition, and even ascendancy. The change of attitude had its attendant effects on relationship. The Jukun began to suspect the Tiv of trying to take over both the economic and political spheres of life in the area. Already, by this time, the Tiv were no doubt the most

dominant economic force in the entire Local Government Area. The sudden Tiv-Hausa political alliance in 1987 clearly unveiled the Tiv political agenda. But when we recalled the fact that the Jukun were already politically entrenched, it became obvious that the Tiv ambition inhibited potentials for rivalry, as the case soon proved itself.

What introduced the land factor into the above political development was the Jukun action to review their land administration to check the incursion of, particularly, the Tiv on their land.⁶⁷ This policy almost became a reference point to Samuel Adda in the way and manner he related to the Tiv during his tenure.⁶⁸ Impliedly, even though land factor was to eventually become an object of conflict between the Tiv and the Jukun, it was only a surface reason to be used to achieve the underlining political objectives. This is why it is even safe to assert that one of the dominant consequences of the growing political rivalry between the Tiv and the Jukun was the manipulation of land as an object of hostility to achieve political objectives. In other words, land factor was only a means to an end.

From findings across the Local Government Area, especially among the Tiv, it is evident that Samuel Adda's pronouncement in 1990 did not originate the process for the manipulation of the machinery of land as a weapon in attempt to displace the Tiv. Rather, it was only an official pronouncement of a process that was already in progress, particularly among eminent Jukun personalities. Tiv sources, like Gbagede, maintained that the activities of these eminent personalities in holding claims over land already inhabited by the Tiv set the ball rolling for eventual Jukun-Tiv land related disputes.⁶⁹ Avav and Myegba shared the same view, arguing that,

What is relevant is that hitherto the peasant Jukun and the peasant Tiv had no land disputes among themselves. The campaign to dispossess the Tiv of their ancestral lands was initiated and actively promoted by eminent personalities ...⁷⁰

While other Jukun sources also argued that forceful acquisition of land has been one of the causes of the recent Jukun-Tiv clashes, they believed that it is the Tiv who are guilty of perpetrating the incident. Sources like Sam Ahmadu accused Tiv farmers from Benue State, like late Mbapuun and Tilley Gyado, of acquiring large expanse of land in Wukari for their farm projects.⁷¹ And, on his part, Luka Agbu lamented that, “the Tivs who know fully well that they are settlers in Wukari Local Government which belongs to the Jukuns, decided on seizing the land by force despite all concessions given to them over land matter.”⁷²

These catalogue of claims and counter claims by both the Tiv and the Jukun over land use revealed one important issue. That land has always been an important factor in shaping Jukun-Tiv relationship in the area under review. This is why Tseror was constrained to remark that,

The land question between Tiv and Jukun in Wukari daily assumes greater significance... Land disputes have therefore become characteristic of Tiv–Jukun relations in the 20th century, especially at present.⁷³

The truth of the matter is not necessarily that the machinery of land alone would have been potent enough to produce serious disaffection as already stated. The crux of the matter was that at this time Tiv-Jukun political relationship had been over saturated with frictions. That the Tiv and the Hausas attempted to get hold over the schemes of affairs in the area and the Jukuns were able to regain their ability to challenge the

trend. That the Jukun now have to decisively deal with, particularly, the Tiv by forcefully relieving them of whatever position(s) they felt they have held over land and politics.

It is pertinent to stress at this juncture that the exploitation of land resources in Wukari alone would not have raised the spirit of envy and suspicion among the Jukuns. One of the main contributory factors was the indiscriminate way and manner some Tiv elements from main Tiv land flooded the area to cultivate the land, as Sam Ahmadu rightly pointed out. Most of these recent Tiv economic adventurers indulged in activities that were not even approved by the autochthonous Tiv communities in Wukari.⁷⁴ Apart from taking the areas to be their camps to only exploit the land, greater majority of these recent communities believed that their dead, no matter their ages, must not be buried in the area. In the face of these unapproved practices, even by the indigenous Tiv communities, the latter could not be exonerated, since most of these recent immigrants resided with them as their 'guests'. And in most of these cases, the new comers did not officially pass through the Local authorities, as it is the common practice in most rural set up. This, in itself, was a potential for conflict, especially when these new comers were actively involved in politics.

The question now is, what role did the land factor play in the ongoing controversy between the Tiv and the Jukun? . We have already stressed the fact that the recent Tiv immigrants resided with their kith and kins in the area, and were subsequently being used by same to challenge the Jukun politically. This raised the question among the Jukun of how to shake up the Tiv foundation, and possibly

depopulate them in the area.⁷⁵ Tiv sources argued that the manipulation of land administration by the Local Government was one of the effective weapons used to attempt to displace the Tiv in the area.⁷⁶ The sources argued further that even though this did not achieve the desired objective, it helped to over stretch the already gloomy relationship between the two communities. Consequently, in many places where land was not a point of conflict, the Tiv maintained that they began to face challenges from their Jukun neighbors over land use. The most disturbing emerging trend was the forceful relocation of areas occupied by the Tiv to Jukun land speculators through certificates of occupancy. This became common practice in the 1980s. Across the Local Government Area, Tiv Communities were threatened with certificates of occupancy over their lands. It was on this basis that the Tiv communities in Rafin Kada and Tsokundi Districts jointly petitioned to the then Military Governor of the former Gongola State on the 6th January, 1988, as contained in the appendix 2 at the end of the work.

Apart from the issues raised in the above petition, the Tiv communities at Akomikyar, in Bantaje District, were, in 1995, threatened with a certificate of occupancy over their land by the then Governor of Cross River, Group Captain Ibrahim Kefas. The certificate, No TS/4412, was dated 7th June, 1975.⁷⁷ The tension that mounted over the issue in the area compelled the state government, under Colonel Yohanna Mamman Dickson, to revoke the allocation.⁷⁸ The same was the case with the certificate of occupancy given to Barrister Baba Adi over a large expanse of land along Wukari – Takum road already occupied by the Tiv. The controversy over the land, and the impending crisis over the allocation, was only

checked by the revocation of the certificate by Governor Jonah Jang in 1987.⁷⁹ Similarly, the Aku's claim over land in Mbatinyam Community in Chonku District equally heightened tension between the Tiv and the Jukun in the area. Needless to say that this resulted from the fact that the Jukun could not imagine their paramount ruler, considered to be God's representation on earth, being challenged by the Tiv on matters of land ownership.

It is relevant to stress that in all the cases raised, tension erupted between the Tiv and the Jukun. This stemmed from the fact that at this time disagreement between individual members of the two communities was interpreted on inter-group basis. This resulted from the political tension that characterized the relationship between the two groups. In the same vein, even though it could be argued that both the Aku, the Governor and eminent Jukun sons had the right to own land; and most especially that the government had the prerogative to allocate land, it was not in the interest of inter-group unity for government to allocate areas already occupied by the Tiv to the Jukun, and vice versa. This was more so at the time political differences had pulled the two apart. Even the world experience show that the peasants have always resisted any attempt by the rich to displace them of their land in order to make them tenants to be exploited. Even within groups, such resistance are commonplace.

In his analysis of a similar situation in Takum Local Government Area of Taraba State, Lawson stated that,

...the acquisition of land in Kpashi Village by General T. Y. Danjuma (RTD) led to a court action by the people against him; Dr. Nuhu

Andeyaba sweated it out with the Kpambo Community over land acquisition; Mr. B. Ikiloma faced an irate villagers around Kufi Village over same issue; Dr. Sunday Dankaro's labourers were attacked over his acquisition of Jenuwa farm lands. All these cases occurred during the second half of 1980, and affected the history of inter-group relations adversely.⁸⁰

The time frame given by Lawson indicates that both the peasant communities in Takum and their Tiv counterparts at Wukari were subjected to threats over their lands by the few privileged individuals at the same time.

Across the globe, the Boer land speculative activities over blacks' land in the then racist South Africa was one of the major causes of frictions between the two communities. Even at democratic rule, the question is still much around, since there is the difficulty of reclaiming black lands from the whites without friction. In former Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe, the issue of land speculation by the rich white farmers was a source of friction between the whites and the black. The strong opposition faced by Mugabe from the European Union, particularly Britain, over his attempt to reclaim illegally acquired lands by the few rich white farmers for redistribution also unveils the sensitivity of land as an object of conflict, especially in politically charged atmosphere.

In the case of Wukari, the politically charged atmosphere made the manipulation of land as a ready instrument to propel politically motivated crisis. The appointment of Simon Iorter Musa in 1981 as Wukari Local Government Chairman; Tiv – Hausa political alliance in 1987; the growing Tiv political influence in the Local Government administration in the eighties, and the eventual election of Samuel

Tsovini Adda, a Jukun, in 1990 and 1991 as Council Chairman were political developments which were to eventually introduce land as one of the causes of conflicts between the Tiv and the Jukun in the area over the years. Among such conflicts were the 1990 Jukun-Tiv clash at Kato Bagha District and the 1991/92 all-out crisis between the two communities in the entire Local Government Area.

6.6 1990 JUKUN-TIV CLASH AT UBANG IN KATO BAGHA DISTRICT

In a nutshell, the conflict erupted on the 25th September, 1990, on a disputed piece of land in Nwuban in Kato Bagha district. Both communities accused the other of attacking its members in cold blood while working on a piece of land; an incident that soon heightened Jukun-Tiv tension in the district in particular, and the Local Government at large.

Many Tiv and Jukun sources argued that this conflict could have been averted if not for the growing socio-political tension between members of the two groups.⁸¹ The sources argued that the skirmish occurred at a time members of the two communities were increasingly being mobilized along ethnic lines in interpreting disputes between their members. The sources maintained that worse cases occurred in the past without generating into inter-ethnic concern like the case under review. It is on this basis that Princess Grace Atoshi remarked that,

Land is only a surface reason used. The crisis has different faces. Beyond the land issue are some factors ... one of them is politics.⁸²

Similarly, Tseror added that, “in analyzing the 1990 war, efforts must be made to go beyond the land question, and the search light to the historian must necessarily be focused on the political question.”⁸³ Other Tiv sources argued that the Jukun have

always used the strategy of violence as a instrument to manipulate the political process to their advantage.⁸⁴ It could be recalled that the conflict occurred close to the December 8th, 1990, Local Government election during which the Jukun emerged victorious over the Tiv-Hausa front.

From the Tiv and the Jukun points of view, therefore, it is obvious that politics was the main determining factor in the dispute, especially in the escalation of the dispute in the entire Kato Bagha District within a month. Though the dispute was timely resolved, it had far-reaching consequences on the already strained Jukun-Tiv relationship, not only on Kato Bagha District, but on the entire Local Government Area. Both Tiv and Jukun sources maintained that since after the Atem Tyo episode, no similar clash of this nature occurred between members of the two communities.

What is very important at this juncture is that the 1990 land dispute in Kato Bagha marred all the remaining virtues of peace between the Tiv and the Jukun across the Local Government Area. The skirmish resulted in the release of dangerous rumours and propaganda all over the place. The phenomenon heightened the spirit of strife, suspicion and intolerance in relating to one another. Tiv sources maintained that the dispute also gave the Jukun more confidence in the use of violence in resolving their differences with the Tiv.⁸⁵ This resulted from the seeming victory they recorded in the dispute. The post dispute period was therefore a time the two groups began to examine their levels of preparedness or otherwise to face one another in subsequent conflicts. It was in this unhealthy spirit that the 1991/92 conflict occurred.

6.7 THE 1991/92 JUKUN-TIV CONFLICT

Both Jukun and Tiv sources linked the outbreak of the 1991/92 Tiv-Jukun conflict in the Local Government Area to the 1990 episode at Kato Bagha District. Our analysis of the general effect of the incident on relationship points to the same direction. Both Tiv and Jukun sources, particularly the Tiv, maintained that after the 1990 clash, the people resorted to guerilla warfare, during which unsuspecting people were attacked on farms, at roadblocks, at home and at different points.⁸⁶ It is difficult to exonerate any community from this callous attitude towards life and property, since the action of one might have conditioned the action of the other. Generally, a state of insecurity and confrontation was created, thereby making the area vulnerable to emerging crisis.

The foregoing terrain was converted into open crisis in 1991 when the Tiv and the Jukun were at each other's necks for almost two years. The crisis erupted from a minor land dispute at Wana, near Ibi, in October, 1991. Already, before this incident, the atmosphere was charged with news of inter-ethnic clash between the Tiv and the Jukun. In all the districts in the Local Government Area, no community was ignorant of the fact that a minor dispute involving members of the two groups was capable of converting the whole area into a theatre of conflict. This is why, like the 1990 dispute, many observers would want to perceive the role of the land factor as only a scapegoat.

While the Jukun accused the Tiv of conditioning the factors that led to this all-embracing aggression, Tiv sources accused the Jukun, particularly, Samuel

Tsovini Adda, of master minding the conflict.⁸⁷ Tiv sources reinforced their claim by the earlier declaration by Adda, as contained in the Analyst Magazine, to check the incursion of the Tiv in the area. The resumption of conflicts between the Tiv and the Jukun immediately he assumed office added ingredients to the Tiv claim. These and among other considerations made some Tiv sources to emotionally declare that,

... at the inception of the leadership of Samuel Adda as Council Chairman in 1990, the Jukun launched 'OPERATION PATSWI', meaning 'an Operation to recover land'... The next stage was the recruitment and training of warriors... the Ajiduku, that is, Jukun warriors... By 1990, the warriors were fit enough to strike at the enemy, the Tiv.⁸⁸

As strong, and as vivid, as the above declaration sounds, it is in itself presumptive. It was only possible for one on the Jukun side, and, of course, a close associate of Samuel Adda who could have had enough inputs to give such a vivid account. It is true that the Jukun exhibited a credible degree of organizational skills in prosecuting the crisis. This can be linked with their strong determination to surmount the threat posed by the Tiv. Of course, the earlier remark by Luka Agbu that the Jukun decided to call on all Jukun communities, wherever they be, to defend their land from the Tiv might have accounted, in part, for the vigour with which they prosecuted the war. Above all, the position of Samuel Adda as Council Chairman throughout the crisis period facilitated the process for the accomplishment of their resolve.

That the 1991/92 crisis was fierce and devastating in its effect on life and property is not arguable. Both Tiv and Jukun sources maintained that the level of

aggression exhibited in the prosecution of the conflict by both groups created an indelible mark on their relationship.⁸⁹ The crisis produced a culture of violence, intolerance, hate and suspicion toward one another. This agreed with Weber's theory that " violence intensifies violence in a short run..."⁹⁰ And even when violence eventually leads to calm, the situation is always an uneasy one, full of suspicion, hate and intolerance as it is being observed in societies like Rwanda, Takum, Zangon – Katab and even Wukari. And in places like the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, Sudan, Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Israel-Palestine, Liberia, to mention but few, violence has considerably remained the cause of the unending violence in the areas. It is on this premise that one advocates for peaceful approach towards resolving disputes, no matter the cost, other than the use of violence as it has become the order of the day.

In the case of the 1991/92 Tiv–Jukun conflict, what determined the extent of effect on relationship was the human and material loses incurred by both communities. Both Tiv and Jukun sources agreed that it is difficult to accurately account for the life and property that fell victim in the aggression. Most efforts in this direction are surface attempts that look at only lives that fell victim in conflict points, organized raids and roadblocks. To adequately account for the accurate figure, which is very difficult, one has to look at three main stages at which life and property fell victim. These levels are victims trapped at crisis points, innocent people trapped and killed at road blocks or in guerilla attacks, and lastly those who died as a result of psycho-emotional stress resulting from the effects of the crisis. The difficulty in

arriving at the accurate figure has made the assessment of the entire phenomenon to be essentially imaginative.

From the foregoing discussion on the wanton destruction of life and property from Tiv and Jukun sides, one dominant feature is projected; that more than any other episode in the area, the incident generally pushed Tiv-Jukun relationship to a very bad stage, even though in some areas in the Local Government normalcy was relatively restored fairly immediately after the crisis. One's interview with both the Tiv and the Jukun sources confirmed the phenomenon. For instance, to Jukun sources like Japhet, the 1991/92 crisis "marred Jukun-Tiv relationship."⁹¹ Others like Agyo argued further that the crisis "brought hate and lack of trust"⁹² between members of the two ethnic groups. And in his assessment, Abdul maintained that the crisis "created distrust and fear among the two ethnic groups".⁹³ He went further to stress that,

Intermarriage is not common among them like before. The population of Tiv in the Wukari town reduced drastically... For instance, some Tiv lawyers that used to be in Wukari are rarely seen practicing law in Wukari these days.⁹⁴

Other Jukun informants like Gambo Ezekiel, Lami Audu, Adi Daniel, Tabitha Ali, Juliana Angyu and Daniel Andokari agreed that "since the crisis, comments on one another from both sides have been very negative."⁹⁵ To some of these informants, "since the crisis, members of both communities continued to make very inflammatory and insulting comments on one another."⁹⁶

From the reality of the effects of the crisis, the Jukun argument cannot be invalidated. As the Jukun sources clearly highlighted, the post crisis period was a

period of reconsideration of relationship. Most Tiv sources agreed with the Jukun assessment of the situation.⁹⁷ Most of these informants agreed that their relationship with the Jukun changed for worse. The sources maintained that many of them find it very difficult to relate well with the Jukun as it used to be the case. What sustained this unfortunate trend was the way and manner publications by members of both communities relayed the philosophy of the emerging trend. For instance, publications by members of the two communities, like Grace Atoshi; 'The Story of Jukun/Tiv Crisis...' Luka Agbu; Report on conflict between Jukun and Tiv in Wukari...' Atohinko T. Adi; 'Jukun-Tiv Crisis...' Samuel T. Adda; 'For Posterity...' Avav and Myegba; 'The dream to conquer...' etc, including other publications by Socio-cultural Associations from both communities all exhibited the same destructive characteristic. The same was characteristic of articles contained in Newspapers and magazines written by either members of the two communities or their sympathizers.

This unfolding trend had very negative effect on the process of reconciliation, reconstruction and rehabilitation. One other unfortunate development was the way and manner the enterprise helped to spill over the consequence of the entire development on general Tiv-Jukun relationship. To be precise, the affect was not only on Tiv-Jukun relationship in Wukari, but also on other Local Government Areas, like Takum and Donga, where members of the two communities co-existed. Even in institutions of learning, like in schools and offices, some Jukun sources maintained that "the relationship between Tiv and Jukun students was no longer cordial like before."⁹⁸

Here, too, the Wukari incidence cannot be treated in isolation. In many areas across the country, and across the globe, where devastating crisis occurred between communities, the effect on relationship has always remained long lasting. For instance, while the Kuteb and the Chamba – Jukun in Takum can hardly forget the memories of the agonies of the 1993 aggression on one another, the Hausa and the non Hausa communities in Jos can hardly let go the memories of the in human assault on one another in 2001/02 skirmishes. Similarly, the Hausa and the non-Hausa communities in Zangon-Katab find it difficult to swallow the effects of the 1992 aggression on one another. And, on the international level, it will take a great deal of time for the Tutsis and the Hutus to forget the agonies passed through in the Rwandan genocide war in 1994. The communities in Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Ivory Coast, the Middle East, etc, are currently in contests that will soon yield similar results.

In the case of our reference area, what dampened the process of reconciliation, reconstruction and rehabilitation in the post crisis period was the active involvement of both the Local and Traditional Authorities in coordinating anti – Tiv policies. We have already mentioned that Samuel Tsovini Adda was removed from office by Governor Jolly Nyame of Taraba State in 1992 as Council Chairman as a result of the air of strong suspicion around him in connection with his negative role in either averting the crisis or facilitating the peace process. Invariably, the attitudes of both organs of government produced chains of issues and contradictions, which soon became potent enough to trigger off a more embracing aggression against the Tiv, not only in Wukari Local Government Area, but virtually in the entire

Taraba State. The cruelty exhibited in prosecuting the crisis made it to even adopt a national and, even, international dimension. The big question, therefore, is, what areas of involvement did the third tier of government exhibit in helping to throw the Tiv and the Jukun farther apart?.

6.7.1 Local Government Policy on the Return of the Displaced People

The role of law enforcement agents deployed to the area to facilitate the return of normalcy left little or nothing to be desired. Their open partisanship greatly marred the process of return and reunion of displaced people. While adequate protection was given to the affected Jukun areas to facilitate resettlement, nothing was offered to the Tiv areas. For instance, while Wukari virtually became a paramilitary barrack for soldiers and the Police Mobile Force, Jukun settlements like Kente, Akwana, Rafin Kada, Chonku, Gidan Idi, Sondi, Arufu, and Tsokundi received strong detachments of Law enforcement agents, who kept vigil day and night.⁹⁹ This arrangement facilitated only the return of some Jukun communities that fled during the crisis.

Given this scenario, the Jukun were able to frustrate the return of Tiv communities in areas the Jukun intended to completely evict the Tiv. This was particularly between Wukari and Gidan Idi where, even up to the 2001/02 crises, the displaced Tiv communities were not allowed to return for resettlement. Many Tiv attempts to return to the area in settlements like Tse Anza, Gberindyer, Uyoo, etc were effectively challenged and frustrated by the Jukun youths.¹⁰⁰ This development was even confirmed by some Jukun sources who stated that “ many Tiv villages were

displaced in different places in the Local Government Area as a result of the 1991/92 crisis.”¹⁰¹ The table below is an illustration of the point under review.

Table 10: A Conservative list of Tiv settlements displaced between Wukari-Gidan Idi road as a result of the 1991/92 Crisis

1. Tse Gberindyer
2. Tse Gaza
3. Lanem
4. Tor Aindir
5. Kimbi
6. Anenga
7. Tse Anza
8. Ason
9. Tse Ligom
10. Tser
11. Shimakov
12. Tse Time
13. Ukende
14. Mkaa Mende
15. Kyukyundu
16. Tse Gberityo
17. Akumka
18. Ugbede
19. Imborivungu
20. Niyiam Anyogo
21. Shaapera Chamegh
22. Emberga Ahua
23. Tyoor Gberifan
24. Tagundu
25. Tse Gesa Yade
26. Tor Kwase Anaya
27. Ayima
28. Kanve
29. Tor Kyomon
30. Yuhwa Shagba
31. Akuraga Uja
32. Iorhom Ikyoor
33. Gor Ilim
34. Shima Butu
35. Igba Dyuran
36. Mza Ate
37. Iorngurum Ikyongur
38. Uyoo

Source: Information acquired from fieldwork among the affected Tiv Communities. The fieldwork was conducted between October and November, 2002.

The point of emphasis here is how Local Government policy frustrated the reunion of members of the two ethnic groups. Even in some areas where some Jukun cherished the reunion, like in the area cited above, the prevailing circumstances dampened their desire, since only the Jukun returned. One would have expected Local Government policies to facilitate the return, also, of the displaced Tiv Communities. On the contrary, the policies adopted by both the Local and Traditional Authorities made even the unsuspecting innocent average Jukun to begin to perceive a Tiv as an alien in their midst. For instance, among the measures to frustrate the return of the Tiv, and also to make those who return to be considered as alien in their country, was the “stringent policies on Tiv returnees, like the filling of forms.”¹⁰² It could be recalled that among other conditions in the forms, returnees were to be accorded permanent tenantry status, renewable only as the ward heads, and the authorities that be, deem ‘appropriate’. Even in the area of land use, returnees were not at liberty to have access to any piece of land except through their Jukun ward heads. Among other effects, the policy, and the conditions therein, marred the return of the displaced Tiv people in many areas. And even though the policy was not implemented at the end, the debate and resistance whether the conditions in the form should be the modality for the return of the displaced Tiv adversely delayed the resettlement process.

It could be observed that such stringent Local Government policies did not only frustrate the return of the displaced Tiv people, but also significantly laid the basis for widening the gap between members of the two communities. Though it

could be argued that many Tiv communities returned to their original settlements, many, who still returned, had to relocate to other areas due to the emerging hatred and spirit of intolerance fueled, in part, by the Local Government attempt to alienate the Tiv through the issue of the form. Of importance to note is the fact that, even though the forms were not used, the consciousness raised among many Jukuns by the content of the forms greatly changed their perception about the status of the Tiv in the area.

The persistent refusal by the Local Government Authority to reabsorb displaced Tiv staff, particularly primary School teachers, was yet another government policy which helped to widen the gap between the Tiv and the Jukun. Needless to even say that since the crisis ended, the Tiv faced abject discrimination both in the Local and Traditional administration. The most glaring issue was the refusal by the Local Government Council to reabsorb the displaced one hundred and sixty eight Tiv Primary School teachers. The details about the statistics and otherwise of the affected teachers are supplied in appendix 3 at the end of the study.

Series of interviews with affected teachers, both on group and individual levels, suggested that the Local Government was directly responsible for their ordeal. The sources maintained that relentless efforts by them, using different bodies, including even the state Primary Education Board and the state Government, could not bend the Local Government on its resolve. In fact, several directives by both the State Primary Education Board and the State Government for the re-engagement of the affected Tiv teachers were persistently disregarded by the Local Government. This, and among other actions, showed why the incumbent Council Chairman,

Samuel Tsovini Adda, was indicted and, eventually, removed from office for directly or indirectly frustrating the peace process in the area. In his deep concern for the negative role being played by Adda, the Governor remarked that,

I think that the problem with the Chairman of Wukari is that he does not realize that he is part of the problem of this conflict... If he, as a Jukun, would deny a Tiv man his own right, you can not expect a Tiv man to respect him or to respect the Law within the area. Let me give you a typical example, there are well over a hundred and two Tiv teachers that he has denied to pay them their salaries up to date. Then how do you expect these Tiv teachers to co-operate with him. They can't co-operate.¹⁰³

In the case of the aforementioned teachers, even when they were eventually reluctantly re-engaged, all of them were under placed, irrespective of their years of service.¹⁰⁴ In addition, many interviewed lamented that their salaries kept fluctuating in disguise of levies not paid by their Jukun counterparts. Among such levies included deduction in the name of relief materials to the affected teachers. This action, in addition to the deaf ears to their complaints, gave the obvious impression that the Tiv man was now different from his Jukun counter part, even in government service.

We have to observe at this juncture that after any crisis of this nature, what any responsive leadership normally does in order to give everybody, and community, a sense of belonging is to reabsorb and assimilate everyone, irrespective of whatever role any of the parties played. It was the principle the Gowon's regime adopted in Nigeria immediately after the civil war in 1970. In the Reconstruction, Reconciliation and Rehabilitation process, the Igbos were

significantly reintegrated into the Nigerian system. Unfortunately, even then the relationship between the Igbos and the generality of the Nigerian citizenry remained rough for a reasonable while. The same reintegration process was adopted by countries like Rwanda, Liberia, etc which once had one form of crisis or the other. Even in present Iraq the panacea for peace and unity is the unconditional reintegration of the Kudish community into the Iraqi system. It was therefore very unfortunate that Wukari Local Government never took a leaf from this worthwhile principle, but instead went ahead to attempt to alienate a group that can not be alienated from the area. It is little wonder, therefore, that her role only stiffened inter-group rivalry in the area.

Apart from the Local Government unpopular policy against the displaced Tiv teachers, the government persistently refused to reopen all Primary Schools located in Tiv settlements. It could be recalled that as a result of the crisis, all the schools located in Tiv settlements were not reopened, even upon persistent appeals from the affected communities. The table below is a reflection of the schools closed down with other details attached.

Table 11: List of Tiv Primary Schools closed down as a result of the 1991/92 Jukun-Tiv Conflict

S/NO	NAME OF SCHOOL	ENROLMENT	NO. OF STREAMS
1	Amokaha	457	11
2	Ako	188	5
3	Gborbegha	755	19
4	Atsaga-Atsaga	393	10
5	Nyamhina	320	8
6	Ikyernum	416	10
7	Tor-ruam	398	10
8	Tsar	261	7
9	Aben	286	7
10	Ikperen	700	18
11	Ndo Daa	520	13
12	Ashi'tsa	447	11
13	Nger Chia	395	10
14	Agena	303	8
15	Ukande	391	10
16	Demelu	660	17
17	Deke	445	11
18	Abiem	402	10
19	Abako	1,144	29
20	Begha Nyam	594	15
21	Sharegh	666	17
22	Agan	464	12
23	Tse Goson	585	15
24	Va'ayem	680	17
25	Kwaor	558	14
26	Anyam	526	13
27	Igbogodo	343	9
28	Taver	211	5
29	Kine Ka'a	608	15

Source: Condition Survey of Primary Schools: A consultant's Report and Estimates,

al- amin, Sponsored by the Taraba State Government Primary Education Board, Jalingo, October, 1995, vol.4, last chapter.

The same source above gave the details of Primary Schools affected in

Jukun areas as follow:

a
Table 12: List of Primary Schools in Jukun settlements closed down as result of the 1991/92 crisis

S/O	NAME OF SCHOOL	ENROLMENT	NUMBER OF STREAMS
1	Gidan Hamidu	474	12
2	Jebwanji	503	13
3	Jato Wutsu	558	14
N4	Tsiken	562	14
5	Chudan	412	10
6	Gidan Ikwe	385	10

Source: Ibid.

From the details in tables three and four above, in respect to pupil enrolment, the difference is very glaring. It becomes more glaring when we consider the fact that even most of the schools located in Jukun settlements were essentially serviced by Tiv pupils. The schools located in Chudan and Gidan Ikwe experienced more of this characteristic.¹⁰⁵ This leaves no doubt that thousands of Tiv Primary School pupils were affected by the Local Government policy to refuse to reopen these Schools. In many of these areas, many innocent children completely lost the opportunity to continue with their education. Even others who managed to continue with their education after the crisis when some of the schools were reopened in 1997 had to pass through very hard conditions, in addition to the many years lost as a result of the crisis.

It could be recalled that the Local Government partisan attitude in promoting Primary education in the area after the crisis was reported by some Jukun informants. To some of these sources, the “Local Government was non-challant in her efforts to reopen Primary Schools located in Tiv settlements.”¹⁰⁶ Even in areas where some jealous communities made private arrangements to reopen their schools, they were apprehended of operating ‘illegal’ schools. This intimidating attitude compelled some of these jealous communities, like Torruam, to obtain fresh permission from the Ministry of Education to legalize their community or private arrangement. The detail of the point in view is contained in appendix four at the end of the study.

The foregoing analysis reveals an unfortunate development. It clearly shows that what started as an inter-communal rivalry between the Tiv and the

Jukun became centrally coordinated and managed by the Local Government. The involvement of both the Local Government and the Jukun Youth Associations attracted the partisanship, also, of the Tiv Cultural Associations in attempts to defend the right of the Tiv, not only in Wukari, but in the entire Taraba State. Consequently, the series of campaigns, propaganda, claims and counter claims from both communities did not promote inter-ethnic unity in the area.

Comparatively, it was the same approach adopted by the Shiaki government in Takum, as was reported by Lawson. We have already seen the role of Shiaki in making sure that he ran the affairs of Takum Local Government Area as an exclusive Kuteb reserve. Lawson stated how Shiaki's no-nonsense pro-Kuteb policies resulted in abject discrimination against the non-Kuteb, especially the Chamba-Jukun. The active involvement of the Kuteb Yatso of Nigeria (KYN), a Kuteb Cultural Association for the promotion of Kuteb unity in mobilizing the entire Kuteb community to support Shiaki's pro-Kuteb agenda was one of the major issues that complicated the process of inter-group relations in the area. It was the chains of events resulting from this enterprise which increased tension in Kuteb – Chamba – Jukun relationship, a process that was to later produce a bloody inter-ethnic clash between the two groups in Takum in 1992 and 1993.

In the case of Wukari, apart from deliberate Local Government policies hampering the reconciliation process, the activities of both the Jukun and the Tiv youths in prosecuting the aggression left indelible marks in the minds of the two communities. Both groups exhibited high sense of brutality against life and property as opportunities warranted.¹⁰⁷ Both communities raged assaults on each

other's villages; burning houses and property indiscriminately. Here, though the Jukun also suffered losses, the Tiv felt the brunt the more. It is, indeed, an experience many will hardly forget. Houses were destroyed, and people rendered homeless, even months or years after the crisis.¹⁰⁸ Up to the time of this report, many people had not yet recovered from the effect of the 1991/92 aggression, talk less of the 2001/02 conflict. Virtually all Tiv villages in the Local Government were burnt down. In most cases, property were looted before houses were set ablaze, since most people could not remove their valuables as they fled from the Jukun attackers. The details of the Tiv villages destroyed are contained in appendix five at the end of the work.

Even though the Tiv suffered more from the fire rampage, a number of Jukun settlements also fell victim. The most spectacular of the incident was Kente, where substantial amount of life and property fell victim to the raging Tiv attackers. According to Jukun report, both the old and infants were not spared in the brutality of the Tiv assault.¹⁰⁹ Other Jukun settlements that fell victim included Sondi, Riti, Chonku, Arufu and Akwana. There were other unsuccessful attempts to raze down Jukun settlements like Rafin Kada, Gidan Idi, Tsokundi, etc. Even an attempt was made on Wukari; an incident Atohinko reported that the attackers paid dearly for their action.

Generally, the crisis produced a vandalistic culture towards one another. This had a social effect on relationship. In areas where the attacks were severe, and the people suffered great losses, they found it difficult to socialize even many years after the crisis. For instance, in areas like Kente, Tsokundi-Iorshagher axis,

Akwana, and between Wukari and Gidan Idi, the spirit of oneness, and willingness to co-exist, again, was blurred.¹¹⁰ This resulted from the intensify of the crisis on both communities. In the case of Kente where the Jukun were worst hit, many efforts were made to prevent the Tiv from resettling in the area. Among the measures adopted was the afforestation strategy.¹¹¹ This strategy, sanctioned by the Local Government, covered a large expanse of land engulfing many Tiv settlements.

In areas like Rafin Kada, Tsokundi and Mahanga, members of both communities also found it very difficult to co-exist and normalize relationship. The Tiv, in particular, did not want to patronize the Jukun markets as a result of the memories of the conflict. In all these areas, the Tiv attempted to establish their separate markets.¹¹² However, while Tiv attempts both in Iorshagher and Ikyernum in Rafin Kada and Tsokundi Districts, respectively, were frustrated and aborted by the Jukun action, the Tivzua market in Mahanga flourished. Even in the two areas where the attempts were aborted, the Tiv banned, for some time, their communities from patronizing the Jukun markets.¹¹³ This was more severe on the Tsokundi market where the Tiv were not allowed to return for resettlement.

It was the same case with the Jukun and Tiv communities in Akwana and its environs. Both communities did not show much interest to normalize relationship due to some obvious reasons. The Tiv, in particular, complained of harassment from the Jukun. In addition, there were claims of seizure of both some of their farm lands and salt mines; a claim the Jukun never refuted on the ground that the said natural endowments were located within their enclave.¹¹⁴ However,

since the Tiv resisted the claim, and were bent on reclaiming such areas, the disputed areas became spots of frequent clashes between members of the two communities. And in the case of the generality of the Tiv communities along Wukari–Gidan Idi road who were completely evicted, and made to face very difficult conditions, one can only imagine their new perception about the Jukun communities in the area. For refusing to allow the Tiv communities to return, it takes no mental energy to conclude that the Jukun communities in this area had turned their backs on the Tiv.

6.7.2 Amicable Jukun-Tiv Communities in the Post Crisis Period

In the face of the serious disagreement between Tiv and Jukun communities in the post crisis period in the areas mentioned above, there were some exceptional cases. The action of some Tiv and Jukun communities in other parts of the Local Government must be commended. While it was difficult for some areas to normalize relationship, others were quick to mend fences. This was typical of Tiv and Jukun communities in areas like Sondi, Arufu, Rafin Soja, Chonku, Ikyaior, Fyayi, Chia Orabum, to mention but few.¹¹⁵

In all these areas, both Tiv and Jukun sources maintained that even though the initial efforts were difficult, members of the two communities soon swallowed the effects of the crisis to resume normal relationship. What made this possible was the very cordial relationship that characterized the union of these communities in the pre crisis period.¹¹⁶ Thus, while other communities were protesting, resisting and frustrating the attempts by one another to return, these communities readily accepted, and even aided one another in the resettlement process.

We must also emphasize the fact that the action of these communities helped to check the excesses in the action of other communities. Even then, when some communities were compelled to re-socialise they did so with serious reservations, even up to the outbreak of the 2001/2002 hostility. On a general note, it is observed that when communities fight and refused to reintegrate themselves into the system they hitherto belonged, the process of reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction is greatly marred. This is very typical of the Takum case where most Kuteb have, due to their obvious reasons, refused to come back to resettle in Takum town. Apart from the under development this action has brought to bear on the town, inter-ethnic suspicion and hate is heightened. Similarly, in other areas where people return for resettlement, but decide to compartmentalize their quarters, like in the case of Jos and Kaduna after the 2001 and 1993 conflicts respectively, the story is not quite different. This arrangement creates more possibilities for similar occurrences. It is therefore advised that, because no society goes to war or conflict to disintegrate forever, communities involved in conflicts should always learn to swallow the bitter pills of conflict to reintegrate.

6.7.3 Jukun-Tiv Politics in the Post Crisis Period

No matter the positive development in some areas where communities readily reunited, it should be emphasized that the crisis generally heightened the spirit of ethnicity among the Tiv and the Jukun. This consciousness, in turn, nourished the spirit of suspicion and confrontation toward one another. And among other effects, this had a “negative change in the political relationship between the two communities”.¹¹⁷

While other Jukun sources admitted that the crisis resulted in varying degrees of political rivalry between the Tiv and the Jukun, some Tiv sources traced the genesis of the phenomenon to the 1987 Tiv – Hausa political alliance.¹¹⁸ The latter argued that the crisis only added momentum to an already existing political behavior. We have already mentioned that in the 1990 Chairmanship and Councillor elections, the Jukun mobilized themselves to save their ‘land’ from being taken over by the Tiv and the Hausas.

After the 1991/92 crisis, the same spirit was manifested. This time it was more or less to show that they have now dislodge the Tiv and could now monopolize the political scene. This was why in the 1997 Local Government elections, out of the forty eight candidates who contested under the five political parties, only three were Tiv, while the Jukun fielded twenty nine candidates; and with the remaining shared between the Hausas and others of mixed Jukun and Hausa parentage.

Even though one may argue that three Tiv candidates, Chepe A. Stephen (Tsokundi ward), Beene Tsav (Rafin Kada ward) and Marve Joshua (Kente ward) were involved in the 1997 contest,¹¹⁹ their woeful defeat in same presupposed that they did not enjoy the favour of majority of the Jukun electorates. Similarly, the fact that only one non-Jukun candidate emerged victorious presupposed, also, that the Hausas were not a better option to the Jukun at this time. More ever, there is no serious evidence to show that it was the Jukun votes that gave victory to the Hausa candidate, in view of the fact that the Hospital ward where the candidate emerged

is predominantly made up of Hausa communities. The details of the results of the 1997 Councillor Elections are contained in appendix six at the end of the work.

The 1997 election results revealed a crucial issue. That the three dominant political groups in the area, the Jukun, the Tiv and the Hausa, neither agreed with one another nor was there any solid alliance between the Tiv and the Hausas, like before, to still challenge the Jukun in the polls. This of course, accounted for the Jukun victory in nine out of the ten Councillor wards, notwithstanding allegations from the other groups. This development no doubt showed that the Jukun had succeeded in their resolve to get rid of the Tiv and the Hausa threats in their midst. The question asked is, whether politics should continue to be perceived and pursued in the area as a hostile contest between hostile opposing groups?

The consequence of this trend was the manipulation of the Local Government administration in favour of the Jukun to the detriment of not only the Tiv and the Hausa, but must disturbingly to the process of friendly inter-group relations. It is every body's guess what must be the driving force behind any policies that affect, particularly the Tiv, when one considers the fact that the Tiv and the Hausas were pushed aside by the Jukun in an atmosphere of hostile political contest. Needless to even say that these, and among other considerations, accounted for the events that resulted in further Tiv-Jukun aggression. The negative role played by the then incumbent Chairman, Samuel Adda, particularly in relating to the yearnings and aspirations of the Tiv threw further light on the issue under review.

The point to observe is that in any multi-ethnic society, if unity must be attained and sustained, especially after any inter-ethnic conflict, the communities involved must see politics as a canopy under which the diverse groups will jointly pursue objectives. Anything short of this will tantamount to unity eluding the society. For instance, until the whites in South Africa saw politics as a canopy for common function, unity continued to elude that part of Africa. In the same vein, unity eluded the Kuteb and the Chamba-Jukun in Takum when the communities began to perceive and practice politics as a divide where each is involved in a tug of war for selfish and parochial group interest. Many of such examples could be cited in Nigeria and beyond.

In the case of Wukari, the Tiv have always accused the Electoral Commission of deepening political rivalry between them and the Jukun. They anchored their claim on the way and maner the Commission has persistently continued to under enumerate Tiv areas to Jukun advantage. A Tiv political observer alleged, for instance, that “the Commission has always over looked the fact that the Tiv form the majority in the Local Government Area.”¹²⁰ We have already illustrated the objectivity of this claim, time and again, with concrete figures, both in chapters four and six. The Tiv source further blamed the Commission of persistently using the lopsided ward arrangement which always gives the impression that the Tiv settlements are not matured to the status of ward headquarters. Ironically, in most of the ten wards in the Local Government it is the Tiv settlements or population that support and sustain the numerical strength, and otherwise, of the areas. The final results of the 1991 population census in

respect to Wukari Local Government Area presented by the National Population Commission, and marked as appendix 7, reinforce the above claim.

In appendix 7, while the Tiv are exclusively found in one hundred and four localities (106) (areas designated with stars), other Jukun localities like Tsokundi, Rafin Kada, Chinkai, Gidan Idi, Mahanga, Sondi, Akwana, etc. still had some substantial Tiv population clustered in and around. Even in Wukari and its environs, chunks of Tiv population were still found. The preponderance of the Tiv population in the Local Government could also be reinforced in the judgement in favour of the Local Government in respect to the suit filed in objection to the 1991 population census results. It can be recalled that both the Local and the Traditional Councils filed separate suits against the National Population Commission for under enumeration to the figure of 90,375 in the 1991 census exercise.¹²¹ A close look, particularly on the petition by the Local Council, showed that one of the strongest reasons advanced to support the claim was the incident of the 1991/92 Tiv-Jukun conflict. However, for obvious reasons, the Traditional Council decided to avoid mentioning the issue, which by all standards, remained one of the clinching factors both in the submissions and the final judgement. The details of the above petitions are fully contained in appendixes 8 and 9 attached.

The judgement to the suit made the point of emphasis more bare. Out of the thirty eight process items in evidence, in favour of the suit, sixteen were exclusively derived from Tiv localities. The remaining process items were shared between Jukun and Hausa localities as reflected in the Tribunal's judgement attached, and marked as appendix 10. Note that areas marked with stars are

exclusively Tiv settlements. It is of interest to note that, it was on the strength of the evidence above that the census exercise in the Local Government was reviewed. And, most importantly, the review pushed the population figure for the area from 90,375 to 157,170, as reflected in the third column, in the last page of appendix 7

The issue in question is, if the Tiv population could be so important in determining a crucial suit in favour of the Local Government, why has the Local Government council, particularly the Electoral Commission, continued to under represent Tiv settlements in the delimitation of electoral wards and polling boots? The question was even more compelling in the 1997 Chairmanship and Councillorship elections. In these elections, out of the eighty-five polling units in the Local Government Area, only seven were located in the Tiv villages, while sixty eight were located in purely Jukun villages as is reflected in appendix 11. The polling units located in Tiv villages were Beghanyam T.C.G. (in Akwana Ward) Gborbegha, T.C.D. (in Bantaje Ward), Agaku, T. C. L. (in Kente Ward), Ason Primary School, E.B.D (in Rafin Kada Ward) Iorshagh Primary School, E.B.F (in Rafin Kada Ward) and Kyernum, T.C.E. (in Tsokundi Ward).

The point of emphasis advanced by Tiv politicians, in the light of the foregoing evidence, is that the Electoral Commission has continued to remain a strong instrument manipulated by the Jukun to their advantage. In addition, by implication, the Commission, with its lopsided electoral arrangements, has continued to remain one of the major variables that help to stiffen the crack in inter-group relations in the area, particularly between the Tiv and the Jukun.

6.8 CONCLUSION

On a conclusive note, a survey of the events between 1980-1999 shows that the period marked a negative turning point in Tiv-Jukun relationship. Available evidences suggest that the trend was propelled by four major socio-political antecedents. These were the appointment of Simon Iorter Musa in 1981 as Council Chairman, Tiv-Hausa political alliance in 1987, the election of Samuel Tsovini Adda as Council Chairman in 1990 and 1991, and lastly the 1991/92 Tiv-Jukun conflict in the area. The factors responsible for these events are contained in the foregoing discussion in the chapter. Each of the events carried along with it very negative features in respect to Tiv-Jukun relations. The 1991/92 conflict was, however, the event that worsened the already strained relationship. Table 13 summarises what became of Tiv-Jukun relationship in the entire Local Government Area as a result of the conflict.

Table 13: A Tabular Representation of Jukun-Tiv Relationship after the 1991/92 conflict

S/NO	RESPONDENTS TIV/JUKUN	TYPE OF RESPONSES
1.		Very negative change in the relationship between the Tiv and the Jukun.
2	“ “	Negative change in political relationship between the two Communities.
3	“ “	Reluctance to interact again in commercial centres.
4	“ “	Unwillingness to promote laissez-faire attitude toward land use as it used to be the case.
5	“ “	Increased spirit of distrust, suspicion intolerance and hatred toward one another.
6	“ “	Heightened spirit of ethnic consciousness in members of both communities.
7	“ “	Refusal to allow the displaced people, particularly the Tiv Community between Wukari- Gidan Idi road, to return to their Areas.

8	“	“	Discriminatory policies against the Tiv, like non involvement in Local and Traditional administration over a protracted period of time.
9	“	“	Local Government unwillingness to re-engage the displaced Tiv Primary School teachers
10	“	“	Protracted closure of Primary Schools located in Tiv areas.
11.	“	“	Stringent Local Government policy on the return of the displaced Tiv people
12	“	“	. D derogatory, inflammatory or instigating comments on one another.

ENDNOTES

1. Okibe Sunday Agwu, "Inter-group relations between Agila Area of Idoma land and Ngbo Area of Ibo land from pre-ocolonial times to the present day." M.A. History Thesis, University of Jos, Nigeria. 1994, p.95.
2. Lawson Hassan Emmanuel, "The Kuteb, Kpanzu, Chamba peoples of Takum: A study in the history of inter-ethnic relations from 1990 –1993".M.A. History Thesis, University of Jos, Nigeria, 1995, p.108.
3. Avav Ter-rumun, Refugees in own Country: The TivJukun Crisis Alpha Digital Press Ltd., Garki, Abuja, 2002, p.50.
4. Ninyio Samuel Yakubu, "The struggle for Atyap Chieftdom, 1902 to 1995." M.A. History Thesis, University of Jos, Nigeria, 2001.
- 5 MAKPROF/4/31/AR/REP/W/7, op.cit. Also see table II in chapter four.
- 6 MAKPROF/FED/4/1/4377, op.cit. para.4, p.1
7. Shausu Ahur, Interview in November, 2001. The respondent was one of the leading Tiv members in the GNPP in Tsokundi District.
- 8 Ibid.
9. Agbu Luka, Report on Conflict between Jukun and Tiv in Wukari Local Government Area. MAMSER Office, Wukari 1992, p.18. Also see African Concord, 29th October, 1990, "War in Gongola" by Victor Omuabor, p.35.
10. Lawson Hassan Emmanuel, op.cit., p.117.
11. Ibid. p.11.
12. Ninyio Samuel Yakubu, op.cit. p.12.
13. Simon Iorter Musa , op.cit.
14. Avav Ter-rumun and Myegba Mson, op.cit. p.26.
15. Adi Agyo, Interview at Wukari, November, 2001.
16. Adi Atohinko T., Jukun–Tiv Clashes... p.16
17. David Mtuem, op.cit.

18. Simon Awua, Interview, October, 2002.
19. Ibid.
20. African Concord, 29th October, 1990, op.cit.
21. Avav Ter-rumun and Myegba, Mson op.cit. p. 26.
22. Myegba Mson, Interview at Jalingo, March, 1995.
23. Tyobee Angough, Interview at Kyernum, April, 1998.
24. David Mtuem, op.cit.
25. Ninyio Samuel Yakubu, op. cit.
26. Lawson Hassan Emmanuel, op.cit. p.116.
27. Shausu Ahur, op.cit.
28. Ninyio Samuel Yakubu, op.cit.
29. Lawson Hassan Emmanuel, op.cit. p.116.
30. David Tor Ayua, Interview at Kyado, November, 2002.
31. Gambo Adi, Interview at Wukari, January, 2003.
32. Adi Agyo, Interview at Wukari, January, 2003.
33. Bala Angyu, Interview at Wukari, January, 2003.
34. Random interviews with the Jukuns on matters arising from appointments of the Tiv under Wukari ticket. Interviews took place at different places between October and November, 2002.
35. Avav and Myeba, The dream to conquer...p.
36. Atoshi Grace , The story of the Jukun/Tiv crisis why and how they happened? Amune Printing Press Wukari,1993.,p.14
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.

39. Sam Ahmadu, Interview in his house at Safni Quarters, Jalingo, in April, 1995.
40. Simon Angyu and Mike Agbu, Group interview in Simon Angyu's office, Budget Department, Ministry of Finance, Jalingo in March, 1995.
41. Adi Atohinko, T., Interview at Nukkai, Jalingo, June, 1995.
42. Atoshi, Grace op. cit., p.15.
43. Dr. Yusuf Magaji, Interview in his office, Civil Service Commission, Jalingo, March, 1995.
44. Alhaji Shehu Danladi, Interview at Wukari, November, 1998.
45. Angyu Adihinchu, A rejoinder in Curious Democracy Magazine, 3rd April to 6th May, 1989, cited by Avav and Myegba, in op.cit., p.108.
46. Atoshi, Grace op. cit., p.115.
47. Angyu Adihinchu op. cit., p.108.
48. David Tor Ayua, op.cit.,
49. Angyu Adihinchu, op. cit. pp.108-109.
50. David Mtuem, op. cit.
51. Joseph Gbagede, Interview at Jalingo, March 2002.
52. Atoshi Grace , op.cit., p.20.
53. Ibid., p.19.
54. Ibid., P.20.
55. Agbu Luka, op.cit., p.11.
56. Ibid, pp.11-12.
57. Atoshi Grace , op.cit., pp.20-21.
58. Ibid,
59. Samuel T. Adda, in the Analyst Magazine, cited by Avav and Myegba, op.cit., p.14

60. David Tor Ayua, op.cit.
61. Adda Samuel Tsovini, For posterity: The roles of Governor Nyame, others and myself. Target publicity Press, Jos, 1993, introductory page.
62. The air of suspicion around Samuel Tsovini Adda in connection with the origin, management of the 1991/92 Tiv-Jukun crisis, and the peace process in Wukari constrained Governor Jolly T. Nyame to remove Adda from office at the close of 1992. This action was justified on the claim that the Government saw Adda to be part of the entire conflict. See the scope magazine, May 9th – 15th, 1993, cited by Samuel Adda, Op.cit., p.34.
63. Lawson Hassan Emmanuel, op.cit., p.116.
64. Random interviews with Tiv and Jukun sources on the roles of land and politics in the perennial Tiv-Jukun conflict in Wukari. Interviews took place between September to December, 2001.
65. Ihuwe Tseke, Interview.
66. David Mtuem, op.cit.,
67. The Analyst Magazine, vol.6, No.1, 1991, cited by Avav and Myegba, op.cit., p.14.
68. Ibid.
69. Joseph Gbagede, op.cit.,
70. Avav and Myegba, op.cit., p.
71. Sam Ahmadu, op.cit.,
72. Agbu, Luka op.cit., p.17.
73. Tseror Timothy , op.cit., pp.64-65.
74. Andrew Nenshi, Interview at Jalingo, December, 2002.
75. David Mtuem, op.cit.,
76. Ibid.
77. Avav Ter-rumun, op.cit. pp.83-84.

78. Ibid.
79. Eye witness accounts maintained that members of the two communities were almost at each other's throats when Barrister Baba Adi brought a grader to clear the purported land. Even though the exercise was timely halted by the government's counter order, the grader remained on the site for many years. The most important issue is, how the attempted acquisition had negative effect on Tiv-Jukun relation not only in the area, but across the local Government.
80. Lawson Hassan Emmanuel, op. cit. pp.115-116.
81. Random interviews with the Tiv and the Jukuns on the out break of the clash in Nwuban, in Kato Bagha District. The interview took place between November to January, 2001 & 2002 respectively.
82. Atoshi Grace , op.cit. p.53.
83. Tseror Timothy, op.cit., p. 67.
84. John Tseke, op.cit.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
87. Random interviews with the Tiv on the role of Samuel T. Adda in the 1991/92 Tiv-Jukun conflict. The interviews took place between October to November, 2002.
88. Avav and Myegba, op.cit. pp.16 & 23.
89. Random interviews with the Tiv and Jukun on the effects of the 1991/92 conflict. The interviews were conducted in November, 2002.
90. Ivor Feierabends and R.L Feirabend, "Violent consequence of violence", in Violence as Politics, by Herbert Hirsch and Perry David (eds.), New York, Harper and Raaw, 1993, p.48.
91. Japhet, Interview at Wukari, March, 2003.
92. Agyo, Interview at Wukari, March, 2003.
93. Abdul, Interview at Wukari April, 2003.

94. Ibid.
95. Group response from Jukun respondents in a questionnaire randomly served in May, 1997.
96. Ibid.
97. Random oral interviews with the Tiv on the effects of the 1991/92 conflict. The interviews were conducted in March, 2002.
98. Group response from Jukun respondents ...op.cit.
99. Random oral interviews with the Tiv on the role of law enforcement agents in restoring peace, Law and order after the 1991/92 crisis. Interviews were held between February and March, 2002.
100. Hembatsav Panvanger, Oral interview on Tiv efforts to resettle in their areas between Wukari and Gidan Idi. Reports from Tse Anza and Gberindyer maintained that many Tiv who made attempts to return to these areas were physically assaulted, and their houses pulled down by Jukun youths. In some cases, the sources maintained that the victims were forced to pull down their houses on the orders of the Jukun youths. And at Gberindyer, several attempts by Terwase Gberindyer, an Air Force Officer, to bury his father in the area were effectively challenged by combined efforts by the Jukun youths and the Traditional Authority.
101. Group response from Jukun respondents...
102. Ibid.
103. The Scope Magazine, op.cit. p.34.
104. Random and Group oral interviews with affected Tiv Primary School teachers. The interviews took place between October and December, 2001.
105. Random interviews with Tiv/Jukun in and around Ikyaior on pupil enrolment in Chudan Primary School.
106. Group response from Jukun respondents...It is important to add that this type of response, even from the Jukun, was not a surprise because at this time the Local Government was not pretending in her social activities offered to Tiv communities, particular education.
107. Random interviews with Tiv/Jukun on the effects of the 1991/92 conflict. The interviews took place in November, 2002.

108. Random interviews with the Tiv on the issue under review. The interviews took place in November, 2002.
109. Random interviews with the Jukun on Tiv attack on Kente during the 1991/92 conflict.
110. Stephen Akomikyar, in a group interview with the Akomikyar community. The fact was confirmed by some Jukun randomly interviewed. The interviews took place in February, 2003.
- 111 Group interview with the Tiv community at Igbongom. The interview was conducted in February, 2003.
112. Group interview with the Tiv Communities at Iorshagher, Mahanga, Ikyernum and Tivzua. This fact was confirmed in random interviews held with the Jukun at Rafin Kada and Gindin Dorowa. The interviews were conducted between October and November, 2002.
113. Group interviews with the Tiv Communities at Iorshagher and Zegeate. The same view was shared by some Jukun interviewed at Rafin Kada. Interviews took place in November, 2002.
114. Interviews with the Tiv and Jukun communities in and around Akwana on the effects of the 1991/92 conflict. Interviews took place in February, 2003.
115. Random interviews with the Tiv/Jukun in the areas mentioned.
116. Ibid.
117. Group response from Jukun respondents...
118. Ibid.
119. National Electoral Commission of Nigeria, Taraba State, Jalingo 1997 Local Government election results.
120. David Mtuem, op.cit.
121. National population Commission, Taraba State. Jalingo, 1991 Population census on Wukari Local Government

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE PROBLEMS OF RECONCILIATION IN WUKARI LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA 2001-2003

7.1 INTRODUCTION

The 1991/92 Tiv-Jukun crisis had a profound impact on the subsequent relationship between the two ethnic groups. In spite of the efforts made in some areas to rebuild the relationship for better, and to forget the past, the conditions in several other areas remained volatile. Suspicion and distrust of each other in those areas eventually led into very bloody confrontation between 2001 and 2002.

Apparently, therefore, even though the immediate cause of the 2001/02 conflicts was linked to the killing of a Tiv, Iortimin Umande, by some unidentified Fulani grazers on the 13th May 2001, efforts must be made to conceptualize this phenomenon beyond this singular event. Information abound to show that throughout the period after the 1991/92 aggression, relationship between the Tiv and the Jukun, and to some extent, between the Tiv and the Fulani never remained the same. While many Jukun did not welcome the return of the Tiv people, the Fulani, who had occupied the deserted Tiv settlements and farms were not ready to easily relinquish what they considered to have become their grazing lands.

The Tiv reaction to this growing phenomenon signalled the possibility for a recurrent conflict. The Tiv vehemently challenged both claims by the Jukun and the Fulani. The Tiv efforts to reassert their legitimate socio-political status in the area, using all organs and levels of government, including the Mzough U Tiv (Tiv cultural Association), and other related bodies, only deepened the existing crack

between them and the Jukun.¹ The near success the Tiv achieved in this struggle produced series of issues which made the Jukun to be more determined in their resolve not only to frustrate the Tiv agenda, but also to deal with the Tiv threat once and for all.² These parallel and, of course, conflicting struggles made the two ethnic groups to become increasingly intolerable to one another, particularly on the eve of the 2001/2002 conflict.

The dangerous stage the two communities found themselves compelled them to seek allies in preparation for any possible attack.³ This worsened the momentum in the struggle for the attainment of peaceful co-existence pursued by well meaning members of the two groups. While the Jukun accused the Wukari Tiv of bringing in the Benue Tiv into the emerging tension,⁴ the Tiv, on their part, believed that on the eve of the 2001/02 aggression, the Jukun had wooed a lot of allies, like the Alagos in Nassarawa State and the Pindiga Jukun in Gombe State.⁵ Similarly, the Fulani and other satellite Jukun communities in Gassol, Bali and Ibi Local Government Areas in Taraba State were other allies mentioned by the Tiv.

This, and other considerations, explained the Tiv claim that the appearance of the Fulani in the outbreak of the 2001/2002 crisis was merely a mask worn by the Jukun to renew their aggression against the Tiv in the area. This claim was supported by many Fulani sources that tried to explain their role in the outbreak, and the prosecution, of the 2001/2002 aggression.⁶

The decision by the Wukari Traditional Council to accept to coordinate the course for the resuscitation of the birth of the second Jukun kingdom across the country was also, among other factors that suggested that the Fulani were only a

by product in the outbreak and the prosecution of the 2001/2002. For instance, on the 22nd February, 1993, immediately after the 1991/92 Jukun-Tiv conflict, the Jukun Union, Makurdi Branch, presented a strong worded proposal to the Aku Uka of Wukari to lead the process for the birth of the second Jukun kingdom in the country. Among other strategies set out for adoption to actualize their objectives as contained in the forth paragraph, page two, of the Memorandum, were the reinvigoration of the spirit of Jukun nationalism, and to crush all forms of hindrances and opposition by groups, particularly the Tiv. On page three in the second paragraph of the memorandum, it is suggested that the struggle was not to tolerate any forms of apposition as earlier stated. "Then we shall launch the birth of the second Jukun kingdom for national awareness so that any recalcitrant tribe that wants to point an abusive finger at any Jukun village will know that the people (Jukun) are no longer asleep." The entire memorandum can be found in appendix 12 at the end of the study.

Even though there is no official document to show the agreement reached between the Jukun Union and the Wukari Traditional Council to lead the process for the birth of the second Jukun kingdom, events proceeding the dispatch of the said memorandum to the Aku Uka and other Jukun rulers, and eminent Jukun sons, pointed to the non rejection of the proposal by the Wukari Traditional Council. The most notable event was the efforts to resuscitate the former Wukari Federation. Among the strategies adopted to achieve this objective was the general awareness created among the different Jukun and pro Jukun communities that made up the former Wukari Federation. Some of the major highlights of this

agenda were awards to eminent Jukun sons in the former Wukari Federation. These awards were presented to the recipients at Wukari in 1997 by the Aku Uka, in addition to a calendar that bore the picture of Lt. General T. Y. Danjuma (Rtd), as the Abontha of Wukari Federation. By this strategy, some reasonable degree of unity was enforced among the Jukun communities.

The thorny experience the Tiv community had with the entire Jukun community in Wukari Local Government Area pointed to the fact that the Tiv threat and opposition was no longer to be tolerated. The attempt to completely evict the Tiv in some areas, and with the appearance of some pro Jukun communities in same areas, were other possible evidences to show the enforcement of the last paragraph of the Jukun Union memorandum which stated that “And Wukari being the center of all sons and daughters of Jukuns, to back our suggestion land should freely be given to any Jukun sons who comes with ambition of development.” In the same vein, the many claims by the Fulani over some Tiv areas could also be some of the strategies adopted to displace the Tiv. It was this very factor which was to witness the strange appearance of the Fulani into what had been an age long rivalry between the Tiv and the Jukun.

7.2 THE FULANI AND THE IMMEDIATE CAUSE OF THE 2001/2002 CRISIS

To most Tiv and Jukun sources, including non Tiv and non Jukun observers, the Tiv-Fulani clash at Umande village in the Tsokundi District of Wukari Local Government Area was the immediate clinching factor that triggered off the 2001/2002 conflict.⁷ The events that proceeded this clash produced chains of reactions from both the Tiv and the Fulani which were eventually translated into

a full fledged encounter in the Local Government Area. Similarly, the issues and events that built up the momentum for a full fledged encounter were factors that saw the active involvement of the Jukun into the phenomenon.⁸

To many Tiv sources, the involvement of the Fulani in the outbreak of the 2001/2002 conflicts, and the later appearance of the Jukun in same cannot be simplistically explained. Most Tiv sources, like Simon Awua, argued that the sudden involvement of the Fulani in the unfortunate development in the area could be traced to the event of 1991/92 Tiv-Jukun conflict.⁹ Another Tiv source categorically stated, in this connection, that,

In the 1990-92 Jukun-Tiv war, the Jukun made some gains...the Jukun dispossessed the Tiv of some valuable parcels of land. The Fulani were sold some parcels of land along Wukari – Tsokundi road. When some of the Tiv people whose parcels of land were sold to the Fulanis returned to their old homes and farmlands, the Fulanis who had bought these parcels of land began to have problems with their rightful owners, the Tiv... By this, the Jukun succeeded to pitch the Fulanis regarded as age long playmates of the Tiv against their playmates in Wukari Local Government Area.¹⁰

Even though it is very difficult to authenticate the Tiv claim of the sale of some of their parcels of land to the Fulani, what remained difficult to refute is the fact that the entire Tiv community in the Local Government Area was displaced in the course of the 1991/92 conflict. While majority of these communities came back after the crisis, some, especially along Wukari-Gidan Idi road, were denied the right to return by the Jukun communities in the area. In this area, some Jukun allies, like the Etulo, and some Alago elements from Plateau State were given

residential rights on former Tiv settlements. Between Wukari and Tar Orshi area, along Wukari–Takum road, some Bekwara elements from former Ogoja province in present Cross River State were settled as a buffa community to check Tiv incursion on Wukari.¹¹ The Tiv argued that if these communities did not support the Jukun in their struggle against the Tiv, they would not have accepted to extract fortunes out of other's misfortune.

In the case of the Fulani, some Tiv sources argued that even if they did not officially purchase Tiv areas, they felt very comfortable grazing on deserted Tiv areas.¹² This accounted for why even before most Tiv communities returned, the Fulani had occupied, whether legally or illegally, substantial proportions of Tiv farm lands. The initial stiff challenge posed to the returning Tiv communities by the Fulani in the former's attempts to resume normal economic activities in their areas were reasons the Tiv had to accuse the Jukun of leasing out their land to the Fulani. A prominent Tiv source argued, for instance, that,

Disputes between the Fulani grazers and Tiv farmers when brought to the District Head that was alleged to have sold the parcels of land would not receive the attention deserved. The Jukun chiefs were alleged to encourage the Fulanis by assuring them that they should not mind the Tiv farmers, since they, the Tiv, according to the Jukun, have no land in Wukari Local Government Area. This assurance gave the Fulanis the audacity to challenge the Tiv on their farm lands whenever their animals graze into the Tiv farms.¹³

As strong as this Tiv claim sounded, it was refuted with the wave of hand by Jukun sources. Both the Jukun leadership in the District, along side with other Jukun sources, could not accept any such transactions with the Fulani, especially

on Tiv areas.¹⁴ This also invalidated the claim by some Fulani in the District that some lands were sold to them by the District leadership.¹⁵ The Fulani claim could, of course, be construed as a ploy by the Fulani to intimidate the Tiv farmers in order to have free range of grazing activities over what used to be Tiv areas. But the vehemence with which the Fulani pursued this objective threw one into doubt whether any external force did not support the Fulani. It was even the vigor with which the Fulani pursued this objective, almost unchallenged, that produced the conditions that gave confidence to some Fulani herdsmen to kill a Tiv, Iortimin Umande, who challenged their entry into his beniseed farm. As already stated, this singular event became the immediate factor that sparked off the Jukun-Fulani/Tiv aggression in the area, and later to almost the entire southern part of Taraba State.

From the records on ground in relation to the immediate cause of the 2001/2002 conflict, both the Tiv and the Fulani shared the blame. While the law could not exonerate the killing of a Tiv by the Fulani, the same law could not justify the jungle retaliation of the Tiv on the Fulani, during which the entire Fulani community in the District were attacked, resulting in the loss of many lives and property. Even though the Tiv had complained that attacks on them by the Fulani were always not given the due attention by the District leadership, one would have still expected the Tiv to have followed the normal legal procedure other than taken the law into their hands as the Fulani did. The jungle justice on the Fulani was what produced conditions and contradictions that did not only escalate into a full fledge crisis, but also brought in the Jukun in the forefront.

It could also be observed that even if the Tiv would claim that the Fulani were only used by the Jukun to renew their aggression against the Tiv, reports from both the Tiv and the Fulani pointed to the fact that the two communities, held the key to either aborting or implementing the Jukun plan. If the Fulani never killed a Tiv, or even if they did, and the Tiv exercised restraint, the law of moral justice would have convicted the Jukun to the point of refusing to seek another catalyst to lure the Tiv into crisis. Unfortunately, the loopholes that developed in the Tiv-Fulani relationship, especially after the 1991/92 conflict, contaminated all the conditions that would have enabled the two age long playmates to refuse to be used against one another. The killing of a Tiv in cold blood, and the jungle justice on the Fulani community were among issues that brought out this phenomenon more clearly.

Even in the face of this down trend in Tiv-Fulani relationship, many sources, including the Tiv, Jukun and law enforcement agents blamed the Fulani leader, the Ardo, for creating conditions that made it difficult or impossible to avert the possibility for an impending conflict in the area. As much as the Aku, the security agent and the Tiv were out to diffuse tension by the many security meetings held, the Fulani leader refused to sign the peace document that was purported to reconcile the Tiv and the Fulani. According to a Tiv Report, which was corroborated by the Aku, the police and SSS (State Security Service), for instance,

The Security Committee comprising the DPO, SSS Boss and the Mobile Police Officer designed a peace undertaking form to be signed by both parties. While Honourable David Mtuem signed

on behalf of the Tiv, the Ardo declined to sign. In annoyance, the Mobile Police Officer and the SSS Boss left the meeting, saying that it was the Ardo, the leader of the Fulani that was trying to ferment trouble.¹⁶

The Ardo's refusal to sign the peace document and the increasingly suspicious action by the entire Fulani Community in the District were issues that brought fear to bear on the entire District about an impending counter attack by the Fulani. It was true that the Fulani suffered great losses as a result of the Tiv retaliatory attack. Even some Tiv sources frowned at the magnitude of the assault on the Fulani community in the District. Invariably, this was one of the reasons that compelled the Ardo to refuse to sign the peace document. This action however exposed the Ardo of creating conditions that would breach peace in the entire area. It was not even long that rumours began to zoom into the air that the Ardo had begun to raise money to employ mercenaries to handle the Tiv menace. For instance, in his peace meeting with the Tiv and the Fulani, the Aku Uka was reported by the Tiv representative, David Mtuem, of declaring that,

On the 30th May, 2001, the Aku Uka of Wukari called the Tiv, Fulani and Jukun to his palace and addressed all parties in the dispute. He told the meeting that he heard the rumours of the Fulani collecting money to hire warriors from Niger to fight the Tiv, but that he would not want such a thing to happen in his domain.¹⁷

This Tiv claim was confirmed by the Wukari Traditional Council, particularly about the tireless efforts made by the Aku Uka to forestall peace in his domain.¹⁸ We must not only commend the Aku Uka for openly condemning the Fulani plan, but also ascribe credit to him for making efforts to keep off his kith and kins, the

Jukun, from the Fulani agenda. Unfortunately, all his fears came to pass. The Fulani neither stopped the attack on the Tiv nor did the Jukun keep off from the entire episode. Even the different strange faces that appeared on the Fulani side in the crisis indicated that the rumours about the possible use of mercenaries were after all not just rumours but stark realities. And since this crisis, other crises, particularly in the Middle Belt, like in Plateau and Nassarawa States, have always employed the full participation of soldiers of fortune from those poor African countries like Niger, Chad, etc that have such regular bandits.

7.3 THE OUT BREAK OF THE 2001/2002 CRISIS AND THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE JUKUN

The Fulani retaliatory attack on the Tiv settlement of Zegeate on 23rd June, 2001, in Tsokundi District was the event that triggered off the 2001/2002 crisis. The attack, supposedly led by the Fulani, left eight people murdered in cold blood. This confirmed the fears in the minds of the Tiv and the Jukun leadership about an impending counter attack by the Fulani. The panic created among the Tiv as a result of this incident was of equal magnitude with the Tiv counter reaction against the Fulani for the murder of Iortimin Umande.

Both Tiv and Jukun sources contended that the attack on Zegeate produced chains of reactions and issues, which prepared ground for wide scale offensive.¹⁹ Following this attack, women, children and the old were evacuated by the Tiv to either neighbouring Local Government Areas in Benue State or Taraba State. The speed with which this was done created further suspicion in the minds of every body that a counter offensive by the Tiv would come very soon. This action alerted Tiv communities in other Districts in the Local Government Area, who either

evacuated the weak among them or remained, but were vigilant in anticipation of possible conflict.²⁰

The general State of insecurity created by the relocation of Tiv communities, particularly from the Tsokundi District, compelled the law enforcement agents, the Aku Uka and, later, the Governor of the State, Reverend Jolly T. Nyame, to initiate peace meetings between the Tiv–Fulani and the Jukun. Unfortunately, all these efforts yielded no positive dividend, since the atmosphere was already over charged.

As the relationship between the Tiv and the Fulani continued to worsen, the Tiv began to suspect the Jukun of covertly supporting the Fulani. This was particularly in the Tsokundi District where the bulk of the Fulani elements who remained in the District took refuge. But one could argue, however, that in any conflict situation, there is always a place for refuge. At any rate, we must also understand that in any conflict, communities always ran to those who sympathize with them; and, in some cases, those who could render adequate help. This same fact had continued to be used to explain the common practice among the Wukari Tiv for always taking refuge in Benue State, where the bulk of the Tiv people reside. Even the claim that some attacks on the Jukun during Jukun-Tiv conflicts were always initiated and coordinated in Benue cannot be easily waved away.

It was on the basis of the foregoing consideration that the Tiv accused the Jukun in Tsokundi District of taking side with the Fulani to launch attacks on them. We have earlier mentioned that following the Tiv attack on the Fulani, and the latter's counter offensive, the entire Fulani elements who remained in the

District took refuge at Tsokundi. It was even as a result of this consideration that the Tiv maintained that some Jukun elements were among the Fulani attackers on Zegeate.

The Tiv suspicion of the Jukun for their involvement in the Zegeate attack was one of the factors that later brought in the full participation of the Jukun in the entire episode. While the Tiv openly accused the Jukun of hosting the Fulani, and coordinating their attacks on the Tiv,²¹ the Jukun, on their part, accused the Tiv of physically attacking and eliminating some of their members.²² These claims were not easily or convincingly refuted by both parties. The most outstanding of the Tiv claim was in respect to the attack on Ikyaior, one of the biggest Tiv settlements along Wukari–Akwana road, on the 5th September 2001. For instance, one of the major Tiv Reports on the attack categorically declared that,

On this day very early at about 5.00 a.m, the inhabitants of Ikyaior were waken up by the sound of gunshots. This was an attack on their village by a combined team of Jukun and Fulani that left thirteen people dead, many wounded and the whole village burnt down.²³

The attack on Ikyaior revealed very crucial issues in the spirit of mounting tension in the area. That the Fulani were bent on avenging any act of aggression against their members by the Tiv. It could be recalled that following the killing of David Mtuem's wife, Mary, during the Zegeate attack, some of her relatives at Ikyaior attacked the Fulani community in the area.²⁴ It was, therefore, partly, in reaction to the attack that Ikyaior became the second Tiv settlement in the Local Government Area to fall victim to Fulani attack. Similarly, the Tiv could no longer hide their feelings about the role of the Jukun in the entire phenomenon. Some

members of the settlement who survived the attack argued that they literally identified some Jukun elements among the Fulani attackers. Some of these Tiv sources maintained that this discovery unveiled the mystery about the Jukun involvement in the entire episode. More so, the numerous Fulani camps around Wukari metropolis, and other Jukun settlements, were some other instances the Tiv used to build up their claim. If the Benue Tiv were accused of helping the Wukari Tiv to fight the Jukun on the ground that they always accommodated them in times of crisis, what, then, exonerated the Jukun from similar accusations for accommodating the Fulani.

The many issues uncovered in the Ikyaior attack, and the level of aggression exerted on the Tiv community in the episode, were clear signals to the formal outbreak of hostility between the Tiv and Fulani-Jukun blocs in the Local Government Area²⁵. The brutal murder of innocent people informed the generality of the Tiv community in the area about the state of their insecurity. Already, they had confirmed the involvement of the Jukun in the phenomenon.

Even though Jukun sources refuted this claim, the suspicion already created in the Tiv about the Jukun role compelled the Tiv community in the area to begin mass exodus into Benue State, and other surrounding Local Government Areas in Taraba, like Donga, Takum, Gassol and Bali. Within shortest time, almost the entire Tiv community in the area was evacuated, leaving behind some youths, who did not even possess the military capability to face the combined forces mounted by the Fulani, Jukun, and with some hired soldiers of fortune as hangers on.²⁶

The mass exodus of the Tiv people from Wukari was a strong flash point that suggested the possibility for a wider-scale aggression in the entire Local Government Area. Similarly, the strong accusation levelled on the Jukun by the Tiv, which they could not convincingly defend, also clearly suggested that in the event of the outbreak, the Jukun and the Fulani would join forces against the Tiv. And it was not long that this became a reality. It is argued that if the burnings of deserted Tiv villages never began, the Tiv would have eventually come back, and peace restored. The reverse was, however, the case. There was spontaneous burning of deserted Tiv settlements. This unfortunate development forced out the remaining Tiv communities who remained, mostly in hiding, in anticipation for the eventual restoration of peace and normalcy. Thus, the crisis formally began.

It is relevant to stress at this junction that where people allow the culture of violence or suspicion and intolerance to becloud their relationship, even very trivial issues could ignite open aggression. This is more so when suspicion and spontaneous friction increasingly become the order of the day in the way and manner the people relate to one another. It was similar situations that produced the Hutu/Tutsi genocide war in Rwanda in 1994; the Zangon-Katab Hausa-Fulani/Atyaps clash in 1992, the Kuteb/Jukun-Chamba clash in Takum in 1993; the Itsekiri/Ijaw aggression; the perennial inter-group violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo; the age long Israeli/Palestinian hostility in the Middle East; and a host of others. Even the then racial conflict in the then Apartheid South Africa cannot be easily forgotten. Of importance to note, also, is the fact that the level of suspicion and intolerance, as well as the size and communities involved in

all such conflicts normally determine the magnitude and the course of conflicts. This brings out the relevance to try to look at the magnitude and the course of the Jukun-Fulani/Tiv violence in Wukari Local Government Area in 2001/2002.

7.4 THE COURSE OF THE 2001/2002 JUKUN-FULANI/TIV CONFLICT

The eventual involvement of the Jukun in the clash between the Tiv and the Fulani in the Tsokundi and Chonku Districts in the Local Government Area determined the magnitude and the course of the conflict. The sudden appearance of the Jukun in the conflict was not a surprise, since relationship between the Tiv and the Jukun became fragile after the 1991/92 conflict.²⁷ As stated elsewhere, efforts by some Tiv and Jukun communities in the area to rebuild peaceful relationship could not yield the desired result due to the unwillingness of some members of these communities to forgive one another. It was even this factor which made the Tiv to easily accuse the Jukun of involvement in their clash with the Fulani.

The appearance of the Jukun in the conflict indicated that the clash had become a Local Government affair. This resulted from the fact that both communities co-existed in all the districts in the Local government Area. And on the basis of the already charged atmosphere between the Tiv and the Jukun, the conflict that ensued at Zegeate on 23rd June 2001, soon engulfed the entire Local Government Area. After the attack on Zegeate and Ikyernum on the same day, several Tiv villages in the District were burnt down in successive days.²⁸ The flames soon engulfed Tiv villages in neighboring Rafin Kada District.

To be noted, also, is the fact that as the burning and attacks on Tiv villages in the Tsokundi and Rafin Kada Districts precipitated, the Tiv communities in

other Districts like Chonku, Kente and Rafin Soja continued to flee.²⁹ This accounted for the swift displacement of the entire Tiv communities in the area. Infact, in most of the villages burnt, less lives, other than property, fell victim, since most villages were deserted before the burnings took place. Between 23rd June, 2001, when Zegeate was attacked, to 10th October, 2001, virtually all Tiv villages in Wukari had been razed down by fire, with lives and property falling victim, and with hundreds of thousands of people displaced. Appendix 13 presents a more detailed understanding of the course of the conflict, and its effects on life and property, including the number of Tiv people displaced in the course of the conflict.

It is obvious that some of the facts presented in the Memorandum could have been exaggerated, as some Jukun sources observed.³⁰ This fabrication covered mostly the effect on property and the number of people claimed to have been displaced. Many efforts were made to confirm the statistics raised in respect to lives lost. And in the areas visited, the claims were easily confirmed, since the document supplied names of deceased. However, statistics in respect to property and the number of people displaced were not satisfactorily verified. On the whole, however, whether the document suffered from fabrication, due to obvious socio-political and economic reasons, it supplied very useful inputs in our imagination about the levels of destruction to life and property, and the number of people displaced as a result of the crisis.

The Jukun equally suffered some losses. However, the loss, both in lives and property, were comparatively low. The basic explanation to this was the fact

that the crisis was taken deeper into the Tiv camp than to the Jukun. It is even over flogging the issue to say that the Jukun had the upper hand in the conflict. The only notable Jukun settlements burnt down by the Tiv were Akwana, Kente, Chonku, Arufu and part of Chinkai. Even in these sporadic Tiv attacks, less lives fell victim, since most Jukun had already vacated these areas due to their proximity to Tiv areas.

The area the Jukun equally suffered much was the number of refugees that flooded, particularly Wukari, the Jukun headquarter. Thousands of Jukun fled Jukun settlements like Akwana, Kente, Chonku, Rafin Soja, Nwoko, Fyayi, Arufu, Riti, Sondi, Gidan Igba, Tsokundi, Kinda Shanni, Byepita, etc, to take refuge at Wukari.³¹ It was not possible to arrive at rough estimates, as in the case of the Tiv, since most Jukun sources could not attempt giving precise estimates, apart from the claims that “many people lost their lives, and thousands of people displaced, and with great losses in property.”³² In fact, throughout the crisis period, and even months after the crisis, Wukari was flooded with thousands of displaced Jukun, including many Fulani communities, most who depended largely on relief materials supplied by the local, state and Federal Governments. Unfortunately, these efforts by the three levels of government, including philanthropist organizations and individuals within and without were very far-in-between to meet the required need as a result of the great number of people displaced in the course of the crisis.

7.5 THE CRISIS AND JUKUN-TIV RELATIONS IN 2002.

It is certain that both the Tiv and Jukun, including the Fulani, suffered great losses ranging from human to materials resources. Both Tiv and Jukun sources contended that the legacy associated with this unfortunate development cannot be easily forgotten by both communities.³³ Among other more serious effects was the great damage done to relationship, especially in the first year after the crisis.

Considering the great damage done to relationship in the first year after the crisis, many Tiv and Jukun sources, particularly those who sounded like prophets of doom, maintained that the damage is significantly indelible.³⁴ For instance, such Jukun sources like Agyo asserted that,

The level of hatred and suspicion became deepened. The two tribes look at each other with even morbid hatred. The Tiv, in particular, are unlikely to trust the Jukuns because of the level of loss they suffered during the crisis. It seems crisis cannot be ruled out permanently between the two tribes.... As for crisis-free future, I am not God to guarantee it, but from what have been going on over the years, it will take a miracle to avoid crisis.³⁵

Other Jukun sources like Japhet reinforced Agyo's pessimism, reaffirming that "the 2001/2002 crisis worsened the already marred Jukun-Tiv relations due to the 1991/1992 crisis".³⁶ And for future anticipation in the relationship, Japhet asserted that "the way things seem to have been going between the two tribes over the years, it is difficult to say no crisis would come up again".³⁷

Adding more ingredients to Agyo and Japhet's narrow-gauged assessment, Abdul lamented that,

The 2001/2002 crisis was more devastating than the 1991/92 crisis. The level of fear and suspicion it caused is such that no Tiv man will feel safe if found alone in a secluded place or bush among the Jukuns. The reverse is also true. As it is now, the Tiv would prefer to relate to other tribes other than the Jukun.³⁸

The same source went further to postulate that,

Absolutely, crisis-free relationship cannot be guaranteed, even though both tribes may not be praying for one. It is the work of Satan to shed blood and destroy property. But it seems both tribes have not been able to resist this temptation over the years. We keep praying for peace.³⁹

Other Jukun sources, like Jarumi, joined the prophets of doom to also assert that,

The 2001/2002 crisis again messed up; the repaired relationship between Tiv and Jukun after the 1991/92 crisis. It should be expected that serious distrust and suspicion would continue to exist between the two tribes. Except if a prolonged period of peace, may be over twenty years, exists among the two tribes, it will take only God for the two tribes to trust each other...⁴⁰

As pessimistic as the Jukun sources sounded, most Tiv sources interviewed emphatically re-echoed the Jukun position.⁴¹ Many of the Tiv sources could not imagine any period when the Tiv, again, will co-operate with the Jukun. But the point of error in both the Tiv and the Jukun analyses of the situation are premised on the understanding that both perceived situations in the context of an unchanging phenomenon. Each was guided by the atmosphere of morbid hatred created for one another as a result of the crisis. It is no doubt most likely that looking at the situation in the first few months after the crisis, many surfaced observers were bound to believe that things had fallen apart, and that the center could no longer

hold together forever. For instance, the following are summaries of nine responses from written/oral interviews held with 19 Jukun and 19 Tiv respondents.

1. The crisis aggravated the already fragile relationship between the Tiv and the Jukun.
2. The crisis had more devastating effect on relationship than the 1991/92 crisis.
3. It resulted in the drastic change in positive conception about one another.
4. It created a situation of highly inflammatory comments on one another.
5. It produced the type of relationship characterized by fear, suspicion, intimidation, insecurity and lack of trust for one another.
6. The level of disregard for life and property during the crisis created the situation in which it will be very difficult to rebuild the spirit of trust and confidence towards one another.
7. The youths from both groups were more furious about the conduct of one another, and are seemingly more unwilling to co-exist, again, without ill feeling towards one another.
8. While some Wukari Tiv are reluctant to return, not all Jukuns welcomed the return of the Tiv in virtually all areas of the Local Government Area.
9. Unwillingness of the Traditional and Local Government Authorities to reabsorb the Tiv in the system without conditions.

These responses were determined by the highly in human culture that characterized the prosecution of the 2001/2002 crisis. In fact, there had been no other conflicts in the history of the area between the Tiv and the Jukun which manifested gross abuse for life and property like the one under review. There are abundant evidences to show that where warring parties grossly abuse life and property, the process of reconciliation and rehabilitation always suffers great set back. It was the same situation during the Hutu-Tutsi genocide war, the Israeli-

Palestinian age long crisis, the Hausa-Fulani and the Atyap conflict in Zango-Katab, the Jukun-Chamba and the Kuteb inter-ethnic conflict in Takum, the Ijaw/Itsekini violence in Delta State, etc.

A similar effect was observed in Wukari immediately after the crisis. It was difficult, as already stated, for many Tiv and Jukun to foresee any hope for peace between the Tiv and the Jukun. In other words, up to the fourth quarter of 2002, the possibility of peace existing between the two ethnic groups was highly unpredictable. Many Jukun sources argued that the involvement of, particularly the Federal Government in the whole phenomenon was what marred the possibility for the attainment of an immediate peaceful co-existence.⁴² Most of these sources maintained that the Federal Government action in imposing on the Local Government the return and resettlement of the Tiv was hastily done, and in the wrong direction. One of such sources asserted that “It was wrong for the Federal Government to bring back the Tiv without confiding with the Jukun leadership on the modality for the return and resettlement.”⁴³

These, and other considerations, were some of the factors that made the Jukun to be very unco-operative with the Federal Government Tiv Resettlement Scheme. In areas like Wukari-Rafin Soja, Wukari-Akwana, Wukari-Chediya, etc., the Tiv suffered serious rejection from the Jukun, especially in the first few months after the Tiv were returned. In Tiv settlements like Abagye, in Chediya; and Toho Abanyo, in Rafin Soja, the Jukun communities of Nakambo and Adikan displaced the Tiv respectively. The table shows some of the areas that put up stiff

resistance to the Federal Government Tiv Resettlement Scheme. The table brings out the type of reactions in each area.

Table 14 Tabular representation of some Jukun communities that resisted Federal Government Tiv Resettlement Scheme.

S/NO	AREA	NATURE OF REACTION
1.	Akwana	<p>Very un-o-operative attitude towards the Tiv.</p> <p>Seizure of some Tiv Salt mines and farmlands.</p> <p>Inflammatory comments on one another.</p> <p>Unwillingness to patronize each other's commercial centers.</p> <p>Unwillingness to co-exist with the Tiv.</p>
2.	Kente	<p>Jukun afforestation scheme across Tiv Settlements like Tse Jabo, Tse Ucha, Tse Annor, Tse Mbaakaa, Tse Muekuna, Tse Amenger, Tse Gum Igo, Sontyo, and others.</p> <p>Unwillingness to attend each other's markets.</p> <p>Inflammatory comments on one another.</p> <p>Unwillingness to co-exist with the Tiv.</p>
3.	Rafin Soja	<p>Allocation of original Tiv compounds and areas to non-Tiv, like the Etulo.</p> <p>Ban on Tiv returnees to farm any area until told to do so.</p> <p>Displacement of the entire Tiv settlement of Toho Abanyo by the Jukun settlement of Adikan hither to located inlands.</p> <p>Abusive comments on the Tiv.</p>

Several threats on returnees, as well as physical assaults on some of them.

Unwillingness to accommodate the Tiv by the Hausa and Jukun leadership in the area.

- 4 Chediya/Akomikyar and Mahanga. Ban on all Tiv from farming any area until allowed to do so.

A special ban on the Tiv community at Ugber Jembe from making more than one round hut for accommodation. This was enforced for a while, irrespective of the sizes of families.

Undue levies on Tiv in Chediya market.

The displacement of the Tiv settlement of Abagye by the Jukun settlement of Nakambo hither to located in land.

Abusive comments on the Tiv.

NB. The stiff opposition suffered by the Tiv community in this area from the Hausa/Jukun leadership compelled the Tiv to Petition to the state Governor, as reflected in Appendix 14.

Source: Information derived from field visits to the affected areas.

Even in the face of stiff opposition from the Jukun in the aforementioned areas, there were some areas the Tiv were warmly received. In others, even though the initial reaction was not cordial, the situation did not degenerate to morbid hatred, especially in the first few months of resettlement. The Table II below contains the details of the report.

Table 15: Tabular Representation of Jukun Areas That did not give stiff resistance to the Tiv on their return in 2002.

S/NO	AREA	NATURE OF REACTION
1	Adakenjo	<p data-bbox="703 470 1325 499">Very co-operative attitude towards Tiv returnees</p> <p data-bbox="703 541 1414 611">Very sympathetic to the Tiv for the bitter experiences of the crisis.</p> <p data-bbox="703 653 1414 751">Supply of relief materials like foodstuff, soap and, even seedlings, mostly grains, to the Tiv to be able to begin life.</p> <p data-bbox="703 800 1414 869">Freedom for free range of socio-economic activities to Tiv returnees.</p>
2	Sondi/Gidan Igba and Fyayi	<p data-bbox="703 911 1414 980">Both the leadership and their subjects in these two Jukun settlements warmly received Tiv returnees.</p> <p data-bbox="703 1022 1414 1121">The Jukun communities officially met with the Tiv to welcome them and condoled them over the crisis experiences.</p> <p data-bbox="703 1163 1414 1232">Some relief materials, like foodstuffs, were given to some Tiv returnees.</p> <p data-bbox="703 1274 1414 1415">These two communities condemned any act of aggression or inflammatory comments on the Tiv by some Jukun, particularly those in Riti, who were very un-o-operative to the Tiv.</p> <p data-bbox="703 1457 1414 1556">Apart from maintaining cordial relationship, they employed every avenue to ensure that general peace between the Tiv and the Jukun was restored.</p> <p data-bbox="703 1604 1414 1673">Some Jukun even helped the Tiv to erect new houses for accommodation.</p> <p data-bbox="703 1715 1414 1814">Quick resumption of cordial interaction in socio-commercial activities. Both communities freely patronized each other's commercial centers.</p> <p data-bbox="703 1862 1414 1961">NB. The cordial ties between the Tiv and the Jukun communities in Sondi and Gidan Igba became one of the major sources of strife between the Sondi and Riti</p>

- 3 Arufu Jukun.
The Tiv community near Arufu, particularly Anyiin, warmly received Jukun returnees.
- The Tiv community condoled the Jukun community over the crisis experience.
- The two communities were quick to resume normal relationship. Both patronized each other's commercial centers.
- No inflammatory comments on one another.
- 4 Tsokundi The Tiv community was warmly received by the Jukun leadership and its subjects.
Tiv returnees were hosted at Tsokundi, the District Headquarters, for some days before they began to relocate to their respective areas.
- The Jukun leadership even sympathized with the Tiv community over their bitter experiences in the crisis.
- The Tiv were quick to begin to patronize the Jukun market at Tsokundi.
- NB. The only notable problem in this area remained the rivalry between David Mtuem and the Jukun community over his alleged role in the conflict, and other socio-political skirmishes between the Tiv and the Jukun in the area. It could be recalled that over two years, David was denied the right to bury his wife, Mary, who was killed during the Zegeate attack. Even as much as the rivalry between David and the Jukun community deepened, the Jukun perceived it more or less as a personal rivalry between David, as a person, and the Jukun.
- 5 Rafin Kada Even though there were some initial negative reactions from the Jukun, and both communities had negative comments on one another, the situation did not degenerate to any significant hostility as was the case in some area. The Tiv still patronized the Jukun market at Rafin Kada. Generally, however, the relationship was affected.

Source: Written and oral interviews with the Tiv and Jukun communities in the affected areas.

7.6 JUKUN-TIV RELATIONS AFTER 2003

The above tables show that the Federal Government Tiv Resettlement scheme in April, 2002, received cold reaction from the Jukun community. The decision by the Federal Government to over look the Jukun leadership in the entire exercise was also welcomed in bad fate. These, and other factors, affected the way and manner the Jukun community and its leadership related to Tiv returnees. Findings across the Local Government Area showed that this development affected relationship between the Tiv and the Jukun, especially for the rest of 2002.⁴⁴ However, while in some areas, the Jukun communities were bent on frustrating the returnees, as the tables above show, in some places, the Jukun communities welcomed the Tiv, and began normal life with one another.⁴⁵ Generally, however, the Jukun community and its leadership had lots of things to consider before taking decision on how to relate to the entire peace and resettlement scheme.⁴⁶ It was, therefore, issues arising from the period of passivity on the part of the Jukun leadership which made many Jukun and Tiv pessimists to arrive at theories of pessimism about the anticipated post-crisis Jukun-Tiv relationship.

The period between 2003 and 2004 remained a period of significant change of attitude on the part of the Jukun leadership in its role in the peace and resettlement programme. From the culture of passivism, the leadership became fully involved in the entire process. The positive role now assumed by the Jukun leadership influenced the general Jukun attitude towards the Tiv.⁴⁷ And, among other effects, even in areas where the Tiv initially faced stiff opposition, the Jukun

began to relax their conditions. Similarly, more individuals and other organizations, including the Christian bodies, began to emerge in the race for the attainment of lasting peace in the Local Government Areas, as well as between the generality of the Tiv and the Jukun wherever they find themselves.

Even before these frantic efforts in 2003, by the close of 2002, most Tiv and Jukun pessimists began to rethink their theories. The prophets of doom, led by Agyo, began to see their fears fast weaning away, in rationalization of the popular adage that “No condition is permanent”. And to those like Japhet and Jarumi, the miracles they perceived to be the only panacea for the downtrend in Tiv-Jukun relationship started to take place. In many areas across the Local Government, Tiv-Jukun relationship was fast assuming its normal shape. This positive development was attributed to a number of factors.

1. There was a corresponding increase in the willingness to forgive and tolerate one another. This resulted from the readiness to over look the bitter experiences both communities, particularly the Tiv, encountered during the crisis.
2. Readiness to seek compromise, especially on the part of the Tiv, without necessarily depending on the Federal might. It could be recalled that in April, 2002, the Federal Government took it upon herself to return all the displaced Tiv people. Consequently, while the Tiv counted so much on the Federal might to regain their socio-economic rights and privileges in the area, the Jukun community, particularly its leadership, was bent on frustrating the Tiv hopes and aspirations. And, in most areas in the Local Government, the Jukun action

towards the Tiv made the latter to disregard the former in their efforts to achieve objectives. This trend produced more frictual relationship. However, some Tiv communities were soon to realize the need to make internal negotiations with the Jukun communities for peaceful co-existence. By the turn of 2003, most Tiv communities who understood, and adopted this approach, began to enjoy co-operation from their Jukun counterparts. Unfortunately, some Tiv elements who preferred to keep distance from the Jukun accused such Tiv communities of compromising with the Jukun. But this proved to be the most possible immediate approach to seek and obtain certain basic opportunities to begin new life in the area.

3. The active involvement of, particularly, the Traditional and Local Authorities in an aggressive peace process. This was evident by the constitution of “Implementation Committee on Tiv/Jukun Peace Process, Wukari Chapter”. This important committee drew membership from both the Tiv and the Jukun. While the Jukun had six members, and enjoyed the posts of the Chairman and Secretary, the Tiv had only three members, and with only the post of the Vice Chairman conceded to them. It should be stated that this lopsided arrangement was what made many Tiv to criticize the activities of the Committee. It is, however, one’s contention that other than rigidly dwelling so much on the inbalance, both in the membership and the sharing of posts, we have to commend the efforts of the Local Government for seeing the need to initiate such an official peace process.

Since its constitution in 2003, the Committee has embarked on aggressive peace tours and awareness programmes to reunite the Tiv and the Jukun. It has helped, and is still helping, to provide official avenues for the Tiv communities to channel their grievances for the purpose of achieving meaningful results. Still, one wishes to state that many Tiv feel reluctant to approach this Committee on the ground that it is dominated by the Jukun. It is one's earnest advice that such discontented individuals should eschew bitterness to fully put the committee on course. Appendixes 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19 give the details of the membership of the Peace Implementation Committee, its terms of reference and its activities since its inauguration.

We must commend the efforts of the Local Government in sustaining the activities of the Committee, active involvement in the peace process by Traditional rulers, elders; political, Church, Community and youth leaders from the Jukun and Tiv Communities in Taraba and Benue States. This process was initiated and coordinated by the Peace, Justice, and Reconciliation Committee of the Reformed Ecumenical Council, of Nigeria (RECON), assisted by the Christians Reformed Church of North America, and facilitated by Professor Hizkias Assefa of the Africa Peace Building and Reconciliation Network. Efforts made so far by this Christian body in organizing series of consultations and workshops on peace and reconciliation among the Tiv and Jukun across Tiv land, and in Wukari in particular, are highly commendable. Many Church leaders and members have since imbibed this culture, and are fast working towards actualizing the desired objectives.

Similarly, through the activities of this Committee, traditional rulers, elders, political and youth leaders are adequately conscientised on the need for peaceful co-existence. The working document produced by the Committee, and presented as appendix 20, captioned, “Jalingo Resolution on Peace and Reconciliation between the Jukun and Tiv in Taraba State, Nigeria, is an earnest manifestation of the Committee’s resolve to restore peace and unity between the Tiv and the Jukun. Even though this document was dishonoured by the Tiv Traditional Council and the Mzough U Tiv,⁴⁸ both in Taraba and Tiv land, on the basis of some felt lapses over some of its resolutions, and also on the ground that the case is being handled by the International Arbitration Panel, one tends to contend that the document, if followed to its logical mainstream, provides more workable resolutions. Rather than dwelling so much on the lapses in some of the resolutions, it is one’s contention that an internal problem is more effectively resolved internally by the parties involved than through the instrumentality of an external body. Where the parties involved in disputes unanimously arrive at resolutions, each tries to stand by its words. And for now, the above document, and the Local Government Peace Committee, are the only available internal instruments geared towards the attainment of more lasting peace in the area. The process of awareness initiated and coordinated by these organs have gone along way to making some Tiv and Jukun to reconsider their conception about one another for the purpose of re-establishing more lasting brotherly relationship.

4. The Local Government attitude towards the displaced Tiv staff, particularly in the Educational Department. It could be recalled that after the 1991/92

crisis, it took more than six years before the displaced Tiv staff in the local Government service were reluctantly reabsorbed. It also took the same number of years for primary schools located in Tiv settlements to be reopened. This attitude widened the gap between the two ethnic groups. The persistent struggles by the affected staff, and communities, deepened the crack. But the reverse was the case after the 2001/2002 crisis. It took barely only one year for Tiv staff to be reengaged in the local Government pay roll, and for primary schools located in Tiv settlements to be reopened. This facilitated the process of meaningful interaction between the Tiv and the Jukun. More so, this quick positive action from the local Government added impetus to the factors that made the Tiv to begin to forget their bitter experiences during the crisis. The hope for a better future compelled them to begin to reach some compromises with the Jukun. We must, also commend the same Jukun communities for providing conditions for this positive development to be on course.

5. The active involvement of the Federal Government in the Tiv Resettlement Scheme. It could be recalled that the crisis displaced the entire Tiv communities in Wukari, Ibi; and in greater parts of Ardo Kola, Donga and Bali Local Government Areas of Taraba State. The gross abuse of life and property by both sides created great fears into, particularly the Tiv people, from returning to their respective areas. In Wukari Local Government Area where the crisis started, and which has remained the place where conflicts always erupted between the Tiv and the Jukun, the possibility of the Tiv

returning immediately was very remote. In some areas, the likelihood for the Tiv to return was not even visible. The quick intervention of the Federal Government in the entire Tiv Resettlement Scheme reversed these fears. Even in many areas where the Tiv would have been killed at sight, especially at the time they were returned, the Jukun communities could not manifest this level of bitterness. While areas that readily accepted the Tiv, as our previous tables showed, remained calm, others that still manifested morbid hatred were forced to maintain an atmosphere of an uneasy calm. Insults, inflammatory comments and physical assaults on some Tiv communities, alone, did not prevent the Tiv from remaining.

It is on this basis that many maintained that the action by the Federal Government had major positive effects in helping to reconcile the Tiv and the Jukun. For one, it threw the Federal might on the Jukun to accept the Tiv, and to begin the process of reconciliation and resettlement. Among other effects, it compelled the Local and Traditional Authorities to be actively involved in the peace process, especially at a time one would have expected these two organs of government to be either very indifferent or highly partisan, as was evident after the 1991/92 crisis. It is one's contention that the timely intervention by the Federal Government did not only prevent the crack from deepening, beyond repair, but also provided timely conditions that enabled the two communities to begin to interact for the purpose of attaining more meaningful peace, the very negative reactions from some communities at the initial stage notwithstanding.

6. The eventual disabuse of the minds of members of both communities from

inflammatory comments on one another, and over politicizing the entire phenomenon. It is normal that in crises of this nature many people become very emotional in relating to one another. In most cases, this marred the peace, reconciliation and rehabilitation process. But such a phenomenon does not always persist forever. At any rate, the degree to which this is attained within given time frame is dependent on the ability, and willingness, of the rival communities to accommodate one another.

In the case of the Tiv and the Jukun, even though it was not easy for both to learn to accommodate, and tolerate one another, the combination of the aforementioned factors helped to create ponds, if not rivers, in the desert. What is observed today in most parts of the area is an impressive machinery put in place by the two communities to rebuild a more lasting peace framework. It is, in fact, observed that no concerted efforts have ever been made after any conflict in the area to achieve peace and harmony between the two groups as was evident after the 2001/2002 conflict. And by these efforts, significant peace was attained between the Tiv and the Jukun across the Local Government Area within the first half of 2004. It is hoped that the close of the year will produce more positive results. Table sixteen below is the reflection of Tiv-Jukun relationship in some districts in the Local Government Area in the first half of 2004. This information was derived from the study tour in the areas.

Table 16: Tabular Description of Jukun-Tiv Relationship in the first half of 2002

S/NO	DISRICT	ISSUES IN THE NATURE OF RELATIONSHIP
1.	Wukari	<p>Both Tiv and Jukun now interact freely, especially in Wukari Town.</p> <p>Issues of suspicion and inflammatory comments are no longer prominent in the interactive process.</p> <p>Many Tiv even live in Wukari town without fear.</p>
2.	Puje	<p>Most Tiv communities have not yet returned in the area, but those who have returned now mixed freely with the Jukun.</p> <p>NB. It should be stated that most Tiv communities in this area were Kparev elements, who decided to relocate to other areas after the crisis. Some did not even return after the 1991/92.</p> <p>This not withstanding, since Puje District stretches much into Wukari town, and relationship between the Tiv and the Jukun in the town is no longer gloomy, we can as well argue in favour of general good working relationship between the two communities in Puje District.</p>
3.	Tsokundi	<p>Most Tiv communities in this area have returned.</p> <p>The Tiv and the Jukun now interact freely with one another.</p> <p>The Tiv also constitute one of the major groups that patronize the Jukun market at Tsokundi.</p> <p>The level of suspicion and inflammatory comments on one another are much reduced.</p>

The Jukun leadership in this area has been doing much, within its ability, to reconcile the Tiv and the Jukun.

Primary schools located in Tiv areas like Ikyernum, Tor-ruam and Tse Da'a have been reopened, the acute dearth of staff, pupils and facilities notwithstanding.

Even the outstanding rivalry between David Mtuem and the Jukun community in the area has significantly subsided. This was evident by the permission given to David Mtuem to bury his wife, Mary, who was killed during the Zegeate attack. It could be recalled that more than two years after the murder, several attempts by Mtuem to bury the wife in the area were disrupted by the Jukun community.

The only thorny issue still remains the refusal by the Jukun community to allow the Tiv community to resettle at Ayu (Tsokundi town). This had been an outstanding issue even after 1991/92 crisis.

4. Nwokyo

There is much relative peace in the interactive process.

The Tiv communities have now settled down for economic activities, though with some restrictions on areas to be covered.

Generally, relationship is not as smooth as in other areas due to the displacement of the Tiv settlement of Toho Abanyo by the Jukun community of Adikan. Also, the Tiv community at Rafin Soja does not feel comfortable with the relocation of their ancestral compounds to other satellite Jukun communities like the Etulo. Most of these elements appeared after the 2001/2002, and were used as barriers to hinder the Tiv from occupying their original compounds.

5. Bantaje
- Relationship between the two communities is relatively calm.
- Many Tiv communities in the area have returned, and are going about their normal activities with less fear of harassment.
- The Tiv patronize the Bantaje and Chediya markets.
- NB. The most thorny issue in this area remains Tiv-Jukun relationship at Ugber-Jembe-Akomikyar, Abagye and the Jukun and Hausa leadership at Nakambo and Chediya. The Tiv community at Abagye is still under stiff suppression from the Nakambo Jukun who has taken over the Tiv settlement. The bitter aspect remains the way and manner the rural Jukun community at Nakambo extorts substantial amount of money to allocate farmlands to the displaced rural Tiv community at Abagye in a rural set up.
- The situation at Chediya-Ugber Jembe and Akomikyar is not very different. The Tiv are still relieved of residential rights over most of their farmlands.
- NB. It is hoped that the moment these measures are checked, particularly by the peace and Reconciliation Committee; normalcy will be restored in the relationship.
6. Akwana
- Relationship is relatively calm.
- The Tiv patronize the Jukun market at Akwana.
- NB. The only thorny issues still remain the Tiv grudge over the seizure of some of their salt mines and farmlands by the Jukun.

7. Assa
 Relationship is relatively calm.
 Both communities interact freely with one another without great fear or suspicion.
 Issues of distrust and inflammatory comments are no longer of interest to the two communities.
8. Kente
 There is also relative calm.
 Both communities interact freely.
 The Tiv patronize the Jukun market at Kente.
 The Jukun afforestation programme which remained one of the major sources of rivalry between the two communities is relaxed.
9. Rafin Kada
 Significant normalcy has been restored in the relationship.
 The Tiv go about their normal activities unharrassed.
 Almost all Tiv communities in the area have returned.
 Less energy and focus are exerted on issues of inflammatory comments and propaganda aimed at soaring relationship.
 Both communities interact freely with one another.
 The Tiv even constitute the greater bulk of the communities or groups that patronize the Jukun market at Rafin Kada.
10. Chonku
 Relationship in generally very calm.
 The two communities interact very freely.
 The level of suspicion and fear for one another is significantly reduced.

Cases of negative propaganda and inflammatory comments on one another are no longer matters of interest in the minds of members of the two groups.

11. Gidan Idi

This has remained the most problem area since the 1991/92 crisis.

Since the 1991/92 crisis the Tiv have been forcefully ejected from the area by the Jukun community. The strong resolve to permanently evict the Tiv from the area, particularly in Gidan Idi, was demonstrated by the relocation of the Government Day Secondary School, Gidan Idi, to the former big Tiv settlement of Agbo B. And in other areas in the District, Tiv settlements were either taken over by the Jukun or their satellite communities.

At present, even the concerted efforts being made by the Peace and Reconciliation Committee in the local Government to resettle the displaced Tiv communities in the area have not yet yielded any positive dividends.

NB. The area has remained a thorn in the flesh of concerted efforts being made towards rebuilding peaceful Tiv-Jukun relationship, particularly in the District.

Source: Generated from filed work.

From the foregoing discussion, it could be contended that other than aggravating the friction in Tiv-Jukun relationship, as many Tiv and Jukun perceived, the post crisis period witnessed an unprecedented search for more lasting peace between the Tiv and the Jukun. The concerted efforts initiated by individuals and organizations, both among the Tiv and the Jukun, as well as by other well-spirited organizations, particularly philanthropist and religious bodies, produced an impressive peace machinery adopted by the two communities in order to eschew violence, hatred and suspicion for one another for the purpose of attaining a more lasting peace. And within shortest time, after the 2001/2002 crisis, this earnest approach yielded positive effects. It is hoped that the peace process being pursued by the two communities will yield lasting peace in the area.

We attribute the credit to God for causing members of the two communities to be more careful in relating to one another unlike in the period that immediately proceeded the crisis.

ENDNOTES

1. David Mtuem, interview,
2. Adda Samuel T., 'For Posterity.'
3. Random interviews with members of the two communities on issues of internal and external support to their struggle.
4. Interview with Reverend Yohanna Irimiya Elawa
5. Interview with David Mtuem
6. A memorandum submitted to "The Jukun-Fulani/Tiv Peace and Reconciliation Committee" by the Tiv of Wukari Local Government Area of Taraba State, Nigeria, February, 2002, pp.19 & 20. This claim was corroborated by random interviews with the Fulani on their role in the same phenomenon.
7. Random interviews with the Tiv and the Jukun on the outbreak of the 2001/2002 conflict.
8. Interview with Gani Agbu on the involvement of the Jukun in the conflict. Both Gani and other Jukuns accused the Tiv of attacking and insulting the Jukuns in the course of their clash with the Fulani. The sources maintained that as the clash intensified the Tiv offensive could no longer be tolerated.
9. Interview with Simon Awua, and other Tiv sources on the involvement of the Fulani in the outbreak of the 2001/2002 conflict.
10. A memorandum submitted to "The Jukun-Fulani/Tiv Peace and Reconciliation Committee, by" The Tiv of Wukari Local Government Area of Taraba State, Nigeria" February, 2002, pp.19 & 20.
11. The Bekwara community shares common boundary with the Kunav clan in Vandeikya Local Government Area of Benue State. This clan, and the entire Tiv, refers to the Bekwara community as Udam. The Kunav and the Bekwara communities have an age long hostile history characterized by hunting for human heads from one another in the event of the death of their influential members. The heads were buried along with the bodies of such influential members. This type of relationship did not provide room for peaceful co-existence, and hence the prevalence of hostile relationship between the two communities, even up to date.
12. Random interviews with the Tiv communities on the incidence of Fulani-Tiv clashes on farm lands after the 1991/92 crisis.

13. A memorandum by 'The Tiv of Wukari...', p.17.
14. Interview with the District Head of Tsokundi and other Jukuns in the District on the outbreak of the 2001/2002 conflict.
15. This claim was commonplace among the Fulani after the 1991/92. Many Tiv were challenged by the Fulani on the use of lands on the ground that some areas were bought over by them. In some cases, whenever the Tiv challenged the Fulani for trespass over their farmlands, their ready response was always that "you don't have land here". The prevalence of this comment compelled the Tiv to accuse the Jukun of creating the awareness in the Fulani.
16. A memorandum by 'The Tiv of Wukari...'
17. Ibid.; p.20.
18. It could be recalled that in the wake of the Tiv-Fulani clash, the Aku Uka made several efforts to reconcile the aggrieved parties. He also made frantic efforts to keep the Jukun off from the incident. The open attack the Aku Uka had on the Fulani leadership for planning for the breach of peace in the area were issues used to commend the Aku. In the same vein, the efforts by the Traditional Council to try to compel District Heads and other sub leaders to maintain peace in their domains was yet another commendable effort.
19. Interviews with the Tiv and the Jukun on the implications of the attack on Zegeate and the eventual outbreak of full fledged hostility in the area.
20. Interviews with different Tiv communities on the effect of the attack on Zegeate and its link with the outbreak of hostility in the area. Most of the sources linked the attack with subsequent developments that later produced wide scale hostility in the Local Government Area.
21. A memorandum by 'The Tiv of Wukari...'
22. The prevalence of this suspicion was so much that even the Wukari Traditional Council began to feel concerned. The Jukun leadership, and the entire Jukun community continued to accuse the Tiv of launching secret unprovocative attacks on its members. It was at this point that the Traditional council began to deviate from its meditative role to partisanship.
23. A memorandum by 'The Tiv of Wukari...' p.21.

24. Interview with Simon Awua on the outbreak of hostility between the Jukun-Fulani/Tiv in Wukari Local Government Area. The interview was one of the series of interviews held with the Tiv and the Jukun on the issue.
25. Ibid.
26. Interview with Jacob Gbagede on the outbreak of hostility between the Jukun-Fulani and the Tiv in Wukari.
27. Interview with Agyo Agbu, and other Jukun sources, on the involvement of the Jukun in the Tiv/Fulani clash in Wukari Local Government Area. Note that most Jukun sources preferred to be anonymous.
28. Interview with David Mtuem on the spread of hostility in the Tsokundi District.
29. Ibid.
30. Interview with an anonymous Jukun informant on the effects of the 2001/2002 crisis.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Interviews with the Tiv and the Jukun on the effects of the 2001/2002 on Tiv-Jukun relationship.
34. Ibid.
35. Interview with Agyo at Wukari on the effect of the crisis on Tiv-Jukun relationship.
36. Interview with Japhet.
37. Ibid.
38. Interview with Abdul.
39. Ibid.
40. Interview with Jarumi on the effect of the 2001/2002 crisis on Tiv-Jukun relationship.
41. Interviews with cross-section of Tiv communities on their views on the general effects of the crisis on Tiv-Jukun relationship.

42. Interviews with the Jukun on their views about the role of the Federal Government in the Tiv resettlement scheme.
43. Interview with Reverend Yohanna Irimiya Elawa on the Jukun view about the federal Government role in Tiv resettlement Scheme.
44. Interviews with some Tiv and Jukun sources on the Jukun reaction to the Federal Government Tiv resettlement scheme.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid,
48. Mzough U. TIV is a Tiv cultural Association with its headquarter at Gboko, the seat of Tiv Traditional Administration. The Association liaises with its various branches across the country to advance the course of the Tiv people. The parent Association was very instrumental in protecting the rights of the Tiv in Taraba, and Wukari Local Government Area, in particular, after the 2001/2002 crisis. It has even instituted a case against the Federal Government at the International Arbitration Panel for the atrocities committed on the Tiv during the 2001/2002 crisis.

CHAPTER EIGHT

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1 SUMMARY

The foregoing study revealed very cardinal horizons in Tiv-Jukun contact and interactions, particularly in what is today Wukari Local Government Area of Taraba State. While the study did not leave any doubt in our minds that the Tiv and the Jukun do not constitute the only ethnic groups in the area, it clearly revealed the dominance of the two in the area.

Much details have also been laid bare in the study to show that Tiv-Jukun contact and interaction in our focal area predated the take off point of our study period. In other words, the two groups had been in contact with one another far behind 1850. And for the period before our period of study, the historical predicament had remained the dearth of written historical records. Even the oral accounts which remained the dominant historical sources capitalized significantly on the dearth of written records to make some generalizations on very crucial historical issues that needed to be put in their proper and specific time perspectives.

For the period between 1850, up to the inception of colonial rule in the area in 1900, the study revealed very important features in Tiv-Jukun relationship. The most dominant feature, however, remained the very cordial inter course between the two groups. Even ever before 1850, the two groups were already on a very significant match towards attaining an appreciable symbiotic socio-cultural and political fusion.

Other areas of cultural admixture, as the study revealed, were brought about by the impressive trade network that characterized another aspect of Tiv-Jukun relationship. Through trade, both communities copied technology from one another, particularly in textile works. The similarities in some of their textile products were practical illustrations of the symbiotic intercourse for the purpose of advancement. Other flash points were the use of common or identical tribal or ethnic facial marks.

By and large, before the interruption of colonial rule, the Tiv and the Jukun had established a very significant fusion which informed a colonial official to remark that the two groups are complementary to one another. It was also on this basis that a Jukun elder had to only inter lace his fingers in response to a colonial official who demanded to know the Jukun relationship with the Tiv.

Unfortunately, the study revealed that the colonial machinery truncated the peace process sustained between the Tiv and the Jukun. As damaging as this phenomenon was to relationship, it did not take the British by surprise, since their colonial system of indirect rule was at its best, in all their colonial territories, in dividing and setting communities against others. This explained why even though this approach enabled the colonial administration to achieve objectives, it left very damaging legacies on inter-group relations, as was evident, also between the Tiv and the Jukun.

The study also revealed that the period proceeding the year of Nigeria's independence, up to 1979, witnessed a relative calm in Tiv-Jukun relationship. Apart from the Nande Ior and the Atem Tyo uprisings in 1960 and 1964

respectively, the Tiv and the Jukun were able to swallow their differences to enter into a fruitful socio-political alliance.

Unfortunately, the 1980s could not sustain the prevailing tempo due to some developments, most of which were politically rooted. These developments, as our study revealed, set the ball rolling for negative change in relationship. Among these developments were the appointment of Simon Iorter Musa, a Tiv, as Wukari Local Government Council Chairman, 1981-83, and the Tiv-Hausa political alliance between 1987 and 1989.

The 1990s and 2001/2002 witnessed the most disturbing features in Tiv-Jukun relationship since the groups came together in the area. Non the less, from the evidence on board, one could say that the sad stories of the 1990s and 2001 were scape goats of the down trend rooted in the 1980s, resulting from uncompromising political wrangling between the Tiv and the Jukun.

The study, however, revealed an important development after the 2001/2002 conflict, in particular. We have already mentioned that the conflict had grave consequences on life, property and relationship. And as grave as the consequences were, so were frantic efforts made by all tiers of government to provide lasting panacea to the perennial impasse between the Tiv and the Jukun in the area. It is, indeed, optimistic that these frantic and, of course, sincere efforts will surely yield the desired dividend. Generally, the journey through the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s and 2001 witnessed a very undulating pendulum in Jukun-Tiv relationship.

8.2 CONCLUSION

The major flash points in our study revealed that since the colonial era, meaningful peace has continued to elude the interactive process between the Tiv and the Jukun. Much evidence has also been provided in our study to show that government non-challant or partisan attitude has always aggravated the down trend in Tiv-Jukun relationship. For instance, while the colonial regime laid the foundation for, and heightened, rivalry between the two groups, the non-challant and, later, the seeming partisan role of the Local Government Administration in the perennial Jukun-Tiv stalemate accounted, in part, for the momentum that accompanied the 1991/92 and 2001/2002 conflicts in the area. Similarly, the increasing attitude of the Local government to refuse to recognize, and treat as legitimate residents, even the autochthonous Tiv communities in the area has been one of the major causes of mounting rivalry between the Tiv and the Jukun.

It is also evidential from our study that since the colonial period, any government attempt to be involved in any struggle against the Tiv in the areas has always failed; the results which always enhanced the official entrenchment of the Tiv in the area. For instance, the colonial attempt in 1918, through the Ring Fence Policy, to evict the Tiv from the area woefully failed; and with the colonial administration officially allowing the free movement and occupation of the area by the Tiv. In the same vein, the attempt by the Local Government to drive out the Tiv in 1991/92 only brought much pressure to bear on the Local Government from the state and the Federal Governments to ensure the recognition of the Tiv as bona fide indigenes of the area. And, recently, the combined efforts to flush out the Tiv in 2001/2002 compelled the state and Federal Governments to be more straightforward in their pronouncement about the legitimacy of the Tiv in the area. The direct involvement of the Federal Government in resettling the displaced Tiv people was a practical demonstration of the point under review. The soon involvement of, even, the Local Government administration in the peace and reconciliation process added ingredients to our position. All these examples implied that the use of force, covertly or overtly reinforced by government partisanship, has not been, and will, of course, not be an option in resolving the perennial Tiv-Jukun impasse.

It is also observed that the refusal by the Local authority to honour the implementation of recommendations for peace has remained one of the major causes of recurrent violence in the area. It is evident, also, that the nonchalant posture of the upper strata of government to always thrash the insubordinative attitude of the lower strata to enforce compliance only hardens such an erring strata, and the group(s) it represents, in their efforts to marginalize others at the expense of peaceful co-existence.

The study also revealed the mistaken central role government always ascribe to the Benue Tiv in efforts to resolving Tiv-Jukun matters in Wukari and Taraba state at large. It is true that the Benue Tiv speak the same language with the Wukari and Taraba Tiv, and also have common origin and culture, but the latter Tiv group is the closest to the Jukun, and as such knows how best to seek and obtain peace with the Jukun. It is observed that some of the uncompromising utterances and issues always raised by the Benue Tiv in times of conflict do not always represent the views of the generality of the Tiv community in Wukari and Taraba State at large.

On inter-group level, our study revealed that the adoption of the culture of violence in relating to one another has always affected peaceful relationship. Weber argues that “Violence intensifies violence in a short run...” But for most societies across the world, the “short run” concept does not represent the literal interpretation of the term. For instance, when will the short run concept be applied to the Israeli-Palestinian clash, the rivalries in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan, etc. We are constrained to even argue that even when violence later provides solution to itself, the atmosphere of calm is always an uneasy one.

8.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

On the basis of the above flash points, the following recommendations have been proffered as panacea for the perennial Tiv-Jukun rivalry in Wukari Local Government Area of Taraba State.

1. The adoption of the spirit of group identity devoid of hatred, distrust and suspicion for one another. It could be recalled that over the years, members of the two groups developed group consciousness founded on distrust, hatred and suspicion for one another. This trend was accompanied by derogatory name calling attitude which conveyed the message of hatred,

disregard or disrespect for one another. It is hoped that the abuse of this trend will contribute immensely in rebuilding the spirit of peaceful inter-group interaction.

2. De-emphasis on the use of violence in achieving group objectives. Our study laid bare the fact that members of the two groups gradually drifted from peaceful approach to the use of violence and other non-integrative approaches in achieving group objectives. This, and among other factors, accounted for the prevalence of violence in the area. Members of the two communities are therefore advised to bury all difference to re-orient themselves against the use of violence in the way and manner they seek and pursue group objectives. Individuals and organizations in both communities should inculcate into their members the need to seek peaceful channels to address any grievances that might arise so that they do not degenerate into unhealthy rancour or violence.
3. Members of both communities should learn about one another's culture and traditions. This aspect should be vigorously patronized by cultural associations and the traditional administration. Both groups should embark on aggressive, but sincere, efforts to learn about each other's cultures and traditions, as well as identify some of the cultural practices that are obstacles to community co-existence for the purpose of evolving mechanisms to deal with such practices in order to achieve mutual respect and trust.
4. Both the Traditional and Local Council administration should embrace the Tiv as bona fide indigenes. This should be demonstrated in appointment into the Local Government administration. Both organs should ensure that groups and individuals who would want to ferment trouble between the Tiv and the Jukun are exposed and treated according to the law of inter-group harmony. Above all, they should not be partisan even in times of inter group rivalry.
5. Reconstitution and enlargement of Wukari Traditional Council administration to accommodate the Tiv and other groups. This will ensure proper representation, especially on deliberations and decisions on issues that particularly affect such groups. This recommendation does not, however, affect the patrimony of the Aku Uka, and the central role of the Jukun in the Council.

6. Implementation of all recommendations proffered in times of conflicts. It has been observed that many recommendations have always been ignored by the Local Government after any crisis in the area. Such deliberate negligence created further tension and violence, since while one group felt covered, the other felt unprotected by the organ that supposed to protect both. To check the issue of non-compliance, the superior strata of government should always compel the lower strata, on whose shoulders the recommendations fall, to ensure compliance.
7. Return of all displaced Tiv people. It could be recalled that during the 1991/92 crisis, all Tiv communities between Wukari and Gidan Idi were denied the right to return to their areas. The same was the fate of the Tiv community at Tsokundi. Similarly, the 2001/2002 violence also left many Tiv people displaced. In some areas like Toho Abanyo, Rafin Soja, Abagye, Tse Ama, etc, some communities who returned were forced to lose greater part of their land. All these communities have some misgivings about the Jukun. To avert this trend, therefore, all the affected communities should be allowed to return. And for those whose lands were seized, even on return, such lands should be given back to them. It is only this approach which will rebuild the spirit of brotherhood and good neighborhood.
8. Respect for constituted authorities. Both communities should respect constituted authorities in the way and manner they operate. Just as it is very unlawful to either evade tax or pay to whom inappropriate, as the Jukun always argue in the case of the Tiv, so it is unlawful or unconstitutional to prosecute violence on any community within the borders of Nigeria for the purpose of achieving group objectives, as the Tiv always argue in the case of the Jukun. The law of this nation does not also allow any Local Government Council to subject any community to violence. It is, therefore, hoped that if the Tiv, the Jukun and, even, the Local Government will respect constituted law and authority their area will become violent free.
9. Adoption of peaceful and harmonious political culture. Politics must not be seen as a weapon to be used to exhibit division and bitterness for one another. Rather, politics should, once again, be considered as a melting point for the two communities as was demonstrated in the 1950s and 1970s. Both groups should mutually interact politically for the attainment of

common and group objectives. The era of political alliances aimed at antagonizing one another should be seriously discouraged.

10. Respect for the constitutional right of all to settle in any place of their choice within Nigeria. It is unconstitutional for any group to refuse another the right to settle and go about normal activities in any part of the country as long as the group is law abiding. It is even more counterproductive for the attainment of peaceful co-existence for communities that existed in a place for a long time to be eventually stigmatized as non bona fide groups just for one socio-political reason or the other. People should respect the constitutional right of others to stay in any part of this country for socio-economic and political activities. In this way, the idea of “sub-constitutions” as it is seemingly evident in many parts of the country should be strongly challenged. Infact, this trend does not only tantamount to the disrespect of the Federal constitution, but has also been one of the major causes of inter-communal clashes in the country. We hope the Tiv and the Jukun will allow the spirit of God which calls for love for one another to reshape their orientation towards one another.

8.4 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE

Since the colonial era, Tiv-Jukun relationship has suffered significant set back. The increasing friction in the relationship, resulting from many factors, has given an improper conception about the general nature and form of Tiv-Jukun contact and interaction over the years. This growing misconception was reinforced by the 1991/92 and 2001/2002 Tiv-Jukun aggression.

As strong as the above-misconceived presumptions continue to resound in our minds, this study unveiled important flash points which will go along way to reshaping the wrong impression about Tiv-Jukun relationship. The study, more than any contemporary works, provides us with enough inputs to believe that Tiv-Jukun contact and interaction did not start on a bad note.

Importantly, also, the study offers an important clue into the developmental stages in Tiv-Jukun contact and interaction, clearly highlighting issues of compromise and friction over the years. Our findings, particularly in connection with the 1991/92 and 2001/2002 conflicts debunked the pessimist theories that the two communities will forever be at dagger's drawn against one another. In short, this study has helped to widen our horizon in our understanding about Jukun-Tiv relationship over the years.

8.5 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

This study is no doubt a premier attempt to critically examine Tiv-Jukun relationship in Wukari Local Government Area of Taraba State. Being a premier approach, and the circumstances in which the study was conducted, quite a number of information or records were either lacking or concealed from the researcher.

Invariably, as much as the researcher tried his possible best to approach the subject much sufficiently, he still believes that much more can be done by others to fill in the missing parts of the jig saw. Similarly, a more indepth study into the role of politics in the growing aggression between the Tiv and the Jukun will give us an indepth understanding about the genesis of the perennial rivalry between the two groups.

GLOSSARY

Abontha – commander of the Jukun Army.

The Abontha is the highly esteemed Jukun Army commander who, alone, has the prerogative to decide on matters of defence.

Aku Uka, the Jukun paramount ruler.

Atem Tyo, head breaking: a phenomenon associated with the Tiv political uprising of 1964.

Atoatyev, Tiv appellation for all non Tiv Communities.

Baja, Tiv derogative name for Hausa/Fulani and their northern based political party, the Northern peoples Congress (NPC) in the First Republic's politics.

Ber, Tiv word for lake.

Bichi or Mbichi, Jukun appellations for settler Communities as was used particularly for the Tiv.

Jukun ka Jukun tso, a Tiv phrase, meaning all Jukuns are Jukun or are one.

Kura Chacha, a Tiv term literally translated means 'clear all'.

Mzough U Tiv, Tiv cultural Association.

Nande Ior, a Tiv phrase literally translated means 'burn people or 'set people ablaze'.

Tiv ka Tiv tso, a Tiv phrase literally translated means 'all Tiv are Tiv or are one.'

Tor Agbande, a Tiv term for Drum Chief among the Tiv in the early developmental stage of the Tiv traditional institution.

Tor Tiv, Tiv paramount ruler.

Tsav, Tiv term for witchcraft.

Udam, Tiv appellation (or nick name) for the Gakem, Obudu and Bekwara Communities in Cross River State and the Igede Community in Benue State.

Iyongo Pania, Tiv adulterated pronouncement of the English work 'The Young Pioneers.'

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. PRIMARY SOURCES

A. SELECTED LIST OF INFORMANTS

- Adi Agyo (60 years), interviewed at Wukari, November 2002
- Agyo Igbinde (75 years), interviewed at Ugber Hembe Village, Chediya, November, 2002
- Akighgo Ahura (60 years), interviewed at Akomikyar Village, December 2002.
- Alam Musa (60 years), interviewed at Musa Village, March, 2002. He is a Retired Headmaster.
- Anakaa Awen (100 years), interviewed in his house, Awen Village, November 2002.
- Andrew Dajo (61 years), interviewed at Tsema Village, November 2002.
- Atohinko T. Adi (Late) (47 years), interviewed at Nukkai, Jalingo, April, 1997. He was the Personnel Officer, Office of the Secretary to the state Government, Jalingo, Taraba State.
- Asema Kaa (100 years), interviewed at Mahanga, November 2002. He is a Village Head.
- Bala Ajiduku (48 years), interviewed in his office at Jalingo, April, 1995.
- Bala Angyu (47), interviewed at Wukari, November 2002.
- Bulus Angyu Bauka (50 years), informally interviewed between February 2002 and April 2003. He is presently a Secretary in one of the Ministries in Taraba State.
- Chia Orabum (55 years), interviewed at Orebum Village, November 2002. He is a Village Head.
- Dan Auta Yavela (48 years), interviewed in his house at Jalingo, March 1995. He is presently a Chief Lecturer with the Business Education Department, College of Education, Jalingo, Taraba State.
- Evkera Kwer (85 years), interviewed at Igbongom Village, December 2002.
- Fidelis Gbenger (52 years), interviewed at Jande-Kyula Village, December 2002. He is a politician.
- Geni Adi (65 years), interviewed at Orabum Village, Fyayi, November 2002.
- Geofrey Henda (70 years), interviewed at Jande-Kyula Village, November 2002.
- Ihuwe Tseke (100 years), interviewed at Nenshi Village, October 2002. He is a Village Head.

- Iorsende Kaave (80 years), interviewed at Iorshagher Village, November 2002.
He is a Village Head.
- Ivo Sura (90 years), interviewed at Igbongom Village, December 2002.
- James Shikaan Gbenyi (70 years), interviewed at Toho Abanyo,
November 2002. He is a Village Head.
- Jibrin Amfani (65 years), interviewed in his house at Wukari, March 1995.
He is a retired Permanent Secretary. He is a very valuable asset to Wukari Traditional Council and presently serves as one of the advisers to the Aku Uka.
- John Tseke (81 years), interviewed at Jande-Kyula Village, November 2002.
- Joseph Tahwa (50 years), interviewed in his office at Wukari, April 1995.
He served as the Secretary to the Wukari Traditional Council for a couple of years.
- Joseph Ubur (80 years), interviewed at Jande-Kyula Village, along with John Tseke.
- Mbaade Malu (70 years), interviewed at Rafin Soja, December 2002. He is a Village Head.
- Michael Akomikyar (90 years), interviewed at Akomikyar Village,
December 2002. He is a Village Head.
- Mike Angyu (48 years), interviewed in Jalingo, March 1995. He is a Civil Servant.
- Momga Azege (60 years), interviewed at Ayilamo Village, November 2002.
- Mtiyudian Wanmker (50 years), interviewed at Akomikyar Village,
December 2002.
- Nyiga Andura (100 Years), interviewed at Mahanga, November 2002.
He is a Village Head.
- Orakalemhan Iwer (80 years), interviewed at Toho Abanyo,
November 2002. He is a Village Head.
- Orbee Uchiv, D. (43 years), interviewed severally at Jalingo between
April 2000 to December 2002. He served as Adviser to Governor Nyame and as a Director-General in the Taraba Civil Service. He is a veteran politician.
- Peseza Yade (65 years), interviewed at Tsema Village, November 2002.
- Peverga Uwua (70 years), interviewed at Ugber Jembe Village, Chediyo,
November 2002. He is a Village Head.
- Saawua Hamber (60 years), interviewed at Iorshagher Village,
November 2002. He is a Village Head.
- Sam Ahmadu (51 years) (late), interviewed in his house, Safni, Jahingo, April 1995. He was a Jukun prince, and served as Director in the Ministry of Land and Survey, Jalingo, Taraba state.

Shehu Danladi (55 years), interviewed in his house at Wukari, November 1997.

He was Wukari Local Government Chairman between 1987 to 1989.

Simon Angyu (50 years), interviewed in his office in Jalingo, April 1995.

He served as the Director of Budget, Taraba State before his present appointment as a Permanent Secretary.

Simon Iorter Musa (55 years), interviewed in his house at Musa Village,

March 1999. He served as Wukari Local Government Chairman
Between 1981 to 1983.

Tavershima Agata (83 years), interviewed at Ugber Jembe Village, Chediya,

November 2002. He is a Village Head.

Tsavdoo Orawai (65 years), interviewed at Ugber Jembe Village along with

Tavershima Agata.

Tingir, D. K. (55 years), interviewed at Anyiin, December 2002.

Tingir, Johnny Iwar (57 years), interviewed along with Tingir D. K.

Tyociv Mcha (65 years), interviewed at Iorshagher Village,

November 2002.

Ugbide Atumbur (60 years), interviewed at Ayilamo Village,

November 2002.

Utor Malu (70 years), interviewed at Rafin Soja, December 2002.

Yohanna Irimiya Elawa (50 years), interviewed at Christian

Leadership Institute, Shere Hills, August 2003 and in Bauchi, in the
Same year. He is a Pastor lecturing with the Taraba Polytechnic, Ibi Campus.

Yusuf Magaji (Dr) (60 years), interviewed in his office, Civil Service

Commission, Jalingo, April 1995. Several discussions were also made with on several
occasions on the perennial Jukun-Tiv confrontation in Wukari Local Government Area.
He is a retired Civil Servant. He served as the Chairman, Civil Service Commission. He
also served as Wukari Local Government Sole Administrator in 1987. He is still a very
valuable asset to Taraba State Civil Service.

B. ARCHIVAL MATERIALS

Abraham, R.C. The Tiv Tribe.

Benue Province, Tiv-Wukari boundary adjustment of (a) Akwana enclave.
SNP/17/2/1704

Bridal, Report No. 14 on Wukari Division. MAKPROF/FED/4131/REP/W/3, 1932

Dewar, K. Intelligence Report on Wukari Division, MAKPROF,
FED/4/24/AR/INT/W/1, 1932.

Dewar, K. Intelligence Report on Donga District, Wukari Division, 1935-37, SNP/17/3/24478.

Dewar, K. (C). Intelligence Report on Takum District, Wukari Division, 1935-36, SNP/3/24898.

Freemantle, J.N. Gazetteer of Adamawa Province. 1936

Freemantle, J.N. Gazetteer of Muri Province. London, 1922.

Gunn, I.G. Report on Tiv in Wukari Division: Reorganisation of 1947. MAKPROF/FED/4/1/4377, 1947.

Keates, E.H.O. Notes on the Old Kingdom, Kwararafa, NAK/SNP/17/2441, vol.i. MAKPROF /FED/24/AR/W/1

Meek, C.K., (B), The Kam. D.O's Office, Jalingo.

Munshi Tribe, Necessity for proving for expansion in the South Western Area. SNP/17/9/C, 1932.

NAK/MAKPROF/4377

NAK/MAKPROF/4131/AR/REP/W/18

NAK/SNP/17/K. 2002

Palmer, H.R. The Sudanese Memoirs, vol. iii. Lagos, 1927.

SNP/17/8/K.4049.

2. SECONDARY SOURCES

i. Published Works

Abdullahi, M. etal. History of Nigeria I: Nigeria before 1800 A.D. Longman Nigeria Ltd. 1989.

Abraham, R.C. The Tiv Tribe, Farnborough, Lagos 1940.

Adda, S.T. For Posterity: The Role of Governor Nyame, Others and to Myself. Target Publicity Press, Jos, 1993.

Adi, A.T. Jukun-Tiv Clashes: A Reconsideration, Amune Press Wukari, 1992.

- Afigbo, A.E. Igbo and Their Neighbours. Ibadan University Press, Ibadan, 1987.
- Afolalu, R.O. A History of Africa since 1800. Onibonoje Press, Ibadan, 1972.
- Agbu, L. Report on Conflict between Jukun and Tiv in Wukari Local Government Area, MAMSER office, Wukari, 1992.
- Ajayi, J.F.A. and Crowder, M. (eds.), History of West Africa, vol. i Longman, Nigeria Ltd. 1976.
- Akiga, Sai. Akiga Story's Story, edited by East, R.M. Frank Cass, London, 1965
- Amir, Samir Modern Migration in West Africa, Studies Presented at the Eleventh International African Seminar, Dakar, April, 1972, Oxford University Press, London, 1974.
- Anene, J.C. The International Boundaries of Nigeria, 1855-1960: The Framework of an Emergent African Nation, Longman, Nigeria Ltd, 1970.
- Anifowose, R. Violence and Politics in Nigeria: The Tiv and Yoruba Experience. Nok Publishers International Ltd., Enugu, 1982.
- Arthur, Hazlewood (ed.), Africa: Integration and disintegration, Oxford University Press, London; 1967.
- Atoshi, G. The Story of the Jukun-Tiv Crisis: Why and How they Happened, Amune Press, Wukari, 1992.
- Aubrey, Yates Frustration and Conflict, Longman, Methuen, 1962.
- Avav, T. Refugees in own Country: The Tiv-Jukun Crises, Alpha Digital Press Ltd., Garki Abuja, 2002.
- Barth, F. (ed.), Ethnic groups and boundaries, Boston, Littler Brown and Company, 1969.
- Basil, D. Old Africa Rediscovered, Faber and Faber, 1959.
- Bohannan, P. The Tiv of Central Nigeria. New Haven, London, 1953.
- Christian, P. Potholm, The Theory and Practice of African Politics, Eaglewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1979.

- Dollard, John et al, Frustration and Aggression, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1939.
- Fage, J.D. and Oliver, B.A. (eds.), Papers in African Prehistory. Cambridge, 1970.
- Gbor, J.W.F. Mdue U Tiv man mnyer ve ken Benue (Tiv origin and migration into the Benue Valley). Gaskiya Press Corporation, Zaria, 1978.
- George Sorel, Reflections on Violence, Collier-Macmillan, London, 1950.
- Greenberg, J. Studies in African Linguistics Classification, New Haven, 1955.
- Grove, A.T. Africa. 3rd Edition, Oxford University Press, London, 1978.
- Guthrie, Malcolm, "Some Development in the Prehistory of Bantu Languages," in Fage, J.D. and Oliver, B.A. (eds.), Papers in African Prehistory, Cambridge, 1970.
- Hamman Mahmoud, "European Rivalry in the Middle Benue Basin and its Impact on the Emirate of Muri, 1880-1895". A paper Presented at the 29th Annual Congress of the Historical Society of Nigeria, University of Sokoto, Sokoto, Nigeria, 19th – 25th March, 1984.
- Hailey, L. An African Survey. Oxford University Press, London, 1939.
- Heinecke, P. Popular Fallacies in the Nigerian Social Sciences, Zaria, 1984.
- Herbert, H., and David, (eds.) Violence as Politics Harper and Raaw, New York. 1973.
- Henry, Bien, Violence and Social Change, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1968.
- High, D.G., and Ted, G. (eds), The History of Violence in America. New York, 1969.
- Horo, Witz, D. Ethnic Groups in Conflict, University of California Press, Berkek, 1985.
- Hugh D. Graham and Ted Gur (eds.), The History of Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives, New York, 1969.
- Ikime, O. (ed.). Groundwork of Nigerian History. Hienemann Education Books, Ibadan, 1980.
- Iloeje, N.P. A New Geography of Nigeria, Longman, Nigeria Ltd; 1981.

- Judith, A., (ed.), Handout for community leaders on conflict management. Lagos, 1998
- Karl, M. A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1973.
- Kukah, M.H. Religion, Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria, Spectrum, Ibadan, 1993
- Magid, A. Men in the Middle: Leadership and Role Conflict in a Nigerian Society (Idoma), Manchester University Press,
- Mason, P. Race Relations, Oxford University Press, London, 1970.
- Meek, C.K. A Sudanese Kingdom. Paul Kegan, London, 1931.
- Nieburg, H.L. Political Violence: The Behavioural Process, St. Martin Press, New York, 1969.
- Nnoli, O. Ethnic Politics in Nigeria. Fourth Dimension Publishers, Enugu, 1980.
- Nnoli, O. Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa: Intervening Variables, Malthouse Press Ltd. Lagos, 1994.
- Norah, L. Africa: From Prehistory to Modern Times, Hutton Educational Publications, London, 1972.
- Ogot, B. etal (eds.), A Survey of East Africa Longmans, Nairobi, 1968.
- Okolo, A. Foreign Capital in Nigeria: Roots of Underdevelopment, Hearthland Publishing House, 1987.
- Orr, C.W.J, The Making of Northern Nigeria, Faber and Faber, 1911.
- Plato, The Republic.
- Potter, D., etal, (eds.) Society and the Social Sciences. Open University Press, London, 1981.
- Preswerk and Parrot, Ethnocentrism and History Africa, Asia and Indian American Western Textbooks, London, 1978.
- Rodney, W. How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, Dar-es-salam, Tanzanian Publishing House, 1972.

- Sanda, A.D. (ed.), Ethnic Relations in Nigeria: Problems and Prospects.
- Shelton, A.J. The Igbo-Igala Borderland, New York University Press, 1956.
- Sherif, M. and Sherif, Social Psychology. University of Oklahoma, U.S.A. C.W. 1978.
- Siedentop, L. The Nature of Political Theory, Oxford University Press, London, 1983
- Suliman Mohammed (ed.), Ecology, Politics and Violent Conflict, Zend Books, London and New York, 1999.
- Tandon, Y. Root Causes of Peacelessness and Approaches to Peace in Africa. Umtapo Centre Durban, 1999.
- Temple, C.L. Notes on Tribes, Provinces, Emirates and States of Northern Province of Nigeria, Frank Cass and Co. Ltd. London, 1965.
- Ter-rumnun, Avan and Mson Myegba, The Dream to Conquer: The Story of Tiv-Jukun Crisis, Swem Kalagbe series, makurdi, 1992.
- Tseror, T. Tiv and their Neighbours: A History of Relations in the 19th and 20th Centuries. PHA Press, Jos, 1992.
- Vansina, Jan Oral Traditions,: A Study in Historical Methodology, Aidine Publishing Company, Chicago, 1969.
- Wallastein, J. (ed.), Social Change: The Colonial Situation, Wiley, New York, 1966

ii. **ARTICLES**

- Agber, S.K. "Tiv origins and migrations: A reconsideration," Archaeology and Society: Proceedings of the 8th Annual Conference of the Archaeological Association of Nigeria, Minna, June 25th-1st July, 1989.
- Ajayi, A.J.F. "Nineteenth Century origins of Nigerian nationalism," Journal of Historical Society of Nigeria (JHSN) vol. ii, No 2, Dec., 1961.
- Bruse, S. "The Politics of Violence: How Effective is Violence?" Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, vol. xxx, 1968.
- Growther, S. and Schon, Journal of an Expedition up to the Niger and J.F. Tsadda rivers in 1854, 1855.
- Dorward, D.C. "The Development of British Administration among the Tiv, 1900-1949," African Affairs, vol. 68, No. 279, October, 1969.

Dorward, D.C. "Precolonial Tiv Trade and Currency," International Journal of African History, vol. ix, No. 4, 1976, pp.577-579.

Gundu, Z.A. "Are the Tiv a part of the Bantu?: Nigeria in Antiquity," J.A.S.A. vol. ii, 1984.

Nic Fine and Fiona, M. Playing with Fire. New York Press, 1992.

Ikime, O. "The British Pacification of the Tiv in 1908," Journal of Historical Society of Nigeria, vol. vii, No. 1, 1973.

Orkar. J. "Swem: Tiv origin," Benue Valley Project Papers, (BVPP), No. 24, pp.153-155.

Sergent, R.A. "Anglo-Tiv relations, 1855-1974: The era of aggregation," BVPP, No. 10.

Toure, K.T. "The political Economy of Ethnic Conflicts Governance in Southern Kaduna, Nigeria: Deconstructing a Contested Terrain," African Development, vol. xxiv, Nos. 1&2, 1999, pp.112-126

Ulf, H. "Tribalism, Nationalism, Rank Equilibrium and Social Structure." Journal of Peace Research, vol.2, 1969, pp.81-103.

iii. UNPUBLISHED WORKS

a. Conference and Seminar Papers

Akombo, E.I. 'Community Co-existence, Peace and Harmony: The case of the Tiv-Jukun in former Wukari Federation,' A paper presented at the instance of the vision 2010 Committee Taraba State Chapter, Investment House, Jalingo, 23rd Oct., 1997.

Bulus, A.B. 'Position paper of Community Strategies for Stemming Communal Violence in Nigeria,' African Leadership Forum, Sampath House, Jos, 26th -28th June, 1995.

Gabosa, 'Labarun Chambawa da Alamuransu,' (Stories of the Chamba and their activities). MS, NHSR, Zaria, 1974.

Georgi, P. 'The materialist understanding of history,' Handout, History Department, A.B.U, Zaria, 1983.

Kay, W. 'Indigenous Languages of the Niger-Benue Confluence: Their Classification and its Implication for Prehistory,' A paper at the Conference on Confluence Nigerians, Lokoja, 27th Sept. 1987.

b. Dissertations and Theses

- Akombo, E.I. The origin of the 1991/92 Tiv-Jukun Crisis in Wukari Local Government Area of Taraba State. M.A. Dissertation, History Department, University of Jos, 1996.
- Amadi, L.O. The problem and process of political integration in Nigeria, 1923-1966. Ph.D Thesis, History Department, University of Jos, 1992.
- Bawa, B.F. Economy and Society in the Lowland Division of Plateau Province 1900-1960: A Study of the Impact of Colonialism, Ph.D Thesis, History Department, University of Jos, 1995.
- Dorward, D.C. A Social and Political History of the Tiv, 1939, Ph.D Thesis, University of London, London, 1971.
- Gbor, J.W.F. Traditions of origin and migration with specific emphasis on Eastern Tiv Frontier to c.1900. B.A. Project, History Department A.B.U. Zaria, 1974
- Hassan, L.E. The Kuteb, Kpanzu, Chamba People of Takum: A Study in the History of Inter-Ethnic Relations from 1900-1993 M.A. Dissertation, History Department, University of Jos, 1995.
- Ikpa, I. A Political Economy of the Tiv Revolts, M.A. Dissertation. History Department, University of Jos, 1990.
- Iyo, J. Tiv Nationalism and Some Aspects of British rule, Ph.D Thesis, History Department, University of Calabar, 1989.
- Moriki, M.L.B. The Alibawa Fulani Factor in the history of North-Eastern Zamfara. M.A. Dissertation, History Department, University of Jos, 1995.
- Nengel, J.G. Inter-group Relationship in the Precolonial Polities of Kauru and Pengana Highlands, Central Nigeria, Ph.D Thesis, History Department, University of Jos, 1989.
- Ninyio, S.Y. The Struggle for Atyap Chieftdom 1902-1995, M.A. Dissertation, History Department, University of Jos, 2001.
- Nomhwange, B.O. Changing Patterns of Inter-groups Relations in the Benue Valley: The Jukun and the Tiv as a case study. B.A. Project, History Department, University of Jos, 1979.

Okibe, S.A. Inter-group Relations between Agila Area of Idomaland and Ngbo Area of Iboland from Precolonial Times to the Present Days, M.A. Dissertation, History Department, University of Jos, 1995.

Yabracks, S.I. The British Colonial Conquest and its impact on Tangale-Waja, 1900-1960, M.A. Dissertation, History Department, University of Jos, 1995.

Yohanna, S. Ethnic minorities and the conflicts in Kaduna State: A Study on the National Question 1902-1993, Ph.D. Research Proposal. History Department, University of Jos.

Yohanna, S. The Colonial State and the Evolution of Social Stratification in Central Nigeria: The Case of Southern Zaria, 1902-1960, M.A. Dissertation, History Department, University of Jos, 1988.

3. TERTIARY SOURCES

Amfani, J. et al, "Scourge of Tiv infiltration in Taraba State," (5), Vanguard Magazine, 23rd November, 2001.

Erim, O.E., "The Early Foundation of Kwararafa Confederacy 1331-1902," Nigerian Magazine, vol. 55, No.3, 1987.

Hagher, I. "Tiv Cleansing Agenda: From Lugard to Obasanjo" (2) Vanguard Magazine, 13th December, 2001.

Kpera, J.A. and Hagher, I. "Tiv in the Valley of the Shadow of Death," Vanguard Magazine, 29th and 30th November, 2001.

National Concord, vol. 17, No.3772, 5th March, 1998.

Northern Nigeria in Perspective (NNIP), vol.i, No.2, Oct., 1992.

Oyigbelu, O.M. "Did the Jukun Really Migrate from Egypt?" Sunday Standard, 5th March, 1978.

Sebastine, H. "Siege on the Tiv Nation," The News Magazine, 19th November, 2001.

The Punch Magazine, 24th February, 1998.

West African Pilot, No. 2, 1965.

**THE CURRICULUM VITAE OF SOME COLONIAL OFFICIALS
CONTAINED IN THE END NOTES**

1. Bridel, H.S. - District Office, Wukari Division
2. Cole, C.W. - Resident, Benue Province
3. Counsel, E.M.H - Resident, Benue Province
4. Delves-Broughton, L.R. – Acting Resident, Benue Province
5. Dewar, K. - Acting District Officer, Wukari Division
6. Downes, H.S. - District Officer, Wukari Division
7. Findley, B.L. - Acting District Officer, Wukari Division
8. Gunn, I.G. - District Officer, Wukari Division
9. Patterson, J.R. - Chief Commissioner, Northern Province

Aboth